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PART 
THE FORMAT ION AND ' GROWTH OF THE FEDERAL PARTY 
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CHAPTER ONE 
I NTRODUCT ION 
The year 1948 is rightly regarded as pivotal In the 
history of South Africa. Before then, the principal tensions 
in South African pol itics had been between Afrikaner national-
ism and the Engl'ish-speakers, and had centred around such 
Issues as South Africa's relations with the British Empire and, 
later, with the Commonwealth. In 1948, for the first time In 
South African history, an exclusively Afrikaner government 
came to power and it appeared as if the Anglo-Afrikaner con-
troversy was reaching a cl imax. 
However, the issue which brought the National ist~~ and 
their Afrikaner Party al I ies, to power was not confl ict with 
the Engl ish-speakers, but 'apartheid'. (1) This emotive pol icy, 
to entrench legally the dominance of the Whites in South Africa, 
brought the colour issue into the centre of South African 
pol itics. The col lapse of the colonial empires and the emer-
gence of the new nations of Asia and Africa, made apartheid an 
international Issue. Thus, the controversies between Afrikaner 
and Engl ish-speaker were apparently overshadowed by the race 
question. Even the word 'racial ism', which had previously been 
used to denote discord between the two White groups, now came 
to be appl ied to tension between White and non-White. 
But, despite appearances, the Anglo-Afrikaner dispute . 
remained a dominant force in South African pol itics. Historians, 
with the aid of hindsight, might often view the race Issue as 
the paramount question of the 1950s. However, the dominant 
White group continued to regard ethnic differences within its 
own ranks as being important, even to the extent of often 
viewing the new race issue as subservient to Anglo-Afrikaner 
relations. White-Black racial questions, In fact, often bols-
tered the old ethnic disputes. For example, it can be argued 
that removal of the Coloureds from the common voters' rol I, 
was viewed by the Engl ish-speakers largely as a threat to the 
1. Vide infra: Ch.6. p.137. 
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constitution and thus to their 'entrenched' language rights. 
Furthermore, the existing pol it ical parties, had entrenched 
their parties before the colour question sprang into prominen-
ce and conti~ued to represent the wishes of the section of 
the White electorate which traditionally supported them. In 
this way, the 1950s was a continuation of Union pol itics based 
on Anglo-Afrikaner differences. It was, in fact, the last 
decisive phase of this dispute. When minor groups of the 1950s, 
such as the Liberal and Progressive Parties, tried to shift the 
centre of pol itical focus from the ethnic to the racial problem, 
they were singularly unsuccessful. Only after 1960, and the 
triumph of Afrikaner national ism in the republ ic, did the race 
question become the dominant issue in South African pol itics. 
The I iterature deal ing with South African history for the 
period 1948-1960, does not reflect this. The main emphasis is 
on apartheid and inter-race relations. The general works such 
as L. Marquard's The Peoples and Pol icies of South Africa, (2) 
E.A. Walker's A History of Southern Africa, (3) D. Denoon's 
Southern Africa since 1800(4) and T.R.H. Davenport's South 
Africa: A Modern History!S) as wei I as the works of Selby, 
Lascour -Gayet and Muller (ed.)(6) tend to ignore the issue of 
the Engl ish-speaking reaction to Afrikaner national ism in favour 
of the race issue. The titles of the excel lent works by E.S. 
Mu nger (Afrikaner and African National ism), (7) G.M. Carter (The 
Pol itics of Inegual ity)(8) and M. Sal I inger (From Union to ---
Apartheid)(9) are indicative of what was viewed by the authors 
as the central issue in modern South African pol itics. 
2. L. Marquard: The Peoples and Pol icies of South Africa, 1962. 
3. E.A. Walker: A History of Southern Africa, 1957. 
4. D. Denoon: Southern Africa since 1800, 1972. 
5. T.R.H. Davenport: South Africa: A Modern History, 1977 
6. J. Selby: A History of Southern Africa, 1973; R. Lascour-
G~yet: A History of South Africa, 1977; C.F.J. Muller (ed.): 
Five Hundred Years A History of South Africa, 1969. 
7. E.S. Mu nger: Afrikaner and African National ism, 1967. 
8. G.M. Carter: The Pol itics of Inegual ity, 1958. 
9. M. Sal linger: From Union to Apartheid, 1969. 
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Because the apartheid pol icy was devised by the leaders 
of Afrikaner national ism, it has become the subject of many 
studies. (10) It is obvious that any study of the growth of 
Afrikaner national ism must deal with the Anglo-Afrikaner 
dispute in some depth, but this is usually done only up to 
1948 a.nd is then I arge I y abandoned. I nstead, the concentrat ion 
moves to White-non-White tension. 
Other authors have chosen to concentrate on the liberal 
reaction to Afrikaner national ism. (11) Although this did 
involve mainly Engl ish-speakers, the movement never enjoyed more 
than marginal support, illustrating the fact that these were 
no more than a tiny, untypical fraction of the group. 
A number of works do contain sections on the position 
of Engl ish-speakers in South Africa in the 1950s. Broughton, 
Randal I and van den Berghe al I deal with the issue, (12) but 
in each case the Engl ish-speakers' reaction to Afrikanerdom IS 
not dealt with in any depth. A simi lar criticism can also be 
made of Patrick Duncan's Engl ish South Africans Face the 
Future, (13) a work of pol itics rather than of scholarly his-
torical study, while N~ Mansergh's The Price of Magnanimity(14) 
is polemical rather than analytical in deal ing with this period, 
and hence is only of I imited value. 
There are two works which attempt to explain the actions 
of the Engl ish-speakers in the 1950s. Brookes and Webb deal 
with the issue . in their History of Natal(15) and discuss why 
the Engl ish-speakers remained loyal to the United Party (U.P.). 
The section devoted to this is smal I and, because of the 
nature of the study, is limited to Natal. R. de Villiers In 
10. W.H. Vatcher: 
a I ism, 1965; W. e er: e ur I tans In rica, 1 
J. Fisher: The Afrikaners, 1969; H.W. van der Merwe: 
looking at the Afrikaner Today, 1975; S. Patterson: The 
last Trek, 1957. 
11. J. Robertson: liberal ism in South Africa, 1948-1963, 1971. 
12. M. Broughton: Press and Pol itlcs of South Africa, 1961; 
P. Randall (ed.): South Africa's Minorities, 1971; 
P. van den Berghe: South Afri'ca, A Study in Confl ict, 196~ 
13. P. Duncan: English South Africans Face the Future, n.d. 
14. N. Mansergh: The Price of Magnanimity, 1962. 
15. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb: A History of Natal, 1965. 
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the Oxford History of South Africa(16) also discusses the 
reaction of the Engl ish-speakers to Afrikaner national ism but, 
once again, the treatment is very brief and is part of a chap-
ter on Afrikaner national ism which is followed by the chapter 
entitled African National ism in South Africa, 1910-1964. (17) 
The emphasis of the work is thus on the Afrikaner-Black clash 
and not on the Anglo-Afrikaner dispute. 
As a powerless minority, the Engl ish-speakers could react 
to National ist initiatives in one of three ways. They could 
abandon their group identity and be absorbed into the Afrikaner 
majority, as many National ists suggested, to form a White bloc. 
Very few fol lowed this option. Another alternative was to adopt 
a cautious, middle-of-the-road stand to al I South Africa's prob-
lems, thereby hoping ~to attract sufficient Afrikaner support 
to unseat the government. (18) The third reaction was to form 
a strongly sectional ist party for the Engl ish-speakers. The 
U.P. represented the second of these options and the Federal 
Party, which is the subject of this study, represents the third. 
Any attempt at such a study is faced with a very real 
problem: the paucity of material. As has been discussed, the 
publ ished material on Engl ish-speakers in the 1950s is meagre. 
As regards the F edera I Party I n part i cu I ar, it is pract i ca I I y 
non-existent. Where ment ion IS made of the party, it is done 
I n a sentence or two, (19) or, at most, ina page. (20) The context 
IS usually the disintegration of the U.P. and no detai led exam-
ination of the party or of the reasons for its existence are 
given. Only Craig's sl im volume, Lost Opportunity, which was comm-
16. M. Wi Ison andL. Thompson (eds.): The Oxford History of 
South Africa, Vol. 11, 1975. 
17. Ibid., pp. 424-75. 
18. Vide infra: Ch. 2. pp. 9 and 32. Ch. 6. p.133. 
19. Patterson: op.cit., p.118; Davenport: op.cit., p.261; 
Marquard: op.cit., ~.164; Munger: op.cit., p.21; 
Lascour-Gaye~: Op.Clt., p~300; Denoon: op.cit., p.184; 
Muller: 0Ef.Clt., p.388; Fisher: op.cit., p.345; K.A. Heard: 
General E ections in South Africa 1943-1970, 1974, p.75. 
20. Dunc~n: op.cit.~ pp.10-11; Carter: op.cit., pp. 352-3; 
B~I I Inger: 0h.Clt., p.404; Brookes and Webb: op.cit.,p.280; 
Wilson and Tompson: op.cit., pp. 418, 486. 
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issioned by the Federal Party and deals with the history of 
federal ism in South Africa, deals excl~sively with the party 
and its ideals. Because it was written as a propaganda work, 
it is of I imited value and is poorly researched. 
This paucity of material is not only found In secondary 
sources. I n the pr imary mater i a I, too, there are gaps in the 
avai lable information. The archives, both national and prov-
incial, do not al low access to deposits of the 1950s. How then 
is contemporary research justified? One response to this 
criticism is that from a purist point of view, all research 
becomes outdated as new viewpoints are taken and new assessments 
are made, even if new material does not come to I ight. Another 
response could be that there are positive advantages for a 
researcher who now works on this period, for he has access to 
sources which wi II be lost to future historians. By drawing 
on oral testimony, he can thus hope to compensate for his 
exclusion from publ ic papers. As far as private papers are 
concerned, it can a Iso be argued that the advantages I ie with 
the historian of near contemporary history, for he is able to 
use papers which, as experience shows, are more than likely 
to be lost or, destroyed. I n the course of wr it i ng th i s 
thesis numerous persons were interviewed and no person who 
possessed private papers refused the writer unrestricted access 
to them. 
Publ ic I ibraries made their material avai lable. The Heaton 
Nichol Is Papers in the Ki I I ie Campbell library, a number of 
pol itical documents at the Institute of Contemporary History 
at the University of the Orange Free State and, most important, 
the United Party Papers at the University of South Africa, have 
been particularly useful. 
The official papers of the three Federal Parties would 
be an obvious source. The parties, however, did not deposit 
their records in any collection and even the most exhaustive 
inquiry has not revealed their fate. The Cape party was smal I 
and bad I y organ i sed and, if it ever kept deta i I ed records 
(which is unl ikely), they have disappeared. The Transvaal party 
was more substant i a I, ' but its papers, accord i ng to Mrs. Brath-
waite, the widow of the party's leader, 'have been lost'. (21) 
21. S. R. Brathwaite to B. Reid, E Febru.::a .... ., 10'7Q I. 
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None of the many N~tal Federal leaders, who were interviewed 
in the course of prepar.ing this work, knew what had become of 
the party's official records. Col. A.C. Martin, the last 
leader of the party, informed the author that they were probably 
in the 'lorry load' of papers which he had destroyed in the 
1960s. (22) 
The most valuable sources for this thesis were the docu-
ments of private individuals supplemented by personal interviews. 
Extensive attempts were made to trace 118 people who were either 
election candidates, office-bearers or prominent party members. 
The names were obtained either from party I ists or from the 
contemporary press. Of this number, fifty-two were traced. 
Eighteen had died or had left the country. Contact was made 
with the remaining thirty-six persons, twenty of whom could 
supply I imited documentary or oral information. The position 
with the remaining sixteen persons, (23)however, was different. 
They, especially B. Batchelor, Mrs. J. Stewart and D. Heaton 
Nichol Is suppl ied extensive documentary evidence. As important, 
these sixteen people granted the author interviews In which 
the attitudes, hopes and aims of the Engl ish-speakers and of 
the Federal Party were fully and openly discussed. These inter-
views wer~ important to al I parts of this thesis and vital to 
some (such as the planning and creation of the Federal Party) 
where there are few other sources. Because of the pitfal Is and 
I imitations of memory, attempts were made at every stage to 
corroborate and check such information against known evidence. 
In addition to Federal Party members, D. Mitchel I and L. Boyd, 
former Natal leaders of the United and Progressive Parties, 
R. Fenhal Is of the Torch Commando and Professor W. Kleynhans 
of Unisa were interviewed and/or suppl ied documents. 
Also of the greatest · importance were the newspapers of 
the day. The information which they suppl ied regarding the 
activities of the Federal Parties and their al I ies, the attitu-
des of the Engl ish and Afrikaans-speakers, and the pol itical 
developments in South Africa was indispensable to thi~ study. 
22. Interview with A.C. Martin. 
23. Vide infra: Bibliography,p. 303. 
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It wi II be argued in this thesis that the Federal Party 
was essentially an Engl ish-speaking reaction to Afrikaner 
national ism. It grew out of frustration at the powerlessness 
or unwi I I ingness of the U.P. to represent the Engl ish-speakers 
effectively. The study is divided into three sections. The 
first concerns the fai lure of the United Front in 1952-53 
and deals with the launching of the Fed~ral Party, with its 
structure and organisation and its attempt to establ ish ' itself 
in the elections of 1954. The second section deals with the 
decl ine and demise of the Federal Party. Defeat in 1954 necess-
itated a change of tactics, and in spite of the attempt that 
was made to do this, apathy and disunity beset the party. After 
the elections of 1958-59 and the coming of the republ ic, the 
Federal Party faded away. The third section is concerned with 
the reasons for the Federal Party's inabil ity to attract a 
sufficient number of the Engl ish-speaking voters and hence 
establ ish itself as their mouthpiece. 
It is hoped that this detai led examination of the Federal 
Party and the reasons for its fai lure wi I I contribute to a 
better understanding of the history, not only of the Engl ish-
speakers or of the 1950s, but of modern South Africa. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED FRONT 
In 1948 an al I iance of the National and Afrikaner 
Parties won the general election . The two parties, which 
merged in October 1951, were inspired by Afrikaner national-
Ism. So all-pervading was this influence that every Cabinet 
member, and indeed every pari iamentary member, of the two 
governing parties in 1948, was an Afrikaner. (1) The ultimate 
constitutional goal of the government ·was the founding of a 
republ ic, thus separating South Africa from the British Crown. 
In addition, the governing p~rties preached a rigid separation 
of the races (i.e. apartheid) in pol itics, the economy and in 
society. It was this apartheid pol icy, rather tha.n republ i-
can ism, which had brought them to power. 
In opposition were the U.P. (the Offi~ial Opposition), 
the small and decl ining Labour Party and the thr~e Native 
Representatives, who, although not tied to a pol itical party, 
generally opp~sed the Nat ional ists. The U.P. lacked the in~er 
coheSion of the National Party. It enjoyed the support of the 
overwhel~ing majority of the Engl ish-speakers, who found little 
to attract them in the governing parties. As a result, every 
predominantly English-speaking c'onst 'ituency elected either 
a U. P. member or one of the i r Labour a'l lies. (2) At the same 
time~ the U.P.drew the support .of a substantial minority of 
Afrikaners. Clearly, ' if it hoped to return to power, it would 
have to ' increase its support amongst this g~oup. Thus, the 
U.P. became increasingly sensitive to the views of what it 
termed the 'moderate' Afrikaners - both within .its own ranks 
and among government supporters. 
1. Carter: 0f.cit., ·p.37. It w.as the first time in the 
history o~ the Union that the Cabinet had been drawn 
entirely from one language group. 
2. Ibid., p.26~ 
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Within the first two' years of its first term of office, 
the Nationalists passed legislation segregating society. The 
most significant acts were the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages 
Act, the Amendment to the Immoral ity Act, the Population 
Registration Act to classify the whole population into race 
groups, and the Group Areas Act, al lotting separate residential 
and business areas to different race groups. 
On a political level, the government was determined to 
enforce complete segregation. This necessitated the removal 
of Coloured voters from the common roll with the Whites, -
desp ite the fact that the Co loured vote was protected by one 
of the two 'entrenched' clauses of the Union constitution(3) 
and therefore could be altered only by a two-thirds majority 
of a joint sitting of both Houses of Pari iament. 
The government, which did not command a two-thirds 
majority of both Houses, passed the Separate Representation 
of Voters Act in June 1951 through each House separately, 
In the normal fashion. The opposition interpreted this 
action as a challenge to the constitution and, while the 
opposition pol itical parties fought it In pari iament, . the War 
Veterans' Torch Commando was formed to oppose it outside 
parliament. led by Group-Captain A.G. 'Sailor' Malan and 
comprising mainl~ ex-servicemen, the Torch Commando, which 
eventually acquired a membership of 250 000 (4)was the 
largest extra-pari iamentary pol itical group in South Afri~a's 
history. The Torch Commando was based on five principles. 
These were: 
To uphold the spirit and the solemn compacts 
entered upon at the time of Union as moral 
obi igations of trust and honour binding upon 
Pari ia~ent and the people. 
3. The other 'entrenched' clause guaranteed equal ity to 
Engl ish and Afrikaans as official languages of South 
Africa. 
4. Natal Mercury: 18 May 1953. Another figure quoted was 
234 000. O. Walker: Sai·lor Malan, 1953, p.177. 
To secure the repeal of any measures enacted 
In violation of such obi igations. 
To protect the freedom of the individual in 
worsh i p, I anguage and speech and to ensure 
his right of free access to the Courts. 
To eliminate all forms of total itarianism, 
whether Fascist or Communist. (5) 
To promote racial harmony in the Union. 
11 
In January 1952 the National Executive of the Torch 
Commando, in anticipation of the general election to beheld 
the fo II owi ng year, issued a dec I arat ion ent it I ed The 
Election Pol icy of the War Veterans' Torch Commando~6) 
This declaration committed the Torch Commando, as the only 
'practical course' open to it, to 'accept' the existing oppo-
sition parties and to assist them both in the fight against 
the National ists and in the formulation of 'positive and 
dynamic' alternatives to the government. (7) The independence 
of the Torch Commando, however, was expressly emphasised and 
the purpose of the organisation was seen as adding moral and 
numerical strength to the anti-government forces in the 
country. (8) 
This rapprochem~nt of the Torch Commando and the United 
and Labour Parties was given added impetus by the Appeal 
Court's decision on March 20 that the Separate Representation 
of Voters' Act was unconstitutional, and even more so by the 
government's refusal to accept defeat and its determination 
to find some other means of legally removing the Coloureds 
from the common rol I. As a result of these developments, the 
national leaders of the Torch Commando and the U.P. met in 
Cape Town to discuss possible joint action.(9) These dis-
cuss ions, in turn, I ed to the format i on of the Un ited Demo-
cratic Front; an al I iance between the U.P., the Torch Commando 
and the fast disintegrating Labour Party to defeat the National 
Party at the next general election. The three organisations 
5. W.V.T.C.: Aeel icat ion for Membershie, n. d. 
6. Natal Mercur~: 16 Apr i I 1952. 
7. Natal Mercur~: 16 Apr i I 1952. 
8. Natal Mercur~: 16 Apr i I 1952. 
9. Carter: oe. cit. , pp. 315-7. 
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retained their separate identities and the principles of the 
Front were made sufficiently wide to appeal to al I non-Nation-
al ists. (10) The problem of the acceptance of this al I iance by 
many Nata I T orchmen, however, I ay not in the pr i nc i pies of the 
United Democratic .Front but in the fact that they distrusted 
the U.P. and saw what they considered as Natal's rights as 
wei I as the Torch Comm~ndo's ideals sacrificed to U.P. elect-
oral expediency. 
The most influential Torchman in Natal was E.G. Ford. He 
was a foundation member of the Commando, had in May of the 
previous year led the Natal contingent in the spectacular torch-
I it parade through Cape Town to pari iament, and was chairman of 
the Coastal ·Region of the Torch Commando, the larger of Natal's 
two Torch regions. He had, whi Ie in the Torch Commando, 
developed a disl ike of what he considered to be the U.P. 's 
'wishy-washy' pol icies of trying to . be al I things to al I men, 
and began thinking In terms of a bold pol itical movement which 
would take account of South Africa's I inguistic and racial 
differences.(II) This would oppose the central ising tendencies 
of the National ist gov~rnment and, with a 'background of 
federation', would al low al I groups a say in the running of 
parts, at least, of the country. (12) On the crucial colour 
Issue, Ford was implacably opposed to the National Party's 
apartheid pol icy, whi Ie he was critical of the U.·P. 's pol icy 
wh i ch, In his eyes, was aparthe i d enunc i ated with 'honey In 
the voice'. (13) 
These ideas of Ford, with their anti-U.P. bias, were 
aired in Natal Torch Commando circles and received support 
from the Rev. J.B. Chutter, Torch Commando chairman of the 
Inland Refion and Roger Brickhi I I the Natal organiser of the 
Commando. 14) The views of Nata I Torch Commando leader sh i p 
were thus moving away from the U.P. at the very time that the 
Torch Commando's national leaders were arr.anging the United 







Interview with E.G. Ford. 
'b i d. -
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as the reason for his resignation from the Torch Commando 
the fact that' ••• since March-April of this year our pol icy 
here I n Nata I has been anyth i ng but nat i ona I. I t has c I ear I y 
been an embarrassment to the national leaders.,(15) This 
divergence of view between the Natal and national leaders also 
affected the U.P. While the Natal leader of the U.P., Douglas 
Mitchell, was a firm supporter of the party's national leaders, 
Heaton Nichol Is, the U.P.'s leader in the Senate, bel ieved that 
the U.P.'s days were numbered and felt that the party could not 
long survive after Smuts's death~16) In addition, he had grave 
misgivings about the party's intentions even before the Natal 
Torch Commando leaders experienced the same feel ings. As early 
as June 1951, he saw the U.P. as being 'jealous' of the inde~ 
pendence of the Defenders of the Constitution.(17) It would 
be 'fatal to the movement' he commented, 'to al low the [U.P.) 
party machine to have anything to do with it. ,(18) With this 
opinion of the party, it is not surprising that Heaton Nicholls 
agreed with Ford as regards the United Democratic Front when 
they met for long discussions on pol itics. (19) 
Heaton Nichol Is was particularly sensitive on the question 
of 'Natal's rights' and he was therefore particularly concerned 
about Natal's relations with the rest of the Union. Speaking 
in the Senate in May 1952, on the High Court of Pari iament 
Bil I, he argued that the Bil I, which was .part of the govern-
ment's attempt to remove the Coloureds from the common rol I 
and which therefore aimed to destroy one of the 'entrenched' 
clauses, was a 'definite stage' in the repudiation of the 
South Africa Act.(20) The Senator tacitly conceded that the 
15. F/P: J. Alexander to E.G. Ford, 30 October 1952. 
16. Interview with D. Heaton Nicholls. 
17. The Defenders were a group of citizens committed to 
'preserving' the Union's constitution and to uphold-
ding the 'rule of law'. Defenders of the Constitution: 
The Covenant of the Constitution, n.d. 
18. KCM 3779: G. Heaton Nichol Is to L. Egeland, 
21 June 1951. 
19. E.G. Ford to B. Reid, 15 November 1978. (In the possess-
ion of the author) 
20. Senate Debates, No. II, 1952, col.2955. 
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government may have the legal right to alter the constitution 
but he drew a clear distinction between legal grounds which 
, ••• belonged to lawyers' and the moral foundation of the 
constitutio~ which belonged to 'the people'. This non-
legal istic argument, based on claimed moral considerations, 
was fundamenta I to later F edera I th ink i ng. I f the Act of 
Union were destroyed, he argued, the 'Union compact ••• 
~would be~ at an end', and Natal would be free to decide her 
own future. 
On 29 May 1952 Heaton Nichol Is returned to the question 
of the constitution, this time discussing the issue of pro-
paganda for a re)ubl ic. This he flatly stated, amounted to 
high treason. (22 Developing his point, he declared that Natal 
did not wish to secede from the Un i on but that, if par I i ament 
'seceded from its Constitution, then Natal wi I I not fol low 
it in that secession.,(23) Heaton Nicholls then introduced 
what was to become another theme in this I ine of thought, 
namely, that Natal was economically viable and could stand 
alone. (24) 
The Senator's speeches caused a sensation and consider-
ably em~arrassed the U.P.'s national leaders, (25)who could 
neither ~upport nor repudiate Heaton Nichol Is for fear of 
al ienating some major section of its supporters. The Natal 
Provincial Council, on the other hand, was sure of its 
support and planned to pass a resolution on 4 June 1952 
cal I ing on pari iament to convene a National Convention to 
re-consider the Act of Union in view of the government's 
attacks on an 'entrenched clause. (26) Before this could be 
done, the Torch Commando in Natal organised a rally in Durban 
on 6 June 1952 to support the Provincial Counci I resolution. · 









co I s. 2957-8. 
col. ·3468. 
co I. 3472. 
25. Natal Witness: 23 May 1952. 
26. G. Heaton Nicholls: South Africa In my Time, 1961, 
p. 447. 
Natal M.P.'s to agree to the meeting,(27)which drew some 
45000 people. With deep emotion, the huge crowd then took 
an oath which was to play so large a part in the I ife of 
the Federal Party. 
The oath bound the people: 
To preserve the sanctity of the engagements 
entered upon at the time of Union as moral 
obligations of trust and honour binding upon 
the Pari iament and the people, and to secure 
th~ repeal of any measures enacted in violation 
of such obi igations; 
To oppose any attempts to violate the Constitu-
tion embodied in the South Africa Act, and 
more particularly to maintain respect for the 
Entrenched Clauses of that act; 
To maintain the rule of law as the basis of 
our civil liberties. 
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The oath was administered by Heaton Nicholls and immediately 
afterwards Ford asked the crowd: 'Are you prepared to take 
the consequences if Natal is forced to stand on her own?' 
They roared 'Yes:,(28) This constituted the base of what 
was later to be termed the 'Natal Stand'. 
This rally had a' lasting impact on the participants 
and hence was crucial in the formation of the Federal Party. 
The Natat Torch Commando was deeply involved in an issue 
which concerned mainly the Natal Provincial Counci I and the 
people of one province. The pol icy shift by the Natal Torch 
Commando from a national to a provincial level, which 
Alexander had noticed in March and April of that year, was 
thus dramatically and publ icly affirmed. In addition, the 
intense feel ing against the Nationalists, who were seen as 
threatening the constitution, so keenly felt by Heaton 
Nicholls and the Natal Torch leaders, appeared to be shared 
by a large section of the Natal publ ic. This put considerable 
power into the hands of Heaton Nichol Is and Ford. Furthermore, 
27. 
28. 
Ibid., 448-9. See also W.V.T.C. (Natal): Joint Natal 
txeCutive Meeting Minutes, 17 January 1953, p.3. 
Natal Daily News: 7 June 1952. 
the defence of the constitution was I inked, by Ford's 
question fol lowing the oath, with the possible breakup of 
16 
the Union and Natal standing on her own. Natal's resis-
tance to the government was thereby shown to be of a unique 
type. As significant, Ford and Heaton Nichol Is had appeared 
together at the largest pol itical meeting in Natal's history. 
From then. on, their pol itical careers remained closely I inked 
and resulted in the creation of the Federal Party. 
Despite the enthusiasm of the huge crowd and their 
apparent will ingness to have Natal stand alone, the leaders 
of the. rally were not entirely convinced that the people would 
act, should this become necessary. Derek Heaton Nichol Is 
afterwards ~ontended that the Natal Torchmen merely used the 
Natal Stand as a threat to ' ••• hold over the National ists' 
heads', but that they did not really want any type of 
secess ion.(29) His father, Senator Heaton Nichol Is, went 
further and confided in a private letter to his son a little 
over three months after the rally that he very much doubted 
whether Natal' ••• could be got to stand alone.,(30) Ford 
agreed with this view and later stated that the Natal Stand 
was simply a symptom of popular frustration at the rapid 
growth of. National ism and the weak attitude of the U.P. 
~Very few visual ised Natal ever daring to stand alone pol itic-
ally and economically', (3 1)he commented. Whatever the private 
reservations of the rally leaders as regards the viabi I ity of 
Natal standing alone, they fully real ised the value of the 
rally itself in halting what they saw as the government's 
attack on the constitution; behind which lurked the danger 
of a repub I i c. 
~n order to strengthen Natal's position, the Natal 
delegation to the first Annual Congress of the Torch Commando, 
led by Ford, pressed for the acceptance of the Natal Stand 
by the Torch Commando as a whole. The Natal delegation 
29. Interview with D. Heaton Nicholls. 
30. NiP: G. Heaton Nicholls to D. Heaton Nicholls, 
27 September 1952. 
31. E.G. Ford to B. Reid: loc.cit. 
'closely knit' with 'wei I prepared' arguments, (3 2)persuaded 
the congress to pass a resolution on 9 -July 1952 which 
stated: 
If, in her efforts to save Un i on, Nata lis 
forced to stand alone, the Torch Commando 
throughout South Africa and South West 
Africa affirms its readiness to support 
Natal to the ful I by whatever action the 
National Executive may deem necessary. (33) 
The whole of the Commando therefore was tied to the Natal 
Stand, which was seen as an 'honourable' action taken in 
reaction to a government which was without honour.(34) 
At the request of the nat i ona I pres i dent of the Torch 
Commando, 'Sai lor' Malan, the consent of the other two 
members of the United Democratic Front was sought before 
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the resolution was publ ished.(35) The Labour Party accepted 
the resolution but 'requested' that it should not be publ ished. 
The U.P., on the other hand, rejected the resolution. 
Mitchel I declared that he could not' ••• under any circum-
stances accept the Natal Stand'. (36) His interpretation 
of the oath of the 6 June was that Natal would fight any 
change in the constitution in elections and, if necessary, 
through the courts. He disagreed with the contention that 
her separate opinion had to be sought if the government 
proceeded constitutionally. (37) The U.P., therefore, and 
especially its Natal leader, was at variance with the Torch 
Commando and especially with the Natal leaders of the 
Commando. 
32. Interviews with E.G. Ford and C.S. Keary. 
33. W.V.T.C. (Natal Coast Region): Information Bulletin, 
No. II, 23 January 1953, p.l • . 
34. I bid. 
35. W. V. T. C.: Second Nat i ona I Congress Minutes, 12 and 13 
June 1953, Chairman's Report, p.3. 
36. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 12 and 13 June 1953, loc.cit. 
37. Heaton Nichol Is: op.cit., pp.449-51. Confirmed In 
an interview with D. Mitchel I. 
Heaton Nichol Is further polarised opinion amongst 
Natal's leaders by resigning from the U.P. on 6 August, as 
a result of Mitchell's publ ic attitude towards the Natal 
Stand. (38) He informed Strauss, the U.P. 's national lead~r, 
who invited him to Johannesburg for a meeting aimed at 
heal ing the breach between the two Natal U.P. leaders. 
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The meeting was futi Ie, but Strauss was confronted for 
the first time with the ful I impl ications of the Natal Stand. 
Heaton Nicholls highl ighted the difference between himself 
and the U. P. I eaders as be i ng that they were concerned on I y 
with court actions and the legal aspect of the government's 
actions, whereas he was more concerned with the 'moral and 
const itut i o~a I aspects'. (39) Whatever the i r differences, it 
was agreed to keep the resignation secret so as not to 
damage the image and unity of the United Democratic Front. (40) 
Heaton Nicholls was thus placed in the 'extraordinary position' 
of lead i ng the U. P. in the Senate, when he was no longer a 
member of the party. (41) 
On one of his frequent visits to Heaton Nichol Is, just 
after the latter had resigned from the U.P., Ford, 'thinking 
aloud,(42)expressed the opinion that a new party' ••• based 
on Torch ideals coupled with a Federal and a progressive 
non-European pol icy' should be formed.(43) Heaton Nichol Is 
stated that he would support such a party. (44) This was the 
first discussion concerning the formation of a new pol itical 
party. 
All these manoeuverings were conducted behind closed 
doors · because both the U.P. leaders and their Natal oppo-
nents inside and outside the party, did not want these 
38. Heaton Nichol Is: op.cit., pp.451-3. 
39. Cape Times: 16 May 1953. 
40. Cape Times: 16 May 1953. See a I so Nip: G. Heaton 
Nicholls to D. Heaton Nicholls, 14 February 1953. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Interview with E.G. Ford. 
43. Heaton Nicholls: op.cit., p.456. 
44. 1 bid. 
sensitive issues debated in publ ic. Such a debate could 
only damage the positions of both sides as it would be 
conducted in the ful I glare of publ icity at a time when 
apparent unity was vital in view of the court cases 
surrounding the Coloured franchise, and the looming general 
election. In view of the excitement of the Durban rally In 
June and the increasing number of people in the three 
organisations of the United Democratic Front who were 
involved in discussions about the question of Natal's future 
const itutional position, it could not be expected that the 
publ ic at large would be unconcerned or totally uninformed 
about the topic. 
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Because of the ' ••• increase in loose ta I k and 
emotional pol itical writing on the subject of Secession', 
twelve leading Natal businessmen sent a long letter to the 
Natal Mercury in August 1952 setting out many of the economic 
difficulties involved in secession in or.der to impress on the 
people of Natal' ••• the great material sacrifices and hard-
ships that must inevitably fol low secession. ,(45) Heaton 
Nichol l s, who considered that the letter originated in the 
U.P. 's head office, (46)answered the next day in a letter which 
was given equal prominence in the same newspaper. He repudia-
ted the major thesis of the businessmen and welcomed the 
initiation of the topic fo~ publ ic discussion, cal I ing on the 
economists to 'lend their aid' by making a study of Natal's 
vi ab i I ity. (47) I n the event, the subject rece i ved very 
I ittle further publ icity. It was within the Natal pol itical 
organisations, out of the glare of press publ icity, that the 
struggle, was joined to advance the ~deas of the Natal Stand 
and the formation of a new party. 
The U. P. in Nata I was secure I y under · the contro I of 
Mitchell and there was I ittle chance of any major group within 
it joining a new party. The position in the Torch Commando, 
45. Natal Mercury: 15 August 1952. 
46. Heaton Nicholls: op.cit., p.452. 
47. Nata I Mercury: 16 August 1952. 
20 
however, was quite different. Here the two Natal leaders, 
Ford and Chutter, together with the Natal organiser, Roger 
Brickhill, were in substantial agreement concerning the Natal 
Stand as well as over the formation of a new party. From 
the Coast and the Midlands respectively, Ford and Chutter, 
met Brickhil I and other interested parties on a number of 
occas ions at Drummond, midway between Durban and Pietermaritz-
burg, to discuss the possibi I ity of a new pol itical party. (48) 
later, the Federal Party was to claim that the only part which 
the Torch Commando played in the Party's formation, apart from 
supplying ideas and ideals, was' ••• to bring certain people 
together, and to start them thinking. ,(49)This was to a great 
extent true; but it is important to note that it was only 
'certain' people who were brought together. By no means al I 
of the Natal Torch Commando were supporters of the idea of 
Natal standing alone or of forming a new pol itical party. 
Some, like R. Fenhal Is~ the deputy leader of the Coast 
Region of the Torch Commando was a staunch U.P. supporter 
and be l ieved that the Natal Stand could not be successful. Apart 
from its questionable .Iegal ity, he argued that for any pol iti-
cal idea, or party, to be successful in South Africa, it had 
to have at least twenty per cent. Afrikaner support. An a)peal 
solely to Engl ish-speaking sentiment he saw as futile. (50 In 
addition, he, together with many other Natal Torchmen, felt 
that 'history showed' that spl inter parties had I ittle chance 
of success in South Africa. He therefore preferred to work 
to 'regenerate the U.P. from within,.(51) 
Fenhalls was invited to a private meeting to discuss 
the viabil ity of Natal standing alone and because he considered 
the meeting to be 'preposterous' he, and many of the other 
committee members of the Torch who thought I ike him, were 
48. I nterv i ew with Mrs. G. Ham I yn. 
49. A.R. Selby: The Union Federal Party and the Torch, n.d., 
p. I. 
50. Interview with R. Fenhalls. 
51. Ibid. 
'excluded' from the private discussions that were taking 
place.(52) Other Torchmen feared for the unity of the Torch 
Commando and gave their first loyalty to the Commando rather 
than to a new pol itical movement, considering, in any event, 
that 1952, the year before a general election, was hardly 
the opportune time to discuss the formation of a new party 
and thus divide the opposition sti II further. If, however, 
members wished to discuss the possible formation of a new 
party, they felt that the Action Committee of the Torch 
Commando in Natal was the place to do so. (53) 
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Ford and his supporters, on the other hand, saw their 
meetings simply as unofficial private discussions and, because 
the U.P. had no prior claim on their loyalty, they considered 
that they were not being underhand in any way. They felt 
that the Torch Commando had made a grave error in deciding 
not to become a pol itical party because this meant that, once 
it had entered agreements with pol itical - p~rti~s such as in 
the United Democratic Front, it had 'shot its bolt' and could 
then exert only moral pressure. (54) The Torch should trans-
late its principles' ._ •• into terms of pol icy and ••• 
constitute itself as a pol itical party committed to put those 
principles into effect.,(55) 
The Natal Torch Commando leaders felt this particularly 
strongly as they considered that the U.P. was effete and, rn 
any event, had sacrificed the interests of Natal, the only 
real bulwark against the National ists~ for the sake of trying 
to swing a few National ist voters. (56 This lack of appre-
ciation of Natal's position amongst the U.P. leaders, it was 
claimed, was also widely felt by the voting publ ic of Natal. 
It could be pointed out that the destinies of the U.P. were 
control led entirely from beyond the Drakensberg~ In addition , 
it was felt that Natal U.P. representatives did not do 
52. Ibid. -
53. J. Alexander to E. G. Ford: loc.cit. 
54. A. R. Selby: The Union Federal Party and the Torch, 
loc.cit. 
55. Natal Mercur~: 8 November 1952, 28 November 1952. Ratal Witness: 23 January 1953. 
56. Natal Witness: 19 January 1953. 
enough to propagate what Natal ians thought. (57) Most 
serious, many Torch Commando leaders in Natal did not 
fully trust the U.P. to resist the National ists. Because 
of the wide spectrum of bel ief amongst the party's 
supporters, they felt that certain sections of the U.P. 
might be wi I I ing to come to an agreement with the Nation- · 
alists.(58) This suspicion made it ridiculous to discuss 
the formation of a new party in the Torch Commando Acti~n 
Committee because those who were actually opposed to the 
move would then be party to the discussions. As it 
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happened, this suspicion was not entirely groundless because, 
during the fol lowing year, a number of U.P. M.P.s either 
left or were expelled from the party and voted with the 
National ists on the vital issue of the Coloured franchise~ (59) 
Torchmen generally could not condone such an action and most 
Torchmen, if they suspected that there were such M. P.s in 
the party in 1952, could feel no confidence in South Africa's 
Official Opposition. On top of all the other problems 
bedevi I I ing relations between the Torch Commando and the U.P. 
was a clash of personal ity between Mitchell on one hand and 
Heaton Nichol Is and Ford on the other. This clash aggravated 
al I other difficulties and added personal and emotional 
reasons t~ those of pol icy in favour of a break. (60) 
It was against this background that Ford and his support-
ers conducted what were termed 'private' meetings to decide 
what action should be taken to defend Natal's rights and what 
form the proposed new party should assume. It was at this 
time that the basic principles of the Federa .1 Party were 
57. Natal Witness: 23 January 1953. 
58. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 17 January 1953, op.cit., p.3. 
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Carter: 0r.cit., p.321. Confirmed in interviews with 
D. Mitche I, R. Fenhal Is and E.G. Ford. 
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'evolved'; from the ideals of the Torch Commando, appl ied 
I ' 't ' (61) Th t' I to Nat a's unique POSI Ion . ese mee Ings were a so 
vital from another - point of v i ew - they were aimed at gain-
ing ful I control of the Natal Torch Commando. Ford and 
Chutter were determ i ned to sw i ng the i nf I uent i a I In I and and 
Coast Regions of the Commando behind the idea of a new party, 
so that it would have a powerful base from which to work In 
Natal as wei I as a base from which to try and swing the 
entire Torch Commando behind the new movement. 
To this end, Chutter addressed smal I gatherings through-
out the Midlands, (62)whi Ie t he Natal Coastal Region of the 
Torch Commando assembled for a confidential meeting in Durban 
on 25 October. Among the matters discussed was a resolution 
cal I ing for the stoppage of further payments by the Natal 
Torch Commando to the National Executive; another was a 
demand on the U.P. that it give assurance on certain questions 
such as the guaranteed support of the Natal Stand, as inter-
. preted by the Natal Torch Commando. (63) These resolutions 
were passed by a 'considerable majority', (64)the planning 
and organisation of th~ meeting being a tribute to the 
abi I ities of Ford. Fenhal Is maintains that the Ford 'faction' 
had the support of less than half of Natal's Torchmen, whi Ie 
Ford and Derek Heaton Nichol Is claim that the majority of 
the Torchmen supported them. (65) It is impossible to ascer-
tain exactly how many Torchmen supported each faction but 
what is clear is that Ford's ideas prevai led and that his 
position, and his ideas, had attained dominance in the Natal 
Torch .Commando. Ford's position was further strengthened 
when the leading U.P. supporters Professor H. Pol lack and 
Mr. (later Professor) K. Mcintyre resigned from the Natal 
Coastal Action Committee of the Torch Commando, on the eve of 
6./. Interview with E.G. Ford. 
62. Natal Dai Iy News: 28 October 1952. 
63. F /P: R. Parrott to J. B. Chutter and E. G. Ford, 
28 October 1952. 
64. Ibid . 
65. I nterv i ews with R. F enha I Is, E. G. Ford and D. Heaton 
N icho II s. 
the ?5 October meeting. After the meeting, five more U.P. 
supporters, including Ford's deputy, Roy Fenhalls, handed 
h . . t' (66) In t elr reslgna Ions. 
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This triumph of the future Federal Party leaders 
within the Natal Torch Commando took place in private. The 
resolutions were unknown outside a restricted circle and 
the resignations, using the by now fami I iar reason of 
. . t f t t d b I·' (67) preserving the antl-governmen ron, were no ma e pu IC. 
Inevitably, however, the press bec~me aware of what was 
happening, and publ ished some of the facts. The ful lest 
report appeared on the front page of Die Transvaler on 28 
October 1952. (68) The report stated that the Natal Torchmen 
had been holding a number of secret meetings to discuss the 
question of whether the movement in Natal should break away 
from the United Front and from its 'own organisation'. (69) 
The newspaper clearly had very good sources of information 
because a group led by the Natal Torch leaders was indeed 
planning a new party and was as a result ~eluctant to assist 
the United Front in the election. 
Ford suavely dismissed Die Transvaler's report by saying 
that the Durban meeting had dealt with 'domestic matters', 
adding that regional conferences were always held 'in committee'. 
The confidential ity of the meeting was quite in keeping with 
normal Torch practices. (70) This answer temporari Iy si lenced 
the press and allayed publ ic apprehension of a divided Torch 
Commando, but in the inner counci Is of both the Torch Commando 
and the U. P. it was known that the Commando in Nata I was 
deeply divided. 
In a letter to Chutter and Ford, Ralph Parrott, the 
national secretary of the Torch Commando, refers to the 
66. R. Parrott to J. 8. Chutter and E. G. Ford: loc.cit. 
67. F/P: Correspondence between E. G. Ford and J. Alexander 
and R. F enha II S, 30 October 195?, 7 November 195? 
68. Natal Dai I~ News: 28 October 195?·. 
69. Natal Dai I~ News: 28 October 1952. 
70. Natal Da i I~ News: 28 October 1952. 
circulation of 'confidential memoranda bel ieved to be in 
connection with the formation of a new party In Natal. ,(71) 
With 'private' or 'secret' (depending on the speaker's con-
victions) meetings being held frequently al lover Natal 
during the last three months of 1952, there were doubtless 
a large number of 'confidential memoranda' in circulation. 
Easi Iy the most important was a document dubbed the 'Green 
Horror,(72)by the U.P. It was drawn up by Ford with the 
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help of other Torch Commando leaders and was circulated 
confidentially amongst people who were disillusioned with the 
U.P. and who appeared to be coalescing into a new party. The 
purpose of the document was to force people to decide between 
continuing to support the establ ished o~position parties or 
backing the creation of a new party. (73 
The 'Green Horror' opened with a number of propositions 
which were 'accepted' by its authors. (74) These included 
the ideas that the Torch Commando had successfully resisted 
the government's attacks on the constitution but that it had 
become an 'embarrassment' to the U.P. in their election 
campaign. (75) Detai Is .of why the Torch Commando had become an 
'embarrassment' were not stated. The document then analysed 
the po l itical attitude of the Torch Commando membership, 
'particularly in Natal' and, continuing with its accepted 
propositions, found that they fel I into three distinct cate-
gories.(76) The first category consisted of staunch U.Pm or 
Labour Party members whi Ie the second consisted of people who 
were not necessari Iy party members but who were wi 1 I ing to 
assist the parties unti I after the next general election, lest 
the National ists again be returned to power. The third group 
was clearly that to which the authors of the 'Green Horror' 
71. R. Parrott to J.B. Chutter and E.G. Ford: loc.cit. 
72. So cal led because it was reproduced on green paper. 
Interview with D. Mitchel I. 
73. Interview with E.G. Ford. 




belonged, and consisted of: 'Those who are anti-National ist 
but who cannot acce)t the pol icies or personnel of the Oppo-
sition Parties. ,(77 The d ifferences between the groups, 
especially the first and third groups, were seen as 'funda-
mental and irreconci lable', particularly as Mitchel I had 
refused to accept that the UaP. candidates should subscribe 
to the Torch Commando's definition of the Natal Stand.(78) 
Having dealt with the position as they saw it, the 
authQrs of the 'Green Horror' then set out nine resolutions, 
laying down future strategy for the Natal Torch Commando. 
The first called for the Natal Torch Commando to assume a 
state of 'quiescence', with no publ ic meetings or statements 
directed against opposition parties.(79) It also envisaged 
the merging of the two Regional Executives of the Commando 
In Natal. The se~ond resolution cal led for the integration 
of the first group with the parties to which they · belonged, 
whi Ie the third resolution cal led for the setting up of a 
'Liason Committee' 
tion parties. (80) 
between the second group and the opposi-





That the members of gpoup (c) constitute 
themselves under a Provincial Committee 
in order to maintain a state of readiness 
against:-
(a) future action of an il legal, unconsti-
tutional or immoral nature in the 
party pol itical field and/or 
(b) the breach of any of the Five Principles 
of the Torch Commando and/or 
(c) the establ ishment of a Republ ic in South 
Africa and/or 
(d) any attempt to bring about a coal ition 
between any pol itical parties in confl ict 
with any of the Five Principles of the 
Torch Commando or based on suppresive 
doctrines 
80. Ibid. , p.2. 
Further that the members of group (c) be 
free to interest themselves in the establ ish-
ment of a group or party formed for the 
purpose of contesting the next Provincial 
Council Election and/or any General Election 
due to be he I din Apr ii, 1953, and thus fu I I y 
to protect the interests of the people of 
N at a I • ( 8 I ) . 
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In this resolution are contained al I the elements of the 
thinking of the future Federal Party. There is the accent on 
moral and constitutional standards as we!'1 as on legal princi-
ples; there is the implacable resistance to the institution 
of a republ ic as wei I as the defence of the constitution. 
There is also the smouldering bel ief that the U.P. could not 
be trusted because it might enter into an all iance with the 
National ists. There is even an indirect concern with racial 
matters in that racial harmony was the fifth principle of the 
Torch Commando. The group committed itself twice in the 
resolution to defend al I five principles. Most important, the 
group stressed the interests of the people of Natal and thought 
in terms of the provincial counci I elections as well as a 
general election. This was in keeping with the interpretation 
of the Natal Stand, wh' ~ch held that what the country needed 
was resolute resistance to the government by Natal, led by 
men who w~re uncompromised and uncompromising in their bel iefs • 
. The remaining resolutions of the 'Green Horror' were 
designed for the strengthening of the second and third groups, 
that is, the non-party anti-National ists and the future Federals. 
They included a demand for the appointment of ful I-time organis~rs 
for these groups and for the exclusion of pari iamentary candi-
dates from serving on the provincial executives created by the 
groups. Further resolutions cal led for a comprehensive state-
ment, embodying the ideas of the document, to be republ ished 
in the Natal newspapers and, most significant, for the two 
groups to be ' ••• entitled to draw upon the pooled Natal Funds 
f th ' f' . I . (82) . ' or elr Inancla requirements. It wll I be noted that 
81. lli.2. 
82. ~. 
the United and Labour Party supporters were excluded from 
the Torch Commando's funds in Natal. Ford later maintained 
that this was equitable because the U.P. had received 
considerable financial assistance from the Torch Commando 
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in the months between the formation of the United Democratic 
Front and the meeting which had met to consider the 'Green 
Horror' and that the other two groups were therefore entitled 
to the remaining funds. (83) . 
The resolutions of the 'Green Horror' are of importance 
In assessing the position of dominance within the Natal Torch 
Commando which Ford and his supporters had attained. The 
confident tone of the document clearly indicates that Ford 
expected no effective opposition from within the Torch 
Commando. He had by this stage complete control of the Natal 
section of the Commando and had taken the advice which 
Senator Heaton Nichol Is, overseas at the time, had given at 
that critical juncture to his son, Derek (who was a keen 
supporter of Ford): 'One word of advice old Abe Bai ley once 
gave me was, "never resign", kee~ a hand on the ti Iler. 
bel ieve that was very sound. ,(84 
The Senator was on a visit to South America and to the 
United Kingdom. The British part of his trip) at the sugges-
tion of the chairman of the Natal Mercury, (85 which strongly 
supported the Natal Stand, was to ascertain the opinion of the 
Briti~h Government on the 'contractual' nature of the Union 
and its attitude towards the introduction of a republ ic In 
South Africa. (86) As former High Commissioner in London, 
Heaton Nichol Is had access to the leaders of the British 
government and 
members of the 
discussed the issues with' ••• Sal isbury and 
British Government and other influential people 
in England , (87) I h ' t b ' h H . • • • • n I s au 0 lograp y, eaton N I cho I Is 
83. Interview with E. G. Ford. 
84. NiP: G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. Heaton Nicholls, 
3 November 1952. 
85. Heaton N i cho II s: o~. cit. , p.458. 
86. Heaton N icho II s: o~. cit. , p.459. 
87. I bid. 
does not record what the attitudes of the members of the 
Br i t ish government were and, a Ithough he wrote to his son 
that his trip had been 'eminently successful', (88)he 
confided to Ford on his return to South Africa early in 
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1953 that I ittle could be hoped for from the Conservative 
government, which saw itself as 'fighting for its existence' 
and was unwil I ing to support a new issue which could be 
detrimental to its position in the United Kingdom. (89) With 
I ittle hope of foreign support at that stage, the Natal Torch 
Commando leaders had to rely on their own resources. 
Meanwhile relations between the Torch Commando leaders 
and the U.P. were steadi Iy deteriorating. On 20 November 
1952 the U.P. congress in Bloemfontein had praised the Torch 
Commando for its support of the United Democratic Front but 
passed a resolution which' denied the possibi I ity of 
uni lateral action by any province. ,(90) This al ienated many 
Natal ians and led to the Natal Torch Commando cal I ing a joint 
session of its regional executives on November 29. At this 
meeting, held at the urging of the National Action Committee 
of the Torch Commando and especially of the Commando's 
national chairman, Louis Kane-Berman, who was sympathetic to 
the idea of the Natal Stand, (91) it was decided to meet the 
U.P. leaders. The Natal Torchmen wanted to discuss the Natal 
Stand and a number of issues related the United Democratic 
Front's candidates and campaign tactics in the forthcoming 
general election. They sought a guarantee that Natal United 
Front candidates would not help the National ists ' under any 
circumstances' to gain the two-thirds majority which was 
required to remove the Coloureds from the common rol I with the 
Whites.(9 2) The fact that these issues were discussed was 
made publ ic(93)but there were further discussions, the sub-
stance of which were never publ icised. These concerned the 
88. Nip: G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. Heaton Nichol Is, 10 
December 1952. 
89. Interview with E.G. Ford. 
90. Carter: op.cit., p.322. 
91. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 12 and 13 June 1953, loc.cit. 
92. Carter: loc.cit. Natal Mercury: 19 January 1953. 
93. Natal Mercury: 19 Januar:-y 1953. 
'Green Horror' and the strategy of the Natal Torch Commando 
I eaders for the months ahead. The Nata I Da i I y News's 
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pol itical commentator was aware of these discussions, hinted 
at them and censured the Natal Torchmen for having 'mixed 
priorities' In not concentrating solely on removing the Nat-
ional ists from office. (94) Ford promptly rejected the notion 
that the Torch Commando had mixed priorities and deftly evaded 
a discussion on the proceedings of the meeting on the grounds 
of 'security'. (95) 
At the meet .ing, the Natal leaders of the Torch Commando, 
General Selby (a national vice-president), Ford, Chutter and 
Brickhi I I met the U.P. representatives. They were Strauss, 
de Vi I I iers Graaff, Mitchel I and Dr. Steenkamp, the deputy 
leader of the U.P. in Natal. It took place in Johannesburg 
on December 19 and, because of the disagreements which ensued, 
only the Natal Stand was discussed. (96) At Strauss's request, 
the Natal delegation gave a detai led account of the history 
and meaning of the Natal Stand and pointed out that they spoke 
for the majority of Natal ians: the Torch Commando rally in 
Durban had attracted 45 000 pepple, whereas the U.P. could 
muster only 20 000 members in the province. (97) The U.P. 
representatives were wi I I ing to make a few minor concessions 
but rejected, in conformity with their congress's resolution 
of the previous month, any possibi I ity of uni lateral action by 
Natal. (98) In fact, Strauss rejected the Natal Stand 'for al I 
time' and was warned that this could lead to the formation of 
'a new party,.(99) On this note the meeting closed. The U.P. 
and the Torch Commando were at complete variance. The forma-
tion of a new party was now only a question of timing. 
The first quarter of 1953 was hardly the time for the 
94. Natal Dai I~ News: 10 December 1952. 
95. Nata I Dai I~ News: 13 December 1952. 
96. Natal Mercur~: 19 January 1953. 
97. Natal Mercur~ : 19 January 1953. 
98. Natal Mercur~: 19 January 1953. 
99. W.V.T.C. : Minutes, 12 and 13 June 1953, loc.cit • . 
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Natal Torchmen to break ranks. This was because the govern-
ment was continuing its struggle concerning the Coloured 
franch i se with renewed determ i nat i on. I n May 1952 the High 
Court of Pari iament Act had created a High Court of Pari ia-
mentarians to review Appeal Court decisions. The Judicial 
Committee of this Court set aside the Appeal Court's decision 
and va I i dated the Separate Representat i on of Voters Act. In 
November, the Appeal Court upheld a judgement of the Cape 
Supreme Court declaring inval id the High Court of Pari iament 
Act, thus inval idating its decisions. The Prime Minister, 
Dr. Ma I an, announced that, wh i Ie he accepted the Appea I Court's 
judgement, an election would be held the following Apri I to 
ask the people for a 'mandate' on the fra~chise issue.(100) 
Faced with the prospect of a general election, which the Natal 
press agreed to be the most crucial in the country's history, (101) 
it was impossiblefor the Natal Torch Commando to act indepen-
dently . Even the sympathetic Natal Mercury warned that in view 
of Malan's speech and the e lection, it was 'no time for spl in-
ter parties'. (102) Knowing ·the dependence of al I pol itical 
parties, and especially newly-founded groups, on press support, 
the Natal Mercury went further and, whi Ie not denying that 
there was not' complete unanimity' in opposition circles, 
expressed confidence that' ••• between now and the Election 
a plan wi I I be evolved' to achieve this. (103) 
The plan to make the United Democratic Front achieve the 
appearance of unanimity of which the Natal Mercury spoke was 
evolved at the congress of the Joint Natal Executives of the 
Torch Commando in Pietermaritzburg on 17 January 1953. Kane-
Berman chaired the meeting and stressed that the Commando 
stood by its resolution of 9 July 1952 in support of the Natal 
Stand. ( 104) Douglas Mitchel I was then introduced and invited 
to address the meeting in an att ~mpt to settle the 'differen-






Natal Mercury: 17 November 1952. 
Natal Mercur1: 14 November 1952. Natal Dai I§ News: 10 December 952. Natal Witness: 19 January I 53, 
27 January 1953. 
Natal Mercury: 17 November 1952. 
Natal Mercury: 28 November 1952. 
W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 17 January 1953, op.cit., p.1. 
Commando over the previous months. 
( 105) 
Mitchel I presented the U.P. 's case with skill. He 
stressed that the U.P. was trying to defeat the National-
ists and that it needed the help of the Torch· Commando with 
its resources and power. (106) He then dealt with the 
quest ions of the republ ie, coal ition between the U.P. and 
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the National ists and the Natal Stand - al I the issues on 
which the Natal Torch Commando had attacked the U.P. As 
regards a republ ie, Mitchel I stated that the U.P. was In 
favour of maintaining the existing constitutional position 
(monarchical). Clause 2(d) in the party's constitution, which 
al lowed republ ican propaganda to be made by members in party 
circles, had been included so that' .•. men I ike General 
Smuts and Botha who fought for their Republ ic during the Boer 
War, mi.ght feel included in the aims of the Party.,(107) To 
maintain that Smuts needed the clause to feel 'included' In 
a party which he, to a large extent, had created was a little 
far-fetched and to argue that Botha would have any feel ings 
about a party formed over a decade after his death was indeed 
strange. The essential point, however - ·that the clause was 
inherited by the U.P. from the South African Party and was 
designed to satisfy anti-National ist republ icans who had 
fought for the Boer Republ ics(108)_ was made, and what is 
more, was made more palatable by I inking it with the honoured 
names of Smuts and Botha. 
On the question of a possible coal ition between the 
National ists and th~ U.P., ·Mitchel I was emphatic. He stated 
that the government was led by men whom the U.P. 'did not 
trust' and that it would have' ..• noth ing to do with a 
I . t . , ( I 09) D I' . h h .. coa I Ion ..•• ea Ing Wit t e opposite Issue of 
support for the Natal Stand, Mitchel I put forward a number of 
arguments as to why the U.P. could not support it. The party 
105. Natal Witness: 19 January 1953. 
106. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 17 January 1953, op.cit., pp.I-2. 
107. Ibid., p. I. 
108. U.P. (Durban), Candidates' Publicity Section: Circular, 
8 May 1954. 
109. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 17 January 1953, op.cit., p.2. 
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In Natal, he said, was part of a national movement and 
had to 'take the I ine' that was beneficial to the party In 
, II t l'tself.(110) From th'ls the other provInces as we as 0 
base, he developed his thought by pointing out that 
'unilateral action' by Natal was i I legal. On a practical 
level it would lead to bloodshed. It was as strategically 
unsound as a ' ••• platoon that was at variance with its 
regiment. ,(111) After his speech, Mitchel t answered, at 
some length, questions from the floor. 
After Mitchell's address, the Natal Torch Commando 
unanimously spelt out the terms of its co-operation with 
the United and Labour Parties in the general election. The 
first 'reaffirmed' the resolution of the national congress 
of the Torch Commando in July 1952, supporting the Natal 
Stand. The second declared support for the Natal Provincial 
Counci I's wish to convene a national convention to discuss 
the constitution. (112) The third stated that the Natal Torch 
Commando accepted the nominated candidates of the United and 
Labour Parties as 'its own' and pledged its active support ' 
for them provided that: 
Each candidate undertakes publ icly and 
unequivocally to support the Natal Stand 
in accordance with the Covenant sworn to 
by the people of Natal at the Mass Rally 
on June 6th, 1952. (113) 
The terms of the oath of 6 June 1952 were then repr·oduced. 
The statefflent then went on to deal with what the Natal 
Torch Commando would do in the event of a breach of the 'Union 
Contract' • I n such an event, it reserved its right to take 
'separate action', in consultation with the National 
Executive of the Commando, in defence of Natal's' undoubt-
ed and unchal lengable constitutional rights as a contracting 
party to Union ••.• ,(114) 
The Un ited and Labour Party I eaders accepted, In 
110. I bid. 
Ill. Ibid. 
112. W.V.T.C.: Information Sui letin, op.cit., p.2. 
113. I bid. 
114. I bid. -
identical statements, the Natal Torch Commando's require-
ments in respect of the Natal Stand. (115) They expressed 
their pleasure at the evidence of the 'unity' of 'our' 
forces (i.e. anti-government) and 'welcomed' the oppor-
tunity to re-affirm, on behalf of the respective parties' 
candidates in Natal, their previous declaration made 
in the vow taken at Durban on 6 June 1952 .•• ' and then 
proceeded to quote the oath taken by the crowd on that 
. (116) occasion. 
Although the meeting ended on a note of 'elation', 
with the national chairman of the Torch Commando declaring 
that 'we shall sleep well tonight',(117)the agreement 
between the Natal Torch Commando and the pol itical parties, 
especially the U.P., was in fact more apparent than real 
and was, in any event, forced on the three organ i sat ions by 
publ ic opinion in view of the general election. The basic 
differences remained. 
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In the first instance, there was no agreement among 
the groups as to the ful I impl ications of the much-quoted 
Durban oath. As the Natal Witness pointed out publ icly 
and as the Natal Torch Commando leaders real ised privately, 
the oath could be interpreted 'in more than one way', the 
exact interpretation resting with the candidate's conscience~118) 
Nowhere was there reference to uni lateral action by Natal. 
This meant that both the Natal Torch Commando, which advocated 
uni lateral action as a last resort and I inked the oath to 
Ford's questions on the same night, and the U.P., which 
rejected uni lateral action in al I circumstances, could claim 
support for its case. Secondly, the U.P. bound only its 
Natal candidates to the oath and, in view of Mitchell's 
insistence at the meeting with the Torch Commando that the 
U.P. was a national party and that the Natal section of the 
party had obi igat ions to the rest of the organ i sat ion, it was 
clear that he did not regard the agreement as altering the 
115. Natal Mercur~: 19 January 1953. 
116. Natal Mercur~: 19 January 1953. 
117. Nata I Mercur~: 19 January 1953. 
118. Natal Witness: 19 January 1953. W.V.T.C.: Information 
Bu II et in, loc.cit. 
u.P. 's stand at al I. Thirdly, the Torch Commando's resolu-
tion, referring to Natal's 'undoubted and unchallengeable' 
rights in a union which was simply a contract (and could 
therefore be dissolved) as wei I as its reference to Natal's 
right of separate action, was obviously intended as an 
interpretation of the Durban rally oath. And, as has been 
stated, this interpretation was at complete variance with 
that of Mitchel I and the U.P. 
Apart from those sources of confl ict impl icit in the 
agreement, various actions taken by the Natal Torch Commando 
at the time indicate clearly its attitude towards the U.P. 
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and the possibi I ity of an open breakdown of the agreement. 
First, Heaton Nicholls, whose resignation from the U.P.was 
being treated as an 'open secret' by the party headquarters\119) 
joined the Torch Commando and was promptly co-opted onto its 
Nata I Act i on Comm i ttee. (120) Second, in order to strengthen 
its position, the Natal Torch Commando publ ished the resolu-
tion of its National Executive of 9 July supporting the Natal 
Stand as it was interpreted in Natal. (121) Third, the Natal 
Inland Region of the Commando, meeting immediately after the 
agreement with the pol itical parties, resolved to set up a 
committee to explore the economic 'viabi I ity of Natal'. (122) 
The obvious intent was to show lack of confidence in the 
abi I ity or resolution of the U.P. to halt the National ists. 
Fourth, in a confidential circular dated 23 January 1953, 
less than a week after the agreement, the provincial organiser 
of the Torch Commando, Brickhi I I, set out the details of the 
agreement but included a copy of the Hoi lander Memorandum( 123) 
and excerpts from General Smuts's speech advocating' •.• 
greater powers for the Provincial Counci Is on a semi-federal 
b . , (124) Th . I I . aSls. e same clrcu ar a so Instructed Torch Commando 
119. Heaton Nicholls: op.cit., p.456. 
120. Natal Mercury: 19 January 1953. 
121. Nata I Mercury: 19 January 1953. 
122. Natal Mercury: 19 January 1953. 
123. The ~ol ~ander Memorandum of 1932 advocated greater 
p~ov'nclal powers. for a discussion of this document, 
Vide: 0h.10. pp. 225-7. 
124. W.V.T.C.: Intormation Bulletin, op.cit., p.4. 
speakers _ under the heading Torch Line for Future - to 
., , db' f k I . d I' t' , (125) 'keep off party politics an to e ran y I ea IS IC • 
Once again, the differences which existed between U.P. 
pol itics and the Torch Commando's impl ied view of U.P. tactics 
were presented in a barely-veiled fashion. 
Fifth, in January 1953 the government introduced a 
number of pieces of legislation, 
Bi I I and the Publ ic Safety Bil I, 
cal led the 'Swart Bil Is,.(126) 
the Criminal Laws Amendment 
both of which were commonly 
These Bi I Is were designed to 
place greater power in the hands of the Minister of Justice 
in the event of civi I disturbance and the declaration of 
martial law. The Torch Commando strongly opposed the Bi I Is 
because they were in confl ict with its principles, (127)whi Ie 
the U.P. supported them for reasons of national security. (12g) 
The two organisations .were in confl ict, once again, on matters 
of principle. 
It is important to note that, whatever its differences 
with the U.P., the Natal Torch Commando stil I regarded the 
National ists as incomparably the greater enemy and it was 
prepared to throw al I its efforts into the election campaign 
behind the U.P. Any suggestion of the 'quiescence' which had 
existed the previous year had disappeared. The circular 
referred to above publ icised the 'Thought for the Month' as 
being, 'For evi I (]ational ists:J to succeed - it is sufficient 
for good men ~o DO NOTHING,,(1~9)and urged that there be 
'no half-heartedness' about the Torch Commando's support. (130) 
Instructions were given to mobil ise the members to help the 
U.P . . with canvassing, while Brickhi I I prepared to leave ~or 
northern Natal to assess what help was needed from the Torch 
Commando to win back the vital seats in this area for the 
125. Ibid., p.5. 
126. Named after the Minister of Justice, Mr. C.R. Swart. 
127. W.V.1.C.: Minutes, 12 and 13 June 1953, op.cit., p.4. 
128. U.P. (Division of Information): Speakers Notes, July 
1954, pp. 1-2. 
129. Capitals in the original. 
130. W. V. 1. C.: I nformat ion Bu \I et in, 0p, cit., p.4. 
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U.P. (131) Having won the support of the Torch Commando, the 
U.P. proceeded to nominate candidates and to conduct the 
election according to its own wishes and paid I ittle heed to 
the Torch Commando. (132) 
After Malan's announcement on February 12 that the 
election was set for Apri I 15, (133)both the National ists and 
the United Front conducted 'highly efficient campaigns'. 
Professor K. A. Heard maintains that there is no evidence to 
~uggest that more drive or efficiency on the part of the U.P. 
would have produced a different result. (134) The Torch 
Commando alone suppl ied fifteen ful I-time organisers, enormous 
sums of money, 5 om cars and an impress i ve 60 000 canvassers 
to help the ' United Front candidates. (135) 
The result, however, was a decisive victory for the 
National ists. They increased their pari iamentary representa-
tion from eighty-five to 'ninety-four, whi Ie the United Front ' 
saw its representation decl ine from seventy-one to sixty_two~136) 
Although the anti-National ists would claim, with justice, 
that the National ists received a minority of the votes cast 
and had profitted from, the fact that the opposition votes 
were concentrated largely in a few urban areas, (137)the un-
deniable fact was that the National ists had increased their 
majority and had enjoyed a swing, even in Natal, towards 
themse I ves. (138) I t was depress i ng, in t he eyes of the Un ited 
Front, that the National ists had won the election by making 
apartheid, the question of the sovereignty of pari iament and 
the Coloured franchise, Communism and the unity of the Whites, 
(a I I issues connected to rac i a I and/or Eng I i sh-A fr i kaner 
re I at ions) the centra I issues. Most depress i ng for Eng I i sh-
131. Ibid. 
132. Carter: op.cit., p.325. Natal Witness: 29 Apri I 1953. 
W.V.T.C.: Natal Coast Region Conference Minutes, 
25 April 1953, pp. 1-3. 
133. N at a I Wit n e s s : I 3 Feb r u a r y I 953. 
134. K. A. Heard: General Elections in South Africa 1943 -
1970, 1974, p.59. 
135. Natal Witness: 6 May 1953. 
136. Carter: op.cit., p.158. 
137. Carter: op.cit., pp. 158-160. 
138. Ibid. Heard: op.cit., p.59. 
speaking Natal was the fact that, In addition to the above 
questions, the National ists had been confirmed in power as 
the spokesmen for Afrikaner national ism, with its republ ic-
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an overtones, as wei I as its apparent Afrikaner exclusive-
ness. Of the National ist candidates (of whom this information 
was avai lable) al I but two were Afrikaans-speaking (and 
those two stood in Natal), whi Ie al I the elected National-
(139) 
ists were members of one of the Dutch Reformed Churches. 
For the Natal Torch Commando leaders, the electoral 
defeat was particularly distressing. They had fought hard 
to consol idate their control of the Commando in Natal and 
to sway the national leadership of the Torch Commando. They 
had battled to rouse the people of Natal to perceive what 
was deemed a threat to their freedom and future. They had 
tried, unsuccessfully, to bring the U.P. round ~o their 
way of thinking. They saw the verdict of the general 
election as being a measure of the U.P.'~ fai lure to respond 
to the demands which they had made upon it. They, therefore, 
now planned to fight what they saw as an immoral, racially-
exclusive minority government by means of a new approach -
a new party. 
139. Carter: op.cit., pp. 179 and 185. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE LAUNCHING OF THE FEDERAL PARTY 
Immediately the election was over, and lost, the 
question of the future of the United Democratic Front 
had to be cons i dered. 'Sa i lor' Ma I an had dec I ared the 
previous year that the United Front would continue to 
exist' ••• unti I sane, democratic government ••• [was] 
once more restored in South Africa. ,(~) This had not, 
according to the United Front's views, happened at the 
elect ion, but the Natal Torchmen were completely unwil ling 
In the circumstances, to continue supporting the U.P~ 
39 
In a j oint statement two days after the election, the 
chairmen and vice-chairmen of the two Natal regions, 
together with two national vice-chairmen of the Commando 
as well as the Natal organiser(2)(all soon to be enthu-
siastic Federal Party leaders), signed ,a statement which 
declared: 'With the end of the election campaign, the 
member organisations of the United Democratic Front 
resume their I iberty of action. ,(3) This state of affairs 
was accepted by the majority of the delegates to an 
'informal' meeting of the Natal Coast Region of the Torch 
Commando which assembled. on 25 Apri I 1953 to discuss, amongst 
other matters, the future of the United Democratic Front. (4) 
The Joint Inter-Regional Congress of the Torch Commando 
similarly, accepted without contradiction Selby's contention 
that the United Democratic Front had ceased to exist although 
, .•. no announcement to this effect had been made publ ic 
[by the Nat i ona I Execut i ve of the T orc'8 .' (5) 
Another development affecting the United Democratic 
Front was the accelerated disintegration of its third member -
1. Cart e r : op. cit., p. 3 17 • 
2. They were E.G. Ford and J.B. Chutter; W.F. Hami Iton and 
R. Hughes Mason; A.R. Selby and T. Durrant and R. Brickhi II. 
3. N at a I Wit ness: I 8 Apr i I 1953. 
4. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 25 April 1953, loc.cit. 
5. W.V.T.C.: Natal Joint Inter-Regional Congress Minutes, 
16 May 1953, p. I. 
the ' labour Party. (6) This development, which was particu-
larly marked in the Natal section of the party, began 
before the Federal Party was formed and continued after 
that event. Early in May, Raymond Arde and Selwyn Greene, 
chairman and secretary respectively of the labour Party in 
Natal, resigned their positions and were later joined by 
Roger Brickhill, who was a former secretary of the labour 
Party in Natal. (7) More serious, Senator E.R. Browne 
resigned later in the same month. (8) Both Browne and Arde 
gave as the reasons for their 
the National Executive of the 
wishes expressed in Natal. (9) 
resignations the refusal by 
party to pay any he~d to 
As all office-bearers who 
resigned from the labour Party later joined the Federal 
Party!10) and, except for Arde, played prominent parts in 
it, it appears clear that their views were simi lar to those 
of the Natal Torch Commando leaders. 
Heaton Nichol Is, already closely associated with the 
Natal Torch Commando leaders, was also p1anning a new 
pol itical future. Within a week of the general election, 
he publ icised his resignation from the United Party, (11) 
causing a wave of speculation as to his future intentions. 
The Natal Witness, a firm supporter of Heaton Nichol Is's 
views, reported 'speculation' from Johannesburg as to the 
I ikely moves that the Senator would make on his return from 
the Coronation in June. (12) Although the speculated date 
was wrong, the rumour that he was planning either to 're-
form' the Dominion Party or to start a 'Federal ist Party' 
was partly correct. (13) Even before the general election, 
he had confided to his son that the Natal Torchmen should 
go on with' ••. the intention to form the Torch into a 
Natal Mercur~: 
Natal Mercur~ : 
Natal Witness: 
20 May 1953. 
7 May 1953. 
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pol itical part) to ~efe~d the Natal Stand in the ~rovincial 
elections. ,(14 This view was repeated to a meeting of the 
Natal Coast Region of the Torch Commando on 25 Apri I 1953~15) 
It ignored , the fact that the Commando could not, in terms of 
its constitution, become a pol itical party, but could onlr 
" t h' h h Id 't "I (16) support an eXisting par Y w IC up e I s prlnclp es. 
His attitude does, however, express his frustration at the 
powerlessness of the U.P. to unseat the National ists, even 
with Torch Commando support, and also his frustration at the 
refusal of the U.P. leadership, especially Mitchell, to 
accept the Natal Stand. 
Discussions between Heaton Nichol Is and Mitchell had, 
in fact, taken place during the previous few days. Heaton 
Nicho l Is, acting as a 'go-between', offered to arrange an 
al I iance beteeen the U.P. and the Torch Commando in Natal, 
if Mitchel I would accept the Natal Stand. (17) Mitchel I, 
after discussions with Strauss, decl ined to support the 
Commando's view of the Natal Stand and hence the negotiations 
fai led. It is unl ikely that such an all iance could, In any 
event, have been arranged because the Natal Torch Commando 
was unwi I I ing to accept Mitchel I as the provincial leader 
and he wou I d have had to I eave, in the words of Heaton 
Nicholls,' the Provincial sphere entirely to the Torch 
, ( 18) This no national pol itical party was I ikely to 
accept. 
Significantly, the central cause of the disagreement 
was the Natal Stand, which Mitchel I maintained was open to 
var i ous i nterpretat ions. (19) I n order to c I ar i fy exact I y 
what was meant by the Natal Stand, therefore, Heaton Nichol Is 
tabled a 'redefinition' at the Torch Commando's Natal Coast 
14. G. Heaton N i cho I I s to D. Heaton N i cho I Is, 14 February 
1953, loc.cit. 
15. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 25 April 1953, op.cit., p.2. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Heaton Nicholls: op.cit. p.462. 
18. Ibid., p.463. 
19. Ibid. 
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meeting of 25 Apri I 1953. (20) This redefinition stated 
categorically that the Natal Stand meant the determination 
of Natal to resist' ••• by any means in its power any 
attempt to deprive the citizens of Natal of their allegiance 
b h ' 't ' f Rbi' ,(21) Th to the Crown y t e Imposl Ion 0 a epu IC. e 
resolution continued by demanding a separate referendum 
for Natal, should a republ ic be proposed and it closed with 
a declaration that the Torch Commando, in accepting the 
Natal Stand, was concerned about the welfare of al I the 
people of South Africa, the future of Western civil isation 
in the country and the interests of the 'Native peoples' of 
Natal. (22) The redefinition was referred to the Natal 
Torch Commando Congress the fol lowing month, where it was 
accepted. (23) By that time, the Federal Party had already 
been formed. 
Having done his best to reconci Ie the anti-government 
forces in Natal and being free of al I party 'shackles', (24) 
Heaton Nichol I·s felt that the time had come to present his 
views forcibly and publ icly. He did so a·t the Services 
Club in Pietermaritzburg on 29 Apri I 1953. He drafted the 
speech - his first since the general election and the pub-
I ication .of his resignation from the U.P. - alone. Although 
he had frequently discussed his ideas with friends and 
acquaintances, the contents were therefore unknown to anyone 
but himself. (25) 
Heaton . Nichol Is began with a survey of the election 
campaign(26)and then analysed the reasons why the United Demo-
crati~ Front had not only fai led to win the election, but 
had seen the National ists increase their strength. The main 
20. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 25 April 1953, loc.cit. See also 
Heaton Nicholls: loc.cit. and NIP: G. Heaton Nicholls 
to D. Heaton Nichol Is, 20 May 1953. 
21. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 16 May 1953, op.cit., p.7. 
22. .!..2..i.2. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Heaton Nicholls: op.cit., p.463. 
25. Interview with E.G. Ford. 
26. Later publ ished by Heaton Nichol Is under the title 
Greater South Africa: A Pol itical Survey. 
reason (and this removed al I. hope of a future defeat of the 
governing party) was that the Afrikaner national ist party 
was fighting a 'rei igious war,.(27) In this it was backed 
by the Calvinist phi losophy of the Dutch Reformed Churches 
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and was supported by three generations of 'indoctrinated 
youths' who had emerged from National ist-control led schools~28) 
The National ists' aim, he maintained, was complete Afrikaner 
domination and the complete 'el imination' of the Engl ish-
speaking South African from any influence in a 'theocratic 
Repub l ic'. (29) This 'theocratic Republ ic' took no account of 
the monarchical feel ings of the Engl ish-speaking sector. 
Whi Ie it was based on the Calvinist faith and led · to a 
'dictatorship, the opponents of Afrikaner national ism favoured 
democracy'. (30) While Afrikaner national ism was seen as 
archaic and intolerant, Heaton Nichol Is saw the Engl ish-
speakers as I iberal;(31) whi Ie Afrikaner national ism preached 
, hatred', its opponents preached ' reason' (32) and, wh i Ie 
Afrikaner national ism stressed national separateness, the 
Engl ish-speakers suP)orted the 'one stream' pol icy initiated 
by General Botha. (33 . 
Having presented a picture of the stark contrast between 
Afrikaner national ism and its opponents, Heaton Nichol Is 
declared that Union, as envisaged by its founders in 1910, 
had 'completely failed,.(34) He therefore turned his thoughts 
towards reconstructing the Union. He proposed the division 
of the country into two separate entities - one a republ ic 
and the other a monarchy - I inked 'on a federal basis'. (35) 
The republ ic, consisting of the Transvaal, the Orange Free 
27. G. Heaton Nichol Is: Greater South Africa: A Pol itical 
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State and 'a part' of the Cape would be free to choose any 
form of government it wished, whi Ie the remainder, mainly 
Engl ish-speaking, would develop on its own. (36) In the 
federal government, the two areas would be equally repre-
sented and, as all local matters would be excluded, it 
would deal with international affairs only. Fai I ing this, 
Heaton Nichol Is saw the only alternative as Afrikaners and 
I · h k ., t ' (37) B th Eng IS -spea ers gOing separa e ways. ecause e 
National ists were gaining ground owing to their 'rei igious 
appeal', the Union, which was an 'unfruitful and sordid 
marriage,' had to be brought to an end. (38) 
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Heaton Nichol Is's speech embodied some of the basic 
ideas which many Engl ish-speakers in South Africa, especially 
inN ata I, shared. I n the fir st instance, he saw Un i on under 
the Crown as the only acceptable form of union and, secondly, 
he found the dominance of Afrikaner national ism intolerable. 
Thirdly, having establ ished to his satisfaction that Afrik-
aner national ism could not be beaten at the pol Is, he was 
logically compel led to reject Union. The way of I ife and 
values of the Engl ish-speaking community, as he perceived 
them, had at al I costs to be protected. What is particular-
ly striking about the speech is that his perception of the 
Engl ish-speaker was more a reaction to Afrikaner national ism 
than it was b~sed on any coherent phi losophy. Because he 
saw the National ist Afrikaners as intolerant, steeped in faith 
and hatred, inc I i ned towards autocracy and work i ng for nat i on-
al separateness, he saw the Engl ish-speaking as being tolerant, 
I iberal, reasonable, democratic and aiming at unity amongst 
the Whites. Because the government was using the Union to 
entrench Afrikaner power, Union was a failure. Because the 
National ists favoured the unitary form of government, he 
suggested a unique federal type of government and, because 
many National ists loudly advocated a republ ic, he insisted 
equally emphatically that only a monarchy was acceptable. 
36. I b i d. 
37. I bid. , p.10. 
38. I bid. , p.11. 
Heaton Nichol Is's speech caused a sensation. The 
Natal Witness, the Pietermaritzburg morning dai Iy, des-
cribed Heaton Nichol Is as a man of 'panache' which made 
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him stand out amongst the 'ruck of more humdrum figures 
on the South African pol itical scene'. (39) The newspaper 
saw the Senator's two basic theses as being, firstly, that 
in South Africa there were two pol itical faiths, rather than 
two major pol itical parties and, secondly, that al I the 
demographic, educational and ideological factors favoured 
the National ist faith; a faith which was unacceptable to 
Natal. Heaton Nichol Is did not, argued the Natal Witness, 
advocate that Natal should secede. What he had actu~1 Iy 
proposed was a 'highly original' suggestion which gave hope 
that an 'acceRtable solution' to a grave problem would one 
day be found. (40) 
The Mercury adopted a guarded yet sympathetic stance. 
On the day on which the speech was reported, the newspaper 
did not comment on it editorially but featured an article 
head I i ned Time for Nata I to Face Unp I easant Facts, In 
which the writer adopted the position that the U.P. 
would never return to power and that secession was th~ only 
way out of Natal's di lemma. (41) The fol lowing day, the 
Mercury printed an editorial headed Union at the Crossroads 
which argued that 'Afrikanerdom [wa~ on the march' and 
that it would inevitably retain power. (42) Capital ising on 
th is, the 'Extrem i st' Nat i ona lists were bent on attack i ng 
Natal and the Engl ish-speaking people and the province there-
fore had the right to defend its bel iefs 'by every means in 
its power'. (43) The newspaper, .1 ike Heaton Nicholls, saw the 
essent ial problems concerning the republ ic and the defence of 
the constitution as a moral issue and emphasised that this 
39. Natal Witness: I May 1953. 
40. Natal Witness: I May 1953. 
4l. Natal Mercur~: 30 Apr i I 1953. 
42. Natal Mercur~: I May 1953. 
43. Natal Mercur~: I May 1953. 
should 'not be forgotten'. (44) Whi Ie Heaton Nicholls was 
refer r ed to by name only once, the whole tone of the 
editorial was favourably disposed towards his ideas. 
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The other Natal papers ' and al I the major South African 
newspapers opposed Heaton Nichol Is's views. The Dai Iy News, 
Natal's largest newspaper, sympathised with Heaton Nichol Is's 
feel ings but accused him of advocating 'White apartheid' in 
suggesting that the two White ethnic groups should be 
separated, a proposal which in any case was 'impracticable,~45) 
In the Transvaal, the Rand Dai Iy Mai I also sympathised with 
Heaton Nicholls but maintained that the moment logic was 
appl ied to his speech, it ' .•• collapsed I ike a house of 
cards ' . (46) · The Friend of Bloemfontein termed his ideas 
'impractical,.(47) The Cape newspapers dismissed Heaton 
Nichol Is's plans) with the Cape Times also using the word 
'impractical,(48 to describe them and the Dai Iy Dispatch 
holding that 'many sound objections' could be advanced 
against the plans. (49) The Afrikaans-language newspapers 
were, as the Mercury commented 'contemptuous,.(50) They 
strongly opposed the Senator's conclusions, which Die 
Vaderland stated were 'unfounded', (51) whi Ie Die T~svaler 
dismissed the speech in a highly critical editorial entitled 
A Jingoistic Outburst. (52) 
As regards the pol itical leaders, the Minister of 
(53) Economic Affairs, E.H. Louw dismissed Heaton Nichol Is's 
address as the' ••• drivel I ings of an outdated old jingo 
Mitchell's response was both more restrained and more complex. 
Expressing ideas which were widely felt in U.P. circles and 
, 
in most of the Engl ish-Ianguage .press, he said that he 
44. Nata I Mercur~: I May 1953. 
·45. Natal Dai I~ News: 30 Apr i I 1953. 
46. Rand Dai I~ Mai I: I May 1953. 
47. Natal Dai I~ News: 30 Apr i I 1953. 
48. Caee Times: I May 1953. 
49. Natal Dai I~ News: 30 Apr i I 1953. 
50. Natal Mercur~: 4 May 1953. 
Sl. Natal Dai I~ News: 30 Apr i I 1953. 
52. Die Transvaler: I, May 1953. 
53. Natal W ttness: 5 May 1953. 
sympathised with the feel ings of frustration felt by Heaton 
Nichol Is but he questioned whether his plan could be put 
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into action. Obviously, the National ists would oppose it, 
and until they - the National ists - were removed, nothing 
could be done. Even al lowing for a solution to this problem, 
M itche I I env i saged others, i nvo I vi ng the re I at ions between 
the component parts of the proposed new state. Furthermore, 
maintained Mitchel I, the whole idea of destroying the Act 
of Union was contrary to the oath taken at the Durban rally, 
framed by the Defenders of the Constitution of which Heaton 
Nichol Is was chairman. (54) 
The Natal Torch Commando leaders, on the other hand, 
responded positively to Heaton Nichol Is's speech. Rev. J.B. 
Chutter, Chairman of the Natal Inland Region, stated that in 
their hearts most Natal ians had already' ..• seceded from 
the Un ion', wh i Ie his deputy, Hughes Mason, informed the press 
that Heaton Nichol Is had 'hit the nai I ri ght on the head,~55) 
These sentiments were shared by the other Natal Torch Commando 
leaders. (56) Equally significant was the wei I-reasoned pro-
federation statement handed to the press by Selwyn Greene, 
unt i I recent I y secretary of the labour Party in Nata I. It 
did not dwel I on the detai Is of Heaton Nichol Is's speech but, 
in supporting many of his ideas, it gave an indication of the 
direction in which much of labour thinking was moving. (57) 
Heaton Nichol Is's speech and the sensation it caused were 
of great significance in the founding of the Federal Party. 
Early in Apri I 1953 the Natal Torch Commando leaders had 
informed the nat i ona I cha i rman that they intended launch i ng a 
new party. At his suggestion they agreed to wait unti I after 
the planned National Torch Commando Congress in June 1953. (58) 
The Nata I Torch Commando I eaders, however, I ater dec i ded to 
launch the party at a meeting of the Torch Commando's National 
Executive during the weekend of 8 - 9 May 1953. Why did they 
54. Natal Dai I~ News: 30 Apr i I 1953. 
55. Natal Dai I~ News: 30 Apr i I 1953. 
56. Natal Witness: I May 1953. Natal Merc~: I May 1953. 
57. Natal Mercur~: 8 May 1953. 
58. W.V.T.C. ': Minutes 12 and 13 June 1953, oe. cit. , p. 3. 
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alter their plans? The answer probably I ies in the enormous 
interest created by Heaton Nicholl s' s speech and the fact that, 
except for the references to monarchical and republ ican sec-
tions of the country, the speech mirrored the thinking of the 
Natal Torch Commando leaders. With Heaton Nichol Is's ideas 
the major news story in Natal and rumours circulating widely 
concerning a possible new party, (59) it seemed an opportune 
time to translate ideas into practice. Only one of Natal's 
three major newspapers had opposed Heaton Nicholls's expressed 
views, and most of the Engl ish-language press and even Mitchel I 
had, whi Ie disagreeing with them, expressed sympathy. This 
.augured wei I for a new party. 
The party's manifesto, which had taken months of care-
ful preparation; 'largely' by Ford and Brickhill, (60)had not 
been seen b) Heaton Nichol Is before his Pietermaritzburg 
address, (61 and, as has been stated, the text of his speech 
was unknown to the Torch leaders and nor were they present on 
the occasion. They now decided to go ahead because of the 
interest which Heaton Nichol Is had stirred. Ford approached 
Heaton Nichol Is to lead the Natal party that was to be launch-
ed at a meeting of the Torch Commando's National Executive 
which was to be held in Johannesburg on 8 May. Ford's invita-
tion to the Senator came only three days before the Johannes-
burg meeting. (62) The Natal Torch Commando leaders and Heaton 
Nicholls had not been in contact before this. It is signifi-
cant that, I ess than a fortn i ght later, they were ready to 
co-operate in t he launching of the new party. This, together 
with the decision to bring forward the launching date of the 
party is expl icable only in terms of the changed psychological 
cl imate caused . by Heaton Nichol Is's Pietermaritzburg address. 
:he ~p~ech ~ad ~ot, .as Strauss later thought, sup~1 ied the 
political Inspiration' for the Federal Party, (63J but it had 
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forced the hand of the Natal Torch Commando leaders. 
The meeting of the National Executive of the Torch 
Commando at which the Federal Party was launched met to 
discuss the future both of South Africa and of the Commando~64) 
As regards the pol itical future of the country at large, the 
National Executive was divided; one section felt that the 
National ists would spl it into two groups, whi Ie the majority, 
i.ncluding the Natal delegates, bel ieved that the National 
Party was 'permanently' in power and would press on with its 
programme. (65) As regards the future of the Commando, the 
National Executive was divided into three main groups. (66) 
Some delegates felt that the Commando should cease to exist 
altogether. Others argued that it should go into 'cold 
storage' for a whi Ie but should retain its exec~tive comm-
ittee. (67) The third viewpoint was that the Torch Commando 
should continue to oppose the National ist government strenu-
ously. This viewpoint, held by the aggressive Natal delega-
tion, prevailed and was the pol icy recommended to the 
National Congress of the Torch Commando which was due to meet 
the fol lowing month. (6~) 
Having gained a psychological victory in seeing its 
views on the future of the Torch Commando prevail, the Natal 
delegation, consisting of Ford and Hami Iton from the Coast 
Region, Chutter and Hughes Mason from the Inland Region and 
Selby and Brigadier J.T. Durrant(69) (both national vice-
chairmen of the Torch Commando) decided to press home its 
advantage. After the meeting had been formally closed, Ford 
announced to the assembled Torch Commando leaders that the 
new Federal Party was being launched. He produced a well-
prepared document divided into three sections - an introduct-
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A Cal I to the Electorate - which he asked the members to 
sign in their personal capacities and thus become sponsors 
of the new party. (70) 
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Given the varied views of the National Executives' 
members and the fact that, outside the Natal delegation, only 
I h l71) ·It two members knew of the plans to aunc a new party, 
is not surprising that this produced heated discussion. 
later it became apparent that the members present divided 
roughly into two equal groups, one for and the other against 
the creation of the new Federal Party. Nineteen(72)of the 
thirty-odd members present(73) agreed to become sponsors of 
the new party. They were joined by three others from outside 
the Committee, so that the Federal Party was launched by 
twenty-two sponsors. (74) This number included al I the Natal 
delegates, which meant that they had managed to persuade 
twelve Transvaal and two Cape delegates to support their 
movement. No support had come from the Free State or South 
West African delegates. (75) The national president of the 
Torch Commando opposed the ideas of the new movement and 
behaved, according to Selby, with a certain 'peevishness' 
throughout the discussions. (76) 
After the party had been launched, the Natal delegates 
retired to Heaton Nichol Is's hotel, where they presented the 
signed document to representatives of the press who were, at 
the same time, informed that Heaton N i cho I I s had agreed to 
head the Natal Federal Party. (77) Curiously, he was not one 
of the sponsors of the party itself. Equally curiously, 
sponsorship did not commit the signatories to any definite 
future activity or position. Most of them played no recorded 
70. E.G. Ford toB. Reid, loc.cit., and elaborated In an 
interview. Confirmed ·in an interview with C.S. Keary. 
7 1. W. V. T. C.: Min ut e s, 16M a y I 953, I 0 c. cit. 
72. Selby: The Union Federal Party and the Torch, loc.cit. 
73. Interviews with E.G. Ford and C.S. Keary. 
7(. U.F.P. (Natal): Statement, Principles and A Cal I to the 
Electorate, II May. 1953. 
75. Ibid. 
76. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 16 May 1953, loc.cit. 
77. Natal Mercury: II May 1953. 
part in the subsequent development of the party and, as one 
of them, John Wi I son, I ater wrote: ' I rea I I y never had any-
thing to do with the U.F.P., [Qnion Federal Part~,(78) 
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The press statement began by arguing that the general 
election had given 'Afrikaner National ism' a clear majority 
necessitating a new 'approach' to the country's problems. (79) 
The South African nation (referring to the Whites) was seen 
as being sharply divided into two camps, with the Afrikaner 
government 'permanently' establ ished in office and pursuing 
pol icies which inflamed tensions between White and non_White~80) 
The statement continued by rejecting 'both major pol itical 
parties' which were accused of having appealed to 'racial 
prejudice'. They should be replaced by a movement pledged to 
a 'real istic and courageous' pol icy, based ' on principle and 
rejecting 'sectional ism or prejudices'. (81) The statement 
concluded by enunciating the principles on which the future 
of the country should be built. 
The first principle laid down the national aim of the 
party, which was: 
To create in , South Africa opportunities for 
people of al I races to enjoy fullness of life 
and I iberty under the protection of the law, 
to enable our country to play an honourable 
p~r~ ~n W~rld Affairs and to promote Western (82) 
CIVI I Isatlon among the peoples of South Africa. 
The second principle, which enshrined what was cal led 
the 'long term' pol icy of the party, envisaged a constitution 
and a 'way of I ife' acceptable to al I the states and territor-
I es of' southern A fr i ca. (83.) Th i s, in turn, wou I d be the bas i s 
78. J. Wi Ison to 8. , Reid, n.d. (In the possession of the 
a~t~or) C.S. Keary, also one of the sponsors, 
simi I~rly had no further contact with the party. He 
had signed the stateme~t because of 'war-time loyalty' 
to Ford. Interview with C.S. Keary. 
79. U.F.P. : Statement, loc.cit. 
80. I bid. 
81. Ibid. 
82. Ibid. 
83. I bid. 
of a United States of Southern Africa, consisting of South 
Africa and its unspecified neighbouring 'States, Colonies 
and Protectorates'. (84) . 
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The remaining principles were more specific. The third 
principle required that the 'material' elements of the 
'contract' of Union be entrenched and that, within that frame-
work, the existing quasi-unitary system of government be 
altered to a federal system in accordance with the ideas 
expressed in the Hoi lander Memorandum. (85) The right of the 
provinces in given circumstances to determine their own future 
was the fourth principle. Specifically, if the letter or 
spirit of the constitution were violated, a province could opt 
to 'rema i n 'a par.t of the Commonwea I th under the Crown. (86) It 
was stated, specifically, that the party would work for the 
'mai.ntenance' of the above right, thereby implying that it 
already existed. (87) In order that there should be no misunder-
standing of the type of circumstance which would permit a 
province to determine its own future (and thus permit the 
de facto destruction of the Union) a number of possible even-
tual ities were given . . These " included a weakening of the 
country's loyalty to the Crown, the setting aside of the 
'entrenched' clauses, the denial of the testing power · of the 
courts and the abol ition or reduction of provincial powers. (88) 
The fifth principle concerned the relationship between 
the state and the citizen. It pledged the party to maintain 
the 'Western' democratic form of government and the existing 
pari iamentary institutions, to . protect the I iberties and 
freedom of the individual, to maintain the right of access to 
the courts and to work for the I imitation of the·power of 
the executive. (89) Finally, it opposed all total itarian forces, 
84. Ibid. 
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whether Fascist or Communist. ~90) 
The sixth principle dealt with what was termed 'Racial 
accord'. (91) The word 'racial' in this document was given 
two meanings; firstly, it meant either the Engl ish or Afrik-
aans-speaking ethnic group and, secondly, it meant a group 
based on colour such as the Whites or Blacks. The first 
type of 'racial' accord for which the party would work was 
between the two White groups. It would promote 'unyielding'. 
resistance against any attempt at 'domination' by one of the 
two groups. (92) As regards the second type of 'racial accord', 
the party planned a 'progressive' rather than a 'repressive' 
pol icy in I ine with 'Western' traditions and 'Christian' 
teach i ngs. (93) 
The progressive 'Non-European' pol icy was the subject 
of the final, most detai led and most expl icit of the seven 
principles. (94) The opening paragraph stated that the 
. existing pol icies offered no hope of 'permanently peaceful' 
relations between the peoples of South Africa and the new 
party's 'guiding' principle in this field was the 'abandonment 
of fear,~95) As regar.ds actual pol icy, the Federals saw the 
rapid improvement of I iving conditions, welfare services, 
education and economic opportunities as its immediate aims 
and the only way to overcome 'pol itical discontent,.(96) As 
regards the contentious issue of the franch·ise, the party 
would adhere to the principle that the existing franchise 
should in no way be curtai led. The existing system of group 
representation for the Black population was to be extended 
90. Ibid. This principle was prompted by memories of the 
republ ican constitution publ ished in 1942 with its 
anti-democratic and total itarian bias and, more recently, 
the Swart Acts of earl ier that year which the Torch 
Commando as a whole had opposed because the Acts were 
seen to be an assault on personal liberties. 








to the Indians. This would be for an 'interim' period only, 
after which the main franchise plan and the kernel of the 
Federal Party's race pol icy, would take effect. (97) This was 
a qual ified franchise. 
The clause which dealt with the qual ified franchise 
envisaged the placing of those' .•. non-Europeans who have 
passed suitable tests of a high standard, upon the common rol I 
of voters'. (98) Appreciating its pol itically explosive · 
nature, this was stated to be a 'long term' pol icy only and 
would be 'Subject always to due safeguards against dispropor-
tionate representation of anyone section of the non-European 
population .•.• ,(99) How the Federals proposed to control the 
number of Black votes once the system had been introduced was 
not stated. The party had left the whole question of the (100) 
qual ified franchise open for future del iberation and assessment. 
Having dealt with the franchise issue, the drafters of 
the principles were then faced with an even more difficult 
question - social and residential segregation. They accepted 
'desirabil ity' of residential and social segregation, but 
urged that it b~ done pn a 'fair and equitable' basis and 
wherever possible, by voluntary population movements. (101) 
These could be attained by designing housing and town planning 
schemes for specific population groups. Not only would this 
achieve the desired segregation, but it would, by su)plying 
adequate housing, establ ish 'sound fami Iy life'. (102 
The last of the three sections of the document launching 
the Federal Party was the Cal I to the Electorate· (103)a 
~~~~~~~~~~~~, 
section obviously intended for widespread verbatim p~bl icity. 
This section opened with the statement that, although the 
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103. U.F.P. : Statement, loc.cit. 
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elect~on, the 'time had come for a positive and independent 
assertion of principles and hence, as private citizens and 
not as office-bearers of any movement, they announced the 
formation of the Union ~ederal Party. The ~tatement then 
announced that the party was open to al I people who bel ieved 
in federation and that the broad principles contained in the 
document would be trarislatedinto detai led pol 'icy at a 
convention to be cal led in the future. The Cal I ended with 
a declaration of faith in the good sense and sound judgment 
of the 'common man' of South Africa. (104) 
The Call to the Electorate, I ike the rest of the docu-
ment, indicated forcibly that the new Federal Party was to 
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be the antithesis of the National Party. Selby, a Federal 
leader, on two occasions discussed the formation of the 
Federal Party. On both of these he maintained that the 
strength of the National ists was the primary cause of the 
party's existence. The first occasion was a press statement 
on taking up office in the Federal Party ,in July 1953. He ' 
then maintained that seventy-five per cent. of the Afrikaners 
had supported the National Party in the election. Because 
of this electoral majority, there was no hope of a change of 
government in the fo~seeable future. He therefore saw no 
hope of obstructing the government in its main objectives: 
the establ ishment of an 'autocratic Afrikaner republ ic' and, 
the imposition of 'repressive apartheid'. (105) The reason 
for founding the Federal Party was, he stated, to supply a 
'positive alternative' to these two National ist pol icies. (106) 
The second occasion on which Selby discussed this issue was 
in private, and he was therefore more blunt. He informed a 
confidential Torch Commando meeting, that the Federal Party 
had been planned before the general election because the Natal 
104. Ibid. 
105. Natal Witness: 9 July 1953. 
106. Natal Witness: 9 July 1953. 
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Torch Commando leaders were 'convinced' that the National ists 
were unbeatable. (107) A U.P. victory would therefore have 
( 10~) 
rendered a new party unnecessary. 
Voicing the opinion of the U.P. and many of the 
country's pol itical commentators, Strauss held that the Federal 
d ' . , A £ • k t . I . ( 109 ) Party was forme as a reaction to Irl aner na lona Ism. 
In this he was supported by Henry Mi Iler, a forme~ organiser 
for General Smuts, who felt that the Federal Party had been 
'born of despair', (110)and Stanley Uys, the pol itical column-
ist of the Sunday Times who later discerned the 'threat' by ' 
Afrikaner national ism to 'subjugate' al I the Whites as the 
prime motivation for the formation of the Federal Party. (111) 
Agreement with the idea that fear of National ist intentions was 
the driving force behind the new party came also from most news-
paper editors and from the pol itical commentators of the Natal 
Daily News (112)as wei I as from Lawrence Gandar, who saw the 
Federals as a 'protest movement'. (113) On this point there was 
agreement between these opposition journal ists and Die Trans-
valer, which also felt that fear of the loss of ethnic identity 
by Engl ish-speakers motivated the Federals. (114) 
More important to the party than the press's initial 
reaction ,to the launching of the party, was the stand which it 
took in regard to its pol icies. Predictably, considering the 
reaction to Heaton Nichol Is's speech at the Services C'lub, the 
Natal Witness and the Natal Mercury supported the Federals, 
107. Natal Mercury: 25 May 1954. 
10~. This was confirmed by Prof. Durrant at the Torch Commando 
Congress in June 1953. W. V. T. C.: Minutes, 12 and 13 
J u n e 1953, op • cit., p. 11-
109. Natal Dai Iy News: 13 May 1953. 
110. Natal ,Dai Iy News: 18 June 1954. 
111. Sunday Times: 20 June 1954. 
112. Natal Dai Iy News: 13 May 1953, 15 May 1953. 
113. L. Gandar: 'Federal Party's First Election Contest' 
The Forum, September 1953, p.22. ' 
114. Die Transvaler: 13 May 1953, 7 December 1953. 
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whi Ie the rest of the press continued to support either the 
United or National Parties. The Natal Witness wished the new 
party well and was to prove a useful ally to the Federals by 
constantly defending them against attacks and giving their 
pol icies wide publ icity and sympathetic assessments. (115) The 
Natal Mercury was more selective in its support. The news-
paper saw the party's pol icy as being 'honest' and a sincere 
attempt to face 'real ities'. It strongly supported the idea 
of federation which it discussed at" length, " largely ignoring 
the Federals' other principles. (116) In fact, the Natal 
Mercury, which had strongly supported the idea of a Natal-based 
party, argued that the time was not ripe for launching it. (117) 
In addition, the editor and chairman of the Natal Mercury felt 
that the leaders of the Federal Party were not 'the right 
people,(l18)for the task. Heaton Nichol1s attributed this 
attitude to snobbery. (119) Whatever the reasons, the Natal 
Mercury, although sympathetic, never became an enthusiastic 
supporter of the Federal Party. 
The newspapers which opposed the Federal Party included 
the influential Natal Dai Iy News. This new~paper opposed what 
it termed the 'balkanisation' of the opposition and held that 
the federation idea would, at best, remove only Natal from 
National ist pressure, whi Ie the people of the other three 
provinces would be subject to National ist-control led provincial 
counci Is with increased powers, as wei I as to a National ist-
control led central government. (120) The federation idea was 
also strongly opposed by The Star which saw 'no future' for a 
party which tried to 'reverse' the course of South African 
history. (121) In addition, the newspaper viewed the pol icy as 
unreal istic because it would need a large pari iamentary 
115. Natal Witness: 12 May 1953, 14 May 1953, 18 May 1953, " 3 July 1953. 
116. Nata I Mercur~: 13 May 1953. 
117. NiP: G. Heaton Nicholls to D. Heaton N i cho I Is, 
3 December 1953. 
118. Ibid. 
119. Ibid. 
120. Natal Dai Iy News: 11 May 1953. 
121. The Star: 11 May 1953, 13 May 1953. 
majority to put it 
that this could be 
into effect. The Star did not bel ieve 
achieved in the face of 'National ist 
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d
. . , (122) omlnat Ion. The Rand Daily Mai I agreed whi Ie stating 
that it could not find 'anything' realistic nor of any merit 
in the Federal Party's 'vaguely-worded' programme. (123) The 
Cape Times also viewed the party's proposals as vague as wei I 
as 'grandiose'i(124) the Eastern Province Herald saw the 
Federal Party itself as giving 'great joy' to the Natio~al ist'!25) 
whi Ie the Cape Argus dismissed the party as a 'sect'. 
( 126) 
The lack of support from the Engl ish-language press in 
the Transvaal and Cape boded i I I for a party which hoped to 
gain some support on the Witwatersrand and in the English-
speak i ng areas of the eastern and western Cape. Even in Nata I, 
the opposition of the Natal Oai Iy News meant that the Federal 
Party would face adverse criticism from the province's largest 
newspaper. I n add it i on to press oppos it i on, the F edera I 
Party faced the establ ished influence of the U.P. which was 
quick to denounce the formation of the new party. Mitchel I, 
in a thoughtful statement, commented sadly that the Federal 
Party had achieved what the National ists had been unable to 
do - it had spl it the opposition in Natal, (127) This, he 
felt, would lead to strife, difficulty and bitterness between 
peop I e who shou I d be fr i ends. Strauss, in an aggress i ve 
statement, denounced the formation of the Federal Party as an 
act of defeat i sm. Its federa I propo~a I s he descr i bed as a 
'constitutiona.1 monstrosity,.(128) He also maintained that, 
although the formation of the Federal Party had been announced 
in a way which suggested that it was a 'creature' of the Torch 
Commando, it was nothing of the kind. (129) 
122. The Star: 13 May 1953. 
123. Rand Dai I~ Mai I: 12 May 1953. 
124. Cape Times: 11 May 1953, 13 May 1953. 
125. Eastern Province Herald: 12 May 1953. 
126. Cape Arsus: 11 May 1953. 
127. Natal Mercur~: 16 May 1953. 
128. Nata I Mercur~: 13 May 1953. 
129. Natal Mercur~: 13 May 1953. 
59 
That the Federal Party had been launched In the presen-
ce of the members of the Torch Commando was the subject of 
widespread comment and it was widely reported that there was a 
( 130) 
I ink between a section of the Torch Commando and the new party. 
It was true that the Federal Party had been created by the N~tal 
Torch Commando leaders and launched by many members of the 
Commando's National Executive but it is important to note that 
these members acted in their personal capacities and not as 
Torch Commando office-bearers. (131) Also, Ford only announced 
the pol icy of the new party and cal led for support after the 
Executive had completed its business and the meeting was formally 
closed. (132) Nevertheless, it IS clear that the Natal delega-
t ion wished the Torch Commando to be linked, in the pub I i c mind 
at least, with the Federal Party. The new party could then 
capital ise on the prestige and wide support enjoyed by the 
Commando. 
The first reactions from within the Torch Commando to 
publ ic speculation on the relationship between it and the 
Federals came from Brickhi I I and 'Sai lor' Malan. They are indi-
cative of the spl it which had now emerged in the Torch Commando. 
Brickhi I I re-iterated that the Commando was a non-party organisa-
tion but that any Torchman was free to fol low his pol itical 
conscience and join or support any pol itical party which subscri-
bed to the Torch Commando's principles. He instanced the close 
association which had existed between the Commando and the 
United Party before the general election and casually mentioned 
that the Federal Party had been 'discussed' by the Torch Commando's 
National Executive. (133) This comment was quickly denied in 
a publ ic statement by Group-Captain Malan the next day. He 





Natal \vitness: 11 May 1953. Natal Dai I~ News: 11 May 1953. 
Cape Argus: 11 May 1953. The Star: 11 ay. 1953. 
Nata I Mercury: 12 May 1953. . 
Vide supra: Ch.3. pp. 50-51. 
Natal Dai Iy News: 18 May 1953. Confirmed In interviews 
with E.G. Ford J W"I d C S K , . ' I son an •. eary. 
Natal Mercury: 13 May 1953. 
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pol itical party which did not confl ict with Torch Commando's 
principles,the National Executive had never discussed the 
desirabi I ity or otherwise of a new party. The majority of the 
Torch Commando's 'prominent' office-bearers had nothing to do 
with the Federals!134)he said. Malan concluded his statement 
with an appeal that no office-bearers resign from the movement~35) 
Despite this, four prominent leaders of the Torch Commando, 
including its patron,the former Chief Justice of South Africa, 
Mr. N.J. de Wet, (136)resigned. They gave as their reason the 
actions of certain Torch Commando leaders in 'supporting and 
associating' themselves with the formation of the Federal Pari~~7) 
Justice de Wet also denounced the method in which the party had 
been launched, in that it gave the impress i on that the step was 
sanct i oned by the Torch Comma ndo. I n an attempt to cou nteract 
this impression he -called on all Torchmen to join the U.P. 
'forthwith'. (138) 
Real ising that the Torch Commando was facing serious 
difficulties, the Natal Federal Party leaders, who were the 
Natal signatories to the document launching the party, formed 
themselves into an ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of 
Ford, (139)and worked to win support for their new party within 
the Commando. I t was reported on 14 May in the Nata I Witness 
that Natal's eighty Torch Commando branches viewed the Federals' 
programme 'sympathetically', (.140) but the real test was to come 
at the Inter-Regional Congress of the Natal Torch Commando 
he I din Pi etermar itzburg on 16 May 1953, I ess than a week after 
the formation of the Federal Party. 
The congress was 'less hectic' than was expected(141)as it 
became clear that the great majority of the delegates, represen-
134. Caee Times: 14 May 1953. 
135. Caee Times: 14 May 1953. 
136. The other three were Lieut.-General G. E. Br ink, Mr. A. J. 
de la Rey and Brig.-General B. G. L. Enslin. 
Natal Witness: 16 May 1953. 
137. Nata I Witness: 16 May 1953. 
138. Natal Witness: 16 May 1953. 
139. Natal Witness: 16 May 1953. 
140. Natal Witness: 14 May 1953. 
141. NiP: D. Heaton 
18 May 1953. 
Nicholls to G. Heaton Nichol Is, 
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. (142) ting al I but nineteen of the branches, were sympathetic 
to the Federal Party. The congress I istened to reports from 
Selby, Brickhi I I and Ford on what had happened in Johannesburg 
the previous weekend and then proceeded to discuss the question 
of the future 6f the Torch Commando. Midway through the dis-
cussion, a telegram came from the National Action Committee of 
the Commando which called on the Regional Conference to .give 
'increased powers' to their representatives who would attend an 
enlarged National Executive meeting which would consider 'fold-
ing up' the Torch Commando. (143) This official indication that 
the Commando was rapidly nearing its end, produced strong 
support for the cont i nued ex i stence of the Torch Commando, if 
necessary in Natal alone. (144) The formal resolution, however, 
gave the Natal deleration to the Johannesburg meeting 'ful I 
freedom of action'. 145) These developments were what the 
Federal Party leaders wished. Apart from their support for the 
existence of the Commando per ~, they wished to see its contin-
ued existence, at least in Natal, unti I such time as the Federal 
Party had accumulated funds and become 'wei I establ ished'. (146) 
The Federal leaders were supported by large majorities 
in favour of the formation of the Federal Party. A vote of 
148 to 5(147)supported a resolution affirming the right of any 
Torchman to join the party of his choice and regretting that 
senior office-bearers had ignored 'Sai lor' Malan's appeal. (i48) 
The sentiments expressed were neutral but the tone of the resolu-
tion supported the Federals. Support for the Federal Party 
became more expl icit in a resolution which affirmed the Natal 
142. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 16 May 1953, loc.cit. 
143. Ibid., p.2. 
144. Ibid., pp.3-6. 
145. Ibid., p.6. 
146. D. He":lton Nicholls to G. Heaton Nicholls, 18 May 1953, 
loc.clt. G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. Heaton Nichol Is, 
3 December 1953, loc.cit. 
147. D. Heaton Nichol Is to G. Heaton Nichol Is, 18 May 1953, 
loc.cit. 
148. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 16 May 1953, loc.cit. 
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Torch Commando's confidence in its office-bearers and 'in par-
ticular' in the delegation which had represented Natal at the 
. t . t' th . k d (149) Th Nat lona 'Execut I ve mee I ng e prev 10US wee en . ere 
were only eight dissentients. (150) Total support was then 
expressed for a resolution, drawn up by Heaton Nichol Is, re-
defining the Natal Stand along I ines acceptable to the Federals 
but in confl ict with the interpretat ion of the U. P. (151) 
Having taken complete control of the Torch Commando in 
Natal, the Natal Federal Party leaders left in their capacities 
as Commando delegates for what was planned as an enlarged 
National Executive Committee but which was in fact constituted 
as the Second National Congress of the Torch Commando. The 
purpose of the congress was to decide whether the Torch Commando 
was to disband or not, with most pol itical observers feel ing that 
it would be dissolved. (152) The congress, however, decided 
by a narrow vote of 423 to 399 against disbanding. (153) This 
vote was achieved because each region was al lowed a number of 
votes according to its regional membership. As a result, 
although nine of the sixteen regions voted against the resolution, 
the other seven - numer i,ca I I y stronger, in terms of the number 
of members they represented, and ably led by the Natal delegates -
were able , to keep the Commando al ive. (154) 
Later, at the third National Congress of the Torch Commando 
held in East London in September 1953, only the casting vote of 
the chairman prevented the dissolution of the Commando. (155) 
Instead, the congress voted to maintain the Torch Commando on 
149. " b i d. 
150. Ibid. 
151. Vide supra. Ch.2· pp .34-35. Ch.3. pp.4-1-42. 
152. Natal Witness: 8 June 1953, 15 June 1953. 
153. W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 12 and 13 June, op.cit., p.11. 
154. Ibid. 
155. W.V.T.C.: Third National Congress Minutes, 25 and 26 
September 1953, p.8. 
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d 
.' , b . (156) a 'care an malntalnence as~s. It was never to be 
revived into a fully functioning organisation. 
The reasons for the decl ine of the Torch Commando were 
various. Some Torchmen saw it as stemming from the disunity 
caused by the creation of the Federal Party. (157) Others, 
including 'Sai lor' Malan, felt that the real reason was that 
the Torch Commando had achieved its original objective in 
winning the long drawn-out court battle over the Coloured 
franchise. He admitted that the inabi I ity to remove the 
National ists from office in the general election (158) had 
also contributed to its decl ine. Malan IS correct in this 
analysis but there can be no questioning the fact that the 
creation of the Federal Party by leading Torchmen had divided 
the opposition to the government. Despite the oft-stated 
right of Torchmen to join the party of their choice, this had 
created party-pol itical tension within the movement, destroying 
its unifying ideal ism. The rapid decl ine of the Torch Commando / 
I ittle more was to be heard of it after September 1953 -
removed the Federal Party's strongest potential ally. This 
meant that the party now had to face alone the growing threat 
of a National ist republ ic which, following the 1953 election and 
the planned 'settlement' of the Coloured franchise question by 
the government us i ng CI two-th i rds par Ii amentary major ity, now 
emerged as the dominant fear in opposition circles. 
Anticipating this, shortly aft 2r the election, the Natal 
Provincial Counci I passed a resolution in the last week of May 
cal I ing on the government to hold a separate referendum In 
Natal before creating a republ ic. (159) Although the government 
did not respond to this, Die Transvaler, argued that the 
resolution was 'nonsensical'. The republ ic would be establ ished 
only upon 'the broad wi II of the people' and when the govern-
( 160) . ment deemed it to be in the interests of the country. These 
156. Ibid., p.9. 
157. Ibid., p.5. See also W.V.T.C.: Minutes, 12 and 13 June 
~, pp. 1-13 passim. 
158. Ibid., p.4. 
159. Natal Witness: 28 May 1953. 
160. Die Transvaler: 29 May 1953. 
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sentiments were reiterated SIX weeks later by J.G. Strydom~161) 
Transvaal leader of the National Party. Two days later 
the Prime Minister, in a speech at the election victory cele-
) 
brat ion for the Cabinet, declared that a republ ic was the 
'ideal' constitutional form for South Africa. It would, he 
said, bind the two White 'races' together. (162) The government's 
talk of a republ ic spurred the Federals to greater action. 
The party faced the task of establ ishing itself as a pol "itical 
force in South Africa. If it were to playa role, one thing was 
clear: it had first to face the mundane but necessary task to 
create a party structure. 
161. Natal Witness: 13 July 1953. 
162. Natal Witness: 15 July 1953. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PARTY'S STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
Keen to establ ish themselves as a pol itical fighting 
force as quickly as possible, the Federals began founding 
branches. Within ten days of the launching of the party, 
'several' had been formed in Natal while three had been 
. d ' t h T· I (1) B th b ., fAt const Itute In e ransvaa. y e· eg I nn I ng 0 ugus, 
the Federals claimed that there were over fifty branches in 
Natal alone and the party appeared to be growing quickly.(2) 
Not only did it have popular support and press backing, at 
I east in Nata I, it a I so had the support of two senators and 
hence could make its voice heard in parI iament and in the 
pari iamentary reports in the dai Iy press. 
The two senators were Browne and Heaton Nicholls. Browne 
resigned from the Labour Party and appl ied immediately for 
membership of the Federal Party.(3) This move prompted 
demands from both the leader and the general secretary of the 
Labour Party that Browne resign his Senate seat as he . had been 
elected to it by the Natal Members of Pari iament and of the 
Provincia·1 Counci I - none of whom were Federal Party support-
ers. (4) Browne refused to resign and gave as his reason that he 
represented the people of Natal and not a pol itical party. As 
his principles were the same as those of a large section of 
Natal's voters, he felt that he was justified In remaining 
a senator. (5) When a simi lar demand was made by two U.P. M.P~s 
that Heaton Nichol Is resign his seat in the Senate, he refused 
on grounds simi lar to those of Browne. He maintained, however, 
that he represented the 'bulk' of Natal's population. (6) 
1. Natal Witness: 21 May 1953. 
2. Natal Witness: 7 August 1953. 
3. Caee Times: 22 May 1953. 
4. Caee Times: 22 May 1953. Natal Witness: 27 May 1953. 
5. Natal Mercur~: 22 May 1953. Nata I Witness: 27 May 1953. 
6. Natal Witness: 5 June 1953, 6 June 1953. 
~aee Times: 21 June 1953. 
Despite this initial progress, the growth of the 
Federal Party was not as rapid as many had hoped or expec-
ted. The party leaders had expected many 'prominent' men 
openly to support the new party and had anticipated wide-
spread popular support amongst the Natal publ ic. (7) The 
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Rand Dai Iy Mai I, however, reported that the Federal Party 
was meeting 'wariness from both voters and pol iticians'. (8) 
Natal ians, stated the newspaper, felt that the Federal ideals 
were impractical and that the Federal Party was simply another 
spl inter group~ (9) The sympathetic Natal Mercury agreed that 
the Federal Party had not captured the publ ic imagination in 
the way the Natal Stand had done the previous year but gave 
no reasons for this.(10) As ~he Federals identified strongly 
with the Natal Stand, this sympathetic opinion was not en-
couragl ng. Even party leaders adm itted, in pr i vate, that, 
in the words of Derek Heaton Nichol Is, .there was no 'wi Id 
rush' to join the party. (11) They explained this away by 
arguing that 'fence sittinf' and not opposition was 
of this reserved reaction. 12) 
the cause 
Before the Feder~1 Party could hope to establ ish itself 
further, it needed to be formally organised. This necessity 
was the more pressing since provincial elections were due in 
1954. The party thus turned its attention to its structure 
and organisation. 
The Federal Party, I ike most pol it .ical groups, did not 
emerge as a fully operating organisation within the first few 
months of its I ife. Rather, it evolved. Committees and offices 
were founded or disbanded as the need arose, but certain basic 
ideas, such as the federal structure of the party remained 
unchanged. 
7. Caee Times: 21 May 1953. 
8. Rand Dai I~ Ma i I: 19 May 1953. 
9. Rand Dai I ~ Ma i I: 19 May 1953. 
10. Natal Mercur~: 3 November 1953. 
It. D. Heaton Nicholls to G. 
loc.cit. 
Heaton Nicholls, 18 May 1953, 
12. I bid. 
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In conformity with its .name and one of its basic prIn-
ciples, the Union Federal Party, which was usually referred 
to as one national entity, was actually three provincial 
parties. It was organised and legally constituted on a 
federal basis with sovereign power being invested In each of the 
provincial parties. The Call to the Electorate of 11 May 
1953 stated; 
•.• the centres of sovereign power of the Party 
shal I rest in e~ch Province so that Provincial 
pol itical activity shal I not be exclusively 
controlled by the decision of a remote and central 
Party Executive. A consultant Counci I of Provin-
cial Executives will be formed having advisory 
powers but not executive powers. (13) 
This federat principle was further underscored by the fact 
that separate parties were founded at different times in the 
four provinces, each having its own constitution. For 
instance, 'The Union Federal Party (Natal) (A Constituent Part 
of the Union Federal Party)' was founded at Durban on 14 and 
15 August 1953 and quoted the principle of provincial power 
and autonomy both in the preamble and in the first clause of 
its constitution. (14) . It was the first, largest and best 
organised of the provincial parties. 
After two abo~tive attempts in August and November 1953(15) 
the Transvaal party was constituted in Johannesburg in 
November 1954(16)and this was followed by. the formation of an 
East Cape Federal Party at a convention at Stutterheim and 
Kingwi I I iamstown on 23 and 24 July 1955. (17) A western Cape 
zone of t~e party was establ ished in September 1957.(18) 
Within the month, the west and east Cape Federal groups were 
united in a single Union Federal Party (Cape) with 'west and 
13. U.F.P.: Statement, loc.cit. 
14. U.F.P. (Natal): Constitution, n.d., p.l. 
15. Cape Times: 9 July 1953. Natal Witness: 19 November 1953. 
16. Pretoria News: 8 November 1954. 
17. U.F.P. (East Cape): Principles, n.d., p.l. 
18. Cape Times: 27 September 1957. 
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east zones'. (19) With the Federal Party functioning in 
three of the four provinces, the idea grew that it was time 
to have a federal organisation in the fourth province as wei I. 
As a result, three Natal officials went on a short propaganda 
tour of the Orange Free State in January 1957 to try and bui Id 
up interest there. They were courteously received and pol itely 
given a hearing but nothing came of the visit.(20) 
While each of the provincial parties existed as a distinct 
legal entity, there were inter-provincial contacts at both a 
casual and a formal level. Members were encouraged to cal I on 
party officials in other parts of the country(21)and visiting 
officials from one province to another were accorded guest 
status at meetings. In addition, officials from all the 
provincial parties occasionally met to discuss some issue of 
common importance; such as when Transvaal and East Cape members 
attended the Natal Provincial Executive meeting on 18 September 
1954 after the party had fai led to capture an) seats in the 
provincial council elections of that year. (22 Inter-provincial 
consultation as envisaged by the founders of the Federal Party, 
was to take place through the advisory Counci I of Provincial 
Executives. (23) 
The creation of this counci I, or Inter-Provincial 
Committee as it was eventually cal led, was discussed by dele-
gates from the three provinces at · the 18 September meeting, (24) 
and in February 1955 the Natal Provincial Executive acceded to 
a Transvaal request to hold an inaugural meeting of the comm-
ittee in Johannesburg the fol lowing month. (25) The Jnter-
Provincial Committee was supposed to meet quarterly and was to 
be used for the 'consultation and co-ordination' of the party's 
19. Ca~e Times: 27 ·September 1957. 
20. Federal News: 19 March 1957. 
21. Federal News: 19 Apr i I 1957. 
22. Natal Witness: ' 20 September 1954. 
23. U.F.P. : Statement, loc.cit. 
24. Natal Witness: 20 September 1954. 
25. U.F.P. (Natal) : Provincial Executive Committee Meet i ng 
Minutes, 19 February 1955, p. 2. 
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effort on a national scale. (26) The meetings never material-
ised, however, for over two years later the western Cape 
leader of the party, Mrs. Hope Struben, complained that the 
"committee 'should start to function' and that, as the party~s 
ideas were of nat i ona I importance, a 'nat i ona I leader' " shou I d 
be appointed. (27) This suggestion was supported by the Federal 
Party's influential Natal Provincial Executive(28)and the 
following year a resolution was proposed by the 'West Cape' at 
the Natal Federal Party Congress call iog for the election of a 
national leader and reiterating the plea that the Inter-Provin-
cial Committee 'become a real ity'. (29) The committee was then 
at last appointed, representing the Transvaal, Cape and Natal, 
and duly elected Selby, the then Natal leader, as national 
leader. (30) While the Transvaal party issued an enthusiastic 
statement headed,Federal Party now on a National Basis, (31) 
the Federal News, the organ of the Natal party, gave the new 
committee and the election of the national leader poor cover-
aae , relegating it to a smal I report on the third page. (32) 
Little more was heard either of the committee or of the posi-
tion of national leader. 
In tracing the relationships between the three provincial 
F edera I Part i es and in exam i n i ng the mot i ves, ideas and act ions 
of the party's leaders in relation to the party structure, two 
questions come to mind. Firstly, why was there such a long 








Federal News: 22 December 1955. 
Nip: H. Struben to D. Heaton Nichol Is, 28 June 1957. 
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U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Con~ress Papers, Private 
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national leader, despite the publ ished intentions of the 
founders of the party as regards the former? Secondly, why 
was it that the strong support for the creation of the ·comm-
ittee and the national leader should come from the Cape and 
Transvaal leaders whereas the Natal party was lukewarm, at 
best? 
The answer to the first question I ies partly in the fact 
that the Transvaal and Cape parties took some time to become 
formally constituted; the Cape party was formally created over 
four years after the launching of the party in May 1953. (33) 
More important, however, was the basic concern with federal ism. 
This mitigated against the formation of a supra-provincial 
body and leader, even though these would have no real power. 
As each provincial party met to draw up its own constitution 
and to formulate its own pol icies on vital issues such as 
race or republ icanism, the importance of the ·sovereign prov-
vincial party loomed ever larger and the importance of a 
national party receded. Only when they were organised and 
their pol icies were formulated did the Cape and Transvaal 
parties return to, and. strongly ~upport the idea of a national 
body and leader. 
At .this stage, the Natal party's continued lack of 
enthusiasm can be explained, firstly, in terms of the fact that 
from its inception, it drew widespread support from its close 
identification with the Natal Stand, its constant claim of a 
right to independence In the advent of a republ ic and its 
constant harking back to the lost opportunities and broken 
promises of the Natal devolution movement of the 1930s. These 
preoccupations gave the Natal party a parochial flavour and 
this mitigated against co-operation with organisations in 
other provinces~ Secondly, as the. Natal party had by far fhe 
greatest resources, there seemed to. be I ittle to be gained from 
any equal participation with the other parties. The Cape and 
Transvaal parties, on the other hand, could expect considerable 
33. Vide supra: Ch. 4. pp. 67-68. 
moral and material support from the larger Natal body. The 
Natal party's potential resources were also greater because, 
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as the Federal Parties in al I the provinces appealed almost 
exclusively to Engl ish-speaking voters, it was only the Nata"1 
party which had the potential of being voted into power as it 
was only in Natal that Engl ish-speaking vo~ers predominated 
in most of the constituencies. Also, Heaton Nichol Is, easi Iy 
the most prominent figure amongst the Federals and the de facto 
leader of the movement, was the Natal party leader. 
The Natal party, therefore, because of its greater 
resources and the fact that it alone had the chance of power, 
assumed a dominant position or In the words of Heaton Nichol Is 
was 'given pride of place,(34) In relation to the other two 
provincial parties and could afford to Ignore any inter-provin-
cial committees. Gradually, the Natal party's dominance became 
so great that the other two parties saw the Natal Stand, as 
defined by the Natal Federal Party, as vital to the future of 
the country. As the Transvaal party's statement after the 
1958 Natal Congress pointed out: 
De I egates from the Transvaa I and the Cap e 
were just as keen as those of Natal on 
implementing a Natal Stand and were of the 
opini9n that it would save the whole 
country. (.35) 
It is not surprising, in view of the relationship between 
the parties, that one of the Natal branches suggested at that 
congress that the name of the party should be ch~nged to the 
'Natal Party,.(36) It is indeed ironic that a party which so 
frequently denounced the U.P. for al lowing control of Natal's 
affairs to be exercised from· over the Drakensberg was tempted 
to use its own position within the federal movement to control 
opinion outside the province. 
Whatever the relationships between the provIncial Federal 
Parties, the cohesion of each party should constitutional Iy h~ve 
depended upon annual congresses, at which party officials and 
34. Natal Witness: 6 May 1954. 
35. U.F.P. (Transvaal): Federal Party now a National Party, 
loc.cit. 
36. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Congress Papers, 1958, 
loc.cit. 
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committees should have been elected. The Natal party held 
annual congresses, but there is no record of the Cape and 
Transvaal parties ever having done so, although one was 
planned for the 'Eastern Cape' In June 1955. (37) The annual. 
congresses were never convened in the Cape and Transvaal 
because, In the first instance, the organisation of both 
parties was unstable and ephemeral and, secondly, because 
the Cape and Transvaal leaders attended the Natal congresses, 
where they enjoyed the right to speak and vote. Party 
branches outside the province were also permitted to submit 
resolutions. This meant that Cape and Transvaal members could 
keep in touch with party activity and thought in Natal. They 
cou I d meet I arge numbers of I i ke-m i nded peop I e soc i a II y. In 
addition to this important social aspect, the party congress 
also provided the leaders with the opportunity to meet and 
address the party officials and members as a single group. For 
example, Heaton Nichol Is's plea that the Federals remain aloof 
from the 1958 general election despite previous publ ic state-
ments to the contrary was made at the 1957 party. congress. (38) 
The Natal party congress thus came to playa pivotal role as 
far as a I I the F edera I Part i es were concerned. I t therefore 
merits closer attention. 
The congress, which had to assemble at least once every 
calendar year, consisted of the party's publ ic representatives, 
members of the Provincial Executive, members of the various 
Zone Executives and delegates from the branches ' ... on such 
basis as may be determined by the Provincial Executive. ,(39) 
Once a quorum of representatives of at least one-eighth of the 
branches had been establ ished, ' the congress could proceed with 
its business according to an agenda which had been drawn up by 
the Provincial Executive. Should any of the delegates wish to 
add to the agenda, the support of two-thirds of ' the delegates , 
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select committees. Thus, at the convention which establ ished 
the Natal party in 1953 three committees were appointed to 
draft detai led pol icy statements on education, non-White pol icy 
and social and economic matters. AI I three committees were to 
report to a special congress convened in March 1954. (40) The 
three committees were made into standing committees at this 
special congress and a fourth committee, on current legisla-
tion, was created. (41) 
The first of the committees, the Education Committee 
under the party's educaiion expert, Martin, worked quickly and 
publ ished its fifteen-point Memorandum on Education Pol icy 
in January 1954, (42)before the special congress met. Simul-
taneous I y, it c i rcu I ar i sed numbered and conf i dent i a I ' notes' 
to leading party officials to be read in conjunction with the 
memorandum. (43) The memorandum became Federal Party pol icy 
and later in the year the Education Committee sent copies of 
the memorandum to school principals in Durban and Pietermaritz-
burg(44) and also drew up a statement of pol icy entitled 
Your Chi Id and the Future for election purposes. (45) Apart 
from the formulation of pol icy, the Education Committee 
publ icised its views on certain educational problems, such as 
the shortage of Engl ish-speaking teachers because of low 
salaries and the withdrawal of subsidies for immigrant teacher'~6) 
As active as the Education Committee but with a more 
involved history was the committee appointed to deal with non-
White pol icy. The committee was first created in 1953 and 
presented a report to the special congress of 1954. This report 
40. Natal Mercury: 17 August 1953. 
41. U.F.P. (Natal): Special Congress Papers, 26 and 27 March 1954, 
Agenda, p. 2. 
42. U.F.P. (Natal): Memorandum on Educatibnal Pol icy, 
24 January 1954. 
43. U.F.P. (Natal): Notes for use in conjunction with Memoran-
dum on Education, 24 January 1954. 
44. Natal Dai Iy News: 3 June 1954, 4 June 1954. 
45. Vide infra: Ch.5 · p. 110. 
46. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Congress Papers, 12 and 13 
October 1956, p.8. 
\,'as approved and pub I i shed on 27 March 1954 as the Nata I . 
party's Statement of Non-European Pol icy. (47) The state-
ment, however, was not as final as its title suggested 
because its fourth general principle was that there was 'no 
final solution' to the country's racial problems and that 
constant 'adapt ion' of any pol icy was necessary. (48) When 
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the party's statement was re I eased to the press, it was descr i bed 
as theparty's'immediate pol icy:(49) At the 1956 congress 
a standing committee was then elected to make further recommen-
dations. The whole issue of the non-White franchise was raised 
once more and a third committee on non-White pol icy, (the 
. special Franchise Committee), was appointed to deal with the 
matter. (50) . . . 
The terms of reference of the Franchise Committee were 
to ' investigate and report on the multiple vote and othe r 
franchise methods which would best be appl icable to South 
African conditions.' The actual constitution of the committee 
was left to the Provincial Executive. (51) Five )ersons were 
appointed to this committee in November 1956, (52 it being 
envisaged that it would meet fortnightly and hold interviews 
with 'distinguished persons in all walks of life'. (53) In the 
event, sittings were neither as frequent nor the persons 
interviewed 'as representative as might have been ,.(54) This 
47. U.F.P. (Natal): Statment of Non-European Pol icy, 
27 March 1954. 
48. Ibid., p.1. 
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was because the members of the committee, being in ful I-time 
employment, . had to find time to serve on the committee. They 
were furthermore without secretarial help and did not have 
the advantage of access to government records or statistics. 
Oesp ite these hand i caps, its report was comp I eted and subm i tted 
to the 1957 annual congre~s, where its recommendations were 
accepted, with reservations. (55) Having fulfi lied its 
commission, the Franchise Committee ceased to exist. 
The third committee, under the chairmanship of J. Freeman, 
appointed at the 1953 convention was instructed to draft 
detai led pol icy on social and economic affairs.(56) It drew up 
a wide-ranging if somewhat disconnected interim report. (It 
was undated but was obviously completed ~n that same year.) 
The introduction was concerned with the economic viabi I ity of 
Natal in the event of the province being separated from the 
rest of South Africa(57)and, as it was this aspect of the 
committee's work which became crucial, the committee was re-
const ituted at the spec i a I congress of March 1954. I t thus 
emerged as a third standing committee concerned with the 
'Economic development of Natal' ~nd its convenor, J. Freeman 
was asked by the party chairman, Selby, in April.1954, to 
, ... make a study of the economic impl ications of the Natal 
Stand as a first and urgent necessity.,(58) By this time, 
the committee had completed papers on three aspects of Natal's 
economy(59) and, during the following few years, it issued 
several more papers on Natal's economic viabi I ity. This appears 
55. u. F. P. (Nata I): Prov i nc i a I Congress Minutes, 18 and 19 
October 1957, p.3. For further detai Is of the report, 
V ide infra~Ch.10. pp. 252-3. 
56. Natal Mercury: 17 August 1953. 
57. U.F.P. {Natal}: Interim Repor.t from Social and Economic 
sub-committee of the Union Federal Party, n.d.,p.1 • . 
58. U.F.P. {Natal}: Economic Aspects of the Natal Stand 
April 1954, p.l. ' 
· 59. On' Ports and Harbours', 'Agriculture' and 'The 
viabi I ity of Natal's Economy'. Ibid. 
to have been the only problem which concerned the committee 
because early in 1957 a prominent party businessman, W. 
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Gr i mwood, I amented the fact that no comm ittee had been 
appointed to formulate 'an intell igent economic pol icy'. (60) 
No fresh instructions, however, were issued to the committee, 
nor was another committee appointed. 
The fourth standing committee was appointed by the 
special congress of March 1954 to deal with current legisla-
t i on. I t was convened by an attorney, a former labour Party 
provincial secretary, S. Greene. The committee reported to 
the 1954 Natal Provincial Congress(61)and to the Provincial 
Executive during the following year, (62)after which it lapsed. 
If the first function of the provincial congress was to 
determine the pol icies of the party, its second function was 
to elect provincial office-bearers. (63) The constitution required 
the election of patrons of the party (if any), a leader of the 
provincial party, a chairman, one or more vice-chairmen and 
a provincial treasurer. (64) In practice, the congress did not 
elect any patrons and in addition to the above officials, it 
elected a provincial accountant, a provincial auditor and a 
provincial secretary. (65) Only the provincial secretary 
received . a salary. (66) The number of vice-chairmen varied from 
year to year. For example, the 1953 convention appointed three 
vice-chairmen, one to control planning, one administration and 
one organisation and pol icy. (67) The 1955 congress elected 
60. B/p: W. Grimwood to B. Batchelor, 4 January 1957. 
61.U.F.P. (Natal): Report by the Committee on Current 
legislation, 23 September 1954. 
62. Federal News: 19 Apri I 1955. 
63. u. F. P. (Nata I): Const itut ion, I oc. cit. 
64. Ibid., p.6. 
65. In 1957 they were Mrs. R. J. Mcintosh, D. McLean and 
Mrs. E. Ross respectively. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 
18 and 19 October 1957, op.cit., p.4. 
66. Ibid. 
67. A.R. Selby, W.F. Hamilton and R. Brickhill. 
Natal Mercury: 17 August 1953. 
four vice-chairmen, three to represent the Durban, Midlands 
and Zulu land 'areas' and the fourth, Mrs. Phyl I is Argo, to 
, hid' , ( 68) T h . , I ff . b represent tea les . ese provincia 0 Ice- earers 
formed the nucleus of the party's most influential body, the 
Provincial Executive Committee. 
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The Provincial Executive included, apart from the pro-
vincial office-bearer~, two delegates from each party zone 
plus five members elected at the annual congress. When the 
congress was not in session, the Provincial Executive was 
empowered to 'manage the affairs of the Party,;(69) an author-
ity which included a wide range of activities. It planned 
party 'strategy,(70) and briefed the party's two senators(71) 
just before the convening of pari iament. (72) It debated and 
sanctioned the creation of the Inter-Provincial Committee(73) 
to control the relationship between the provincial party and 
its sister parties in other provinces, for which purpose the 
Natal Executive received reports from its officials on the 
state of the Cape and Transvaal parties. The executive also 
decided on the dates and places of the annual and special 
congresses, but left the detai led organisation of these func-
tions to an appointed committee. (74) . 
These functions of the executive, however, were peri-
pheral to its central activities which were to oversee and 
stimulate the zones and branches, to employ and control the 
party's paid organiser, to debate and decide on the many 
problems relating to the party's newspaper and propaganda 
services and to manage the party's funds. 
68. Federal News: 22 December 1955. C. Kinsman, R. Hughes 
Mason and D. Heaton Nichol Is were the three vice-chairmen. 
69. U.F.P. (Natal): Constitution, op.cit., p.6. 
70. Natal Witness: 18 January 1954. 
71. Senators E.R. Browne and G. Heaton Nichol Is. 
72. Natal Witness: 28 January 1954. 
73. Vide supra: Ch.4. pp. 68-69. 
74. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee Minutes, 28 J u I y 1956, p . .;,.2.;... • ..;;....;...;:...:...;,;:;..;..:..~:.:..:.:::..:::.::..:::...:...!..!::'.....,;~!!!:-!.~~.!:!...!.!~~ 
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Firstly, the organisation and stimulation of zones and 
branches. The province of Natal, according to the constitu-
tion, was to be divided into such zones as were' ..• decided 
on by the Provincial Executive from time to time.' These were 
. h h h . h t . t ·t (75) to enJoy suc powers t at t e executive c ose 0 assign 0 I • 
The branches, in turn, were formed at 'the d i scret i on of the 
Zone Executive for the area,.(76) Quite clearly, therefore, 
the Federal Party was hiera~hical. Decentral isation of power ,. 
operated at a provincial level but not within each provincial 
party. The originators and early organisers of the federal 
movement, mostly Natal ians, had no intention of losing control 
of the movement. 
When the party was organised in 1953, Natal was divided 
into five zones: South Coast, Durban Area, Zululand, Midlands 
and Northern Natal, (77)whereas the Transvaal was divided into 
three regions (the same as zones) called .Northern, Southern and 
Johannesburg. (78) This dividing up of the provinces, however, 
was shortl ived; the Northern Natal Zone was stil Iborn(79)and 
the Transvaal Regions were abol ished and 'combined' with the 
Transvaal Provincial Executive. (80) Other zones, on the other 
hand, could be divided into two because of their unwieldy size. 
Examples of this were the South Coast Zone which was divided 
into an Upper and Lower South Coast Zone in 1954(81)and the 
large Zulu land Zone which was subdivided into the Northern 
Zu I u I and and Lower Tuge I a Zones. (82) I t was not a I ways found 
necessary to divide a large zone into two smaller ones. The 
75. U.F.P. (Natal): Constitution, op.cit., p.4. 
76. Ibid. 
77. Nata I Mercury: 17 August 1953. 
78. U.F.P. (Natal): Vice-chairman's Circular, February 1954,p.4. 
79. It had.only one member in 1954. U.F.P. (Natal): Budget of 
Expend Iture - Three Months to 15 June 1954, 15 June 1954. 
80. U.F.P. (Natal): Vice-chairman's Circular, loc.cit. 
81. Ibid., p.l. 
82. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee Minutes, 
22 June 1957, Treasurer's Report, p.2. 
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Durban Zone, for instance, was divided into two sub-zones, 
, h ' (83) each headed by a Vlce-c airman. 
Once created, the zone with its Executive Committee, 
made up of two representatives of each branch, was responsible 
for the 'effective co-ordination' of al I party activities 
'th' ' t (84) w I I n I . In practice, much of the activity of the zone 
and its Executive ,Committee was merely to act as I iason between 
the branches and the Provincial Executive. The Provincial 
Executive, however, sent circulars direct to the branches. It 
was rare that a project was undertaken by the zone executive. 
An exception to this was the summer school arranged for candi-
dates in the 1954 provincial elections. Held over three days 
in March 1954, the school was organised by the Midlands Zone 
but was attend~d by candidates and other interested people from 
al lover the province. (85) Three years later, the Midlands 
Zone arranged a two day course In publ ic speaking for officials 
of the party. (86) Most commonly, however, zone executives had 
I ittle to report of their own activities and were not even 
represented at Provincial Executive meetings. (87) 
The lowest posit .ion in the party structure was the branch~88) 
This, however, did not correspond with its importance, for apart 
from the Provincial Executive, the branches were the most 
important bodies in the party. The editor of the Federal News, 
the party's newspaper, I ikened the Provincial Executive to the 
heart of a person and stated that 'Everybody knows that the 
, (89) arteries •.. are .•. the branches. The main function of 
83. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 19 February, op.cit., p.l. 
84. U.F.P. (Natal): Constitution, loc.cit. 
85. Nata I Mercury: 15 March 1953. 
86. U.F.P. (Natal): Notes on Short Course in Public Speaking, 
n.d., p.1. 
87. B/P: W. Grimwood to B. Batchelor, 24 November 1956. 
88. The Federal Party branches coincided with provincial 
counci I constituencies rather than with pari iamentary seats. 
Natal Witness: 9 July 1953. 
89. Federal News: 22 December 1955. 
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arteries is to carry blood, he continued, and the blood of 
a pol itical party is money. (90) Apart from fund-raising, the 
functions of a branch and its committee, as defined in the 
constitution, were to elect delegates to annual congresses 
and to hold at least two branch meetings annually. In addition, 
in order to promote 'actively the ideals and principles of the 
party', (91) it was expected to hold publ ic meetings, to ~rrange 
social functions and generally to use its local knowledge to 
advance the party's interests. An example of this dependence 
upon local knowledge was the Natal vice-chairman, Roger 
Br i ckh i I I' s, instruct ions to the branches to comp i I eli sts, to 
be sent to the party's chairman, of 'affluent or influential 
persons' known to them to be in sympathy with the ideals of the 
Federal Party. (92) These people were, no doubt, to be approa-
ched by a senior party official or, later, by the party's 
paid organlser. 
The decision to appoint a ful I-time paid organlser was 
taken by the Prov i nc i a I Execut i ve in September 1954 after the 
party had fai led to capture any seats in the provincial 
elections of the previous June. (93) The organiser, Leo Vermaak 
was young (34) and bi I ingual. He also had an Afrikaans surn~me 
and this gave hope of attracting some Afrikaner support. (94) 
On 1 February 1955 he commenced duties(95)which were to 
stimulate branches into activity. In order to do this, and 
to be kept informed as to branch activity, he issued a circular 
to al I branch chairmen, stipulating that branch meetings were 
to be held once a month (and not only twice annually as consti-
tution required) and that copies of the minutes were to be 
forwarded to him. (96) In addition, Vermaak planned to visit 
al I the zones and branches. He 'made contact' with the branches 
90. Federal News: 22 December 1955. 
91. U.F.P. (Natal): Constitution, loc.cit. 
92. U.F.P. (Natal): Vice-chairman's Circular, op.cit., p.3. 
93. Natal Witness: 20 September 1954. 
94. Federal News: 31 January 1955. 
95. B/P: W. Grimwood to B. Batchelor, 11 January 1955. 
96. U.F.P. (Natal): Organiser's Circular, 6 July 1955. 
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In the North and South Coast areas, (97)announced that he and 
Senator Browne would visit al I the other branches 'shortly,(98) 
and arranged a 'very extensive' itinerary in order to accom-
pi ish this. (99) Apart from visiting branches, Vermaak also 
planned to involve the publ ic more fully in Federal Party 
activities. Starting with Durban, he organised five success-
ful publ ic meetings and planned two more, al I within the first 
two months of his appointment. (100) 
Despite this initial activity, the appointment was not 
a success. One reason for this was that he was soon sidetracked 
into other activities. During July 1955, for example, he worked 
not for the Federal Party at al I but for the Anti-Republ ican 
League. (101) A second problem which Vermaak faced was that 
the Provincial Executive had not clarified the chain of authority 
and he, therefore, had 'too many bosses'. (102) This made him 
disappointingly ineffective and he never even managed to visit 
a I I the Nata I zones, I et a lone a I I the branches. (103) Most 
serious was the fact that Vermaak fai led to generate sufficient 
funds to make his paid position possible. As the treasurer 
put it: 'If Leo cannot bring in the funds then we cannot afford 
a ful I-time Organiser. ,(104) As a result, the position of 
organiser was abol ished In February 1956(105)and the party had 
to rely more heavi lyon the party newspaper, to maintain interest. 
To maintain interest and to keep before the minds of the 
party members' ..• the great purposes for which the Party was 
formed' were indeed the stated aims of the Federal News, (106) 
the official organ of the Natal party and the third major 
activity of the Provincial Executive. Simi lar in aims, content 
97. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, .19 February 1955, op.cit., p.l. 
98. U.F.P. (Natal): Organiser's Circular, loc.cit. 
99. B/p: W. Grimwood to B. Batchelor, 1 December 1955. 
100. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee Minutes 
25 March 1955, p.1. . ' 
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and format was the Federal ist, the official organ of the 
. d ' bl d '1 (107) Transvaal Federal Party. Planned, Incre I y, as a al y, 
this journal appeared every two months in 1955 and 1956 and 
had very I ittle impact. 
The Federal News first appeared on 23 December 1954 and 
continued publ ication for four years, the last edition being 
dated 10 December 1958. During this time the regularity of 
publ ication, the circulat ion, and the size, content and control 
of the newspaper varied greatly depending on the resources -
both human and financial - that were avai lable. 
The editorial of the first edition informed the readers 
that the Federal News would be a monthly paper and, because 
of I imited funds, would be ' .•. small In size and circula-
tion_ , (108) Control of the newspaper was vested in a committee 
which planned to print short interesting articles which, amongst 
other purposes, would keep the readers in touch with the major 
pol itical 'currents of the world'. (109) These aims, except 
for the question of monthly publ ication which was found 
impossible to maintain, were achieved in 1955. At the beginning 
of the next year, however, there were sweep i ng changes. In 
the first instance, the energetic Robbie Hughes Mason was 
appointed honorary organiser of the Federal News, taking over 
the function of the organising committee. (110) He propos~d to 
return to monthly publ ication (which he did) and he further 
aimed at increasing the circulation from 2 000 to 'at least' 
10 000 per month. (111) This was to be achieved by means of 
selected party members each addressing 100 newspaper wrappers 
to people in their areas who were I ikely to be interested in 
the publ ication. These recipients would receive the FederaJ 
News free of charge. Mason expected that increased adverti-
sing revenue as a result of the larger circulation would 'help 
pay the costs ,.(112) T f th t' d' t t o ur er ensure con Inue In eres , 
107. Rand Dai Iy Mail: 18 June 1954. 
108. F edera I News: 23 December 1954. 
109. B/p: D. Heaton Nichol Is to B. Batchelor, 3 December 1954. 
110. B/P: R. Hughes Mason to B. Batchelor, n.d., postmarked 




he increased the size of the newspaper from four to eight 
pages and aimed at using only content of a 'very high 
qual ity'. (113) AI I these innovations were, at best, transi-
tory because by the beginning of 1957 the newspaper was in 
ser i ous f i nanc i a I d iff i cu It i es. I t was reduced to four 
pages again, with 'a smaller distribution', and stil I required 
a grant of £35 per month from the Provincial Executive,(114) 
a sum which the party could then i I I afford. 
Throughout the fol lowing two years, the newspaper 
gradually decl ined. Only seven editions appeared in 1957 and 
again In 1958. It had in fact become a constant financial 
drain on party funds and the newspaper was only kept going 
because it was considered vital for propaganda purposes. Just 
before the East London North by-election, for example, 12 000 
copies of the Federal News were distributed throughout 
constituency. (115) After this enormous effort, the newspaper 
was publ ished 'less frequently than hitherto' in an attempt to 
conserve resources, (116)and in 1958 the Provincial Executive 
of the party assumed direct control over the Federal News~117) 
Th i s respons i b i I ity had, I n fact, been accepted over the years 
and reports of the difficulties of the Federal News had taken 
up much of the time, effort and money -of the Provincial ,-
Executive. The end of the newspaper cam suddenly in December 
1958. There was no announcement; in fact, ~he last edition 
contained a subscription form. (118) The Federal News had died 
for the same reason that the post of paid organiser had to be 
abol ished - lack of money. 
113. Ibid. 
114. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Action Committee Minutes, 
11 January 1957, p.2. 
115. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee Minutes, 
20 July 1957, p.2. 
116. Federal News: 1 November 1957. 
117. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee Minutes, 
26 Apri I 1958, p.4. 
118. Federal News: 10 December 1958. 
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The whole question of money, so vital to any pol itical 
organisation, was the fourth and last major function of the 
Provincial Executive. The Natal Federal Party constitution 
envisaged each branch control I ing its own finances and each 
branch treasurer, together with the provincial treasurer, 
reporting quarterly to the Provincial Executive, which was to 
have 'absolute discretion' in financial matters. (119) Within 
a few months of the adoption of the constitution, however, a 
special Finance Committee of the Provincial Executive had been 
establ ished and was issuing financial directives. (120) Relations 
between this committee, the branches and the zones appear to 
have been confused unti I the provincial treasurer suggested 
measures toregularise them. Early in 1955 he submitted his 
confidential 'observations' to the Provincial Executive. (121) 
He reported that money was being spent without 'proper author-
ity' or without records being kept, that proper accounts were 
not being submitted by zones and branches and that, because of 
the precariousness of the party's financial position, the 
whole financial structure should be 'strengthened'. (122) 
As a result of these 'observations', the Provincial 
Executive altered the Party's constitution and permitted each 
branch to retain only £2. (123) AI I monies, of 'whatever 
nature' were to be 'vested solely in the Finance Committee 
and/or the Provincial Treasurer', unless special instructions 
were issued b) the Executive or the Finance Committee to the 
contrary. (124 Additional resolutions of the Executive 
Committee further increased the power of the Committee and 
and provincial treasurer by requiring detai led financial returns 
to be submitted by z?nes and branches to the provincial 
treasurer. (125) These powers were used by the energetic 
119. U.F.P. (Nata I) : 
120. U.F.P. (Natal): 
'annexure. 
121. U. F • P. ( N at a I ) : 
Treasurer, n.d. 
122. I bid. , p. I. 
123. U. F. P. (N at a I ) : 
8 January 1955, 
124. Ibid. 
125. J bid. 
Constitution, op.cit., p.7. 
Vice-chairman's Circular, op.cit., 
Observations by the Provincial 
Provincial Executive Report, Annexure A, 
p. 2. 
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treasurer, W. Grimwood, to great effect and he was repeated-
ly thanked by the party's leadership and congresses for the 
excel lent way in which the party's funds were control led. 
Although he was head of a so-cal led Finance Committee, he 
personally did all the work because, as he informed the Prov-
incial Executive in 1957, , ... members could not be found ... 
, ,(126) Th 't' to constitute such a Committee. e pOSI Ion was, 
rectified the fol lowing year, however, when a 
Finance Committee, with powers to co-opt, was 
functioned as an effective committee. (127) 
proper Provincial 
formed and duly 
Because the Federal Party, unl ike the U.P., had no trust 
fund to finance it(128)and because the Finance Committee was 
responsible for running the party offices in Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg, the provincial treasurer was deeply involved 
in raising money as wei I as in control I ing it. Funds could be 
raised by means of regular subscriptions, but irregular income 
could be raised at f~tes, by sweepstakes, competitions and 
dances and by donations to special funds organised for specific 
purposes. 
The membership subscription or regular income of the 
Federal Party was fixed at 2/6d. per annum In 1953(129)when 
the constitution was drawn up but was changed to ten shi I lings 
'or less' at the 1956 annual congress~130) Whether this was 
pa i d to the branch or at the centra I off ice, it was not inc I uded 
in the target that was regularly set for each branch. (131) 
126. U.F.P. (Natal): Natal Provincial Executive Minutes 
Treasurer's Report, 22 June 1957. ' 
127. U.F.P. (Natal): Natal Finance Committee Minutes 
20 September 1958. ' 
128. U.P. (Natal): , Pamphlets issued by Federal Party, 
3 May 1954, p.4. ' ' 
129. U.F.P. (Natal): Constitution, op.cit., p.7. 
130. U.F.P. (Natal): ProvinGial Congress Papers, Resolutions, 
1~ and 13 October 1956, op.cit., p.11. and U.F.P. {Natal}: 
Minutes, 12 and 13 October 1956, op.cit., p.5. 
131. U.F.P: {Natal}: Budget of Expenditure, 15 June 1954, 
loc.clt. 
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These targets, in it i ated ear I yin 1954, set a mIn I mum figure 
for each branch, whi Ie al I branches were urged to exceed the 
target. (132) Targets were also set for zones, (£1 per member, 
except for ZU I u I and where, for some und i sc losed reason, it 
was £3 per person), these targets being the total of the 
constituent branch targets. Possibly the intention was to 
give the zone committees a definite function. If this were 
so, the measure failed because most of the moneys passed 
directly from branch to headquarters. (133) 
The methods employed In fund-raising varied greaily. The 
I argest source of i rregu I ar income, indeed the I argest source 
of total income, was the annual f~te in Durban and Pietermaritz-
burg. In 1956 and 1957, for example, the annual f~tes suppl ied 
over ha I f the party's tota I income. (134) It is therefore not 
surprising that considerable effort was put into these functions. 
Urged on by the prov inc i a I treasurer, I ad i es comm ittees were 
formed and, in 1957, they were ass i sted by a Durban F~te Men's 
Comm ittee. (135) I n a s i mil ar way, other fund ra i sing ventures 
such as sweepstakes based on the Durban July Handicap, dances 
and a raffle of a scooter merged the party's financial need 
with the advantages which accrued to the organisation through 
the personal involvement of its members. 
These ventures required effort but did not necessari Iy 
require the party member to contribute much money himself. 
The special funds launched by the Federals, required cash 
donations from the members. A general Anti-Republ ican Emergen-
cy Fund was establ ished by the 1954 annual congress and appeals 
for donations were made at the congress but no more was heard 
of the fund. (136) Thereafter, a Party Organiser's Fund was 
132. U.F.P. (Natal): Finance Directive No.2, n.d. 
133. U. F. P. (Nata I): Budget of Expend i ture, 15 June 1954, 
loc.cit. 
134. I bid. U. F. P. (Nata I): I ncome and Expend i ture Account 
HalT-Year to 31 December 1957, n.d. ' 
135. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee Minutes, 
21 September 1957, p.2. 
136. Natal Witness: 4 October 1954. 
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launched in 1955. Members subscribed monthly amounts for SIX 
months as from January 1955 to pay for the ful I-time organiser's 
salary. (137) After July, the organiser was himself required, 
as has been discussed, to generate sufficient additional funds 
to cover his sa I ary. (138) Th is fund was successfu lin its 
I imited objective, unl ike ' the Blue Card Scheme which was 
unsuccessfu I. I t was I aunched by the Prov i nc i a I Execut i ve In 
June 1956 and was designed to provide funds for electio~ pur-
poses, the method of col lectio~ being a monthly donation by 
members. (139) In the first year of its existence, only £435 
was subscribed to the fund, mainly from two branches, and 
later it was merged with the East London Election Fund which 
had been created to finance the election in that city. (140) 
Unable to raise sufficient funds by these appeals for regular 
payments, the party rei ied upon lump sum donations from wealthy 
supporters: £600 was donated to defray the expenses of this 
election in response to a single letter of appeal sent to al I 
the party members. (141) 
Overall, the control of finance was effective because it 
was in the hands, for most of the party's existence, of an 
efficient provincial treasurer who had access to and obtained a 
sympathetic hearing from the al I-powerful Natal Provincial 
Executive. 
As can be seen, the powers of the Provincial Executive 
were wide and no major facet of the party's business lay outside 
its control. The committee, however, was large and had some 
difficulty assembl ing at short notice. As a result, a five-
member Provincial Action Committee was elected at a Provincial 
Execut i ve meet i ng on 7 August 1955. I twas given the task of 
coping with 'matters requiring urgent attention .•.. ,(142) The 
137. W. Grimwood to B. Batchelor, 11 October 1955, loc.cit. 
138. Vide supra: Ch. 4 .p 81. 
139. U. F. P. (Nata I): Minutes, Treasurers Report, 22 June 
1957, op. cit., p.3. 
140. Ibid. 
141. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 18 and 19 October 1957, 
op. cit., p. 2. 
142. U. F. P. (N ata I): C i rcu I ar to Branch Cha i rmen, 
8 August 1955. 
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functioning of this committee was flexible and members or 
party officials could contact any member directly, or if 
none was avai lable, the provincial secretary or the party's 
organiser. (143) The committee dealt with a wide range of 
day to day issues, ranging from publ ic repl ies to Cabinet 
Ministers to arranging a tour of the Orange Free State, as 
wei I as meetings between the Natal and Cape Federal leade~s. 
The structure and organisation of the Federal Party was 
not created overnight; it evolved as the needs arose. As 
the party's financial resources grew or shrank, a ful I-time 
organiser was appointed or dismissed and the party newspaper 
grew, shrank and finally disappeared. Committees were appoin-
ted, reported and dissolved or remained in being as circum-
stances dictated. The basic constitution which had given the 
Provincial Executive its dominant role In the party's affairs, 
however, remained largely unchanged. 
The overal I impression of the Federal Party is that of 
a smal I group of dedicated party enthusiasts who tried vainly 
to overcome publ ic inertia, particularly in regard to raisin~ 
party funds. From this point of view, the party was never 




1953-1954 ELECTIONS: A TIME OF HOPE 
Within three months of the creation of the Natal Federal 
Party In August 1953, it was involved in a pari iamentary by-
election in the Berea constituency and in the Natal provincial 
elections the fol lowing June. These elections, although they 
were not the only electoral contests which the party fought, 
represent the peak of Federal effort and achievement. The 
party functioned with verve and enthusiasm, albeit in an 
amateur and disorganised fashion, and confidently expected to 
win at least some of the provincial seats. Fai lure in these 
elections destroyed much of the hope and the high expectations 
of many of the party members. This blow to the party came at 
precisely the time in national pol itics in South Africa when 
there was a shift away from the Coloured franchise issue and 
towards the republ ican question: a movement which was consider-
ed paramount by the Federal Party. 
When the Federal Party was launched In May 1953 there 
was comment, in British newspapers such as the Dai Iy Telegraph 
and the Manchester Guardian, that the party wished Natal to 
secede from the Union. (1) Dr. Malan, who was aware of the 
influence of these national dai I iesin Britain and was conc .ious 
of possible sympathy for the Federals's Natal pol icy in the 
United Kingdom, warned the British press, when he was in London 
for the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, that they 
should make sure that their sources of information were unbiased. 
There were, he said, sources in South Africa which had an 
, ... undying hate of everyone and anything which was anything 
other than pure British. ,(2) Die Transvaler identified these 
sources as the Federal Party, and, In an editorial entitled 
A South African Ulster? warned that because the British 
Natal ians, led by the Federals, could not accept the wi I I of 
1. Cape Times: 12 May 1953. 
2. Die Transvaler: 4 June 1953. 
/ 
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the majority of the voters, they were heading for the creation 
of another ' Ulster.(3) This would mean that the hates and 
discord simi lar to that experienced in Ireland would arise In 
South Africa and the Ulster created would be one of 'blood 
and tears'. (4) 
The Natal Federal Party did intend Natal to remaIn outside 
a republ ie, but whether it would ever be able to create another 
'Ulster' depended on the extent to which it represented publ ic 
opInIon, and the extent to which pol itical ideals evoked a 
response as extreme as that in Ireland. From the time that 
.the s itt i ng Member of Par I i ament for Berea res i gned in Jul y 
1953, there was general agreement that the by-election would 
serve as an important pointer as to the strength of the new 
party. Senator Heaton Nichol Is pointed this out in an inter-
view with the Natal Witness(~) whi Ie Hamilton, the party's 
temporary treasurer and future Provincial Executive member, 
saw the Berea election as a 'pi lot-scheme' for the provincial 
elections.(6) The U.P., similarly, saw the by-election 
as the first test of strength of the Federal Party, and as 
having' ••• interesting impl ications for future elections In 
Natal. ,(7) Even the National ists, who had no intention of 
contesting the Berea constituency themselves, were watching the 
outcome of the election with concern. (8) 
The Federal Party entered the Berea by-election and the 
1954 Natal provincial elections, the major electoral efforts 
of its history, without a fixed and detailed pol icy. Despite 
the statement, in the Cal I to the Electorate section of the 
document launching the Federal Party, that a convention would 
formulate a more detai led pol icy, this was never done. The 
convention in Durban in August 1953 merely adopted the publ ished 
3. Die Transvaler: 4 June 1953. 
4. Die Transvaler: 4 June 1953. 
5. Natal Witness: 3 August 1953. 
6. Natal Witness: 17 July 1953. 
7. Natal Witness: 9 September 1953. 
8. Natal Witness: 9 Sept ember 1953. 
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seven principles of the party - with one si9nificant altera-
tion. This to make' .•• non-European pol icy ••. the concern 
of the individual provinces', (9) thus emphasisin9 stil I 
further the importance of the federal principle in the party's 
thinkin9. 
Apart from the adoption of the seven principles, the 
convention also appointed committees to examine and report on 
various pressin9 social and pol itical issues. (10) As di·scussed 
in chapter four, these comm ittees subm itted reports to the 
party con9ress, (11) but at no time did the Federal Party publ ish 
clear and detailed pol icies on vital issues such as the non-
White qual ified franchise or the exact relationship between the 
central 90vernment and the Provinces in any future federation. 
The result was that n~ither the Federal spokesmen, nor the 
candidates had a detai led pr09ramme to which they could refer. 
Thus, when the party's leaders, durin9 the first two years of 
the party's existence, expressed views which were basically 
in a9reement, this may be attributed to other factors such as 
that the party was smal I enou9h to al low q large amount of 
inter-personal discuss·ion and consultation, al loWin9 for ideas 
to be examined and a9reed upon in an unofficial way. A second 
reason for the general a9reement amon9 the Federal Party leaders 
was that they had stron9 ideas in common on a number of basic 
Issues. Not only were they stron9 monarchists with a deep 
attachment to their British traditions, but, as far as the 
Natal leaders were concerned, they shared a common loyalty to 
the province of Natal. In addition, they were all stron9 1y 
anti-National ist and it was this sentiment which, in addition 





Althou9h the Federal Party did not have a detailed pol icy 
U.F.P. (Natal): Princiiles, ado~ted by the Provincial 
Convention, 14 and 15 U9ust 19 3. 
Vide supra: Ch.4. pp. 73-76. pass ·im. 
Vide supra: Ch. 4. pp. 73-76. passim. 
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in the Berea by-election, it had a forceful and personable 
candidate in Col. A.C. Martin, the retired headmaster of 
Durban Boys/High School. He based his first publ ic speech 
directly on the seven official principles of the Federal Party 
. h ' b· I . (12) and used the occasion to emphasise t e party s aSlc po ICY· 
At subsequent publ ic meetings, however, he tended to refer to 
most of the principles in a brief introduction or conclusion 
and to devote most of his speech to the Natal Stand and repub-
I icanism. (13) Other Federal Party leaders such as Senators 
Heaton Nichol Is and Browne, repeatedly also used the Natal 
Stand and the threat of a republ ic to accentuate the differences 
between themselves and the U.P. This was done by their 
maintaining that the Nationalists would view a win by the 
U.P. as signifying that Natal was irresolute on the republ ican 
issue, (14)or, that in the graphic words of Heaton Nicholls, 
she 'had no guts'. (15) So obvious had this emphasis in 
Ma~tin's campaign become that, by the time he ~as formally 
nominated as a candidate, the Natal Mercury could confidently 
state that the 'main plank in his pJatform is resolute oppo-
sit ion to... a Rep ubI. i c. ' ( 16 ) 
Martin's selection of one, albeit important, issue on 
which to ,base his campaign, is to be explained in a number of 
ways. As the party's first election candidate he enjoyed 
considerable latitude and had made it a condition of his stand-
ing for election that he would not accept the dictates of a 
party caucus. (17) I n add it i on, I n view of the I ack of a deta i led 
pol icy, he was obi iged, when enlarging on the party's principles, 
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accepted as party po I icy, a.1 though these deta i I s had not yet 
been formally accepted and publ ished. None of the party's 
principles had been discussed and analysed by the party leaders 
to the same extent as the Natal Stand and republ icanism, and 
it was therefore understandable that Martin, who had strong 
private feel ings on these questions, should have chosen these 
issues on which to base his campaign. 
This emphasis on the Natal Stand and resistance to a 
republ ic does not mean that al I other issu~s were completely 
ignored. In , keeping with his profession and his position at 
the head of the party's newly-formed Education Committee, (18) 
Martin also dealt with education. He maintained, early in 
October 1953, that Christian Nation~1 Education (C.N.E.) . was 
'~reeping insidiously' into Natal schools and that it was 
supported by 'hundreds' of Natal teachers. (19) Although he 
did not devote much time to this topic, despite the seemi~g 
import of his disclosures, he had broached a subject that was 
to form a regular part of Federal thinking and propaganda. 
Curiously, C.N.E. was not mentioned by name in Martin's lengthy 
manifesto; a publ ication which, ~part from the curr~culum 
vitae of the candidate, was divided into fourteen parts, deal ing 
with issues as varied as trade unions, mi I itary traditions, 
old age pensions, the 'United Party Press', social work, as 
well 'as the Natal Stand and the republ ican issue. (20) 
The U. P. cand i date was a we I I_known Durban bus i nessman, 
Mr. Ronald Butcher. (21) He based his campaign on the 
U.P.'s record. It had successfully fought the government in 
the courts, had strenuously opposed them in pari iament and 
would continue to do so. In addition, Butcher ski Ilfully 
insinuated that the Federal Party favoured unconstitutional 
action by maintaining that the U.P. had acted constitutionally. (22) 
18. V ide supra: Ch.4. p.73. 
19. Natal Witness: 1 October 1953. 
20. U.F.P. (Natal): A.C. Martin's Manifesto, 4 November 1953. 
21. Natal Witness: 6 October 1953. 
22. N~tal Witness: 6 October 1953, 
9 October 1953. Natal Mercury: 
8 October 1953, 
3 November 1953. 
Furthermore, he argued, only t~e U.P. stood any chance of 
defeating the National ists. By fighting the election, the 
d ' 'd' th 't' (23) Th' Federal Party was IVI Ing e OppOSI Ion. IS argu-
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ment, which denied any other opposition party the right to 
exist on the grounds of its alleged indirect assistance to 
the government by weakening the Official Opposition, was to 
become a regular weapon employed against the Federals. 
The Federal Party, with al I the enthusiasm of a new 
movement, conducted an effici~nt and vigorous camp~ign. By 
22 September it had ten voluntary workers staffing its offices, 
with fifty canvassers cal I ing on voters. ,Martin by the same 
date, had addressed three publ ic meetings and had planned 
another eleven.(24) Publ ic interest caused this number to be 
increased, within ~ few days, to sixteen planned meetings -
twice the number of meetings arranged by the U.P. The party 
enthusiasm reflected in al I this acti~ity also meant that with 
the election campaign only half completed, half the constitu-
ents had been canvassed. (25) , 
Whatever the publ ic interest or party enthusiasm, the 
Image of any party, and especially a new party, depended 
heavi lyon the support of Natal's three major newspapers. The 
Pietermaritzburg newspaper, the Natal Witness did not have a 
wide readin~ publ ic in Durban, and hence could not influence 
many voters, but its attitude would condition would-be canvass-
ers and financial supporters of the Federal cause in the 
Midlands and hence indirectly effect the Berea result. (26) The 
newspaper adopted an impartial view in its comment and stated 
that in the Berea contest the 'real foes' (National ists) were 
elsewhere and pointed out that 'one day' the two candidates 
must be prepared to act together to fight the common enemy.(27) 
23. Natal Witness: 6 October 1953, 4 November 1953. 
24. Natal Witness: 22 September 1953. 
25. Natal Witness: 26 September 1'953. 
26. A good example of this was, its headl ining on the front 
page of the announcement of Martin's candidature on 
5 August and of Heaton Nichol Is's assertion on 31 October 
that a U.P. victory would be interpreted by the National-
al ists as Natal having 'no guts.' 
27. Natal Witness: 2 N6vamber 1953. 
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The Natal Mercury, a Durban publ ication, and therefore more 
directly influential, adopted a neutral stand not dissimi lar 
to that of the Natal Witness. It argued that the U.P. had 
neglected Natal's interests and that what was needed was 
a ' ••• properly constituted Natal Party ~ ••• ' But it 
stopped far short of full support for the Federal Party. (28) 
As regards the candidates, the Natal Mercury twice stated 
editorially that either Martin or Butcher would make an 
'admirable' Member of Pari iament and that it was up to the 
voters of Berea to decide between them. (29) The largest of 
the three major Natal newspapers, the Natal Dai Iy New~ was 
particularly damaging to the Federal Party cause, not so much 
by its reporting, as by the bri I I iant cartoons of leyden. (30) 
One, particularly damaging, showed Heaton Nichol Is and a 
perspiring Martin in a trench marked 'The last Ditch', while 
Butcher and Mitchel I drove the U.P. tank into the 'anti-Nat. 
Battle,.(31) 
The result of the election was a victory for the U.P. 
Butcher polled 4 410 votes and Martin 2 920. (32) The · U.P.'s 
win was sufficiently convincing, considering the Federal 
Party's claim to speak for the Engl ish-speaking Natal, to 
show the federals to be a minority party. Mitchel I, for 
instance, maintained, with justice, that if the Federal Party 
could have won any seat in Natal at that time, then Berea was 
that seat. (33) 
For its part,the Federal Party did its best to salvage 
something from the defeat. The result ~as close enough 
considering the newness of the Federal Party, for the Federals 
to claim a moral victory. Heaton Nichol Is stated that the 
party was greatly encouraged by the 'astonishing' support 
it had received and Martin referred to the 'strength and 
fervour' of the party. (34) Martin also contended that the 
28. Natal Mercur~: 7 October 1953. 
29. Natal Mercur~: 7 October .1953, 3 November 1953. 
30. Nata I Da i I ~ News: 17 August 1953, . 8' September 1953, 
29 October 1953. 
31. Natal Dai Iy News: 29 October 1953. Interview with E. G. 
32. Natal Mercur~: 5 November 1953. 
33. Natal Mercur~: 6 November 1953. 
34. Nata I Wi .... n"" ..... • ? ~I -
Ford. 
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by-election had been simply .a 'prel iminary skirmish' for the 
provincial elections the fol lowing ~ear. (35) The idea that 
the provincial elections were vital , to the future of South 
Africa had in fact been held by the Federal leaders since the 
launching of the party in May. At his first meeting with the 
press, Ford had announced that the party would contest the 
Natal Provincial Counci I elections of 1954(3
6
) and this inten-
tion had been repeated by him and other Federal leaders on 
several occasions during the fol lowing months. (37) 
The accent on the provincial elections and the necessity 
of winning control of at least the Natal Provincial Counci I 
was basic to Federal Party thought and survival. This was 
because the whole question of federation rested on the rights 
of provinces as distinct from t hose of the central government 
and, in pract i ca I as we I I as tact i ca I terms, contro I of the 
provinces was the vital base from which to press for and 
implement these federal ideas. Also, the Natal Stand was based, 
as the name suggests, on the province of Natal making a stand 
against the central government. As the Federal leaders had 
I ittle faith in either, the wil I or the wi I I ingness of the U.P. 
Provincial Counci I lors to lead such opposition to the government, 
it was natural that they should wish to replace them. Further-
more, there existed the view, common amongst Federals, that 
the National Party could not be defeated in national elections. 
This was because it based its pol icy on Afrikaner national ism, 
which appealed to the largest group in the electorate. The 
governing party had won two successive general elections, and 
its future strength was, in F edera I eyes, guaranteed by demo-
graphic and educational trends in favour of Afrikanerdom, (38) 
35. Natal Witness: 6 November 1953. 
36. Cape Times: 12 May 1953. Natal Mercury: 12 May 1953. 
37. Natal Witness: 10 June 1953, 11 September 1953, 
26 October 1953, 9 November 1953. 
38. Cape Times: 13 May 1953. Natal Mercury: 13 May 1953. 
The Star: 13 May 1953. Natal Witness: 9 July 1953, 
1 August 1953, 8 June 1954. W.V.T.C.: Minutes 12 and 
13 June 1953, op.cit., pp.5-6. 
as wei I as by del imitation advantages for its rurally-based 
support. (39) 
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There were also tactical reasons why the provincial 
elections were vital to the Federal Party. It was important 
that it should -capital ise on -the enthusiasm which the _Torch 
Commando had aroused and which had again been shown at the 
great ra II y of June 1952. The Torch Commando had, In al Ii ance 
with the U.P., been unable to defeat the National ists and had 
not therefore fulf.1 led the hopes of Natal Torchmen, nor which 
was more important, the hopes of the bulk of the Natal publ ic. 
Unless the Federal Party could assume the mantle as the success-
or of the Torch Commando and - became spokesman for Engl ish-
speaking Natal quickly, and on a provincial-wide basis, its 
appeal was I ikely to wane. The provincial elections provided 
the ideal opportunity for -the party to fulfi I these requirements. 
The need for a Federal win In the provincial elections was 
given added incentive by the actions of the government and its 
supporters I ate in 1953. -I n September 1953 the government 
fai led to muster the requisite two-thirds majority to remove 
the Coloureds from the common voters role, (40) but it appeared 
I ikely that this majority would be achieved through defections 
from the U.P. (41) These defections gave the U.P. an image of 
disunity and disintegration in the face of National ist confi-
dence after its electoral triumph. This confidence was clearly 
portrayed in a number of editorials in Die Transvaler which 
reviewed the position of the National Party in Natal. The 
party, the newspaper declared, could be wei I satisfied with 
the size and enthusiasm of its annual congress in Natal, which 
drew twice the number of delegates as the previous congress~42) 
It drew attention, too, to the recent Jeugbond congress in 
Durban - the 'heart of Jingoland,.(43) The triumphant note 
39. Natal Witness: 11 May 195 4, 8 June 1954. 
Cape Times: 13 May 1953. 
40. Natal Witness: 17 September 1953. 
41. These defections were led by P.B. Bekker. Later, the 
group which numbered six voted with the government on 
the Coloured franchise bi I I. Natal Witness: 15 June 1954. 
42. Die Transvaler:l0 November 1953, 16 November 1953, 
, - December 1953. 
43. Die Transvaler: 7 December 1953. 
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which permeated these edito~ials was not lost on Natal Fed-
, (44) 
erals, for whom they were translated by a party member, 
and served to make them more determined to defend the Engl ish-
speakers' interests and win control of Natal in the provincial 
elections. 
On 12 February 1954 the Natal Provincial Executive 
announced that the Natal elections would be held on 9 June~45) 
later, the date was changed to 16 June. I t was known at the 
time that the other three provinces were to hold provincial 
elections in August and the suggestion came from the National-
ists that all the provincial elections should be held on the 
same day. (46) Some National ists saw the decision in favour of 
a different pol I ing day in Natal as an attempt by the U.P. to 
impress potential Federal supporters with its defiance of the 
governme~t, (47) whi Ie others saw it simply as another example 
of Natal's desire to be different. (48) Much closer to the 
truth was the observation that the U.P.-control led Natal 
Executive had cihosen a different date for the elections I,n Natal 
so that the U.P. could fight the Federals in Natal in a sep-
arate contest ' from that in which it has to fight the National-
ists in the other Provinces. (49) 
The Federal Party wil I ingly accepted the challenge of a 
separate fight. In keeping with its accent on the importance 
of provincial power, it had been laying the groundwork for its 
campaign during the past few months. On 26 October 1953, at 
the height of the campaign in Berea, the party cal led for 
nominations for candidates in the provincial elections.(50) In 
mid-January, a month before the election 'date was announced, 
the Natal Provincial Executive of the Federal Party met to 
formulate the detai Is of the platform on which the party would 
fight. The executive took the sev~n principles of the party, 
and compressed them into six basic priorities, which were to 
44. They were translated by B. Batchelor. Batchelor In 
an i nterv i ew. 
45. ' Natal Witness: 13 February 1954. 
46. Natal Witness: 13 February 1954. 
47. Natal Witness: 13 February 1954. 
48. Die Transvaler: 13 February 1954, 17' February 1954. 
49. Sunda~ Times: 20 June 1954. 
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be dealt with in publ ic speeches. It was stressed by the 
executive that, although the campaign should depend 'princi-
pal Iy' on these six priorities, other issues of interest could 
(51) . 
be discussed. 
The first of the six basic priorities was the 'Revival of 
the "Torch Spirit" ,.(52) Here, the party urged that it be 
impressed on the electors that the Federal Party was the 'pol iti-
cal 'expression' of the ideal ism of the Torch Commando. (~3) In 
support of th i sci aim, it was po i nted out that the party had 
been founded by twenty National Executive members of the Torch 
Commando. (54) The circular continued by giving a history of 
the turbulent relationship between the Torch Commando and the 
U.P., stres~ing the Torch Commando's adherance to the Natal 
Stand and the U.P. 's refusal to support the idea. After the 
general election, the Torch Commando had to choose between 
abandoning the Natal Stand and forming a new pol itical party. 
Thus, the Federal Party could claim to be the 'spiritual 
inheritor' of the Torch Commando. (55) 
In view of the importance placed by the National Execu-
tive of the Federal Party on propagating the idea that the 
party was the 'spiritual inheritor' of the Torch Commando, it 
is strange that the federal candidates did not stress this. 
In the manifestos of three candidates which have surv.ived,(56) 
no claim of descent from the Torch Commando is made and, In 
fact, only one of the three candidates, Derek Heaton Nichol Is, 
mentions the Torch Commando at al I - and he did so only in 
passing. (57) Simi larly, among the general pamphlets issued by 
the Federals which are extant, none deals with the Federal 
Party as heir to the Torch Commando, nor is there evidence that 














A.C. Martin In Umbi 10, C. Kinsman In Durban North and 
D. Heaton Nichol Is in Zululand. 
U.F.P. (Natal): D. Heaton Nicholls's Election Manifesto, 
n.d. 
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reported speeches of the Federal Party candidates, the whole 
qJestion of the formation of the party and the Torch Commando 
never once appeared. The major exception occurred at a mass 
rally two days before the election,when the Federal leaders, 
the two senators and Ford, none of 'whom was a candidate 
of the I ink between the Federal Party and the Torch Commando. (58) 
Otherwise, the only occasions when the issue was raised was 
when Mitchell accused the Federal · leaders of exploiting the 
Commando for their own ends. (59) and when de Vii I iers Graaff 
made the same accusation. (60) The Federal candidates left 
these accusations unanswered. 
The second priority of the Federal Executive was stated 
as being the necessity of convincing the electorate that a 
republ ic would bring disaster upon South Africa. The Federal 
Executive saw the fight against the republ ic as a matter, 
not of sentimental ity but of 'dire necessity'. (61) This was 
because it was felt that South Africa could not survive ten 
years as a republ ic. The United Nations would increase it~ 
pressure and because of its smal I White population, the country 
wou I d succumb. In add ·it ion, thecreat ion of a repub lie wou I d 
lead to 'a collapse of overseas business confidence and subse-
quent widespread ruin. As important, 'wide-spread' disorders 
concernLng the Black population could be expected. (62) Quite 
apart from these dangers, a republ ic would not be free and 
democratic . but ·would be created simply to entrench Afrikanerdom. 
The Federal Executive argued that to counter 'swart-gevaar' 
which had accounted for National ist successes in the past, the 
fear of a republ i~ could now be used against the government. (63) 
In the course of their campaigns, the Federal candidates 
accordingly, I ike Martin in the Berea by-election, held up the 
picture of a future republ ic as both ruinous and frightening. 
58. Natal Mercur~: 15 June 1954. 
59. Natal Mercur~: 25 May 1954, -1 June 1954. 
60. Natal Witness: 7 May 1954. 




Selwyn Greene, Federal candidate for Durban Point, used the 
arguments as devised by the executive (64)whereas Brian Ross 
concentrated on the economic consequences of the declaration of a 
future republ ic. He envisaged al I business as becoming either 
'nationally or ,ie~tated' or ceasing to exist.(65) This would 
lead, in Ross's view, to an almost complete takeover of business 
by National ists in their 'Broederbond republ ic,.(66) The phrase, 
'Broederbond republ ic' was now commonly used by the Federals. 
It was used not only in speeches(67)and in press advertisements!68) 
but a I so on street posters. I n its efforts to i nst i I fear of 
the secret Broederbond into the voters, the party i'ssued two 
posters of a whip-carryin~, hooded figure. , In one poster it 
peered over the Drakensberg and, in the other, it advanced on 
a school. (69) The I ink with the National Party and a future 
republ ic was obvious. Apart from makin
r 
protests against the 
reference to schools on the one poster, 70) the U.P. did not 
take issue with the Federals on the type of repu~1 ic to be 
created by the National ists. 
The third priority was designated as 'The Natal Stand 
against the ,institution of a Republ ic,.(71) The exe~utive's 
directive stated flatly that there was no way , in which the 
South Afr ,ican government could, in ter~s of the South Africa 
Act, establ ish a republ ic. No matter what its majority, such 
action would amount to 'Pol itical Revolution'. (72) The Fed~ral 
Party wou I d on I y accept the estab I (:shment of a repub I i c if, the . , 
Union were first dissolved into jt~ four 'contracting' parties 
(the four provinces), (73) whereafter a new national convention 
64. Natal Mer<;:ur~: 29 Apr i I 1954. 
65. Natal Mercur~: 26 March 1954. 
66. Natal Mercur~: 26 March 1954. 
67. Natal Witness: 9 Apr i I 1954, 8 June 1954, 15 June 1954. 
68. Natal Witness: 14 June 1954. 
69. Natal Dai I ~ News: 7 June 1954. 
70. Natal Dai I ~ News: 7 June 1954. 
71. U.F.P. (Natal) : Federal Party Priorities, oe. cit. , p.3. 
72. Ibid., p.4. 
73. I bid. 
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would have to be convened; at which each province would have 
to agree to enter the new republ ic. The executive frankly 
admitted that it was demanding the impossible and that it 
would 'never come about'. (74) It therefore set out the course 
of action it would fol low In the event of its gaining control 
of the Natal Provincial Counci I and a republ ic being declared. 
It would 'refuse' to be party to the 'pol itical revolution' 
('75) and would 'adhere to the Act of Union under the Crown'. It 
would declare the . Provincial Counci I to be the 'governing 
authority' of Natal and appeal for international recognition~76) 
Finally, it would work for the creation of ' a large federation 
in southern Africa under the Crown. The executive stressed 
that the Natal Stand was a 'deterrent' to the republ icans and 
was designed to force them to drop their republ ican aims. (77) 
The only alternat ive was to accept the republ ic with all its 
envisaged disasters. 
It is not surprising that the question of the Natal Stand, 
became, together with the related issue of . republ icanism, what 
General Selby described as the 'main provincial election 
issue'. (78) The Federal ' Party candidates maintained, in 
conformity with the executive's suggestions, that they repu-
diated arepubl ic in any shape or form and that Natal had a ful I 
legal and moral right ' to remain outside any republ ic. (79) In 
addition, they maintained that Natal had the economic resources 
to do so. (80) 
In order to present its vlews . on the Natal Stand more 





78. Natal Mercury: 12 March 1954. 
79. N~tal Daily News: 30 Apri I 1954. Natal Witness: 6 May 1954, 
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The Natal Stand - Past and Present. (81) This maintained 
that it was 'Natal's Stand' which had restrained the National-
ists ever since the flag controversy of 1927. (82) The pamphlet 
then faithfully reproduced the party's Provincial Executive's 
views regarding the province's position should a republ ic be 
declared. The pamphlet ended with the slogan: 'Vote for the 
federal Party and Veto a RepubJic,.(83) 
In order to contrast its o~n view with that of the U.P. 
on the Natal Stand and the republ ican issue, the Federals 
issued a separate pamphlet entitled The United Party and the 
Repybl ic (84) With its own position well known, the Federals 
cal led on t~e people of Natal not to place trust in the U.P. as 
clause 2(d) in its constitution permitted republ ican propaganda 
within the party. As a result, the U.P. was portrayed as being 
hopelessly divided on the issue and as trying to · hide its ineff-
ectual stand on the republ ic behind a 'cloak of legal ity,.(85) 
It did this by maintaining that it would accept the decision 
of the courts on the legality of a future republic. The U.P. 
had, in Federal eyes, been manoeuvred into this . position by 
'Big Business' which was anxious for compromise because large 
profits depended upon pol itical peace, and by pro-National ists 
within the party's ranks, who, because of the party's bleak 
electoral hopes, hoped for coal ition with ~he Natronal ists.(86) 
The U.P. was, in fact, in a very vulnerable position. Its 
difficulty stemmed from the fact that its support ranged from 
Engl ish-speaking ~oyal ists to Afrikaner r~publ ieans. The party 
was fundamentally anti-republ ican, and had expressed a prefer-
ence for the existing constitutional position, but retained 
clause 2(d) in its constitution because it did not wish to 
81. U.f.P. (Natal): The Natal Stand - Past and Present, n.d. 
82. · 1 bid. 
83. I bid. 
84. U. F. P. (Natal): The United Party and the Republ ic, n.d. 
85. Ibid. 
86. I bid. 
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~ntagonise its non-National ist republ ican supporters. 
Although there are no figures to indicate how many repub-
I icans supported the ~.P., there is evidence to suggest that, 
at this stage, the National ists by no means possessed the 
monopoly of rep~bl ican support. This point is illustrated by 
the fact that the Torch Commando in the southern Free State, . 
while being strongly anti-National ist, was also pro-republ ican~87) 
With the Nat i ona lists ~pea ling successfu II y to the Afr ikaner 
sent i ment for a repub I i c, it is not surpr j sing, therefore, that 
at its Natal Congress in November 1953 the U.P. refused to 
rescind clause 2(d). (88) 
On the other hand, the U.P. could not al ienate its 
Engl ish-speaking supporters by appearing hesitant and undecided. 
The republ ican issue aroused passions amongst the Engl ish-
speakers, who feared a republ ic not only as an Afrikaner crea-
tion, but as an authoritarian one, based on the republ ican 
draft constitution which had been publ ished in 1942. The U.P. 
thus had to stress its I ink to, and support of, the Crown and 
Commonwea Ith, or risk los i ng Engl ish-speak i ng support, espec i a II y 
in Natal. And Natal was, a,fter all, the only province in which 
the U.P. enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of 
the voters. 
In the 1954 provincial elections, the U.P. sought an 
answer to its dilemma by simultaneously adopting a number of 
different approaches. First, it rna i nta i ned that the who I e 
question of the imminence of a republ ic had been grossly exag-
gerated. In question-and-answer pamphlets designed to assist 
U.P. candidates and canvassers (but significantly not in a 
statement or pam~hlet issued on behalf .of the whole party), the 
republ ican suppo~·t was described as being 'over~stimated,(89) 
and as being a 'bogey', which did not have the support of even 
87. Natal Witness: 20 July 1953. ' 
88. Natal Witne~s: 12 November 1953. 
89. U.P. (Durban): Candidates' Publ icity Sectioh: 
The E~ection In Questions and Answers, 18 May 1954, 
p. 2. 
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half of the National ists. (90) 
Second, while denying the importance of the republ ic as 
an issue, the U.P. attempted to convey the idea that clause 2(d) 
was not really designed to faci I itate republ ican propaganda at 
all. It quoted Strauss as stating that the U.P.'s constitution 
was opposed to a republ ic. (91) A clause simi lar to clause 2(d) 
had appeared in the constitution of the old South African Party 
and neither Heaton Nichol Is nor the Unionists had ever seen 
this as advocating republ icanism. (92) One of its candidates 
went so far as"to maintain that he had never heard of a U.P. 
member supporting , republ icanism. (93) The U.P. even attempted 
to I iken itself to the Royal Society(94)and the British Empire 
league(95) in allowing free speech and thought on the issue of 
constitutional change. (What it did not dwel I on was that it 
was a pol itical party whereas the other two organisations were 
not.) like the attempt to defuse republ icanism, this attempt 
at negating the importance of clause 2{d) was not put out as 
the party's considered opinion, but was suppl ied to candidates 
and canv,assers. In th i s way, the U. P. hoped that the ideas 
would reach the electorate without impl icating the party as a 
who I e. 
The U.P. 's third ploy was to associate itself with the 
June 1952 Durban rally by publ ishing a pamphlet which repro-
duced the oath next to a photograph of the crowd. The pam-
phlet then stated that the U.P. was an anti-republ ican party 
and, that in fact it was the only party strong enough to 
'uphold this vow'. (96) In promising to uphold the constitution, 
90. U.P. (Durban): Candidates'Publ icity Section: Some Questions 
and Information for Canvassers and other Helpers, n.d., p.2. 
91. U.P.{Durban): Candidates' Publ icity Section: Extract from 
Hansard, 8 Febr~ary 1954, 18 March 1954. 
92. U.P. (Durban): Candidates'Publ icity Section: The Election 
in Questions and Answers: 0t.cit., p.4. 
U.P. (Durban): Candidates'Pu I icity Section: Circular, 
8 May 1954, loc.cit. 
93. U.P.{Durban): Some Questions and Information, op.cit., p.5. 
94. u. P. (Durban): Extract from Hansard, I oc. cit. 
95. U.P.{Durban): The Election in Questions and Answers, 
op. cit., p. 5. 
96. U.P.{Durban): Natal S~and, n.d. 
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the U.P. clearly meant this in a legal sense, not the secess-
ionist defiance of the Federal Party. The pamphlet then went 
on to make it clear that it was not attacking Afrikaners, and 
praised Afrikaners for their sup~ort in World War 11 as wei I 
as for their support of the U.P. (97) Despite these pro-Afrikan-
er gestures, the U. P. attempted, as with the clause 2( d) dispute, 
to conceal its views from Afrikaner National ists. It wa.s deci-
ded at a candidates' meeting ·that· this pamphlet would not be sent 
to National ists. (98) 
The U.P. 's fourth response was to introduce the idea of 
a separate Natal referendum on the republ ican question. This 
idea had at first been suggested by Heaton Nichol Is the prevIous 
year. (99) E. Grantham M.E.C., the U.P. candidate for Zululand, 
supported by J. Hami Iton Russel I (M.P. Wynberg) announced that 
Natal had the 'right' to hold a separate referendum to determine 
the views of its voters on a republ ic. (100) Hamilton Russel I 
saw the idea as being the essence of the Natal Stand and 
suggested that the candidates should not really be fighting a 
provincial election, but should be organising a referendum t o 
'tel I' the government the feel ings of the people.(101) Mitchel I, 
as U.P. provincial leader, felt that the whole idea of a 
separate referendum was unnecessary, as the U.P. was opposed 
to a republ ic in any event. (102) This view was supported by 
the U.P. 's · Natal publ icity section. (103) The U.P. 's vulnera-
bi I ity to Federal propaganda on the republ ican issue however, 
forced the party to support the plea for a separate referendum 
at a meeting of U.P. provincial election candidates. It was 
unanimously agreed that the U.P. support the view that a repub-
97. Ibid. 
98. U.P. (Durban): Candidates' Meeting Minutes, 20 May 1954, 
.p.1. 
99. V ide supra: Chi 3 .p.42. 
100. Natal Dai Iy News: 30 Apri I 1954. 
101. Natal Dai Iy News: 30 Apri I 1954. 
102. DM/P:D. Mitchel I to J. Freed, 10 May 1954. 
103. u. P. (Durban): The Elect i on in Quest ions and Answers, 
op. cit., p • 4. 
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I ic should be determined directly either by the electorate 
in a special referendum, or by the cal I ing of a national 
convention. The candidates further agreed that Natal had a 
'moral' right to express her wishes separately on this issue, 
and that the U.P. pledge itself to set up the machinery to 
hold such a referendum. (104) The party then reiterated its 
promise to take every 'legal and constitutional' step to 
prevent the introduction of a republ ic.(105) In these ~esol-
utions, the U.P. made as strong a stand as it could. It was 
forced into doing this by pressure from the Federals. The 
fact that its position was a compromise and that it did not 
assert that Natal possessed legal rights, meant that its 
position was weak and could in future be exploited by the 
F edera Is. 
The fifth approach used by the U.P. to tackle the repub-
I ican issue was to move onto the offensive and attack the 
Federals' stand. Sir de Vi I I iers Graaff declared in Pieter-
mar itzburg that, if a repub I i c were introduced I ega II y and 
declared so by the courts, it would then be clear that the 
Federal talk of resistance would be i I legal. (106) This was 
a tel I ing point, considering the Federals' attacks on the 
National ists for their alleged disregard of the courts on the 
Coloured franchise issue. The only counter which the Federals 
could suggest to their candidates was to attack anyone who 
broached the matter in publ ic as a paid U.P. official and to 
stress that the Federals were more interested in 'moral and 
constitutional' issues than in 'trick legalistics,.(107) 
The fourth priority of the Federal Party, as drawn up by 
the party's Natal Executive, was the federal plan for South 
Africa. At first sight it is strange, in view of the 
party's name, that federation should be relegated to the 
fourth priority in so vital an election. The answer I ies In 
the imminence of the National ist threat as perceived by the 
Federal Party. With Afrikaner national ism dominant, confident 
104. U.P.{Durbari): Minutes, 20 May 1954, _op.cit., p.2. 
105. · Ibid. 
106. Natal Daily News: 7 May 1954 • . 
U.P.{Durban}: Pamphlets issued by the Federal Party, 
op.cit., pp.2-3. 
107. U.F.P. (Natal): Splittino the:> Vn+~ _ J 
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and moving inexorably in the direction of a republ ic, long-
term plans, such as federation, had to give way to more urgent 
priorities. 
The issue of federation enjoyed a low priority not only 
In the minds of the party executive but also in the opinions 
of the candidates. little was made by the Federal candidates 
of the question, and the U.P. did not pay much attention to 
the subject either. The Federals did, however, issue a pamph-
let entitled Federation for a Greater South Africa which 
pointed out that the party supported both Union (in the sense 
of the four provinces being united in one country) and federa-
tion (as a desirable system of government). (108) The pamphlet 
then I isted eight advantages of federation. The whole tone 
of the pamphlet was thoughtful and non-aggressive and was in 
keeping with the unemotional nature of constitutional theory~109) 
An additional reason why federation was not a major issue 
in the election was that it was completely overshadowed by other 
Issues such as the Natal Stand, the controversy over education; 
the alleged malfunctioning of the education department, and the 
infiltration of C.N.E. into Natal schools. These were the 
Natal Executive's fifth priority in the election. The state of 
the Education Department was described as 'deplorable', and 
the National ists were seen as forcing 'their' ideology onto 
'our' schools via 'their' cultural societies. (110) 
The view of education in Natal held by the Federal Party's 
executive was fully endorsed in the detai led Memorandum on 
Educational Pol icy which was publ ished by the party's education 
committee on 24 January 1954. (111) This view, especially as 
regards C.N.E., was further supported in the confidential notes 
which were to be read in conjunction with the Memorandum. 
108. U.F.P. (Natal): Federation for a Greater South Africa,n.d. 
109. Ibid. 
110. U.F.P. (Natal): Federal Party Priorities, op.cit., p.S. 
111. U.F.P. (~atal): Memorandum on Education Pol icy, loc.cit. 
For detal Is of tne Education Committee, vide supra: 
Ch. 4. p.73. 
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The Memorandum was highly critical of the Education Department 
and charged that its senior officials were appointed by a 
government-influenced Publ ic Service Commission. It further 
charged that the department was bureaucratic, dictatorial and 
secretive and was unresponsive to pupils' needs, examination 
difficulties, staff shortages and school bui Iding requirements. 
In addition, the department was accused of favouring 'one 
language group' in its promotions and of allowing the schools 
to be 'infected' by C.N.E. (112) In contrast to these weaknesses 
in the department, the Federals proposed to institute an 
Educational Advisory Council, to be appointed in Natal by the 
provincial authorities. This council, which would represent a 
wide range of interested parties, would combat the bureaucra-
tisation of education, rectify the system of teacher promotion, 
el iminate C.N.E., and encourage the private schools to continue 
their good work. The party also wished to see Zulu introduced 
as a schoo I subject; it opposed un i vers i ty segregat i on and 
favoured the restoration of Black education to the provinces~113) 
The appendices to the Memorandum gave details of the dispropor-
tionate number of Afri,kaners in senior posts in the Education 
Department and quoted from the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuur-
vereniginge (F.A.K.) to support its claim of C.N.E. infiltration 
in Natal's schoo 'ls.(114) 
The confidential notes accompanYing the Memorandum 
ampl ified, and In some cases clarified, the points raised In 
the Memorandum. For example, further details of the strides 
allegedly made by C.N.E. in Natal schools were given, while 
examples of distorted history taught in the schools were citedS 115 ) 
Where the Memorandum had spoken of 'one language group' being 
discriminated against, the notes bluntly headed a section 
Scales weighed against Engl ish-speaking teachers 
to attack the system of bil ingual testing used by 
mente (116) 
112. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
113. Ibid., pp. 1-6. 
114. Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
and proceeded 
the depart-
115. U.F.P. (Natal): Notes for use in conjunction with Memorandum 
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To convey al I these criticisms, opinions and pol icies 
to the general publ ic, the Federal Party issued two pamphlets; 
one entitled Your Child and the Future and the other headed 
Do You Know What Christian National Education Means? The 
first pamphlet I isted ten points on what was wrong with Natal's 
educat i on system and, para I I e I to t h.e ten po i nts, ita I so listed 
the ten remedies advocated by the Federal Party.(117) The 
second pamphlet quoted from F.A.K. documents to show that C.N.E. 
represented Afrikaner National ist idealogy and then I ikened the 
whole C.N. E. ideal to that of Nazi Germany. (118) 
The U.P. did not publ ish pamphlets to refute the Fed-
era Is' argument. .I nstead, it issued notes to its cand .i dates, 
who could then use them as the occasion required. These notes 
were detai led refutations of the Federal stand and dealt with 
the Memorandum paragraph by paragraph, as wei I as adding supple-
mentary material. Whi Ie it is true that some of the Federal 
charges could not easily be proved, the U.P. contention th~t 
they were 'wild,(119)rang a I ittle false when the refutation 
of these 'wild' statements were themselves often vague, polem-
ical or completely false. (120) For example, in reply to the 
question of the lack of promotion for Engl ish-speaking teachers, 
the U.P. documents argued that as eighty-four of the one hundred 
and seventy-two Natal schools used Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction, the fact that half the posts from headship up-
wards were held by Afrikaners was 'reasonable'. (121) What they 
omitted to state was that sixty of the eighty-four schools 
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with Afrikaners heading thirty-six of these schools, including 
twenty schools in which Engl ish-speaking children were in the 
" "t (122) maJorl y. 
It was apparent to the Federals that they had fastened 
on a highly emotive issue on which they could attack the U.P. 
Mart in, who had brought up the C. N. E. Issue in the Berea elect ion 
the previous year, (123) launched a scathing attack on the 
Educat ion Department I n a speech at Empangen i in March 1954. (124) 
The result of this attack was the appointment by the U.P. control-
led Natal authorities of the Jarvis Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate al legations against the Education Department. The 
Commiss~on sat for two years and exonerated the educational 
authorities from al I blame;(125) but the Federal Party regarded 
the commission simply as a ruse to save the U.P. from embarrass-
ment in the election. On 3 Apri I a delegation of Federal Party 
leaders met the Administrator of Natal in an attempt to have 
the appointment of the commission postponed. This was because, 
as Selby pointed out, the Natal Provincial Executive Committee 
members were candidates in the election. The appointment of 
the commission therefore ' ••• could only be to their pol itical 
( 126) advantage.' The Federals also objected to the terms of 
reference of the commisSion. They were seen as being too 
narrow, excluding such questions as the promotion of teachers, 
bil ingual ism tests and the teaching of history, (127) - al I 
areas In which the Federals saw the interests of the Engl ish-
speaking as being sacrificed to those of Afrikaners and their 
national ism. The Administrator refused to allow either the 
postponement of the appointment of the commission, or the exten-
sion of its terms of reference. (128) The Federals felt that 
127. 
128. 
4 March 1954, 5 Apr i I 1954, 
29 April 1954. 
13Apri11954. 
112 
they had been cheated of some of their most powerful election 
ammunition. The issues of bil ingual ism, promotion and 
the teaching of history, it was true, were not within the terms 
of reference of the Jarvis Commission but they involved the 
actions of provincial officials who were being investigated and 
were thus sub judice. Martin held that his campaign had been 
largely undermined(129)and the rest of the party saw the effects 
of the commission as 'muzzl ing,.(130) 
The sixth and last priority set out by the Natal Executive 
of the Federal Party was the issue of non-White policy. It 
stated that at root the' party aimed to replace 'antagonism with 
co-operation' and felt that control of non-White pol icy by the 
provinces would facil itate this. (131) The details of non-White 
pol icy were contained in a Statement of Non-European Pol icy 
which was issued by the Federal Party at its congress on 24 
March 1954. (132) This pol icy was, as has been discussed, 
described as the 'immediate' pol icy of the party,as it was 
claimed that it was impossible to devise a non-White pol icy 
for 'all_time,.(133) The pol icy statement was divided into 
four sections deal ing , ~ith the non-Whites in the towns, the 
rural areas, in industry and in the 'organs of the government,~134) 
The first two sections dealt mainly with s ocial, housing and 
land problems, while the third promised complete freedom of 
employment to al I races. It was, however, the fourth section, 
that dealing mainly with the franchise, that was to cause most 
difficulties for the party. The Federals wished to maintain 
Black representation in the Senate and to extend this right to 
Indians. (135) Further, they wished to grant al I race groups 
representation in the Provincial Council. Most controversial 
of all was the idea that people of all races should be allowed, 
subject to certain provisions, to vote on a common roll. (136) 
129. Interview with A.C. Martin. 
130. Natal Witness: 21 June 1956. 
131. U.F.P. (Natal): Federal Party Priorities, op.cit., p.6. 
132. Vide supra: Ch.4. pp. 73-74. 
133. Ibid. 
134. Ibid. 
135. Ibid., p.3. 
136. Ibid., p.5. 
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No detai Is of the provisions were publ ished at the time, it 
being left to the future to devise the exact terms of the 
common franchise. (137) 
The Federal Party candidates presented their non-White 
policy with confidence and vigour. Led by Selby, who declared 
that the race issue was the 'most urgent,(138)and the 'most 
vital,(139) facing South Africa, the non-White pol icy was 
expounded from near I y every F edera I pi atform._ Of a I I the 
Federal pol icies, this was clearly the least popular. Most 
newspapers and pol itical commentators had commented on the 
problems of a Natal-based pol itical party advocating a rela-
tively I iberal race pol icy, (140)and -the U.P. was quick to take 
advantage. It issued a circular to al I its candidates Impress-
ing on them that the party did not accept the principle of 
direct pol itical representation for non-Whites. (141) Having 
thus protected his party from attack, Mitchel I, real ising the 
weakness of the Federals, again and again stressed the dangers 
of the Federal pol icy to a nervous and receptive electoratefl42) 
His campaign culminated in a scathing attack on the Federals' 
race ideas when he said that Engfish and Afrikaans-speakers 
might have to fight 'shoulder to shoulder' in the future as 
both were 'White men in a Black man's country'. (143) This 
representation of the Feder~ls cast in the role of traitors to 
the White cause, was not 
Federals' race pol icy by 
organ in the Cape. (144) 
dissimilar from the attack made on the 
Die Burger, the National ist Party's 









For a ful I discussion of the franchise issue vide 
infra: Ch. 7. pp. 165-69. Ch.10. pp.2.51-4. ' 
Natal Witness: 2 March 1954. 
Natal Witnes~: 9 Apri I 1954. 
Natal Dail~ News: 30 Apri I 1953 15 May 1953. The Star: 
13 May 1953. The Leader: 15 Ma~ 1953. Die Burger repor-
ted in the Rand Daily Mail: 30 March 1954. The Graphic: 
3 April 1954. -
U.P. (Durban): _ Candidate~' Publ icity Section: Circular 
to all United Party Candidates, 29 Apri I 1954-.----~~ 
Interview with- D. Mitchell. 
Natal Witness: 14 June 1954. 
Rand Dai Iy Mail: 30 March 1954. 
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attack, which completely defeated some Federal candidates in 
argument, (145) Heaton Nicholls attempted, just before the 
election, to present the aim of the pol icy as being 'European 
survival'. (146) Even Selby, despite his early enthusiasm, 
did not mention non-Whites in a major speech in Durban the 
week before the election. (147) The damage had been done. 
Apart from its attacks on the Federal Party's race 
pol icies and its attitude towards a republ ic sanctioned by 
the courts, the U.P. fought a defensive campaign against the 
Federals. In a 'pol icy statement' drawn up to assist candi-
dates In composing their manifestos, the U.P. expressed no new 
ideas or pol icies. On provincial issues it advised its candi-
dates to inform the voters of the be"nefits of U.P. rule in the 
past and to ask them for their support in the future. (148) The 
somewhat cumbersome party slogan suggested was: 'Let the United 
Party which has laid such sure foundations continue to build 
on them for the future of Natal'. (149) This same concentration 
on provincial matters was apparent in the U.P.'s principal 
election pamphlet which was entitled Natal's Fruitful Years 
under U.P. Administrat "ion. It emphasised U.P.'s 'achievements' 
In the areas of education, hospitals, housing and roads. (150) 
As regards wider national issues, candidates were advised 
to state that they were anti-republ ican and that the party was 
pledged to uphold the constitution. The slogan suggested here 
was: 'Stand firm. With the United Party there is no surrender,~151) 
Apart from the U.P.'s Natal Stand pamphlet, which has already 
been discussed, two pieces of U.P. propaganda were publ ished. 
The first, was the Workers Charter booklet. This set out the 
U.P.'s attitude to the White workers and was used extensively 
in the White working class areas of Durban. Fourteen thousand 
145~ Dr. B. Sampson, Federal Pa"rty candidate for Umgeni, 
Natal Dai Iy News: 9 June 1954. 
146. Natal Wit.ness: 15 June 1954. 
147. Natal Witness: 8 June 1954. 






U.P. (Natal): Natal's Fruitful Years under U.P. 
Administration, n.d. 
U.P. (Natal): D,\aft Policy Statement, op.cit. - n? 
copies were distributed in the Sreyvi lie, Congel la, Umlazi 
and Umhlatuzana constituencies, so as to capital ise on the 
.. f h I I . t . (152) Th strong labour traditions 0 t ese oca lies. e 
second, was a news sheet entitled Election News, of which 
35 000 were distributed on the day of the election. (153) 
The theme of this newsheet was that the Federal Party was 
pol itically irrelevant and that al I it would do was help 
po I ar i se the two rna i n Wh i te I anguage groups. ,( 154) 
115 
In arranging their election campaign, the Federals 
devoted considerable thought and effort to organisin~ the 
party's strategy because they real ised that the view the 
voters would have of them would depend as much on the party's 
publ ic image as on its formal election platform~ The Federals 
were however, easi ,ly outmanoeuvred by the more experienced 
U.P. For example, early in the campaign, Selby, who appeared 
to be emerging as the major figure in the Federal party after 
Heaton Nichol Is, suggested confidentially that certain pol ic-
ies, especially education) be held in reserve until midway 
through the campaign. (155 After the education issue had been 
broached, the U.P. administration appointed the Jarvis Comm-
ission and the carefully laid plan of Selby went awry. 
Apart from the problem of timing its presentation of 
issues, the Federals faced the problem of whether to conclude 
an election pact with any of the other parties. A rumoured 
pact with the weak Labour Party was rejected out of hand. (156) 
The question of a possible pact with the U.P., however, 
was more complex. There were factors strongly in favour of 
such an agreement. While it was true that since its inception, 
the Federals had attacked the U.P. as being half-hearted in 
its resistance to the National ists; it was the National ists who 
rema i ned the pr i nc ipa I enemy of the F edera I s. I f the U. P. , 
therefore, could be made to agree to a bolder anti-National ist 
152. U. P. (Durban): . Minutes, 20 May 1954, op. cit., p.1. 
153. Ibid., p.4. 
154. U.P. (Natal): Election News, 16 June 1954. 
155. KCM 4083: A.R. Selby to D. Heaton Nichol Is, 29 January 1954. 
156. Natal Dai Iy News: 21 May 1954. 
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pol icy, the Federals were wi II ing to form a pact. 
Another major difficulty for the Federals was that they 
could be accused of spl itting the opposition to the National-
ists. As the U.P. had previously received the overwhelming 
majority of Natal's opposition votes, it was the Federal Party 
that was seen, by its very existence, as spl itting the opposi-
tion. The U.P. could claim that it was weakened in its anti-
National ist fight because it was being forced to divert re-
sources to combat the Federals. (157) The Federals were question-
ed on this issue 'at every' publ ic meeting. They tried to argue 
that they were not spl itting the opposition but were trying, 
in fact, to 'create' an opposition. (158) They argued that the 
U.P. was effete and that the advent of the Federals strength-
ened and did not weaken the opposition. Despite this, the 
stigma of having divided opposition remained so strong that the 
Federals were not even able to capital ise on the advantage which 
a third party can have in pol itics: that of sel I ing its support, 
on terms, to one of the other parties. Both the Natal Mercury 
and the Natal Witness, who frequently reflected Federal thinking~ 
constantly urged such an agreement against the common enemy. (159 
The U.P., however, would be unl ikely to favour such a pact, 
especially if it would have to make concessions (which appeared 
to be the case). The U.P. had, after al I, to consider the 
effect of such a pact on the other prov i nces. A I so, it was 
the incumbent party and therefore acted from a position of strength. 
An example occurred in the Weenen constituency. Here, the 
Federals attempted to coerce the U.P. cand idate, Colonel Cochrane, 
into answering a number of questions by threatening to with-
hold their votes in a straight Un ited Party - National ist cont-
est. (160)The Federals bel ieved that they held the balance of 
157. Natal Witness: 15 February 1954. 
Natal Dai Iy News: 7 May 1954. 
158. U.F.P. (Natal): Spl itting the Vote, loc.cit. 
159. Natal Witness: 2 November 1953, 19 February 1954. 
Natal Mercury: 7 October 1953, 6 November 1953. 
160. Natal Witness: 15 March 1954. 
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power but this was not really the case. To abstain or to 
support the National ist was not a possibil ity for the Federals 
in view of the 'spl itting the vote' cry, and so Colonel 
Cochrane called their bluff and did not even bother to reply 
to the questions. 
With no anti-National ist pact possible, the Federals had 
to fight in the National ist-held northern Natal seats. This 
would maintain the Federals' credibi I ity as an opponent of the 
'common enemy' whi Ie it fought the U.P. in the rest of Natal. 
The problem lay in the fact that the Federals could not risk 
an opposition candidate fail ing to capture a National ist seat 
because of their intervention. They therefore offered to fight 
in three northern Natal constituencies, provided the U.P. re-
mained outside the contest. (161) The U.P., real ising the 
Federal dilemma, did not even reply to the offer. (162) 
The results of the election (in contrast to Federal 
expectations) was a triumph for the U.P. Of the twenty-five 
seats, the U.P. won twenty-one and the National ists won the 
remaining four seats. The National ists narrowly carried the 
new seat of Weenen, by. 162 votes,but, as the former seat of 
Umvoti covered much the same area and was held b) the U.P., 
this could be considered a National ist gain. (163 There were 
no other gains or losses by the parties and the strengths of 
the parties in the new Provincial Counci I were, except for that 
one extra seat gained by the National ists, the same as in the 
old counci I. AI I the minor parties, including the Federal 
Party, were completely routed, with none of them even approach-
ing . a majority in any of the constituencies. 
An analysis of the election figures underl ines the enormity 
of the Federal Party defeat. (164) The party pol led 20 519 votes 
161. Natal Witn~ss: 15 February 1954. 
162. Natal Witness: 12 March 1954, 11 May 1954. 
163. Natal Witness: 18 June 1954. 
164. For all 1954 provincial election statistics, ~: N.P.A.: 
The Official Gazette of the Province of Natal; No. 175, 
24 June 1954, p.712. 
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or some 20.4 per cent. of the total bal lots cast. Against 
this, the U.P. secured 62 530 votes (62,1 per cent.), the 
National ists pol led 14 490 votes (14,4 per cent.) and the 
remaining 3 227 votes (3,1 per cent.) were cast for the Labour 
and Liberal Parties and an Independent. It is significant 
that the U.P. pol led over three times as many votes in Natal 
as did the Federal Party and, even if only the seventeen 
constituencies which the Federal Party fought are considered, 
the U.P. vote was sti I lover twice as large as that of the 
Federals. (165) The highest percentage of votes which any 
Federal candidate obtained was the 38,5 per cent. which Brick-
hil I received in the Berea seat. There were, however, SIX 
other seats in which the Federals obtained more than a third 
of the vote. (166) 
The result stunned the Federal Party. After so much 
effort, enthusiasm and hope it saw al I its hopes dashed. The 
shock of defeat is best gauged by the reaction of the Federal 
leaders. The party's Provincial Executive described the 
election results as a 'temporary setback', deduciny from the 
results a 'mandate' to continue its existence. (167 This was 
a modest enough thought in view of the party's former confi-
dence. ~ughes Mason tried to draw a paral lei between the 
Federals and the Churchi I I group in Britain in the 1930's(168) 
but this idea was not taken up by the other Federals. Heaton 
Nichol Is, in a dignified statement, resigned his position in 
the Senate as he fe .lt that he had no right to speak on behalf 
of the Natal people. He expressed the mood of the Federals 
accurately when he said that they were 'very disappointed' ;(169) 
more so because the 43 000 Torchmen in Natal had not supported 
165. 43 864 as against 20 519. 
166. Pietermaritzburg South, Durban Central, Point, 
Drakensberg, Zululand and Umkomaas. 
167. Natal Witness: 19 June 1954. 
168. Natal Witness: 19 June 1954. 
169. Natal Witness: 19 June 1954. 
~a~e Times: 21 June 1954. 
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the party. (170) 
In analysing why the Federal Party was defeated, the 
country's press suppl ied a variety of reasons. The pro-
Federal Natal Witness attributed the U.P. triumph to the 
fact that it was 'safe', 'fam iii ar', and 'conservat i ve' and 
had a large reservoir of 'stubborn loyalty' on which to draw~171) 
Other newspapers saw in the Federal defeat the fact that a 
new South Africanism had developed in Natal and that the 
, d d 't (172) Oth province was not prepare to stan on I sown. ers 
interpreted the result as showing that the Natal voters felt 
that the U.P. was the only real alternative to the National ists~173) 
As regards the 
favouring some 
Federals.(174) 
future, there was widespread press comment 
sort of reconcil iation between the U.P. and 
Mitchel I offered this but the Federals set 
the 
such demanding and uncompromising terms that the U.P. was forced 
to reject them and any hope of heal i ng the rift between the 
two parties seemed hopeless. (175) 
The ful I reasons for the Federal Party defeat in the 
provincial elections were complex, and numerous. From one point 
of view it can be exp I.a i ned in terms of the fa i I ure of the 
Federal candidates and party in managing the election campaign. 
The F edera I cand i dates were, in the rna i n, attract i ve 
candidat~s and were even praised by a hostile press. (176) Of 
the thirteen candidates whom it has been possible to trace, 
eight were professional people, three were sugar farmers, one 
was a businessman and one was the distinguished trade unionist 
Jimmy Bolton. Only two of the candidates were over sixty whi Ie 
170. Natal Witness: 19 
171. Natal Witness: 18 
172. Natal Dai Iy News: 
Rand Dai Iy Mai I: 
173. Natal Mercury: 18 
174. Natal Dai Iy News: 
Natal Mercury: 18 
Rand Dai Iy Mai I: 
175. N at a I D a i I ~ News: 
19 June 19 4. 
176. Rand Dai Iy Ma i I: 
June 1954. Cape Times: 21 June 1954. 
June 1954. 
17 June 1954, 21 June 1954. 
18 June 1954. 
June 1954. Cape Times: 21 June 1954. 
17 June 1954. Natal Witness: 18 June 1954. 
June 1954. Cape Times: 21 June 1954. 
22 June 1954. 
18 June 1954, Natal Witness: 18 June 1954, 
22 June 1954. 
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seven of them were under forty.~177) But, they were inex-
perienced, we~e not professional pol iticians and lacked the 
skill required to manage an election campaign. They arranged 
a number of impressive publ ic meetings, drawing up to 3 000 
peop I e to a s i ngl e ra I I y. (178) I n order to ach i eve th i s, they 
squandered their resources on non-essentials such as 'pamphlet 
raids' and hundreds of personal invitations. (179) The U.P., 
by contrast, devoted its resources not only to the obvious and 
showy dimensions of the campaign, but also to vital 'behind-
the-scenes' activity as wei I. For example, the U.P. candidates 
were kept extremely wei I informed by the highly efficient 
Candidates' Publ icity Section in Durban~ This group issued 
I iterature advising candidates on issues ranging from a detail-
ed refutation, clause by clause, of the Federals pamphlets and 
education pol icy to information on the Statute of Westminster 
and on the problems of immigration.(180) 
The Federal leaders tended to function on impressions 
rather than on hard facts. A good example of this is the expecta-
tion of the party as regards the provincial election results. 
The Federals were confident of a very good pol I, with the party 
winning seven seats on the Natal coast with two others as 
'possibi I ities', as wei I as a 'fair chance' in the three Pieter-
. ( 181) 
maritzburg seats and Drakensberg. These claims were hope-
lessly at variance with the true facts and were made despite ·the 
detailed canvassing which had been carried out. They suggest 
a high degree of a,mateur i shness in po I it i cs. (182) 
177. Nata I Witness: 12 March 1954, 15 March 1954, 15 Apr i I 
1954. Natal Mercury: 12 March 1954. 
178. Natal Mercury: 28 March 1954, 15 June 1954. Natal Witness: 
9 Apri I 1954, 6 May 1954. Natal Dai Iy News: 17 May 1954. 
179. Natal Witness: 19 February 1954. 
180. The papers of the Candidates' Publ icity Section are fi led 
unnumbered as yet, in the Dougl as M i tche I I Co I I ect ion " 
U.P. Archives, Unisa. ' 
181. The seven coastal seats were Durban North Point Greyvil Ie 
Ub 'l ", m I 0, Berea, Essenwood and Umkomaas. The two 'possi-
bi I ities' were Durban Central and Gardens. The three 
P~etermar!tzburg seats were Pietermaritzburg North, 
Pletermarltzburg South and Pietermaritzburg District 
Natal Witness: 16 J~ne 1954, 18 June 1954. Rand Dai I~ Mai I: 
22 June 1954. The gist of these reports were confirmed by 
D. Heaton Nichol Is and E.G. Ford in interviews. 
182. Thi~ view was fully supported by D. Heaton Nichol Is and 
E.G. Ford in i'nterviews. 
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The Natal electorate had seen the National ists win two 
general elections in a row and even increase their majority 
in the second election. They had seen the Torch Commando, 
with its vast human and financial resources, defeated and so 
could not bel ieve that the Federal Party could succeed where 
the Torch Commando had fa i I ed. It is true that the U. P. had 
also been defeated In the country at large by _the National-
ists but they, unl ike the Federals, had a chance, no matter 
how distant, of replacing the National ists. In addition, as 
the Natal Witness pointed out, the U.P. was 'safe' and, at a 
time when Engl ish-speaking Natal felt threatened on al I sides, 
safetY , was a qual ity which could be valued. The demographic 
and pol itical facts of South African pol itical I ife indicated 
clearly that the Engl ish-speakers were to be a powerless min-
ority if they chose to clash with the Afrikaners and that they 
could only achieve power in co-operation with some, at least, 
of this group. The fact, as the Natal Dai Iy News pointed out, 
that the eight almost exclusively Natal parties which had 
functioned since Union had al I been completely unsuccessful~183) 
was not lost on th~ voters. Engrish-speaking Natal could not 
stand alone pol itical Iy and it was not so much that these 
voters wil I ingly accepted Afrikaners and a broader South Africa-
nlsm, as some of the press suggested, but rather that they 
bowed to the inevitabi I ity of their own pol itical weakness. 
The U.P. was accepted not only because it was a national, bi I in-
gual organisation but also because it convinced the Natal elec-
torate that it was the only possible choice for Natal. Whereas 
Die Transvaler had asked in June 1953 whether South Africa was 
to experience an 'Ulster' in Natal. (184) The Times was able to 
answer at the end of 1954 that 'The province [Natal] is not an 
Ulster,.(185) In this The Times was right. 
The defeat of the Federal Party in Natal was to have far 
reaching effects. It was to discourage the Cape and Transvaal 
183. Natal Dai Iy News: 18 June 1954. 
184. V ide supra: Ch. 5. pp.89-90. 
185. The Times: South African Real ities, 1955, p.19. 
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Federals from even entering their provincial elections and was 
to have a profound effect on the whole of the federal movement 
In South Africa. The movement was forced to change its whole 
approach to implementing its ideals,as the obvious route via 
the Natal provincial elections had been so conclusively closed. 
It had to take stock of its organisation, priorities and pol i-
cles and to consider what steps it would take to face a mi I it-
ant, confident and triumphant Afrikaner national ism. 
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PART 11 











A CHANGE OF APPROACH 
After losing the Natal provincial elections in June 1954, 
the Federal Party changed its modus operandi. The reasons 
for these changes were numerous. Organisational changes stemmed 
from a real isation of some of the causes of electoral defeat, 
whi Ie pol icy changes were partly for reasons of propaganda and 
publ ic appeal and were partly reactions to developments in 
South African pol itics generally and particularly in the Nation-
al ist Party. 
As has been discussed, the Federals had been confident 
of winning a number of seats in the Natal provincial elections. (1) 
When the party failed to gain even a single seat in the elect-
Ions, they ~ere forced to revise their entire image, their 
hopes and their organisation. It was now clear that, as they 
could not claim to speak for Natal; or even for Engl ish-
speaking Natal, the cl imb to power would be a long and arduous 
task that would require more expertise, effort and organisation-
al abil ity than had at first been thought necessary. 'We were 
spread far too wide over the prOVince, we were too thin on the 
ground and we were pol itical amate~rs', said Ford of the 1954 
elections in later years. (2) 
The first result of the fai lure of the party In the Natal 
provincial elections was a decision not to c6ntest simi lar 
elections in the other provinces, set for 18 August 1954. 
Although not yet formally constituted, (3) Federals in the Cape 
and the Transvaal had announced as early as 3 September 1953 
that they were ' planning to enter the provincial elections.(4) 
The Transvaal Federals repeated this intention several times. 
On one occasion they stated that they would contest as many 
seats in Johannesburg and Pretoria as they could, without giving 
1. Vide supra: Ch.5 p.120. 
2. Intervi~w with E.G. Ford. 
3. Vide supra: Ch.4 · p.67. 
4. The Argus: 3 September 1953. 
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the National ists an opportunity to win on a spl it opposition 
vote. (5) On another occasion, whi Ie the Natal Federals were 
fighting the provincial elections, the Transvaal party pro-
mised to fight its elections to the' ... ful lest extent of 
its resources in the province.,(6) This intention continued, 
even after the results of the Natal election had been publ i-
cised. They actually began to consider possible candidates. (7) 
However, on reflection, the Transvaal party real ised that the 
'extent of its resources' was far smaller than that of its 
sister party in Natal, which had been soundly beaten, and that 
the best course of action was to abstain from the Transvaal 
elections. (8) Similarly, the Federals in the Cape announced 
on 25 June that, in view of the Natal results, they 'might 
not' fight the provincial elections. The fol lowing month they 
announced that they would not contest any seats. 
These decisions not to fight the elections (in the Trans-
vaal and Cape) were fol lowed by a flurry of activity to put 
the parties on a sounder footing. 
efficient organisation was crucial. 
It had become apparent that 
As has been discussed, (9) 
the Transvaal party had, after many abortive attempts the 
previous year, been formally constituted in November 1954, and 
even began to produce its own newspaper the fol lowing year. (10) 
I n the eastern Cape, in add it i on to new branches be i ng fou nded~ 11) 
the party was formally constituted in July 1955. (12) 
This activity in the two largest provinces was paralleled 
by a similar burst of organisational energy in Natal, where the 
5. Cape Times: 9 September 1953. 
6. Ca~e Times: 5 June 1953. 
7. Rand Da i I ~ Ma i I: 18 June 1953. Natal Witness: 19 June 1953. 
8. Natal Witness: 16 July 1953. 
9. Vide su~ra: Ch.4 p. 67. 
10. The Federal ist. 
11. Port Eli zabeth Post: 22 Apr i I 1955. 
12. Vide su~ra: Ch. 4 p. 67. 
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party already had more than fifty branches.(13) Here electoral 
fai lure was blamed partly on the Natal Daily News and the 
Natal Mercury. With one of these against them and the other 
half-hearted and highly qualified in its support, (14) the 
Federals did not have an effective news medium in the Durban 
area, where there was such a large concentration of potential 
supporters. In order to remedy this, the Federals founded the 
Federal News as the party's official organ in Natal.(15)" 
It was also clear that enthusiasm and energy alone were 
not sufficient to win elections. The organisational superior-
ity of the U.P. had been a significant factor in its triumph 
in the provincial elections. (16) It had not depended on volun-
tary help, but had used professional workers. This disadvant-
age the Federals now hoped to counteract by means of the 
appointment of a full-time organiser, and the creation of an 
Action Committee. "The organiser was to motivate and co-ordinate 
the party, while the Action Committee was to faci I itate greater 
communication between the members and the leaders, as wei I as 
to provide a more effective and immediate response to events 
than the normal structure of the party permitted. (17) 
Before the setback of the provincial elections, the party 
leaders had not contemplated alliances with other political 
groups. They made no attempt to co-operate with the Liberals 
and in May 1954 strongly denied rumours of an election pact 
with the Labour Party. (18) They never explored the possibi I ity 
of a pact with the U.P. as it was clear that the only conditions 
under which such a pact could be concluded was for the U.P. to 
alter its pol icy. In June their first reaction was to reject 
Mitchell's immediate post-election appeal for a 'common front', 
by demanding a virtual acceptance by the U.P. of the Federal 
pol icy. (19) But, once the impl ications of the 1954 defeat became 
13. Natal Witness: 12 May 1954. 
14. Vide suera : Ch. 3. p. 57. 
15. Vide suera : Ch. 4 • pp. 81-83. 
16. Vide sue ra : Ch. 5 • p. 120. 
17. Vide sue ra : Ch. 4. pp. 87-88. 
18. Vide suera : Ch. 5. p. 115. 
19. Natal Dai I ~ News: 18 June 1954. Natal Witness: 19 June 1954. 
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apparent and the threat of a r.epubl ic became more real, their 
attitude began to change. 
Early in November 1954, Mitchel I held unofficial talks 
in a private home with Federal Party members of the Hi Iton area. 
These talks, arranged by the U.P., were an attempt to el iminate 
'misunderstandings' and to formulate a common stand on the 
republ ican issue. (20) The Federal leadership, having abandoned 
its self-contained pre-election stand, was now wil I ing t~ explore 
the possibi I ities of co-operation and after long discussions 
with Mitchel I, an agreement was drawn up by Selby at the beginning 
of December. (21) However, the hope of establ ishing a common 
front broke down over the question of clause 2(d)(22) of the 
U.P. 's constitution. The Federal Party required that the U.P. 
in Natal repudiate this clause, whi Ie Mitchel I maintained that 
such action was both impossible and unnecessary. (23) Despite 
their fai lure, there were a number of significant points about 
the talks. First, it is noteworthy that they were held at all, 
considering the previous attitude of the Federals. Second, it 
was Selby who drew up the agreement, an action which also 
showed a ne,w wi I I i ngne~s to negot i ate. Th i rd, the agreement 
failed only because of the single disagreement over clause 2(d). 
It is also noteworthy that it was the U.P. and not the Federals 
who rejected the agreement of December 1954, a reversal of the 
roles which had been played in June of that year. 
As In other matters, (24) the Federals outside Natal fol lowed 
the lead of the Natal ians In attempting to arrange a common 
front against the government. Within a week of the discussions 
between Mitchel I and the Federals of the Hilton area, at the 
beginning of November 1954, the Transvaal Federals cal led for 
a campaign to rally 'democrats' into a sol id anti-republ ican 
front. (25) This cal I led to correspondence between the Transvaal 
20. Natal Witness: 6 November 1954. 
21. Sundar Times: 5 December 1954. Nata I Witness:6 December 1954. 
~aee ,mes: 6 December 1954. 
22. For a discussion of Clause 2(d), vide sue ra : Ch.2. p.32. 
23. Natal Mercur~: 7 December 1954. Natal Witness: 13 December 1954. 
24. Vide sue ra : Ch.4. p.71 
25. Caee Times: 8 November 1954. 
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F edera.1 s and the U. P. The former were keen to ho I d a jo i nt 
t 
meeting in Johannesburg to show the government the strength 
of the opposition to it, and also to make known their argumen-
ts against a republ ic. (26) The latter, however, held that 
its att i tude was we I I known and that, I n view of the ' major 
differences' between the two parties, no useful purpose would 
b d b ., 't t' (27) I t th th U Phd e serve y a JO I n mee I ng. n ru, e.. .a no 
intention of assembl inga large group of Johannesburgers ' in 
order to al low the tiny Federal group to present its views and, 
possibly, to embarrass the U.P. 
While this change in their organisation was being carried 
out and while the Federals were showing a new preparedness to 
co-operate ~ith the other anti-government groups, they also 
manifested a shift in emphasis in their pol itical thinking. 
This did not mean the introduction of any radically new ideas. 
Rather, it involved the de-emphasising of certain pol icies and 
the highl ighting of others. The reasons for these changes in 
emphasis were complex and numerous. They were a mixture of 
expediency, necessity and reaction to the rising tide of repub-
I icanism fol lowing the .provincial elections of 1954. 
Any suggestion that expediency was a factor in Federal 
Party thinking would have horrified most Federal leaders and 
supporters. The U.P. had always been seen by the Federals as 
vacil latory and vague - a 'jellyfish' in the words of Selby(28) 
- or as sly and two-faced in its attempts to be al I things to 
all men. (29) By contrast, the Federals saw themselves as being 
purposeful and honest and wedded to principles, no matter how 
inconvenient. (30) In the statement which had launched the party, 
the words' ... the pursuance of principle rather than expedi-
ency ••. ' had given expression to these ideal istic feel ings.(31) 
26. U.F.P. (Transvaal): Statement by Provincial Executive, 
18 February 1955. Natal Witness: 24 February 1955. 
27. KiP: J. l. Horak to the Secretary, U. F. P. (Transvaa I), 
25 Jan uary 1955. 
28. Natal Dai Iy News: 8 June 1954. 
29. Natal Witness: 12 May 1953, 22 May 1953, 3 July 1953, 
7 May 1954. Natal Dai Iy News: 15 May 1953. South Coast 
Herald: 21 May 1954. 
30. Natal Witness: 12 May 1953, 24 September 1953, 10 August 1954. 
31. U.F.P. (Natal): Statement, ·op.cit., p.l. 
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In South African pol itics, a principled racial pol icy could 
be costly . . Yet, the party had presented its pol icy openly 
and had fought for it with candour. Now, the party concluded 
that its non-White pol icy had been costly(32) and very little 
publ ic emphasis was placed on it after June 1954. The si lence 
is al I the more significant in view of the fact that the 
par I i amentary sess ion in the first ha I f of 1956 was dom i,nated, 
in the words of the Federal News, by 'measures affecting the 
non-European ,(33) This is not to suggest that the Federals 
changed their pol icy regarding non-Whites, or abandoned their 
hopes of dismantl ing apartheid. It was simply that they, for 
practical pol itical reasons, decided to postpone the fight on 
the non-White issue in favour of more immediate questions. 
The second reason for a shift in emphasis of Federal pol icy 
after June 1954, was one of necessity. An example of this 
involved the Natal Stand. The Natal Stand emanated from the 
rally in Durban in June 1952, which had been organised by the 
Torch Commando. (34) In supporting the Natal Stand, and in 
arguing for its use in halting the National ists, the Federal 
Party had presumed that it had the support of the bulk of Natal's 
voters. The Torch Commando obviously had the support of most 
enfranchised Natal ians, and, in identifying closely with the 
Torch Commando, the Federals presumed that they too enjoyed 
this support. This explains both their shock at the results 
of the provincial elections, and their rapid abandonment of 
the Natal Stand as their rallying cry. It was clear that for 
the Natal Stand to be implemented, the Federals would have to 
have control of the Provincial Counci I. Only the Council could 
speak for the people of Natal and keep Natal loyal to the Crown 
outside any republ ic declared by the central government. With 
the U.P. In power, the Natal Stand, as seen by the Federals, 
was therefore dead as a practical alternative and the party had 
to abandon it as a major propaganda issue. Instead, it had to 
concentrate all its efforts on the evi Is of a republ ic _ and 
not on Natal's possible individual stand against it. 
32. V ide supra: Ch. 5. pp. 113-4. 
33. Federal News: 24 May 1956. 
34. V i de supra: Ch. 2. pp. 14-16. 
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This change of emphasis. coincided with a number of 
developments which led to greater emphasis being placed by 
the govern i ng party on both the ro I e of the A fr i kaner in South 
Africa, and on the dream of a republ ic. The Federals, ever 
sensitive to trends within the National Party and ever ready 
to react against them, immediately emphasised its role as the 
sole defender of the Engl ish-apeaking group, and emphasised 
its anti-republ icanism to an even greater extent. 
While the 1954 elections were a major setback to the 
Federal Party, they were a stimulus for the National ists who 
won an additional seat in Natal. (35) This was followed by even 
greater successes in the elections in the other three provinces 
on 18 August. The National ists won eleven additional . seats; one 
in the Orange Free State, three In the Cape and seven in the 
Transvaal. (36) For the first time In South Africa's history, 
one party control led all the seats In a provincial counci I 
(the National ists in the Free State). Even more significantly, 
the U.P., because of the three seats gained by National ists, 
lost control of the Cape Provincial Council. Outnumbered two 
to one in the Transvaal Provincial Counci I, and in a decided 
minority in pari iament, the U.P. was reduced to control ling 
only Natal. (37) The final blow was the fact, admitted by the 
Federals only in private, that the government had actually 
captured the support of the majority of the voters. (38) Although 
it was impossible to prove this conclusively because of the 
uncontested seats, it was c I ear that with the tide, as M i tche I I 
admitted, ' ••. running in favour of the National ists', (39) if 
this were not already true, it would soon be so. As the Natal 
Witness headl ined dramatically, it was the Nats' greatest election 
win In the history of their party. 
The impact Qf the elections on the pol itical parties was 
immediate. While the U.P. could claim that the .result meant 
that al I voters should rally to its colours, the Federals could 
35. Weenen. Vide supra: Ch. 5 .p. 117. 
36. Natal Witness: 20 August 1954. 
37. Natal Witness: 20 August 1954. 
38. U.F.P. (Natal): The Rise of the Republ ie, 18 December 1954. 




argue e opposite. Heaton Nichol Is stated that the results 
indicated that the U.P. was moribund and should spl it into two 
with one wing joining the Federals, and the other wing joining 
the National ists. The National ists, he felt, were ~ow on the 
path to a one-party, authoritarian state planned by the Broeder-
bond. (41) 
Malan's resignation and the succession of Mr. J.G.Strijdom 
initiated the next stage in the alteration of the South African 
pol itical scene, for Strijdom's succession heralded a new, 
more forceful era in National ist pol icy and propaganda. Malan 
himself would have preferred the more moderate N.C. Havenga as 
his successor(42)but the party caucus, reflecting the mood of 
1954, decided otherwise. Strijdom's assumption of the premier-
ship in December 1954 was to encourage and magnify two trends 
which had always been present in the National Party but which 
had not always been at the forefront of the party's propaganda 
and actions. One was the position of the Afrikaner in . South 
African socjety, and the other was the question of republ icanism. 
These developments in National ist thinking led the Federals to 
shift their thinking to meet the new challenges. 
The first challenge was the question of the Afrikaner In 
South African society. As has been discussed, the National 
Party was strongly Afrikaner orientated, a bias which was not 
diminished by the electoral victories of 1953-54. (43) On the 
contrary, the party rema i ned, in t he words of Professor Gwendo I en 
Carter, 'above al I else ... an Afrikaner one,(44)and, although 
it had a few Engl ish-speaking supporters, it functione'd at this 
time almost entirely as an Afrikaner organisation. (45) In fact, 
its abi I ity to identify itself with the Afrikaner people was, 
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June 1954 the position altered .only insofar as the National ist 
spokesmen no longer concealed t heir ideal of an Afrikaner 
dom i nance in South A fr i can soc i ety. I n express i ng these views 
strongly, they appeared to exclude the Engl ish~speakers even 
more vehemently than before. 
Strijdom had barely assumed the premiership when, amid 
foreboding in the British press that South Africa's Common-
wealth I inks and the interests of her Engl ish-speaking inhabit-
ants would be sacrificed to Afrikaner interests, (47) the Minister 
of Justice struck the first blow. He instructed publ ic prose-
cutors in Natal to refrain from prosecuting offenders who had 
contravened ~y-Iaws which had not been promulgated· in Afrikaans~48) 
The Minister countermanded the instruction after representation 
had been made by municipal authorities throughout the province. 
The issue appears to have involved mainly Durban, and concerned 
a large body of legislation which had been passed before Union~49) 
To translate this enormous body of partly obsolete by-laws into 
Afrikaans would, as the Federals po .inted out, be an enormous 
task, which would not alter the legal position at all. At the 
same time, the Federals hastily assured the publ ic that they 
agreed with bi I ingual ism in principle, and considered that the 
Minister had acted within his legal rights. (50) 
In Apri lOr. A.J.R. van Rhijn, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs, made an equally provocative statement. He presented 
South African pol itics as being a struggle to the death between 
'National ist ideology and Imperial ism'. (51) The imperial ists 
were defined by Or. van Rhijn as those who 'had their souls 
outside the country', whereas the national ists were those who 
carried within themselves something which was 'in the heart of 
the volk'. (52) This 'something' came from the soul of the people, 
47. For detai Is of the British press comment on Strijdom's 
accession to the premiership, v ide, Federal News: 
31 January 1955. 
48. Federal News: 31 January 1955. 
49. Federal News: 31 January 1955. 
50. Federal News: 31 January 1955. 
51. Natal Oa i I ~ News: 7 Apri I 1955. 
52. Natal Oa i I ~ News: 7 Apr i 1 1955. 
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and was ultimately a 'God-given strength' which was suppl ied 
to each nation. (53) As such, 'National ism is always right 
and ••• ~coul~ never be wrong. ,(54) Armed with this God-given 
justice, the struggle against imperial ism, therefore, ' ••• was 
a fight that had to be fought out until National ism control led 
every phase of I ife in the country .... ,(55) 
One of the few areas in South Africa not controlled by 
the Afrikaner was the economic sector. There were, however, 
plans to alter this. During the same week that Dr. van Rhijn 
addressed the National ist Youth League in Grey town, Dr. N. 
D i eder i chs, ina speech to the Afr i kaanse Studentebond, urged 
that Afrikaners support Afrikaner businesses, and so strengthen 
what he termed the 'Afrikaner economy'. (56) The Durban Skakel-
komitee then issued an Afrikaans Buying Guide to influence 
Afrikaner spending patterns. (57) 
The response of the U.P. to these developments was to go 
out of its way to stress its 'South Africanism', that is, its 
idea of Engl ish-Afrikaner unity in the interests of a peaceful 
South Africa. It also stressed its widespread support amongst 
both language groups. (58) With many of the U.P. leaders them-
selves Afrikaners, and the constant stress which was now placed 
on Afrikaners' support, Brickhi I I accused the U.P. of overwork-
ing its Afrikaans members in order to prove that it was 'not 
racial istic'. (59) 
53. Natal Daily News: 7 Apri I 1955. This type of thinking 
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The Federal Party's reaction was more complex. like 
the U. P., it had at first attempted to show that it was not 
anti-Afrikaner and, . in fact, enjoyed Afrikaner support. George 
Heaton Nichol Is, for example, maintained that the Federal Party 
was as bi I ingual as the U.P. Later, he even offered to pay 
£100 to anyone who could find an anti-Afrikaner utterance in 
his pari iamentary speeches. (60) In order to demonstrate its 
Afrikaner support, the Federals, I ike the U.P., overworked their 
Afrikaner members. The Federals had only two identifiably 
Afrikaans-speaking members. They were Johan Venter and Wil lem 
Conradie, both Transvalers. (61) Both men had been on an exten-
sive tour of Natal and the Transvaal addressing publ ic meetinys 
in Johannesburg and Durban at the end of 1953 and in 1954. (62 
While the Federals remained officially non-ethnic, these 
Afrikaners found it possible to remaIn members. Even the fact 
that Heaton Nicholls had spoken openly of Afrikaner-Calvinist 
domination in his Services Club speech, (63)and the fact that 
the Federals had claimed that Engl ish-speaking teachers were 
dtscriminated against in Natal education, (64)did not affect 
their loyalty to the party. One was a personal opinion, and 
the other was, ~fter al I, easi Iy demonstrated. 
The compl icating factor in the Federal Party's relations 
with the Afrikaners was that it was committed to defending the 
rights of the Engl ish-speakers. When it was launched, many 
observers had seen it as an Engl ish-speaking reaction against 
Afrikaner national ism. (65) National ists, for example, Die 
Transvaler, referred constantly to the Federal Party and its 
supporters as 'jingoes'. (66) . The Federals denied this for the 
first eighteen months of their existence. After the 1954 
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emphasise their commitment tn both White language groups, and 
tended to identify almost exclusively with the cause of the 
Engl ish-speakers. This, in turn, al ienated what I ittle Afrik-
aner support the party had enjoyed. (67) 
Selby summed up the new Federal attitude In a speech at 
Umbilo on 8 November 1955. (68) He stated that the National ists 
had rejected the idea of 'one united free and democratic nation', 
and worked, instead, to make the A fr i kaners a ' ..• separate, 
distinct self-contained racial bloc, a nation within the nation.,(69) 
The final intention of the party was that the 'Afrikaner - not 
(70) .- .-
the South African - shal I rule South Africa.' Selby saw 
the National ists as indulging in Nazi-type propaganda which was 
franklyanti-British.(71) He then cal led on the Engl ish-speaking 
South Africans to rally to oppose the National ists. (72) 
The new orientation of the Federal Party was simi lar to 
the appeal which Heaton Nichol Is had .made at the Services Club 
in 1953, but, whereas that had been a personal view before' the 
creation of the Federal Party, the new attitude was now accepted 
party pol icy. The Federal News, for instance, stated bluntly, 
in an article in June 1955: 'We are British; it would be point-
less to deny it,.(73) The publ ication devel~ped the idea the 
fol lowing year by stating that to be 'British' was not to be 









At this time both Venter and Conradie left the party. 
Conradie informed the author in ' an interview that the 
Federals were basically 'jingoes'. The only reason why 
he, a war veteran and war inval id, had joined the party 
in 1953 was because it appeared to the only group wi II ing 
to oppose what he felt to be the National ists' total itar-
ian tendencies. He left the Federal Party when it was 
clear that they were concerned mainly with Engl ish-speaking 
interests and could not, in any event, halt the National ists. 
A fu I I copy of the speech, handed to the Nata I Mercury, IS 
in the posession of Professor W. KleynhanS: 
Ibid., pp. 4-7 , 
~., p.7. Underl ining in the original. 
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began to identify strongly with the wider Engl ish-speaking 
world. Despite Heaton Nichol Is' plea at the Federal Party's 
. I . t . I ' (75) 1955 congress that 'language IS not a po I Ica weapon, 
they now printed two large articles in the Federal News, 
glorifyiny the Engl ish language and stressing its international 
I inks. (76 Soon afterwards, the party attacked a former Director 
of Education in Natal, Mr. C.M. Booysen, for suggesting that 
books written in England had an 'al ien background'. (77J . On the 
international pol itical scene, the Federals identified strongly 
with the Brit~sh during the Suez crisis and disapproved strongly 
of the South African government's neutral stand in the di~pute~78) 
The Federal News then went on to praise the war sacrifices 
of the Engl Ish-speakers comparinf them with the Afrikaans-
speaking community's war effort. 79) It claimed that Engl ish-
speakers were being discriminated against in the Civil Service, 
the Defence Force, and on the Rai Iways. (80) Replying to the 
plea of National ist leaders, for a greater economic role for 
Afrikaners, it argued that the superior financial acumen of the 
Engl ish-speakers was already being exploited by an Afrikaner 
government through t~xation. (81) Finally, in reply to the Durban 
Skakelkomitee's shopping guide for Afrikaners; the Federal 
Party issued a Federal Shoppin~ Guide in the interests of the 
Engl ish-speaking businesses. (8 ) 
The second development within the National Party, created 
by the triumphs in the 1954 provincial elections, and confirmed 
by Strijdom's assumption of the premiership, was a greater 
75. federal News: 22 December 1955. 
76. Federal News: 22 December 1955, 23 February 1956. 
77. Federal News: 26 Apri I 1956. 
78. Federal News: 23 August 1956, 22 November 1956. U.F.P. 
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October 1956, op.cit., p.3. 
79. Federal News: 21 Apri I 1956. 
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striving for a republ ic. It .i s true that the party had a I ways 
nursed this dream, but the issue had not always been dominant. 
In 1948 Malan, largely as a result of Havenga's influence, had 
soft-pedal led the issue and had concentrated on the colour 
question. (83) His I ieutenant, the Transvaal leader of the party, 
Strijdom, however, had always been staunchly and uncompromisingly 
republ ican, and had held the ideal before the Afrikaner people. (84) 
The decl ine of Havenga's influence in the early 1950s, and the 
simultaneous rise of Strijdom inspired the republ icans to a new 
effort. 
Throughout the latter half of 1954 there was an ever-
increasing press and party battle over the question of a republ ic. 
The Star operied the contest. I n comment i ng on the F edera I Party 
defeat in the Nata.1 provincial elections, it carefully separated 
the defeat of the Federals from any weakening of anti-
republ icanism amongst the opposition. (85) The National ist leaders, 
it commented, were themselves' ... sensibly content to regard 
... ~their republ ica~ aims as unattainable in present circum-
stances, or at least not to make them a major issue .... ,(86) 
So as to under I ine the unattainabi I ity of the republ ican aim, 
The Star supported the idea, first advanced by the Federals, (87) 
that each province should hold a separate referendum to decide 
whether or not it should enter a proposed republ ic. (88) Die 
Transvaler immediately attacked The Star's stand by maintaining 
that northern Natal, once part of the Transvaal, was deserving 
of separate consideration. Furthermore, whi Ie many people In 
the other three provinces would welcome ridding themselves of 
Natal's 'jingo and coolie problems', Natal, in the last analysis, 
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on the British government for help. (89) After the National ist 
triumphs in the Cape, Free State and Transvaal elections, Die 
Transvaler stated, on 21 September, that: 'As the National 
Party grew even stronger by attracting a growing number of voters, 
the real isation of the republ ican ideal had to come more strongly 
to the foreground. ,(90) Repub I i can ism, it announced, was now 
the 'cornerstone' of the National ist pol icy and endeavours. (91) 
Within ten days of Die Transvaler's announcement, the Natal 
Federal Party assembled for its annual congress. Not surprising-
ly, it was dominated by the republ ican Issue. Heaton Nicholls, 
in his opening speech, stated that the Federals existed '~rim­
arily' to fight against being 'driven' into a republ ic. Resis-
tence against National ist republ icanism was the 'creed' of the 
party. (92) He then reiterated the demand for a separate refer-
endum, a cal I which was then taken up by the congress. (93)Most 
significantly, the congress decided unanimously that' ... resis-
tence to the republ ic must now take priority over al I other 
issues. ,(94) In order to implement the resolution, the Federals 
pledged themselves to co-operate with al I other anti-republ ican 
groups. The congress then agreed to establ ish an anti-republ ic 
fund. (95) Selby then closed the congress with a speech which 
dwelt almost exclusively on the republ ican issue, and culminated 
with the cry: 'The Battle of the Republ ic is on •... ,(96) 
After this, the Federals were totally committed to fight-
ing the republ ic. At its foundation, defence of the constitu-
tion had involved preventing the National ists from tampering 
89. Die Transvaler: 23 June 1954. 
90. Die Transvaler: 21 September 1954. 
91. Die Transvaler: 21 September 1954. 
92. U. F. P. (Nata I) : Addresses by G. Heaton N i cho I I s and A. Se I by 
at the Annual Congress of the Union Federal Party, 1 October 
1954, pp. 6-7. 
93. Natal Witness: 2 October 1954. Cape Times:2 October 1954. 
94. Natal Witness: 2 October 1954. 
95. Vide supra: Ch.4. p.86. 
96. U. F • P. ( N at a I ) : Addresses, 1 October 1954, 't op. c I ., p. 18. 
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with the Coloured franchise, and defending Natal's rights to 
remain under the Crown. After 1954, the other issues fel I 
away and the main preoccupation became the defence of the 
constitution of 1910 itself; the constitution which I inked the 
four provinces together under the Crown and within the Common-
wea I tho 
Shortly after the congress of 1954, the country's two 
major parties, entered the republ ican debate, making it the 
most important issue on the South African pol itical stage. At 
the opening of the Cape Provincial Congress of the U.P. In East 
London on 18 October 1954, Strauss del ivered a long and detai l-
ed speech, giving the U.P. 's view on the country's constitutional 
position. He stated that the U.P. was a 'Commonwealth Party', 
and gave reasons, both local and international, why South Africa 
would profit from continued membership of the Commonwealth 
under the Crown. (97) This speech formed the basis of the U.P. 's 
constitutional pol icy for the 'future. Within days, Dr. Malan, 
in reply, had pledged the National Party to attaining a repub-
, (98) 
I ic, a pledge echoed by the government-supporting newspapers. 
The whole republican dispute was again headl ined by the 
statement of the new Prime Minister, Strijdom, within a week 
of Malan's pledg'e. In his first appearance as Prime Minister, 
Strijdom announced that the 'ultimate object' of the National 
Party was the establ ishment of a republ ic. (99) In a wei 1-
publ icised interview with the London Sunday Times three weeks 
later, on his trip to Britain, he stated that a republ ic would 
not be created during the I ife of the existing pari iament, 
and would only be establ ished after a referendum or special 
, general election showed that the 'broad wi I I of the people 
, [Wh it~l' wanted it. (100) , 
These two statements confirmed the worst fears of the 
Federal Party. After the fai lure of the Federal-U.P. attempt 
97. U.P. (Division of Information): Speech at the opening of 
the Cape Provincial Congress of the United Party, 18 
October 1954. 
98. Die Transvaler: 27 October 1954. 
99. Natal Witness: 1 December 1954. 
100. Natal Mercury: 20 December 1954. 
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to co-operate, (101) they now launched the Anti-Republ ican 
leagues. The Natal Anti-Republ ican league (A.R.l.) was launch- , 
ed at a mass rally in the Durban City Hal I on 19 Apri I 1955. (102) 
At this rally, addressed by Selby, Browne and Derek Heaton 
Nichol Is, the publ ic were asked to sign a covenant, enshrining 
. d . t· t b I· ( 103) Th t theIr etermlna Ion 0 oppose a repu IC. e covenan 
stated that the signatories pledged themselves to defend their 
positions as citizens of ' .•• a free and self-governing dominion 
under the Crown .•• ' and to use' .•• al I means that may be 
found possible and necessary ... ' In defeating the coming of 
a republ ic. (104) In addition, the covenant demanded a separate 
referendum for , Natal and pledged a refusal to recognise any 
republ ic wh1ch failed to comply with this demand. (105) 
Whi Ie the purpose and objects of the Anti-Republ ican 
leagues were clear and definite, their relations with the 
country's pol itical parties, and their place in the South 
African pol itical spectrum, was not quite so obvious. In the 
first instance, they claimed to be non-party organisations. 
In his first announcement to the press, on the formation of 
the Natal A.R.l., Selby described it as being 'non-party', (106) 
a claim which the league was to make on many occasions. (107) 
Simi lar claims were also made by the leagues of the Cape and 









V ide sup r a : C h. 6. p. 127. 
Natal Witness: 20 Apri I 1955. 
Natal Witness: 19 Apri I 1955. 
A.R.L. (Natal): Apel ication for Membership, n.d. 
Ibid. 
N at a I Wit n e s s : 15 A e r i I 1955. 
Sunday Times: 10 Apri I 1955. Natal Witness: 30 Apri I 1955, 
22 Feoruary 1956, 5 October 1956, 10 July 1957. Natal Dai Iy 
News: 3 D.ecember 1955 '. 
Rand Daily Mail: 23 April 1955. A.R.L. (Transvaal): Acti"on-
not Apathy, n.d. A.R.l. (Transvaal): Statement, 5 Ju-n-e--~--
1955, p.2. The Cape League was launched in king Wi I I iam's 
~own on 17 May 1955 and the Transvaal League was launched 
In Johannesburg on 24 May 1955. Rand Daily Mai I· 18 M 
1955, 25 May 1955. . ay 
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only if the Anti-Republ ican Leagues were strictly non-party, 
could they act as a 'bridge' between the Federals and the U.P. 
. . b I . . t . ( 109) and so unIte antl-repu Ican OppOSI Ion. 
The three Anti-Republ ican Leagues, despite their claims 
to the contrary, were creations of the Federal Parties. In 
addition, they reflected in detai I the ideas and thoughts of 
those parties. The rally launching the Natal A.R.L., f9 r example, 
was arranged by the Provincial Executive of the Federals which 
'gave its consent' to the league's appeal for anti-republ ican 
unity and was addressed, as has been mentioned, by three promi-
nent Federals. In addition, much of the early work in the 
Natal league was done by the Federal Party's paid organiser, 
to the detriment of the party's interests. (110) Simi larly, the 
launch i ng of the Cape and Transvaa I I eagues, were ' sponsored' 
by the Federal Party, addressed only by leading Federal~(lll) 
and, I ike their Natal counterpart, reflected Federal thinking. 
The close paral lei in thinking between the Federals and the 
Anti-Republ ican Leagues, can also be seen in the fact that the 
leagues adopted the most distinctive structural feature of the 
Federal Party, its provincial ism. The dominance of Natal, al-
ready a feature of the Federal Party, (112) was also reproduced 
in the leagues, with Natal ians being present and assist.ing with 
the formation of the Transvaal and Cape organisations. (113) 
Not surprisingly, the Anti-Republ ican Leagues used very 
simi lar arguments to those of the Federals in opposing a repub-
I ic. Like the Federal Party they argued that the National ists 
were unbeatable at the pol Is, that they planned to impose a 
Broederbond republ ic on South Africa, that the provinces h~d a 
~~_T;...:..:.:im;:.:e::.:::s: 24 Apri I 1955. 
~~~s~u.p~r~a: . Ch. 4. p.81. 
D~ilyMail: 2~ApriI1955, 18 May 1955, 25 May 1955. 
~~_T~lm~e::.:::s: 30 Aprl I 1955. Federal News: 19 Apri I 1955. 
~..;;;.;;;......;s;;.;u;;;.l:p;.;..r~a : Ch • 4 • p. 7 1. 
Daily Mail: 28 April 1955, 25 May 1955. 
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right to separate referendums and that the resistence to the 
National ist republ ic must be on a moral as wei I as on a legal 
bas~s.(114) The Natal A.R.L. 's demand for Natal's rights 
(Natal is mentioned three times in the Natal league's covenant) 
was faithfully supported, as in the case of the Federal Parties, 
I . h th . (115) Th T I by the eagues In teo er provinces. e ransvaa 
league went so far as to pledge support for the '~tand' of 
'our fel low citizens in Natal and the Eastern Cape,.(116) As 
the Natal Stand was the only one ever I ikely to be effective, 
demands of the Cape and Transvaal leagues for separate referen-
dums really amounted only to support of the Natal league's 
position. 
Considering ' the very close paral lei in organisation, 
personnel and ideals between the Anti-Republ ican Leagues and 
the Federal Parties, the question of why the leagues were 
launched at al I is germane. The Federals launched the leagues 
for a number of obvious reasons. First, the Federal Party had 
fai led in the provincial elections and, it had been shown that 
it did not enjoy the support of the majority of voters In Natal. 
The Anti-Republ ican Leagues, on the other hand, had no history 
of defeat, and a divisive election campaign behind them. They 
could unify where the Federals had divided the opposition. 
Second, the Anti-Republ ican Leagues concentrated on a single 
114. A.R.L.(Transvaal): Action - not Apathy, loc.cit. A.R.L. 
(Natal): Appl ication for Membership, loc.cit. A.R.L. 
(Natal): Natal Anti-Republ ican League, n.d. , 
115. The Cape and,Transvaal leagues spoke simply on the rights 
of each province to a separate referendum. Rand Dai Iy Mai I: 
23 April 1955, 25 May 1955. Otherwise, the covenants were 
identical to that of Natal. Federal News: 27 June 1955. 
116. A.R.L. (Transvaal): Resolution on N~tal ~nd East Cape Stand, 
n.d. The support of the east Cape In this resolution was 
the same as t~e support of the Transvaal Federal Party for 
for the 'East Cape Stand' announced by the east Cape 
Fe~erals in 1954. Vide: A.R.L. (Transvaal): Statement by 
Union Federal Party, n.d. and Eastern Province Herald· 21 
August 1954. . 
143 
issue _ repub I i can i sm. In th i s, they cou I d put forward the 
party's principal political interest, while remaining unhamper-
ed by other issues such as federal ism or the race problem. 
Third, the leagues could hope to recapture the elan of the Torch 
Commando. Anti-republ ican and hence anti-government ral lies, 
unl ike party meetings, drew large audiences. Finally, the Natal 
league hoped to become the spokesman for Engl ish-speaking NatalS
l17
) 
In attempting to stir the Engl ish-speaking opposition to 
action, the leagues achieved some success. They fil led hal Is 
In Natal and the eastern Cape, (118)and covenants were signed 
by large numbers of people. By February 1956, the Natal 
covenant had been signed by 30 000 people and that of the east-
. (119) ern Cape by 28 000. These figures were far from represent-
ing a majority of the voters in the areas concerned, or even a 
majority of the Engl ish-speaking voters. They did represent, 
however, a larger support than the Federal Party had, or could 
have, received. 
Given the close I inks between the leagues and the Federal 
Party, it is not surprising that they failed to 'build bridges' 
betwe~n the Federal and United Parties. In fact, both the 
United and National Parties reacted to the leagues in much the 
same way as they reacted to the Federals. Mitchell's initial 
reaction was guarded, (120) but the U.P. 's Natal Executive 
pointed out that the Natal A.R.L. was not a non-party organIsa-
tion at all but was a creation of the Federal Party. In any 
event, maintained the U.P., the republ ican issue was a pol itical 
117. Selby, who led the Natal league, stressed that the aim 
was to have the covenant signed by 80 000 Natal voters 
which would constitute a majority of the province's 
electorate. This was never achieved. Natal Witness: 
30 April 1955, 17 February 1956. 
118. 2000 people at Durban, 1500 people at Pietermaritzburg, 
1000 peop I e at East London and 1 000 peop I e at Port Eli za-
beth. Natal Mercury: 20 Apri I 1955. Natal Witness· 30 
Apri I 1955. The Star: 26 May 1955. Rand Dai Iv Mai I; 
27 May 1955. 
119. A.R.L. (Natal): Circular, 9 February 1956. 
120. Nata1 Witness: 21 Apri I 1955. 
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. ( 121) 
matter and should be dealt with by the pol itical parties. 
There were occasions in the future on which the U.P. accepted 
assistance from the Natal A.R.L., as with the registration of 
voters. (122) There were even occasions on which individual U.P. 
Members of Pari iament praised the A.R.L. (123) But, at base, 
the U.P. saw itself and the leagues as being in competition with 
one another for the allegiance of the opposition voter. whi Ie 
there was continued disagreement as to how the anti-
republ ~can battle 'should be fought. (124) The National ists saw 
the Anti-Republ ican Leagues as powerless groups who had bound 
themse I ves to rebe I aga i nst any rep ub I i c. Sens i ng the i r weak-
ness, the National ists dismissed them contemptuously, (125)and 
did not even devote much time to attacking the leagues. 
Because of their fai lure to create a united anti-republ ican 
front, the leagues gradually sank into ineffectual stridency. 
In addition to their inabi I ity to unify the opposition parties 
on the republ ican issue, the leagues suffered from being simply 
a reaction to National ist republ icanism. As Heaton Nicholls 
commented privately, the Natal league was 'a mere negation -
without a positive political programme .... ,(126) it was there-
fore difficult to maintain interest, because the very strength 
of the leagues depended on being a 'negation' to the information 
which their opponents - the National ists - were wi I I ing to 
concerning the republ ic. And, apart from stating that the 
republ ic was coming, the National ists suppl ied very little 
gl ve, 
add-







Natal Witness: 30 May 1955. 
Natal Witness: 16 June 1956. 
Natal Witness: 11 August 1956. 
~otj~l~ii95;~: 11 June 1955, 14 June 1955, 25 May 1957, 
Federal News: 24 May 1956. DM/p. 
D. Mitchell to A. Maxwell Allen, 22 May 1957. U.P: (Natal): 
Statement, 20 May 1958. 
Die Transvaler: 26 April 1955. 
NiP: G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. Heaton Nichol 'ls, d t 
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there was very I ittle for the leagues and their supporters to 
do. Inaction proved, as IS so frequently the case, to be deb-
i I itat i ng. 
In addition to forming the Anti-Republ ican Leagues the 
Federal Party attempted to fight the government on the republ ican 
question by means of an appeal to the Commonwealth pari iamentar-
I ans. On 17 December 1954, I ess than three weeks after Str i jdom 
took office, Heaton Nichol Is and Selby, as leader and chairman 
respectively of the Natal Federals, directed an appeal to the 
Members of Pari iament in the United Kingdom, Canada, Austral ia 
and New Zealand. The letter, which purported to speak on behalf 
of 'citizens of British descent' in Natal, alleged that the 
South African government wished to obtain permission from the 
Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, prior to declaring 
South Africa a rep~bl ic,(127) in the same way as India had done. 
The position of India was however different because she had not 
signed the Statute of Westminster and was therefore not affected 
by its provision that: 
Succession to the Throne or the Royal Style and 
Titles shal I hereafter require the assent as wei I 
of the Pari iaments of al I the Dominions as of the 
Pari iament of the United Kingdom. (128) 
This meant that any change in the constitutional status of one 
of the Dominions, required the permission of the others. 
The letter went on to attack the National ist government's 
idea I s. I t stated that the env i saged repub I i c wou I d be based 
on a constitution simi lar to that publ ished in 1942, and would 
be authoritarian in character. Further'more, it would be the 
creation of 600000 National ists, in defiance of the wishes of 




Federal News: 31 January 1955. 
Federal News: 31 January 1955. 
Federal News: 31 Januarr 1955. The fol lowing month, the 
Federal Party (East Cape) sent telegrams to the British 
pol itical parties making requests simi lar to those of the 
Natal party. Later, they sent a more detai led memorandum. 
Cape Argus: 21 January 1955. Port EI izabeth Herald: 27 
October 1955. The F~d~ral ist: ,October - November 1955. 
The A.R.L. (Cape), simi larly wished to petition the Common-
wealth Prime Ministers. There is no record of them having 
done so. Rand Dai Iy Mail: 18 May 1955. 
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tly hoped to achieve was that the Members of Pari iament, would 
'withhold judgement' on South Africa's constitutional position 
until they had received a 'ful I statement' of the Federal Party's 
stand. (130) ·1 n the meant i me, apart from the const i tut i ona I 
issues as such, Heaton Nichol Is hoped that the letter would 
mobil ise opinion in the Commonwealth against the National ists, 
who were forcing a republ ic on Natal. He felt that the Nat-
ional ist would not' ... defy the expressed wish of the whole 
Commonwealth. ,(131) If the National ists persisted in the face 
of this, he concluded that Natal would have to defy the govern-
ment. With Natal's secession being discussed 'on the world stage', 
anything could happen. (132) A visit to the United Kingdom, 
however, dampened his enthusiasm. As on his previous visit~133) 
the British pol itical leaders were not keen to involve them-
selves in South Africa's internal affairs. He was told that 
the preamble of the Statute of Westminster, upon which the 
Federals had pinned their hopes, did 'not have the effect of 
law. ,(134) As a result of this visit, Heaton Nichol Is came to 
the' ... growing bel ief that the rest of the world ... ~woul~ 
not interfere. ,(135) 
This appeal to the Commonwealth leaders represents the 
extreme to which the leaders of the Federal Party were prepared 
to go. They saw South Africa as being permanently I inked to the 
Commonwealth, unless the leaders of that organisation gave 
the South Africans permission to create a republ ic. Identifying 
as they did with a broad Anglo-Saxon culture, they found it 
difficult to conceive of themselves placed In a country outside 
of the Commonwealth 'Club'. 
The reaction both inside and outside South Africa to the 
appeal to the Commonwealth leaders was varied. On the interna-
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tional scene, none of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, or even 
cabinet members, publ icly acknowledged the letter. The Federals 
did, however, receive a 'large number' of replies from al I the 
countries involved and, although the repl ies were 'favourable', 
. I' (136) I · d S t:h Af . they were 'fairly non-commltta . nSI e ou rIca, 
there was si lence from most opposition groups. Most of the 
. . d th I (137) d · d Engl Ish-language press Ignore e overseas appea s, as I 
the U.P. unti I Apri I 1956, when Mitchel I referred to 'wishful 
thinking' in some quarters - an obvious reference to the 
Federal appeal.(138) As for the National is~s, Die Transvaler 
strongly attacked the Natal letter as 'a laughable campaign' 
in which a group of 'jingoes' were trying to I imit the sover-
eigntyof South Africa and her electorate. (139) But . the 
government simply ignored the matter. It neither admitted nor 
denied the arguments advanced by the Federals, and the question 
was not in fact raised at the Prime Minister's Conference. 
As far as the F edera I s were concerned, it was aga inc I ear 
that they had lost and not gained pol itical Iy from the strategy. 
As with the Anti-Republ ican Leagues, the campaign to mobil ise 
the Commonwealth foundered, as it app~ared to have no object 
or purpose. The Natal Federals produced an attractive, wei 1-
written, thirty-three page booklet stating their case in ful 1~140) 
and this was mai led to al I the recipients of their letter, but 
there were no further developments abroad, and the party had 
difficulty in disposing of the booklets locally. (141) 
After the 1954 provincial elections, the Federal Party 
had been forced to reorientate its thinking and strategy. In 
add i t .i on, it had reacted aga i nst an i ncreas i ngl y conf i dent and 
aggressive Afrikaner national ism. In doing so, the party fel I 
increasingly under the control of a group of Engl ish-speaking 
extrem i sts. 
136. Natal Mercury: 14 January 1955. 
137. Eastern Province Herald: 28 October 1955. 
138. Natal Dai Iy N~ws: 6 Apri I 1956. 
139. 
140. 
Die Transvaler: 11 January 1955, 24 January 1955, 
3 February 1955. 
U.F.P. (Natal): The Case Against th Rbi· d _ e epu I c, n. . 
141. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Action Committee Minutes, 
16 May 1957, p.3. 
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In a study of Engl ish-speaking South Africans, Professor 
L. Schlemmer has pointed out that: 
Afrikaner national ism, the denials of many 
pol iticians notwithstanding, appears t~ have 
come to identify in many subtle ways with 
the state; an expected process with a pol iti-
cally dominant ethnic 'national ism'. In 
such a case, n~n-dominant e~hnic gr~ups .•. (142) 
may devalop heightened ethnic consciousness. 
He concludes that the 'heightened opposition support up 
to the ear I y s i xt i es ... Gas a. sign o'fl ethn i c res i stance amongst 
the Engl ish_speakers.A143J One sub-group, which he identifies 
within the Engl ish-speaking group as a whole, IS that which 
he calls the 'Anglophi les'. (144) This group, comprising between 
ten and twenty per cent. of the Engl ish-speakers, were people 
who had grown up in the predominantly Engl ish-speaking areas 
of South Africa. (145) They valued highly their I inks with the 
wider Anglo-Saxon world, had a strong need for in-group identi-
fication, and were characterised b) a ' .•• rejection of and 
hostil ity towards Afrikaners. ,(146 These people displayed an 
Engl i sh- language xenophob i a, and, I est it be thought that a 
study concluded in 1974 is notappl icable to the 1950s, 
Schlemmer holds that, contrary to appearances, this 
social type is not a dying imperial fragment, but seems to be 
the result of a self-renewing tradition. ,(147) They represent, 
in Schlemmer's view, the only approximation to Afrikaans-
language chauvinism encountered among Engl ish-speakers. This 
study pin-points the reasons for the Engl ish-speakers' reaction 
of the 1950s, so well expressed by the Federals. It also 
describes, sociological Iy,those (the 'Anglophiles') who had 
come to dominate the Federal. Party to an increasing extent, after 
the National ists had consol idated their power and appeared 
to speak only for Afrikaners. 
142. L. Sc~lemmer: 'Engl ish-:Spe~king South Africa Today: 
Identity and Inte-9ratlon Into the Broader National 
Community'. A. de Vi I I iers (ed.): Engl ish-Speaking 
South Africa Today, 1976, p.95. 
143. Ibid., p.96. 
144. Ibid., p.131. 
145. Ibid. 




APATHY AND DISUNITY 
In the long years between the provincial elections 
of 1954 and 1959, the Federals had to combat weariness, 
apathy and friction - the corrosive by-products of defeat 
and innovation - within their ranks. At the same time, they 
had to counter the attacks which were made upon them by their 
political opponents. 
Of those who left the party after the 1954 defeat, the 
most able and best known were Ford and Brickhi I I. Neither 
of them issued a publ ic statement giving reasons for his 
decision; nor did they leave the party abruptly. Each simply 
withdrew from the various offices which he held and, as Ford 
termed it, gradually 'sl ipped out' of the party.(1) The main 
reason for their actions was disi I lusionment with the Natal 
voters. Both Ford and Brickhi I I felt that the I iberal racial 
pol icies of the Federal Party were so much 'in advance of 
their time' that there . was no possibi I ity of their acceptance 
in the foreseeable future.(2) They also felt that the Natal 
publ ic would be unwi I ling to resist National ist 'aggression', 
even when British traditions and values were involved.(3) 
Therefore, both men were unwi I I ing to make the personal 
sacrifices which leadership of ~ pol itical party involved.(4) 
The withdrawal of these two was of major import for the 
Federal Party. Both were efficient, ful I of ideas and energy 
and were, except for the two senators, the most experienced 





Interview with E.G. Ford. Nowhere was it possible to 
locate any written views on their withdrawal·s or even 
references to the fact that they had left the party. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. For this reason both men emigrated to Rhodesia 
after leaving the Federal Party. 
Ford's income from his law practice had fal len by eighty 
per cent. between 1953 and 1955. Interview with E.G. 
Ford. 
Torch Commando, in which they had held senior positions and 
also, especially Ford, in laying the foundations of the 
Federal Party.(5) 
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While it was sti I I adjusting to the consequences of 
defeat, the Federal Party was confronted by the disputes over 
the Senate Act. This was the last phase of the constitutional 
controversy over Coloured franchise which had convulsed the 
country since 1951. This phase dominated the pol itical scene 
In South Africa for most of 1955 and 1956. 
The Senate Bi II was presented to pari iament on 11 May 
1955, was passed, and received the Governor-General's assent 
the fol lowing month. The purpose of the Act was to increase 
the number of senators from forty-eight to eighty-nine. This 
was done by granting the Cape and the Transvaal more 
representatives than the other two provinces, thus abol ishing 
the former principle of equal provincial representation. 
Moreover, the party control ling a province now received al I 
the Senate seats apportioned to that province, instead of the 
seats being apportioned in proportion to party provincial 
strength. In addition, the number of nominated seats was 
increased from ten to eighteen. The intention behind the 
Act was to give the governing party so large a majority in 
the Senate that it would receive the required two-thirds 
majority in a joint session of both Houses of Pari iament so 
as to alter an 'entrenched' clause of the constitution. As 
a result of the Senate Act, the National Party's sup~ort In 
the Upper House rose from thirty out of forty-eight to 
seventy-seven out of eighty-nine. 
The Federals opposed the Senate Act for two main reasons. 
The Upper House was, in the words of the Federals, the 
'Federal Link' in the constitution.(6) Equal provincial and 
special interest group representation (such as the non-Whites 
and minority provincial parties) were the federal aspects of 
the central government. The effect of the Senate's 
5. Vide supra: Ch.2. rp.12-35 passim. 
6. Federal News: 27 June 1955. D. Heaton Nichol Is: Speech 
at Durban, 16 November 1955, p.2. 
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enlargement was to reduce Black representation and to 
el iminate the old federal principle. To make matters worse, 
the change had been pushed through by a government which had 
little sympathy with federal ism and which clearly viewed 
provincial rights and the Senate as being of less consequence 
than the 'volkswi I', as expressed in the House of Assembly. 
In short, the whole federal dimension of the constitution 
was at the mercy of a pari iamentary majority. 
The second major reason for Federal Party opposition to 
the Senate Act was that it was believed that the Act was a 
prelude to the establ ishment of an Afrikaner dictatorship. 
It seemed inconceivable that the National ists had spent so 
much time and effort just to achieve the 'smal I profit' of 
the removal of the Coloured voters from the common roll.(7) 
Derek Heaton Nichol Is summed up this attitude when· he declared: 
I bel ieve that the Coloured voters issue, 
as far as they [the National ists:J are concerned 
is merely a red herring dragged across the path 
to obscure their real aim which is the complete 
destruction of the Constitution and al I 
democratic forms of government, in order that 
an Afrikaner pol ice type state may be formed. (8) 
In keeping with its new-~ound readiness, after the 1954 
elections, to co-operate with other opposition groups, the 
Federals joined with the liberal and labour Parties in their 
cal I for a revival of the United Front to resist the Senate 
Bi I 1.(9) 'Once again', declared Federal News, ' 'we appeal 
for unity in Natal.' The U.P., however, was against the idea. 
7. Federal News: 27 June 1955. 
8. Speech by D. H~aton Nichol Is, 16 November 1955, op.cit., 
p.6. The Anti-Republ ican leagues, simi larly, held that 
the real intention of the Act was to faci I itate the 
establ ishment of a dictatorship, and, in addition, to 
al low for the removal of the other 'entrenched' clause 
(i .e. that guarenteeing the two official languages). 
A.R.l. (Transvaal): Statement, 5 June 1955, loc.cit. 
9. Natal Witness: 14 May 1955. There was even talk of 
reviving the Torch Commando for the purposes of resisting 
the Senate Bi I I. Natal Witness: 18 May 1955. 
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Mitchel I stated that al I opposition groups should concentrate 
on the 'common objective' of defeating the government at the 
polls.(10) And, as only the U.P. was capable of achieving 
this, al I anti-National ists should support it.(ll) 
After the passing of the Bi II, the Federals argued in 
favour of a boycott of the new Senate by the eight Natal 
senators, who, together with the four senators representing 
the Blacks, were to be the only opposition members in the 
House. It was felt that to participate in the Senate 
elections would be 'condoning the terrible breach of the 
Constitution',(12) and supportinJ what the Transvaal Federals termed the 'House of Frauds,.(13 A boycott, on the other 
hand, would" reveal, according to Derek Heaton Nichol Is, 
••• the nature of this evi I institution. 
Only Nationalists would be sitting in the 
Senate. It would be the only second chamber 
in the world in which al I those taking part 
belonged to one Party. As such it would be 
a joke, it would become the laughing stock ~f 
the world. A music hal I joke. No more 
effective way of kil ling it could be fou~d. 
The National ists would not mind opposition or 
criticism, but they could not stand for long 
being laughing stock. (14) 
The U.P. did not agree with boycotts. The party was 
committed to acting within the legal framework of pari iament, 
which included both the House of Assembly and the Senate. 
In view of this, asked Mitchel I, 'If the courts of law should 
decide that the Senate Act is legal how then would we stand 
if we boycotted the Senate?,(15) Apart from the legal ity of 
the issue, the U.P. considered that a boycott spelt weakness. 
The party decided to fight the National ists in the Senate 
itself rather than al low them to 'work their own sweet wi I I' 
unopposed.(16) " 
10. Natal Witness: 14 June 1955. 
11. Natal Witness: 14 June 1955. 
12. Natal Dai I~ News: 8 September 1955. 
13. U.F.P. (Transvaal): Statement, 4 November 1955. 
14. Speech by D. Heaton Nichol Is, 16 November 1955, op.cit., p.17. 
15. Natal Dai I~ News: 29 November 1955. 
16. Natal Mercur~: 17 November 1955. 
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The Federals, who did not doubt the legal ity of the 
Act, and viewed the U.P. as being ' ••• hemmed in by the 
constitutionalism of its position to try [Jo oppose] only 
through Pari iament and the Courts',(17) decided to appeal 
to the voters to support the idea of a boycott. The party 
planned mass ral I ies in Durban and Pietermaritzburg on 16 
and 17 November 1955.(18) Here, the Federals planned to 
express their anger at the reduction of the federal element 
in the constitution by presenting the fol lowing resoluti9n: 
The meeting, considering the insult to the 
people of Natal presented by the Senate Act 
in depriving them of their just senatorial 
rights und~r the Act of Union, begs the 
e1ectoral col lege of Natal, as representing 
the people of Natal, to take no part in the 
forthcoming election of new senators. (19) 
Explaining the resolution, Heaton Nichol Is stated that the 
Act 'reduced Natal's equal representation in the Senate to 
a nul I ity' by attacking the 'basic principle' (i.e. 
federal ism) upon ~hich Natal entered Union.(20) 
In an attempt to by-pass the U.P. leaders and win the 
support of the U.P. members of the Natal electoral col lege, 
Heaton Nichol Is address~d an appeal to al I the Natal M.P.s 
and M.P.C.s to attend the ral I ies. Mitchel I instructed al I 
the U.P. electoral col lege members to ignore the appeal.(21) 
In publ ic statements, in reply to Heaton Nichol Is, Mitchel I 
reiterated the U.P. stand on the Senate Act, declaring that 
the ral I ies were being used merely to attack the U.P. and 
not the National ists. He therefore appealed to the Black 
Sash(22) to ignore them.(23) In any event, the ral I ies were 
17. Federal News: 27 June 1955. 
18. Natal Dai Iy News: 10 November 1955. 
19. U.F.P. (Natal): Circular to al I Members of ~he Natal 
Electoral Col lege, 8 November 1955. 
20. Ibid. 
21. U.P. (Natal): Circular to al I U.P. Members of the 
Provincial Counci I, 10 November 1955 • . 
22. The Black Sash, constituted as the Women's Defence of 
the Constitution League, was form~d to protest against 
the government's manipulation of the constitution. 
Z3. Natal Mercury: 16 November 1955, 17 November 1955. 
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d I b h t
' (24) 
fai lures, with less than a thousan peop e at ot mee Ings. 
On 25 November 1955, with the U.P. participating, the 
new Senate was elected. In February the .fol lowing year the 
South Africa Act Amendment Bi I I, aimed at removing the 
Coloureds from the common voters' rol I with the Whites, was 
passed by 174 votes to sixty-eight at a joint sitting of the 
two Houses of Pari iament. The Act was val idated in test cases 
in the Cape Supreme Court in May 1956 and in the Appeal Court 
in November 1956. The Chief Justice declared for the majority 
judgment of the Court that 'the legislative scheme which was 
adopted is not open to attack by law,.(25) But, declared 
the Federal Party, 'it remains immoral and unconstitutional,~26) 
As, during 1955-56 S~uth Africa moved further than 
ever away from federation, and as the National ists' finally 
triumphed on the Coloured franchise issue, the Federal Party 
experienced the beginnings of an apathy which was to lead to 
its end.(27) In 1955 the sympathetic Natal Witness stated 
that the opposition voters, including the Federals, were 
'confused, dismayed and apathetic,.(28) This, it was stated, 
was because the voters were not being given the necessary 
guidance by their leaders.(29) Two years later, in 1957, the 
same newspaper stated that, 'It has been obvious for some 
time ••• that the tide has been flowing strongly against the 
Federal Party •••• ,(30 ) Die Burger, on the opposite side of 
the pol itical spectrum from the Natal Witness, stated in 1957 
that I ittle had been heard of the Federals since their 1954 
defeat. (31 ) 
Opinion, especially press opinion, could always be 
refuted, whereas election I'esults had a final ity which was 
24. Natal Witness: 17 November 1955, 18 November 1955. 
25. Natal Dai Iy News: 11 November 1956. 
26. Federal News: 22 November 1956. 
27. For a detai led discussion of apathy In the Federal Party, 
vide infra: Ch. 10. pp.220-4. 
28. Natal Witness: 29 Apri I 1955. 
29. Natal Witness: 29 Apri I 1955. 
30. Natal Witness: 17 August 1957. 
31. Die Burger: 3 June 1957. 
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difficult to contradict. For this reason, the three by-
elections which the Federals contested in 1957-58 were of 
particular importance. 
The first of these contests was in East London North. 
Like the Berea by-election of 1953, the East London contest 
was for a pari iamentary vacancy. It was the second and last 
pari iamentary seat which the Federals fought. The decision 
to contest this constituency was formally taken at a joint 
meeting of Natal, Cape and Transvaal Federal members at Port 
Shepstone in May 1957.(32 ) In real ity, the decision to fight 
East London North had been taken by the Natal Action Committee 
earl ier in the month, because this committee then decided 
that the election was 'essential' to the Federal movement as 
a whole, (33) and resolved to give substantial aid to the East 
Cape party.(34) Kettles (leader of the East Cape party) was 
urged to bring twelve delegates to the Port Shepstone meeting 
to discuss the matter.(35) 
Early in June 1957 Kettles announced that Mr. Donald 
Woods, the East Cape Federal Party's twenty-three year old 
vice-chairman, would be the Federal candidate.(36) The 
party was entering the contest, said Kettles, because of 
' ••• the appal ling lack of respect and interest towards the 
sentimental attachments of Engl ish-speaking South Africans 
shown by both the Government and the pari iamentary 
Opposition.,(37) This sentiment echoed Heaton Nichol Is's 
statement of the previous week that the Natal Federals would 
fight al I Natal's pari iamentary seats in the forthcoming 
general election, because 'Engl ish-speaking interests ••• (;ould 
be:} more effectively guarded if every Natal constituency was 
represented by a Federal ist.,(38) 
32. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 22 June 1957, loc.cit. 
33. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 16 May 1957~ op.cit., pp.1-2. 





London at its meeting before the East Cape party had . 
even been informed that the election was to be fought. 
Ibid. 
U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 16 May 1957, oe.c i t., p.2. 
Caee Times: 5 June 1957. 
C5f2e Times: 5 June 1957. 
Federal News: 7 June 1957. 
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True to its promise of 'ful I support',(39) the Natal 
Federal Party put al I its resources at the disposal of the 
East Cape party. Mention has been made of Natal's financial 
contribution(40) and of the free distribution of the Federal 
News.(41) In addition, leading Natal Federals descended on 
East london to speak, organise and canvass.(42) Apart from 
the Natal ians, Woods, who personally canvassed over 1 000 
voters, was ably assisted by Kettles.(43) All this act'ivity 
received extensive press publ icity,(44) and the .dea rapidly 
grew in the minds of the Federals that the party would win 
the election. Heaton Nichol Is stated publ icly that this 
would happen(45) whi Ie Hughes Mason, who journeyed between 
Durban and 'East london several times,(46) stated that Federal 
support was '9rowin~ daily,.(47) The Federal News spread 
this euphoric news. 48) 
After spending a week in East london, Selby, however, 
real ised that the true picture was very different. At the 
beginninQ of the election campaign, he pointed out, the 
party in the eastern Cape had consisted of 'scarcely more 
than 10 or 12 enthusi ast [sicJ' .{49} In fact, it was an 
'almost singlehanded effort', and without Kettles, there 
' ••• would probably have been no U.F.P. at all in the East 
Cape.,(50) Selby also perceived the weight of publ ic apathy 
39. Federal News: 7 June 1957. 
40. Vide supra: Ch.4.p.87. 
41. V i de sup r a : C h. 4.p. 83. 
42. All five publ ic meetings were addressed by Natal ians who 
even arranged the addressing of envelopes. 
, Federal News: 12 July 1957. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 
20 Ju I y 1957, I oc. cit. 
43. U.F.P. (Natal): A,R. Selby to al I Members of the Provincia1 
Executive, 9 August 1957. 
44. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 20 July t'957, loc.cit. 
45. Natal Witness: 1 July 1957. 
46. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 22 June 1957, op.cit., p.12. 
47. Ibid., p.l. 
48. Federal News: 12 July 1957. 




towards the Federals.(51) It was clear to him that, although 
the Anti-Republican league had been attractive to the Engl ish-
speaking voters of the eastern Cape,(52) the Federal Party 
would never attract the same widespread support.(53) Selby 
concluded that it would ' ••• be a miracle if Woods won this 
election.,(54) 
The U.P., on the other hand, was not relying on a 
miracle. It nominated a personable young candidate, the 
former Springbok cricket captain, Clive van Ryneveld, and 
presented the U.P. as the party ~f Anglo-Afrikaner unity. 
Van Ryneveld attacked the Federals as appeal ing only to 
Engl ish-speakers and chided them for accusing the 'moderate 
Afrikaner' 6f unrel iabi I it~.(55) Although not expl icitly 
, 
stated, his whole speech impl ied that an Engl ish-speaking 
movement was doomed to fai I because demographic and 
political factors placed the future of South Africa in the 
hands of the 'moderate Afrikaner,.(56) The Federals' stress 
on their resistance to the republ ic, on their defence of the 
constitution and, above al I, on their defence of the Engl ish-
speakers(57) al I appeared to substantiate van Ryneveld's 
arguments. 
The result of the East London North by-election was a 
resounding win for the U.P. - by 6 716 votes to 728 votes. 
Kettles, embittered, conceded that the Federals had suffered 
a 'sound beating',(58) while the other Federal leaders 
expressed severe disappointment at the result.(59) The 
51. Ibid. 
52. Vide supra: Ch. 6. p.143. 
53. In November 1955, the same year as the A.R.L. rail ies in 
the eastern Cape, not a single person attended a Federal 
meet i ng organ i sed in the ·East London City Ha I I. Rand 
Dai Iy Mai I: 17 November 1955. 
54. U.F.P. (Natal): A.R. Selby to al I Members of the Provincial 
Executive, loc.cit. 
55. Natal Witness: 13 August 1957. 
56. Natal Witness: 13 August 1957. 
57. For the Federal Party stand, vide, U.F.P. (Cape): D. Woods's 
Manifesto, n.d. Federal News:--r2 July 1957. 
58. The Star: 16 August 1957. 
59. Federal News: 11 October 1957. 
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election clearly exposed the weaknesses of the Federal Party 
and further damaged an already sagging party morale. As 
Selby stated, in a private letter, 'we cannot obviously 
Ic: :, d " E t l d ", ( 60) S ., I ~i~ affor any more as on ons • urprlslng y, 
the party was carried into two more disastrous by-elections 
the fol lowing year. 
The first of these was in June 1958, in a provincial 
by-election in the Hospital constituency in Johannesburg, 
and was the only Transvaal contest in which the . party took 
part. D. Hanafin, the Federal candidate,(61) adopted the 
slogan, 'South Africa, Queen and Commonwealth'. (62) The 
National, United and Federal Parties were compared on a 
number of points of pol icy. On the question of a republ ie, 
the National ists were portrayed as being adamantly in 
favour, whi Ie the Federals were shown to be emphatically 
opposed. The U.P. was dismissed as being 'two faced,.(63) 
The crucial issue, it was argued, was Afrikaner national ism. 
The National ists represented only Afrikaners, and viewed al I 
other peoples as 'foreign and inferior,.(64) The U.P. were 
seen as appeasing Afrikaner national ism, leaving the Federals 
to fight for 'equal ri)hts,.(65) This argument, as wei I as 
the 'great efforts,(66 of the Federals, had I ittle impact on 
the electorate. The party secured only 388 votes against 
the U.P.'s 2 521.(67) No amount of blaming the press for 
fai I ing to give the party its fair share of publ iCity(68) 
could conceal the extent of the defeat in South Africa's 
pol itical Iy most significant province. 
60. B/p: A.R. Selby to B. Batchelor, 30 August 1957. 
61. His opponent, the U.P. candid~te, was Mr. Harry Schwartz, 
subsequently a prominent f~gure in the United, Reform, . 
Progressive Reform and Progressive Federal Parties. 
62. U.F.P. (Transvaal): D. Hanafin's Manifesto, n.d. 
63. Ibid. 
64. I bi d. 
65. Ibid. 
66. U.F.P. (Transvaal): Circular, n.d. 
67. Rand Dai Iy Mail: 26 June 1958. 
68. U.F.P. (Transvaal): Circular, n.d., loc.cit. 
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Having sustained two severe defeats in the Cape and 
the Transvaal, the Federals were confronted with a provincial 
by-election in Pietermaritzburg South. Despite the growing 
apathy within the party and the adverse pol itical trend, they 
could not avoid contesting the seat. The party entered the 
contest on a platform which had been formulated at the Port 
Shepstone meeting of May 1957.(69) This was encapsulated 
in the phrase: ' ••• maintenance of the old Natal way of i ife.,(70) 
During the election, the Federals made the defence of 
the Engl ish-spea"kers the central issue, virtually excluding 
all other questions. D. Wi II, the Federal candidate, spoke 
of the party as being the 'English opposition,.(71) Later in 
the campaigh, he was referring to 'we British', 'our British 
blood' and the necessity of protecting 'British traditions,.(72) 
Midway through the election campaign, the Prime Minister, 
Strijdom, died. His successor, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, pledged 
himself in his first publ ic statement, like Strijdom before 
him, to ' ••• devote al I his energies to achieving the 
republ ic.,(73) The reaction to this was the most expl icit 
statement of Anglophi I~ sentiment ever publ ished by the 
Federals. In a letter to the voters, Denis Lowe, election 
agent for Wil I, stated that 'co-operation between the 
Afrikaans and Engl ish sections', as practised by the U.P., 
was no longer possible~(74) What was needed was a candidate 
such as Wi II with a 'sense of duty' to the Engl ish-speakers. (75) 
If this seemed a 'little pro-Engl ish or extremist', Lowe 
assured the readers, a determined opposition was needed to 
serve 'our' interests.(76) The Federals had abandoned their 
'equal rights' stand which had been used as 1ate as the 
Hospital election and had opted for an Engl ish-speaking 
69. Vide suera: Ch. 7. p 155. 
70. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 22 June 1957, loc.cit. 
71. Natal Witness: 15 August 1958. 
72. Natal Witness: 11 September 1958. Federa I News: 12 
September 1958. 
73. Natal Mercur~: 4 September 1958. 
74. Natal Witness: 19 September 1958. 
75. Natal Witness: 19 September 1958. 
76. Natal Witness: 19 September 1958. 
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nationalism.(77) This was because the 'equal rights' stand 
was a proven fai lure in 1954, in East . london and in Hospital, 
and because the Anglophi les were in command of the Natal 
party. The Federals decided in Pietermaritzburg to force 
the English-speakers, by pl,ain speaking, to decide whether 
they would fight for their rights, as perceived by the 
Federals, or whether they would compromise. 
Despite its claimed non-party position, (78) the A.R.l. 
now entered the pol itical contest. Its leaders addressed a 
number of questions to al I Natal provincial and pari iamentary 
members as wei I as to both candidates. The questionnaire was 
designed to gauge the respondent's degree of commitment to 
the anti-republ ican cause. Wil I, himself a member of the 
A.R.l.,(79) responded enthusiastically, (80) whi Ie the U.P. 
was, predictably, ambiguous. Mitchel I maintained that, as 
the league saw no hope of halting the National ists in 
pari iament, it had despaired of democracy and therefore its 
questions were irrelevant. At the same time, he stressed the 
U.P.'s anti-republ icanism.(81) ' Captain B. Smith, the U.P. 
candidate, issued a simi lar statement.(82) 
The A.R.l., abandoning al I pretence at neutral ity, 
immediately responded by cal ling on its members in 
Pietermaritzburg South to vote for Wi I 1.(83) The Natal 
Witness, the only dai Iy newspaper in Pietermaritzburg, 
immediately supported the league's action.(84) At no other 
election had a Federal candidate enjoyed so much support, in 
terms of publ icity, press support and voluntary assistance 
77. In his manifesto Wil I stated that he was 'entitled to 
fight ••• for the Engl ish-speaking section of the p~ople ••• 
[~ho,were beinill left in the lurch.' U.F.P. (Natal): D. 
WI I I s Manifesto, 6 September 1958. --
78. Vide supra: Ch. 6. p.140. 
79. Natal Witness: 12 August 1958. 
80. Natal Witness: 12 August 1958. 
81. U.P. (Natal): Statement, 20 August 1958. 
82. Natal Witness: 16 August 1958. 
83. Natal Witness: 22 August 1958. 
84. Natal Witness: 23 August 1958. 
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I I d 
. . (85) 
which could be channe e Into canvassIng. 
The result of the election was almost the same as that 
of 1954. The Federals gained 1 430 votes and the U.P. 2 196 
as against 1 515 and 2 381 votes respectively in 1954.(86) 
Despite its effort, the party had made no progress. The 
Federals' strong appeal to Engl ish-speaking sentiment had 
fai led to win the support of the majority of Engl ish-speakers. 
Not even Dr. Verwoerd's accession to the premiership, his 
reputation of racial extremism and his strong republ ican 
leanings had increased the Federal Party's support. 
Whi Ie the Federals were sustaining these by-election 
defeats, the National ists acted to remove the last remaining 
symbols of the British connection. In March 1956 Arthur 
Bar low, the Eng!1 ish-speak i ng, Conservat i ve · Party Member for 
Hospital, introduced a resolution into Pari iament cal ling 
for one flag and one anthem for South Africa.(87) He was 
supported by Strijdom.(88) The fol lowing year, Barlow in-
troduced the Private FLag Bi II into Pari iament. This Bi II 
cal led for the abolition of the Union Jack as one of South 
Africa's flags.(89) Once again the Prime Minister supported 
Barlow.(90) Unexpected support for the Bi I I also came from 
a large section of the Engl ish-language press.(91) Even the 
Natal Witness agreed with Strijdom that ' ••• a large section 
of the Engl ish-speaking community was in favour of one flag.,(92) 
85. Natal Witness: 24 September 1958. 
The United Party countered the Federal arguments by 
maintaining that they protected Engl ish-speaking interests 
without being 'sectional' in their approach. 
Natal Witness: 12 September 1958, 16 September 1958. 
86. Natal Witness: 25 September 1958. 
87. Natal Witness: 24 March 1956. 
88. Natal Witness: 24 March 1956. 
89. Natal Witness: 2 February 1957. 
90. Natal Witness: 2 February 1957. 
91. T~e Argus, The Star, the Natal Dai Iy News and the Natal 
WItness al I supported the Bi I I. Natal Witness: 5 February 
1957, 6 February 1957. Federa I News: 18 Febru ary 1957. 
92. Natal Witness: 5 February 1957. 
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Surprisingly, the U.P. promised to fight the Bi I I in 
. . h t ' t d' (93) Wh Pari lament' Wit every means a I s comman. en the 
time came, however, it supported the main clause of the 
B i I I. (94) 
Only the Federqls and the Anti-Republican Leagues 
opposed the abolition of the Union Jack. The Natal and 
Cape parties arranged for protest meetings to be held in 
Pietermaritzburg, Durban and East London.(95) The meetings 
were smal I, badly attended and a total fai lure.(96) The 
comparison between these meetings and the huge anti-
government demonstrations which had taken place during the 
flag crisis of 1926-27 was striking. Whereas in 1927 Durban, 
much smaller than it was thirty years later, could rally 
15 000 demonstrators, (97) in 1957 only 250 people attended 
a protest meeting in the City Hal 1.(98) The Engl ish-
speakers, even the Federal Party and A.R.L. supporters, 
al lowed the Union Jack to be removed as one of South Africa's 
flags with barely a protest. 
The proposed abol ition of 'God Save the Queen' as an 
official anthem aroused a little more interest. The Minister 
of the Interior, Dr. T.E. Donges announced during the passage 
of the Flag Bil I that the government would regard its 
acceptance as the 'green I ight' to abolish 'God Save the 
Queen', (99) and in May 1957 the Prime Minister issued 
instructions that only 'Die Stem van Suid-Afrika' was to be 
. 93. Natal Witness: 11 February 1957. At the same time it 
refused to support any protest meetings. 
94. Natal Witness: 7 March 1957. 
95. Natal Witness: 5 February 1957. Cape Times: 5 Apri I 
1957. 
96. Natal Witness: 13 February 1957. Cape Times: 5 Apri I 
1957. 
97. M.J. Wi II iamson, Natal and the Flag Issue, 1925-8, M.A. 
thesis (Natal), 1972, p.97. 
98. Natal Witness: 13 February 1957. 
99. Natal Witness: 4 March 1957. 
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. h· S h Af· (100) played as a natIonal ant em In out rIca. 
The U.P.'s reaction to this move was described by the 
. h'· d d·t (101) C ht Federals as 'wIshy-was Y ; as In ee I was. aug 
between al ienating either some Afrikaner sentiment if it 
protested, or some Engl ish-speaking sentiment if it did not, 
the U.P. remained si lent. The Natal Witness expressed a 
widely-held Engl ish-speaking view when it stated that the 
instruction emanated from the 'cl ique of Afrikaner 
extremists', which surrounded the Prime Minister. As a 
result, the municipal authorities of cities such as Durban 
and Port Elizabeth decided to continue playing both anthems, 
wh i Ie Johannesbu rg dec i ded to play ne'i ther. (102) 
The reaction of the Federals against the removal of 
the anthem was, at first, vehement. Heaton N~chol Is termed 
it the 'last humil iation' to which the English-speakers 
would submit and cal led on them to stand up for 'their' flag 
and anthem.(103) The Natal Provincial Action Committee of 
the party resolved that al I Federal meetings would display 
the Union Jack and sing 'God Save the Queen,.(104) Later, 
the Provincial Executi've altered the instruction, leaving it 
to the discretion of the organisers of meetings as to whether 
the Union Jack would be displayed or whether one or both 
anthems would be sung. Even the Federal Party was infected 
by indecision in the defence of symbols valued by the 
Engl ish-speakers.(105) 
100. House of Assembly Debates, 1957, cols. 482-90. 
The creation or abol ition of national anthems in South 
Africa was by Prime Ministerial instruction and not by 
an act of pari iament. The playing of both anthems dated 
from an instruction by Hertzog in 1938. Natal Witness: 
4 May 1957. 
101. Federal News: 18 September 1958. 
102. Sunday Times: 5 May 1957. Durban even cancel led the 
Governor-General's Sal I two years later rather than alter 
its decision. Natal Witness: 3 June 1959. 
· 103. Sunday Times: 5 May 1957. 
104. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 16 May 1957, loc.cit. 
105. For a discussion of the reasons for this apathy, vide 
infra: Ch.l0. pp.246-7. 
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The second maJor effect of the 1954 election defeats 
and the change of emphasis in the Federal Party was disunity 
within the party's ranks. The party had, since its inception, 
appealed to 'two entirel) different and often confl icting 
types of sentiment.,(106 The two 'types of sentiment' were 
that which supported a relatively liberal approach to the 
colour issue and that which valued the British connection 
above al I else. The potential for confl ict between these two 
(107) 
views was obvious to a number of observers. 
The disadvantages of a liberal colour pol icy had been 
demonstrated in the 1954 provincial elections.(108) It was 
clear that the Natal electorate was not attracted to the 
policy and that it would be wise to soft-pedal it. The 
real isation of this by Ford and Brickhi I I was partly 
responsible for their withdrawal from the party,(109) which, 
in turn, weakened the liberal wing of the ·Federals still 
further. At the same time, the strident republ icanism of 
Strijdom and Verwoerd strengthened the reactive, 'imperial' 
wing of the party. 
The first open confl ict involved Bolton, the Federal 
cand i date for Durban Centra lin 1954. He res i gned from the 
party in January 1955 because of the appeal made by the 
Federals to al I Commonwealth pari iaments. This action he 
dubbed 'un-South African,.(110) Bolton further maintained 
that, as the Federal pol icies had proved unacceptable to the 
Natal voters, the party should unite with the U.P. The 
alternative, he felt, was simply to 'create more confusion 
in the future struggles facing South Africa as a nation.,(lll) 
Whi Ie Bolton objected to 'un-South African' practices 
In the party, prominent members such as Greene and Seneque(112) 
106. The Star: 13 May 1953. 
107. Cape Times: 11 May 1953. 
The Star: 13 May 1953. Natal Mercury: 13 May 1953. 
108. Vide supra: Ch. 5. pp.113-4. 
109 • V i de sup r a : C h • 7. p. 149. 
110. The Star: 19 January 1955. 
111. The Star: 19 January 1955. 
112. Peter Seneque acted as honourary treasurer for the Natal 
Federal Party from November 1956 to February 1957. 
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were concerned that the Federals were abandoning their 
relatively liberal colour ideals. As a result, they decided 
to present a resolution to the 1956 Natal Congress cal ling 
for the adoption in principle of the multiple vote system as 
party pol icy. In addition, the resolution cal led for the 
creation of committees to ' ••• report on the implementation 
of the system and on the practical administration thereof.,(113) 
In order to present their case effectively, Greene and 
Seneque prepared a 'highly confidential' ten-paged memorandum 
which was sent to the delegates, together with their congress 
agendas. Apart from arguing their case for a multiple vote 
system, thi~ document exposed the growing rift between the 
two wings of the Federal Party. The authors stated that 
many voters saw the Federals merely as a group of ' ••• Jingoes 
bent on keeping the Union Jack flying ••• ~nd who wer~ 
essentially pro-British and Anti-Afrikaner •••• ,(114) 
Speaking 'from a personal point of view' Greene and Seneque 
saw themselves as anti-Afrikaner only insofar as they opposed 
Afrikaners who adopted a 'harsh Calvinistic' approach towards 
the non-Whites.(115) 'But, they argued, as this view of the 
non-Whites was shared by the Engl ish-speaking Durban City 
. Counci I, it was by no means exclusively Afrikaner. 
I f [they went o~ the core of the U. F.P. is 
composed of persons who are concerned solely 
with and distressed by the spread of 
Afrikanerdom, and who do not give a tinker's 
curse for the present restrictive pol icies 
of the Government directed against the Non-
European, then we are in the wrong home and 
what is more important the Party can have 
no future. (116) 
The resolution, and the thinking behind it, was designed to 
plumb the 'core' of the Federal Party. 
The resolution was ' moved by Greene who spoke to it 'at 
,length' and provoked a 'very I ively' debate, lasting more 
113. U.F.P. ,(Natal): Resolution to be Moved by Selwyn Greene 
and Sec,onded by Peter Senegue, n. d. 
' 114. Ibid. 
', 115. Ibid. 
' 116. Ibid., p.2. 
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than two hours. The result was the adoption of a resolution 
markedly different from that of Greene and Seneque. A 
committee was appointed but it was merely instructed to 
'investigate and report' upon the multiple vote and other 
franchise systems.(117) 
Greene threatened to resign when ~is resolution was 
altered, (118) but was persuaded to join the Franchis~ , 
. . t . t th f h . t . ( 11 9 ) Committee set up to Inves Iga e e ranc Ise ques Ion. 
Two years later, he resigned from the Federals when they 
publ ished the party's pol ,icy, 'playing down the Native 
pol icy'. (120) Seneque ' le'ft the party immediately. In his 
letter of resignation he made it clear that he had no 
(121 ) 
quarrel with the 'basic principles' of the Federals. 
What he objected to was the 'practical policies and 
implementations' of party policy.(122) Whi Ie the party 
fai led to make known its stand against Issues such as 
university apartheid, it was quick to enter the dispute over 
Barlow's Flag Bi I I. 'Accusations of jinzoism', stated 
Seneque, 'would be difficult to defend.' 123) Because of 
its essential 'jingoism', the Federal Party was unwi II ing 
to face the vital colour issue squarely. With their 'side-
stepping, their opportunism and their chess-I ike moves ••• ', 
the Federals had fai led to fight the 'Policy of Apartheid,.(124) 
Hughes Mason, expressing the views of the 
'imperial ist' wing of the party, maintained that the removal 
of the Union Jack was merely a step in the direction of an 
Afrikaner republ ic. 'And if am a jingo for resisting each 
117. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 12 and 13 October 1956, op.cit., 
p.6. For further information on the constitution of 
this committee and the results of its dp.1 iberations, vide 
supra: Ch.4. pp. 74-75. and vide infra: Ch. 10. pp. 2~. 
118. sip: R. Hughes Mason to P. Seneque, 7 February 1957, 
op.cit., p.3. 
119. Interview with S. Greene. 
120. I bi d. 





of these steps, then I am proud of it,' he declared. 
(125) 
As regards the colour issue, Hughes Mason bel ieved that, 
. . t t' S fit (126) it was 'not ••• qUlte as Impor an as eneque e • 
The disagreements over the colour question were not 
solved by the resignations of Greene and Seneque. Others, 
such as Brian Batchelor, remained in the party and continued 
to press for a more I iberal pol icy. As he had agreed to 
'shadow' the Ministry of Native Affairs,(127) and was a 
member of the Franchise Committee, Batchelor was a significant 
force in the party, especially as regards the colour question. 
The 1957 Congress of the Natal Federal Party accepted 
the recommendations of the Franchise Committee for a two-
value voters' roll but reserved ' ••• for further consideration 
the definition of acceptable qual ifications {}or voter!] .,(128) 
With the whole problem sti I I unresolved, further disagreement 
developed. Selby felt that the franchise qual ifications 
recommended by the Committee 'should be raised,.(129) 
Batchelor repl ied on 10 November 1957 that he was constantly 
told to 'be practical' but felt that a pol icy based on 
'progressive and realistic thought' was the only hope for 
the country.(130) Selby then "informed Batchelor that there 
were many Federals who felt that the party should 'back-
pedal' on the franchise proposals.(131) He stated that he 
did not share this view for a number of reasons. The party 
had to be 'honest' and so gain the respect and confidence 
of Blacks. Furthermore, Selby bel ieved that the U.P. would 
attack the Federals on the colour issue and that no amount 
125. Hughes Mason to Seneque, 7 February 1957, op.cit., p.2. 
126. l.hl.2., "p .. 3. 
127. B/p: A.R. Selby to B. Batchelor, 22 October 1957. 
128. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 18 and 19 October 1957, op.cit.; 
p.3. For a full discussion of the Federal Party's 
franchise proposals, vide infra: Ch.l0. pp.250-54. 
129. A.R. Selby: Notes on Franchise Report. Attached to 
Ilette~, A.R. Selby to B. Batchelor, 22 October 1957, 
OC.Clt. 
130. B/p:B. Batchelor to A.R. Selby, 10 November 1957. 
131. B/p: A.R. Selby to B. Batchelor, 25 November 1957. 
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of 'back-pedal ling' would prevent these attacks.(132 ) Selby 
concluded by expressing the hope that the Federals would 
become 'one party instead of two' as regards the colour 
question. 
Despite his protestations of November 1957, within 
five months Selby had joined the ranks of those who wished 
to 'back-pedal'. In a confidential report of 19 Apri I 1958 
he asked that the franchise proposals adopted at the 1957 
Congress be 'reconsidered,.(133) He maintained that the 
two-value voters' rol I would be rejected by the Black leaders 
and would be unpopular with the White electorate.(134) Selby 
conceded that a more I iberal pol icy could be justified on the 
grounds that it 'ought' to be done.(135) Practical pol itics, 
however, dictated that a more conservative pol icy be adopted 
so as to 'retrieve' the existing situation.(136) In a 
forthright conclusion, Selby summarised his position: 
I real ise that my recommendations may seem I ike 
a piece of that political expediency which we 
deplore in the United Party; I do not see them 
in this I ight, and the difference is one of 
motive. 
I cannot see that we should be acting in the 
interests of the Non-European people if, by 
insisting on proposals which have no 
possibi lity of acceptance at the pol Is, and 
which we could not implement even if we win 
the Provincial election, we should throwaway 
whatever chance there is of breaking the 
National ist domination whi Ie there is sti I I 
time. (137) 
The fol lowing month, Selby formal ised his ideas into the 
132. Ibid. 
133. U.F.P. (Natal): Circular, 19 Apri I 1958. 
134. A:R. Selby: Note~ on Non-European Pol icy. Attached to 
Circular, 19 Aprl I 1958, loc.cit. It is significant that 
this report was written three days after the 1958 general " 
election in which the National ists had scored considerable 





statement: 'The Party is not convinced that the extension 
of the franchise to non-Europeans, whether on a common 
voters' rol I or in some modified way provides an acceptable 
or workable solution.,(138) 
The I iberal elements within the party resisted these 
trends. There was a 'long' discussion of the franchise Issue 
at the 1958 Natal Provincial Congress and a compromise 
resolution was adopted.(139) The party agreed that the 
government of South Africa should 'remain in civi I ised 
hands,.(140) Further, it rejected specifically the system 
of universal adult suffrage but supported the 'right of 
civi lised non-Europeans to be placed on the common rol I of 
voters •••• ,(141) The vexed problem of qual ification was to 
be set sufficiently high so as to 'guarantee the cal ibre of 
the applicant', but not so high as to be 'virtually 
unattainable,.(142) 
The liberal faction within the party had retained the 
ideal of the common voters' rol I as party pol icy, but the 
conservatives triumphed as regards the appl i~ation of the 
policy. The debate received little publ icity(143) and the 
detai Is of the qual ification requirements were never 
final ised. The basic differences between the two factions 
within the party remained unsolved. 
Not al I the disputes within the Federal Party were on 
issues of policy; some involved questions of strategy. The 
East Cape Federal Party lost Kettles, the man who, in Selby's 
.estimation, was the driving force of the group, (144) because 
of the Federal decision not to contest the 1958 general 
election. It was, Kettles maintained, an act of 'benevolence' 
138. U.F.P. (Natal): Circular, 14 May 1958, Annexure, p.4. 
139. Ca~e Times: 18 August 1958. 
140. Ca~e Times: 18 August 1958. 
141. C~e Times: 18 August 1958. 
142. Caee Times: 18 August 1958. 
143. The Federa I News of 22 
the discussion. 
August 1958 carried no report of 
'144. Vide sue ra : Ch. 7 . p. 156. 
to the U.P. He thereafter disappeared from the pol itical 
scene and the Federals in the Cape were noticeably weaker. 
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The Federals had entered the 1954 provinci~1 elections 
unified and with enthusiasm. In the years fol lowing their 
defeat in that contest, apathy and disunity had eroded their 
strength. They therefore approached the 1958 general 
election and especially the vital 1959 provincial elections, 
disunified and weakened. 
\ 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
1958 - 1959 ELECTIONS: THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERALS 
In 1958 a general election was held and this was 
followed by provincial elections in 1959. These provided 
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the first opportunity since 1954 for the Federal Party to 
demonstrate its support. Fai lure in these elections, 
considering the party's lack of substantial support in 1954 
and in the subsequent by-elections, would effectively destroy 
it. 
The importance of widespread support in the 1958 general 
election was appreciated by the Federal leaders from an early 
date. The leader of the eastern Cape Federals declared In 
1954 that contesting the 1958 election was the 'main 
objective' of the party.(l) The fol lowing year, Batchelor, 
one of the Natal party's most perceptive members, viewed the 
general election as 'the big test,.(2) He maintained that 
the Federals should announce the names of candidates early, 
despite the accusation that they ·would spl it the opposition 
vote. Voters, he stated, would thereby be compel led to make 
the 'awful decision' of whom to support, before election 
propaganda could 'stampede' them into the U.P. fold.(3) 
The issue of contesting the general election was 
discussed in detai I at the 1956 Natal Federal Congress. The 
party was careful not to commit itself to anything unreasonable. 
For example, a suggestion by a Cape delegate that the fight 
be taken into constituencies such as Calvinia and Waterberg, 
' ••• even if there seemed no chance whatever of victory ••• ', 
was defeated.(4) On the other . hand, a resolution limiting 
the party's participation to 'the six most favourable seats,(5) 
1. Cape Times: 25 June 1954. 
2. B/p: B. Batchelor to W. Grimwood, 28 November 1955. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Natal Dai Iy News: 15 October 1956. 
5. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Congress Papers, 12 and 13 
October 1956, resolutions, op.cit., p.15. 
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was simi larly rejected.(6) The resolution which was accepted 
stated that every seat where there was a 'reasonable prospect 
of success', should be contested.(7) 
Whi Ie the party was considering the extent of its 
involvement in the election, the Natal Provincial Executive 
began organising for the contest. On 28 July 1956 it ordered 
al I branches to be put 'on an election footing,.(8) Within 
six weeks, nineteen branch and public meetings were held in 
response to this cal 1.(9) During the first half of 1957, the 
Federals experienced a 'heartening' response to its efforts 
to prepare for the general election.(10) On 1 June 1957 
Heaton Nichol Is announced that the Federal Party would contest 
al I the Natal seats.(ll) So as to prevent three-cornered 
contests, he, as in 1954, offered that the Federal Party 
contest two National ist-held seats in northern Natal) 
provided that the U.P. 'kept out' of the contest.(12 The 
offer, termed 'impudent' and 'unreal istic' by the Natal 
press(13) did not el icit a reply from the U.P. 
Five months later, the party changed its position. On 
18 October 1957) the Natal Federal Congress resolved 'almost 
unanimously,(14 that 
••• in order not to divide anti-republ ican 
sentiment in Natal, the Union Federal Party 
~oulq] not contest the General Election, 
but l:woulq] contest the next Provincial 
Counci I Elections with al I its resources, 
throughout the Province. (15) 
· 6. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 12 and 13 October 1956, op.cit., 
p.5. 
7. U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Congress Papers, 12 and 13 
October 1956, resolutions, loc.cit. 
8. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 28 July 1956, op.cit., p.2. 
9. Federal News: 23 August 1956. 
10. Natal Dai Iy News: 3 June 1957. 
11. Natal Witness: 1 June 1957. 
Natal Witness: 1 June 1957. 
Natal Witness: 5 June 1957. Natal 
Natal Witness: 21 October 1957. 




15. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 18 and 19 October 1957, 
p.3. 
3 June 1957. 
op.cit., 
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The resolution was passed on the 'advice' of Heaton Nichol Is, 
who suggested this approach because the U.P. bel ieved that it 
would win the election.(16) In his congress speech and press 
statements, Selby stressed that the decision did not imply 
Federal support of the U.p.(17) Further, he stated that 
although he could not envisage the U.P. winning the election, 
the Federal Party was 'not yet' in a position to unseat .the 
government.(18) The real reason for the Federals' withdrawal 
was that they were anxious not to expose their weakness. The 
Star pointed this out very bluntly; ' ••• the vast preponderance 
of anti-National ist opinion in South Africa ••• was ~ti I [] 
firmly wedded to the idea that the United Party offered the 
only hope o~ defeating the present National ist Government~,,(19) 
it wrote. The Star, then went to the heart of the matter 
when it commented that the Federals were making a virtue out 
of a necessity.(20) 
The National ists made apartheid and republ icanism the 
two main issues in the general election campaign.(21) They 
argued, specifically, that the election would be a barometer 
of republ ican feel ing in South Africa.(22) The Federals 
strongly opposed this I ine of thought. The resolution with-
drawing the party from the election had emphasised that the 
contest should not be interpreted as a test \ of republ ican 
sentiment.(23) The reason for this attitude was that many 
in the party felt privately that the National ists would win 
16. Natal Dai Iy News: 18 October 1957. 
17. Federal News: 1 November 1957. 
18. Federal News: 1 November 1957. 
19. U.F.P. (Transvaal): Statement by Provincial Executive, 
23 October 1957. 







2 October 1956, 24 October 1956. 
2 Apri I 1957, 12 September 1957. 
23. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 18 and 19 October 1957, I "t OC.CI • 
the support of a majority of the voters(24) and they were 
therefore anxious lest this be taken as a mandate for the 
declaration of a republ ic. 
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The 1958 general election was a complete triumph for 
the National Party. In a victory ,speech to more than 50 000 
supporters in Pretoria, Strijdom announced that the ' ••• 
republic was nearer than the United Party real ised.,(25) 
This feel ing of triumphant Afrikanerdom was eloquently 
expressed by Die Vaderland: 
The lesson ~of the electio~ is that Afrikanerdom 
has now unfolded its ful I strength. Its 
statistical supremacy has establ ished its influence 
absolutely. It can be expected that its new~found 
strength wi I I bear permanently against anyone who 
might try to thwart it. (26) 
In the face of such Afrikaner confidence, the Federal 
leaders called on the Engl ish-speakers, as a group, to defend 
their rights. Selby stated that English-speakers could not 
rely on 'moderate' Afrikaners to protect their rights. This 
strategy had led to 'appeasement and surrender,.(27) Derek 
Heaton Nichol Is maintained that the National ists had won the 
election on 'a cal i to ' the blood,.(28) He suggested that 
' ••• the most effective counter would be a cal I to the blood 
of the Engl ish-speaking Section •••• ,(29) In this attitude, 
which was prevalent amongst its members, the Federals received 
the support of a new organisation, the United Engl ish-
speaking South Africans (UNESSA). 
24. A Selby to B. Batchelor, 30 August 1957, loc.cit. 
Selby maintained after the election that the National ists 
had received the support of a majority of the voters. 
Federal News: 3 May 1958. Owing to c~mputational 
difficulties, because of uncontested seats, this cannot 
be establ ished conclusively. Some historians, including 
Heard and Carter, hold that the U.P. enjoyed the support 
of the majority of the voters in 1958. ' 
Heard: op.cit., p.88. 
Carter: , op.cit., appendix V, Chart A. 
25. Natal Witness: 23 Apri I 1958. 
26. Natal Witness: 19 Apri I 1958. 
27. Federal News: 3 May 1958. 
28~ U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 26 Apri I 1958, op.cit., p.2. 
29. Ibid. 
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Described by Schlemmer as the ' ••• most recent manifes-
tation of this [:Anglophi I~ sentiment in an organised 
form ••• ',(30) UNESSA was constituted in March 1958.(31 ) It 
was founded in Johannesburg by M.H. Mal I inick, D.W. Crawford 
and P. Parnwell.(32 ) Having 'firmly establ ished' the 
organisation in the Transvaal, (33) Mal I inick went on a 
recruiting tour of Natal and the eastern Cape in December. 
He founded three branches in the former province and six In 
the latter area, bringing the total of UNESSA's branches to 
fifteen.(34) The organisation did not grow appreciably 
after this because, towards the end of that year, the branch 
total was sti I I fifteen.(35) 
UNESSA was formed, stated Mal I inick, because of ' ••• the 
attacks by the National ist Government on the rights and 
traditions of the Engl ish-speaking South Africans.,(36) Its 
objects were formal ised later into eight points. These 
dealt with issues such as honouring the achievements of 
British South Africans, respecting British sentiment, promoting 
immigration, teaching 'impar.tial' history and fighting to 
retain South Africa's I inks with Crown and Commonwealth. t37 ) 
So important was this last Issue that UNESSA adopted the 
slogan, 'For South Africa, Queen and Commonwealth', and the 
emblem of a Usurrounding a crown.(38) 
UNESSA viewed itself as the 'first' and 'only' 
organisation 'set up t( deal exclusively with the rights of 
the Engl ish-~peakers.' 39) It differed from other Engl ish-
30. Schlemmer: op.cit., p.132. 
31. UNESSA: Report from ' UNESSA, No.1, Apri I 1958. 
32. UNESSA: Proposed Constitution for UNESSA, n.d., p.3. 
33. Natal Witness: 16 January 1959. 
34. Natal Witness: 16 January 1959. 
35. UNESSA: Statement, 8 November 1959. 
36. Natal Witness: 30 December 1958. 
37. UNESSA: Proposed Constitution, op.cit., p.l. and UNESSA: 
Manifesto, n.d. 
38. UNESSA: Report from UNESSA, No.12, September 1959. 
39. UNESSA: UNESSA Information Service Publ ication, U.1.S.1., 
n.d. 
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speaking patriotic and cultural groups, some of which, I ike 
the A.R.L., it absorbed, (40) in that they had been concerned 
only with aspects of the Engl ish-speakers' social, cultural 
or educational life. (41) Like the A.R.L., UNESSA was, 
officially, not connected with any pol itical party.(42) It 
did, however, co-operate with the U.P. during the general 
election, when it refrained from publ ic activity so as not 
to 'embarrass' the party in its contest with the 
National ists.(43) After the election, UNESSA launched into 
a spirited defence of British symbols such as the Union Jack 
and 'God Save the Queen'. There was never an open clash 
between it and the U.P. as had occurred between the U.P. and 
the A.R.L. The organisation was also to establ ish cordial, 
though not close, relations with the Progressives, after the 
emergence of this group in 1959.(44) 
In many ways, UNESSA may be considered merely another 
offshoot of the Federal Party. Mal I inick, its driving force, 
was the chairman of the Transvaal Federal Party. (45) It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the two organisations adopted 
very simi lar stands on many issues. For example, both felt 
deeply about the abol ition of the Union Jack and 'God Save 
the Queen', both adopted a fairly I iberal but i I I-defined 
non-White pol icy,(46 ) both were deeply concerned about the 
influence of C.N.E. and the Broederbond(47) and both 
40. UNESSA: Statement, 2 November 1959. 
41. UNESSA: UNESSA Information Service Publ ication, U.l.S.2., 
n.d. 
42. UNESSA: Publ ication U.1.S.1., loc.cit. 
43. UNESSA: Report, No.1, loc.cit. 
44. V ide: PP /P: J .• C. Moore to Cha i rman, The Progress i ve Party 
~outh Africa, 16 November 1959, and the reply of 30 
November 1959. 
45. Natal Witness: 30 May 1960. 
46. Like man~ Fed~rals, UNESSA felt that 'th~ pol itical question 
of mo~t Immediate ~rgency [was] the survival of Engl ish-
~eaklng South African culture. Only when this problem 
LhacQ be~n solved Ccoul~ the colour question be success-
fully tackled.' UNESSA: Publ ication U.1.S.2., loe.cit. 
47. Vide supra: Ch.5. pp.l01 and 108-10. 
UNESSA: UNESSA Information Service Publ ication, U.l.S.1~ 
n.d., pp.5-7. 
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subscribed to the ideals and the 
Both organisations, furthermore, 
, , f U' (48) 1910 compact 0 nlon. 
despite UNESSA's claim to 
uniqueness, worked for the interests of the Engl ish-speaking 
group and both considered republ icanism to be the greatest 
danger confronting the country. 
UNESSA presumably did not openly support the Federal 
Party because it could hope to achieve more for the Engl ish-
speakers if it were not tagged with a party allegiance. 
Association with a pol itical party furthermore, would mean 
that it could not champion a sectional interest but would 
have to adopt a programme 'in the interests of al I sections 
of the community,.(49) Another possible reason is that 
UNESSA had learnt from the A.R.L. that an independent group 
could rally much wider support than one identified wit~ a 
pol itical party.(50) The independence of UNESSA would thus 
be to the benefit of both itself and the Federal Party, with 
which it was very closely I inked in private. 
Having opted out of the 1958 general election, the 
1959 provincial elections were a matter ofl ife and death 
for the Federal Party~ Being a federal party by name and 
commitment and relying on predominantly Engl ish-speaking 
Natal to thwart the National ist government's plans, the 
Federals placed great importance on control I ing at least one 
prOVince, as they had done five years previously.(51) The 
growth of Afrikaner national ism and republ icanism since 1954 
had given a new urgency to the struggle. 
As early as August 1957 Batchelor, Derek Heaton 
Nichol Is and Browne had seen the forthcoming provincial 
elections as the Federals' 'big ehanee,.(52) Selby concurred 
with this view and urged that the party be mobi I ised to act 
as a rallying point for anti-National ists. In keeping with 
48. V i de i n f r a: C h. 10. p. 237 • 
UNESSA: Report from UNESSA, No.17, July 1960. 
49. UNESSA: Publ ication U.1.S.2., loe.cit. 
50. Natal Witness: 3 November . 1959. 
51. V i de su p r a: C h • 5 • p. 96. 
52. B/p: B. Batchelor to A.R. Selby, 24 August 1957. 
178 
this I ine of thought, when it was decided at the 1957 Natal 
Federal Party Congress to withdraw from the general election, 
it was stated specifically that the Federals would fight the 
provincial elections' ••• with all its resources, throughout 
the Province.,(53) So important had the election become in 
Federal eyes that Selby informed the Natal Provincial 
Executive in November 1957, almost two years before the . 
contest, that the party had 'staked everything ••• on a swing 
of opinion' towards it in 1959.(54) The Transvaal Federals 
agreed. Victory in Natal, they said, had become the 'main 
target' of Federals everywhere.(55) In October 1958, Selby 
commented on the importance of the elections to the members 
In a party circular: 
Within the next twelve months, our Party wi I I' 
be facing the most crucial Provincial Election 
in the history of this Province - a contest 
which may wei I decide, once and for al I, whether 
we shal I al low ourselves to be absorbed into a 
Broederbond republic, or stand firm against it. 
In my view, if we lose this chance, it is 
highly improbable that we shal I ever receive 
another. (56) 
Although the provinci~1 elections only took place in October 
1959, a speech by Derek Heaton Nichol Is in Pietermaritzburg 
in March of that year was reported in the press as 'opening 
the Federal Party campaign',(57) and by 27 May the Federa~s 
In Natal had announced the names of five candidates. (58) 
As the Federals' Natal election effort gathered 
momentum, the government, with apparent indifference to 
Natal's reaction, announced the appointment of J.H. Stander 
53. Vide supra: Ch.8. p. 172. 
54. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 23 November 1957, loc.cit. 
55. U.F.P. (Transvaal): Federal Party Now on a National Basis, 
21 August 1958, loc.cit. 
56. U.F.P. (Natal): Circular, 31 October 1958. 
57. D. Heaton Nichol Is: Speech at Pietermaritzburg, 24 March 
1959, p.l. 
58. D. Heaton Nichol Is, A.C. Martin, H. Noel Roberts, S.H. 
Lowe and J. Hunt Hoi ley. Hunt Hoi ley died before the 
elect i on. . 
~atal Witness: 18 May 1959, 27 May 1959, 14 August 1959. 
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as Deputy Director of Education in Natal. In May, the Natal 
Provincial Counci I resolved that this appointment was 'not 
acceptable', and the Executive refused to yield to the central 
government's demand that the appointment be made.(59) The 
provincial administration wished to appoint H. Lundie, who 
. S d · d t' I . ft' ( 60 ) was senior to tan er an nex In Ine or promo Ion. 
The real dispute, however, was over Stander's educational 
and pol itical views. He was a National ist who was bel ieved 
to be sympathetic to Christian National Education. As Natal 
was the only province control led by the opposition, Stander's 
appointment was seen as an attempt to bring Natal's White 
education pol icy into I ine with that of the other provinces. 
There, compulsory mother tongue education had been introduced 
by education departments which were control led by Afrikaner 
national ists. 
The Stander case immediately assumed large proportions. 
AI I the opposition parties, as wei I as the A.R.L. and the 
Black Sash, supported the Natal Executive Committee.(61) The 
city hal Is of Durban and Pietermaritzburg were fi lied to 
overflowing with protestors against the government's actions.(62) 
Mitchel I declared that Natal would not 'budge an inch' and 
'dare not surrender' over the issue of education.(63) 
So far from moderating his pol icy in response to these 
protests, Dr. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister, added to the 
crisis by declaring that legislation to enforce a national 
education pol icy would soon be passed. There should be, he 
stated, 'uniformity' in White education.(64) The country 
could not have one educational ideal in one province and 
another elsewhere. The provincial authorities would have to 
'adjust themselves' to the proposed legislation.(65) 
59. Natal Witness: 29 May 1959. 
60. Natal Witness: 15 July 1959. 
61. Natal Witness: 20 July 1959. 
62. Natal Witness: 22 July 1959, 30 July 1959. 
63. Natal \v i tness: 30 July 1959. 
64. Natal Witness: 10 August 1959. 
65. Natal Witness: 10 August 1959. 
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The Federal reaction was immediate. Selby announced 
that Verwoerd's speech brought Natal to 'D_day,.(66) If the 
province submitted to the government, he said, there was no 
hope for the future as the next generation would be 'infected' 
by C.N.E.(67) All protests, in the face of government 
intransigence, were useless, he observed, and, as nothing 
co~ld be done legally to stop the National ist government, the 
only solution was for Natal to leave the Union.(68) As "the 
election campaign progressed, he returned to the secession 
cal I time and again. On 7 October, in Pietermaritzburg, he 
proclaimed Natal's right to secede rather than submit to a 
National ist 'dictatorship,.(69) This, he maintained, could 
be done 'constitutionally' by the Provincial Counci 1.(70) 
On 12 October he repeated the argument at the Federal's" major 
election rally in the Durban City Hall.(71) 
Despite the support of the party's Provincial 
Executive, (72) secession was not taken up by any other 
candidate. Batchelor mentioned it in passing in one of his 
speeches, (73) but the other candidates did not even broach 
the subject, (74) nor did they include it in " their manifestos 
(Selby mentioned it twice in his).(75) This was because the 

















Mercur~: " 10 
Dai I~ News: 






7 October 1959. 
7 October 1959. 
October 1959. 
August 1959. 
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74. In reply to a question on secession, Derek Heaton Nichol Is -
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Natal Dai Iy News: 17 September 1959. • 
75. U.F.P. (Natal): A.R. Selby's Election Manifesto, October 
1959. " 
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strongly opposed secession and made considerable pol itical 
. I -f h· (76) I dd· t· th cap I ta out 0 tel ssue. n a I lon, e newspaper 
reaction was unfavourable. While the Witness and the Mercury 
ignored the subject, the influential Dai Iy News strongly 
opposed Selby's idea, maintaining that he had 'gone a lon~ 
way towards f~rfeiting the confidence of the electorate.' 77) 
Simi larly, continued the newspaper, the suggestion that 
Stander's appointment could be opposed by any means other 
than the courts raised ' ••• false hopes and prepared the way 
for sad disi Ilusionment.,(78) 
In September 1959, the government appealed to the 
Supreme Court on the Stander case and the Natal Executive 
Committee defended its action in refusing his appointment.(79) 
It was widely appreciated from the beginning that the 
Committee's stand was one of principle and that the govern-
ment was legally justified in its actions.(80) This 
introduced the Federal argument(81) of moral as against legal 
resistance -to the National ists. The Federals maintained 
that, as the U.P. was wi I ling to accept what was legal, it 
had no option but to ~ccept the appointment of Stander.(82) 
In any event, al I the parties concerned were to accept the 
Supreme Court rul ing in November that Stander's appointment 
as Deputy Director of Education stood as from the previous 
January. (83) 
The judgement came after the election and did not 
therefore aFfect the campaign, which was dominated by the 
76. Natal Witness: 25 September 1959, 30 September 1959. 
Natal Dai Iy News: 30 September 1959. 
77. Natal Dai Iy News: 7 October 1959. 
78. Natal Dai Iy News: 7 October 1959. 
79. Natal Witness: 30 September 1959. 
80. Natal Witness: 10 August 1959, 29 September 1959. 
Natal Dai Iy News: 7 October 1959. 
81. V~de ;~fra: Ch. 10. pp.243-4. 
82. Natal Witness: 7 October 1959. D. Heaton Nichol Is: Speech 
at Empangeni, 12 October 1959. 
83. Natal Witness: 25 November 1959. 
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educational dispute. The candidates devoted more time to 
this topic, and more questions were asked about it, than any 
other. Mrs. J. Stewart, the Federal Party's popular Durban 
North candidate, was persuaded to stand only because she felt 
that the province's educational future was threatened.(84) 
It was Martin, however, who led the defence. As he had done 
in the Berea by-election and the 1954 provincial elections, (85) 
he maintained that the C.N.E. ideas were infi Itrating the 
Natal Education Department at an alarming rate, via its 
'hundreds of fol lowers' who had been trained at institutions 
which were 'entirely committed' to its ideals.(86) 
The Provincial Executive of the Federal Party did not 
formulate adetai led pol icy statement In 1959 as it had done 
in 1954.(87) The nearest the party came to issuing a 
statement of pol icy for the election was the Talking Points 
for Federals.(88) This document, compi led by Martin, was 
divided into nineteen sections. Two dealt with the origin 
of the party and with the divisions which had emerged in the 
U.P. Of the se~enteen remaining sections, eight dealt with 
education.(89) . 
According to these, the party's education pol icy 
remained essentially unchanged from 1954.(90) More prominence, 
however, was given to the alleged fai lure of the U.P. to 
administer the department properly. One section dealt with 
the 'growth of so-cal led Christian National Education in 
Natal', whi Ie the fol lowing section analysed what C.N.E. 
involved.(91) According to this, science was to be taught 
within the 'scope of the Old Testament', history and geography 
were to be 'narrowly South African', and teachers were to 
84. I nterv i ew with Mrs. J. Stewart. 
85. Vide supra: Ch.5. pp.93 and 111. 
86. Natal Witness: 26 August 1959. 
87. Vide supra: Ch. 5.p.98. 
88. U.F.P. (Natal): Talking Points for Federals, October 1959. 
89. I bi d. 
90. Vide supra: Ch.5. pp. 108-12. 
91. U.F.P. (Natal): Talking Points, op.cit., p.3. 
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' ••• be spied upon by pupi Is, parents and church.,(92) The 
Stander issue was then referred to in more detai I. The U.P. 
was blamed for creating the problem in the first instance, 
because the Natal Executive Committee (U.P. control led) had 
in 1949 first appointed him an inspector even though he had 
then not been recommended for this post by the Director of 
Education. 'In other words, the U.P. created the Stander 
Problem and it is makin, a very belated effort to avoid ' the 
consequences of it. ,(93 The U.P. was then castigated for 
its 'fai lure to safeguard : Engl ish culture ,and heritage in 
Natal Education') and for its 'fai lures' and 'broken promises' 
on education.(94 These involved alleged preferences to 
Afrikaans teachers and the apparent tardiness, despite the 
comm,ission of 1954,(95J of the edu~ation depart~ent in st6pping 
C.N.E. infi Itration and the teaching of distorted history. 
In addition, the educational authorities were t~ken to task 
for the administration of school hostels and teacher training, 
where it was alleged that Engl ish-speakers were discriminated 
against and their values ignored.(96) , 
The education issue also featured prominently in 
Federal manifestos.(97) Exceptions were the manifestos of 
Selby and of J.E.M. Gi Imour, the Federal candidate for ' 
Greyvi I Ie. Selby's most prominent manifesto issue was 
secession,(98) while Gilmour emphasised his support for the 
government's Bantustan pol icy.(99) In addition to these 
hand-outs which dealt with individual candi , d~tes, th~ Federals 
re-issued the 1954 pamphlets Your Chi id and the Future and 
Do You Know What Christian National Education Means?(100) 
Apart from its impact on election propaganda, the 
92. Ibid. 
93. Ibid. Underl ining In the original. 
94. Ibid., pp.3-4. 
95 • V i de supra: C h. 5. p p • 111- 2 . 
96. U.F.P. (Natal): Talking Poin~s, op.cit., pp.4 and 6. 
97. , U.F.P. ' (Natal): Manifesto~ ofA.C. Martin, J. Stewart, 
B. Batchelor and R.Hughes Mason, October 1959. ' 
98. U.F.P. (Natal): A.R. Selby's Election Manifesto, loc.cit. 
99. U.F.P. (Natal): J. Gilmour's Election Manifesto, October 1959. 
100. Vide supra: Ch. 5. p.110. ' 
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Stander disp~te also led to talks regarding a possible merger 
between the Federals and the U.P.(101) In January 1959, 
Martin, on behalf of the Federals, had talks on the subject 
with Major L. A~thur, a U.P. Natal Provincial Executive 
Committee member.(102) In July, Martin approached Leo Boyd, 
also a Natal Provincial Executive Committee member and Natal 
deputy chairman of the U.P., to inform him that, if the ,U.P. 
agreed to pledge to oppose a repu~1 ic as it had opposed 
Stander's appointment, the Federal Party would be prepared 
to 'join up with it,.(103) 'Resistance to the republ ic' 
was later defined by Martin as requiring the U.P. to acce~t 
that Natal was entitled to a separate referendum on the issue. 
In addition~ the Federals would expect to be 'represented' In 
the new Provincial Counci I in order to safeguard what they 
considered to be vital principles.(104) There is some 
dispute as to the , deta~ls of the ~ubsequent abortive 
negotiations. What is clear is that the U.P. was anxious 
not to encumber itself with a pledge of a separate Natal 
referendum. Furthermo~e, it did not wish to sponsor ex-
Federal candidates with strong Anglophi Ie vie~s when it was 
trying to sway the Afrikaner ' v,ote.(105) As important, the 
U.P. was now facing deep internal divisions which, In view 
of the provincial elections, added a new dimension to 
opposition pol itics. 
These divisions originated In disagreement regardi~g 
Black pol ic~. At the urging ,of Mitchel I, the U.P. National 
Congress voted to oppose further land purchases for Black 
settlement. Eleven delegates, including six 'M.P.s, issued 
a statement, protesting(106) that the congress was ~uilty of 
101. ' These ~onversations took place befor~ the Federal Party 
accused the United Party of being responsible for the 
Stander question. 
102. Natal Mercury: 6 October 1959. 
103. Natal Mercury: 6 October 1959. 
104. Natal Mercury: 6 October 1959. 
105. Natal Dai Iy News: 20 October 1959. 
106. J. Robert~on: Liberal ism in South Africa 1948-1963, 1971, 
p.190. 
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f 0' t d B I k (107) a 'breach 0 promise owar s ac s. The Progressive 
Group, as the dissidents were known, then expressed deep 
concern at the 'whole undertone of the Congress', which had 
fai led to 'face · up to' the increasingly urgent problems of 
'multi-~cial South Africa,.(108) After talks with Sir de 
Vi I I iers Graaff had fai led, the Progressive Group announced 
o 0 0 f f 0 t (109) B thO to Its Intention 0 ormlng a new par y. Y IS Ime, 
the number of M.P.s who had broken from the U.P. had 
increased from six to eleven.(110) 
On 17 August, within days of the first announcement of 
a split in the U.P., the Natal Mercury perceived that the ' 
pol itical position in Natal had altered in a way different 
from that in the other prov i nces. I n Nata I there was a ' ••• 
strong core of Federa I Party supporters, whose views cooi nc i ded 
with those of the Progressives', on the issues of colour and 
provincial educational control.(lll) Before the Natal 
Federals could open discussions with the Progressives, their 
Cape col leagues had acted. They, somewhat unreal istical Iy, 
invited the Progressive Group on 20 August to join their 
ranks in the bel ief th~t ' ••• no good could come of further 
division.,(112) The invitation el icited no reply. 
The Natal Federals were more real istic. Selby, In a 
speech in Pietermaritzburg on 25 August 1959, stated that the 
Federals felt 'closer' and were 'much more in sympathy' with 
the Progressives than ever they were with the U.P.(113) He 
therefore suggested that the two parties consider fusion 
without sacrifice of principl.es on either side.(114) 
107. Cape Times: 14 August 1959. 
108. Cape Times: 14 August 1959. 
109. Natal Witness: 25 August 1959. 
110. They included the two M.P.s against whom the Federals 
had fought - Butcher (Berea) and Van Ryneveld (East 
London North). 
Robertson: loc.cit. 
111. Natal Mercur~: 17 August 1959. 
112. PP/P: N.F. Bowyer to J. Steytler, 20 August 1959. 
113. Natal Dai I ~ News: 26 August 1959. 
114. Natal Dai I ~ News: 26 August 1959. 
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Progressives, who were approached by the press, gave as their 
opinions that, in View of the fact that their party had not 
yet final ised its programme of principles, discussion of 
amalgamation with the - Federals was premature.(115) 
Selby then approached Boyd, the Natal leader of the 
Progressive Group, via a Pietermaritzburg attorney, with the 
suggestion of an election pact. They met in Pietermaritzburg 
and Boyd informed Selby that his offer would be placed before 
the Group's Natal Provincial Executive and its national 
leader, Dr. J. Steytler. The executive was opposed to the 
idea and Steytler was concerned that any pact with the 
Federals would 'taint' the Progressives in the eyes of the 
'moderate Afrikaners,.(116) The Progressives hoped to sway 
this group away from 'apartheid' and it was felt by Steytler, 
as wei I as by the executive, that any identification with the 
'English-bound' Federals would damage this campaign.(117) 
Boyd therefore announced that the two parti~s, whi Ie 
'respectinJ' each other, should not make any election pacts.(118 He explained that, as the Progressives bel ieved 
that they had a .'new pol itical trai I' to blaze in South 
Africa, they could not 'hitch ••• [fhei~ wagon to any other,.(119) 
Once again a Federal attempt to sustain its flagging strength 
by means of a pact or merger fai led. 
Next to the education disputes, the most important 
Issue In the Federal campaign was the question of the republ ic. 
Verwoerd stated unequivocally that the provincial elections 
were not a 'test' of republ ican sentiment in South Af~ica.(120) 
A referendum or spe~ial election would be held for that 
purpose. The National Party would use the provincial 
elections, he stated, to gather 'information for itself' 
which would be 'useful' in reaching the decision as to when 
115. Natal Dai I~ News: 26 August 1959. 
116. Interview with L. Boyd. 
117. Ibid. 
118. Natal Witness: 31 August 1959. 
119. Natal Witness: 31 August 1959. 
120. Natal Mercur~: 6 May 1959. 
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. . (121) 
a public vote on the republic should be takeR. A 
number of Ca~inet Ministers, however, declared that a republ ic 
would soon be achieved. P.M.K. le Roux, Minister of 
Agriculture, F.C. Erasmus, Minister of Defence and P.W. Botha, 
Deputy Minister of the Interior a1 I predicted that South 
Africa would be a republ ic by 1963.(122) 
Such challenges were enough to convince the Federals 
of the urgency of the matter and they lept to the defence of 
Crown and Commonwealth. Noel Roberts, Federal candidate for 
Pietermaritzburg South and vice-chairman of the dying Natal 
A.R.L., declared republ icanism to be the 'main issue' in the 
election.(123) It exceeded education in importance because 
the latter was 'only part of the whole,:(124) if a republ ic 
were to be created, 'everything would be lost,.(125) Martin, 
despite the emphasis which he placed on education in his 
speeches and manifesto, agreed with Roberts. The republ ic, 
he stated, was the 'major issue,.(126) Whatever the degree 
of priority to which they gave republ icanism in the election 
campaign, al I the Federals actively opposed the idea. 
In March 1959, ~he Federals attached a detai led anti-
republ ican statement by Selby to their news letter. In this, 
Selby maintained that the way for Natal to 'challenge' 
Nationalist republ icanism was to demand a separate referendum 
for the province.(127) He was re-iterating a wei I-worn 
Federal argument. So as to emphasise the point, Hughes Mason, 
soon to be Federal candidate in Ixopo, added a section to 
Selby's paper in which he argued the question of a separate 
referendum for Natal.(128) Like his predecessors, Verwoerd 
121. Natal Mercur~: 6 May 1959. 
122. Natal Witness: 
1959. 
5 October 1959, 7 October 1959, 8 October 
123. Natal Witness: 16 September 1959. 
124. Natal Witness: 16 September 1959. 
125. Natal Witness: 16 September 1959. 
126. Natal Dai I~ News: 2 October 1959. 
127. U.F.P. (Natal): News Letter, March 1959. 
128. Ibid., p.6. 
refused to entertain the idea of a separate referendum for 
Natal . He declared in t he Pietermaritzburg City Hal I: 'We 
are not prepared to al Iowa provincial authority to thwart 
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a decision of the Government given under the law of the 
land.,(129) The appearance of the Prime Minister at a publ ic 
mee t ing in Natal's capital, the first in years, marked a new 
offensive by the National ists against Engl ish-speaking Natal. 
He was determined to cal I the Federals' bluff as regards the 
republic and to test how determined the Anglophi les were In 
the i r defiance. 
In Talking Points for Federals, outl ining pol icy for 
the election, two sections were devoted to the republ ic. No 
mention, however, · was made of a separate referendum for 
Nata I • I nstead, the U. P. was attacked. I t was po i nted out 
that the U.P. sti I I retained clause 2(d), which al lowed 
republ ican propaganda within the party. This clause, the 
Federals sti I I bel ieved, permitted pro-republ icans to hold 
influential positions within the U.P. and had led to the 
party's 'half-hearted' stand.(130 ) 
Another accusat.i.on wh i ch the Federa I s I eve I I ed at the 
U.P. was that it ignored the interests of the Engl ish-
speaking population. The reason for this, maintained Derek 
Heaton Nicholls, was that it was always trying to sway the 
moderate Afrikaner national ists. In the process, the 
'legitimate claims' of the Engl ish-speakers were sacrificed.(131) 
.Batchelor saw the U.P. as being 'dedicated to the platteland' 
and hence not interested in Engl ish-speaking Natal.(132 ) 
Selby was, as was to be expected In view of his emergence as 
the most outspoken defender of the Engl ish-speakers, the most 
v.ehement in his defence of the i r rights. He stated that they 
had suffered every sort of indignity and were beginning to 
wonder whether there was any future for them in. the Union. 
This feel ing was re-inforced by the use which the government 
129. Natal Witness: 5 September 1959. 
130. U.F.P. (Natal): Talkins Points, oe.c it., pp.4-5. 
131. Natal Witness: 18 September 1959. 
132. Natal Mercur:i: 23 September 1959. 
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made of bi lingual ism. Instead of being used for practical 
purposes, Se~by argued, bi I ingual tests had become tests of 
'political orthodoxy,(133) and were thus a means of ridding 
the public services of both Engl ish-speaking people and of 
persons who were opposed to government pol icy. 
Whi Ie defending the Engl ish-speakers, the Federals 
stressed that they were not anti-Afrikaner. D. Lowe, the 
Federal candidate for Umzimkulu, maintained that the Federals 
h d . . f' I· ·· 'th Af· k ( 134) I t a no Intention 0 ang IClslng e rl aners. 
was the U.P. which had attempted to calumnise the Federal 
Party in this way. Simi larly, the Talking Point for Federals 
had a section entitled the U.P.~ Misrepresentation of Our 
Attitude to Afrikaners.(135) It stated that the U.P. 
. t (136) 'constantly' accused the Federals of being a 'Jingo' 
This, maintained the Federals, was completely false. 
par y. 
In 
defence, they cited the fact that 'racial accord' was one of 
their prime purposes, and that Afrikaners had been 
foundation members of the party.(137) 
Whi Ie they attacked the U.P. for wooing the 'moderate' 
Afrikaners, the Feder~ls maintained that the National ists 
were unbeatable. This was because they had indoctrinated 
the Afrikaans youth and had organised the del imitation of 
constituencies to their advantage.(138) This point I inked 
with the Federal arguments concerning the English-speakers 
and the republic. The Federals bel ieved that because the 
National ists were unbeatable, it was useless to appeal to the 
Afrikaners. Rather, the Engl ish-speakers should rally to-
gether, especial.ly in Natal, to defeat the republ ic. 
133. Natal Dai Iy News: 1 September 1959. 
134. Natal Witness: 16 September 1959. 
135. U.F.P. (Natal): Talking Points, op.cit., p~5. 
136. Ibid. Alan Paton, leader of the Liberal Party, made the 
same accusation. Natal Witness: 26 September 1959. 
137. U.F.P. (Natal): Talking Points, loc.cit. For detai Is 
of these Afrikaner Federals, vide supra: ch.6. pp.134-5. 
138. Natal Witness: 19 September 1959, 13 October 1959. 
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There w,ere major Federa I po lie i es wh i ch rece i ved very 
I ittle publicity in the campaign. The most striking example 
of this was federation. Talking Points devoted a section to 
th~ supposed 'move towards federation', but apart from listing 
prominent people, mainly academics, who supported the idea of 
federation, the document remained si lent on the issue. The 
manifestos of the candidates treated the topic in a perfunctory 
way, if at all.(139) 
Another policy which received very little publ icity at 
this time was the party's stand on race. Talking Points did 
not mention the subject. In contrast to what had occurre~ In 
1954, I ittle attention was paid by most of the Federal 
candidates to the race issue. Their manifestos referred to 
it only in passing, if at al 1.(140 ) Despite their anxi~ty to 
avoid the issue, they were forced not to do so ' by their critics, 
who gave the matter 'much prominence,.(141) So great was this 
coverage that Martin feared that the topic might 'overshadow' 
the republ ican issue.(142) He therefore spent a major part 
of a speech refuting claims that the Federal Party favoured 
social integration. Nowhere did he put forward the Federals' 
pol icy. 
Whi Ie most of the Federal candidates skirted round the 
issue, only Batchelor, who contested the constituency of 
UmkQmaas, del iberately gave detai led publ icity to the party's 
race pol icy. He stressed that the Federals planned to give 
Blacks representation in pari iament and on the provincial 
counci Is. This would be done, he explained, by introducing 
two voters' rol Is. The 'bulk' of the Blacks would be on the 
'A' rol I ' and only the 'sophisticated el ite' would be on a 
common rol I with the Whites.(143) The result of this scheme 
139. Martin's manifesto did not broach the topic or even use 
the word 'federation'. 
140. Martin, as In the case of federation, did not mention 
race In his manifesto. 
141. Natal DSlil:t News: 2 October 1959. 
142. Natal Dai l:t News: 2 October 1959. 
143. Natal Dai l:t News: 17 September 1959. 
191 
would be to create a 'culture bar' in the place of a 'colour 
bar,.(144) Batchelor's stand led to repeated attacks on him 
by his opponents. In an attempt to embarrass him, they 
quoted letters which he had written when he was sti I I a member 
of the U.P. Batchelor, in reply, maintained that he had tried 
to alter the U.P. from within and, only when this failed, had 
he joined the Federals. It was, he said, the Federals' 
'Native Pol icy' which had attracted him and not its anti-
republ icanism.(145) Batchelor was also atta~ked by his 
col leagues. His stand led to correspondence between himself 
and Hughes Mason on the party's non-White policy and on the 
wisdom of his speeches. Batchelor maintained that he had 
acted correctly in stating that the party's pol icy cal led 
for two voters' rol Is. In the end, Hughes Mason had t~ agree 
that Batchelor was correct on this point.(146) 
The Federal candidates raised a number of issues in the 
election other than the main pol icy topics. Martin was 
deeply concerned at the influence of the Broederbond In 
South Africa. He devoted almost an entire speech to this 
single question.(147) Several candidates devoted time to 
strictly provincial issues such as roads and health services. 
Batchelor devoted a considerable part of his manifesto and 
·speeches to pollution.(148) He argued that large property 
investments were threatened by industrial pollution in the 
Umkomaas area.(149) 
The U.P.'s Natal manifesto was a bland, unemotional 
I document which did not even mention the Federals. The slogan 
of the party was 'We Guarantee Good Government,.(150) The 
144. Natal Dai Iy News: 17 September 1959. 
145. Sunday Tribune: 4 October 1959. 
146. B/p: Correspondence between B. Batchelor and R. Hughes 
Mason, 23 September 1959 to 24 October 1959. 
147. A.C. Martin: Speech at Eston, 20 February 1959. 
148. B. Batchelor: Speech at Umkomaas, 12 October 1959. 
B. Batchelor's Election Manifesto, Joc.cit. 
149. Ibid. 
150. U.P. (Natal): Provincial Election Manifesto, October 1959. 
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u.P. divided its manifesto into five main sections, deal ing 
with the five principal areas of provincial government: 
education, hospital, taxation, roads and parks, game and 
fish preservation. Education occupied the first and largest 
section. It promised education aimed at the creation of a 
broad South Africanism, not 'indoctrination'. Parents should 
continue to choose the language medium of instruction. 
Further, the U.P. promised to review the position of teachers 
constant.1 y to ensure contentment in the profess ion. F i'na I I y, 
it promised to resist central government ~ontrol of White 
education, the U.P. being aware of its responsibil ity to 
Natal in this regard. 'Recent decisions concerning 
appointments to senior posts in the Education Department', 
the manifesto declared, arose from an appreciation of this 
'responsibi lity,.(151) Nowhere was the Stander dispute 
discussed. 
The other four sections were equally bland. As regards 
hospital isation, the U.P. aimed at supplying 'financial 
security and peace of mind' for the population. (152) Taxation 
was to be administere~ in the 'best interests' of the people, 
whi Ie the roads policy was designed to benefit the 'greatest 
number In the shortest time,.(153) Finally, on the issue of 
parks, game and fish preservation, the U.P. refused to draw 
these ' ••• priceless natural assets ••• into the centre of 
pol icial controversy.,(154) 
The campaign conducted by the U.P. candidates was 
equally calm and unemotional. In contrast to the Federals, 
they side-stepped the Stander issue by stating that they 
stood for education and not indoctrination, and for parental 
choice in the medium of instruction.(155) Other U.P. 
, . 
candidates ignored the education issue completely and 




154. I bi d., 
155. U.P. (Natal): L. Arthur's Election Manifesto, n.d. 
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matters. This, they maintained, already existed in the U.P.-
I d N · I d ' . t t' (156) cont ro Ie ata a minis ra Ion. 
As in 1954, the Federals were concerned about spl itting 
the vote. At the same time, they had to cope with the 
accusation that they were not opposing the National ists. In 
order to solve this di lemma, the party's Natal chairman, D.l. 
Nurcombe, proposed a pact between the U.P. and Federals,in 
Durban. As there were only three constituencies in the Durban 
area in which there was 'any possibi I ity' of a National ist 
victory,(157) Nurcombe 'invited' the U.P. to withdraw from 
one of the three seats.(158) This proposal he justified on 
the grounds that the Federals had obtained one third of the 
votes in the seats which it had contested in the 1954 
election. The U.P~ did not even reply to the invitation.(159) 
The 1959 pro~incial elections, unl ike those of 1954, 
took place in al I four provinces on the same daY, 14 October 
1959~ The U.P. and the National ists fought the elections In 
constituencies throughout the country. The Federal P~rty 
nominated eleven candiates, only in Na~al.(160) 
The result of the provinci~1 elections throughout 
South Africa was a triumph for the National Party. It won 
five seats, including the Natal constituency of ladysmith, 
from the U.P. As a result, it strengthened its position in 
the Transvaal, the Cape and Natal, whi Ie retaining al I the 
seats in the Free State. The trend was towards increased 
majoriti.es for the National Party.(161) In Natal, the U.P. 
won twenty seats and the National ists the remaining five. 
156. U.P. (Natal): C. Hills's and R. Wood's Election Manifesto, 
n.d. 
157. Umlazi, Port Natal and Umhlatuzana. Natal Witness: 26 
June~ 1959. 
158. Nat~l Witness: 26 June 1959. 
159. Natai Witness: 23 September 1959. 
160. The numb"er of Natal.seat~ conte~ted were: United Party, 
twenty-two; the Nationalists, SIX; the Progressives three-
the liberals, one; and Independents, four. ' , 




An analysis of the voting figures indicates the extent 
the Feder a'i s' defe at. (162) They po I led 10 392 votes, on I y 
per cent.of the bal lots cast. This was a decl ine of 10,9 
. (163) 
per cent.as compared with 1954. By contrast, the U.P. 
saw its percentage of the Natal vote increase by 2,8, while 
the National ists experienced a 1,2 per cent. increase. The 
Progressives won the support of 6,1 per cent.of the Natal 
vote. 
In comparing the 1954 and 1959 provincial elections, it 
IS important to note that, although the Federal vote dropped 
by more than half, the party contested fewer constituencies. 
A more rei iable comparison than vote totals, therefore, is a 
comparison between the number of votes pol led per constituency 
in each elect ion. In 1954 the Federa I s po II ed, on an average, 
1 206 votes per constituency whereas in 1959 the party 
received, on an average, 945 votes per seat. This represents 
a distinct decl ine. The party had fai led to rally Natal once 
again. Furthermore, it was clear that the Progressiv~ were 
now poised to replace the Federals as South Africa's third 
I argest po lit i ca I party. I n the three const i tuenc i es wh i ch they 
contested, they pol led 6 637 votes, and in the key 
constituency of Pietermaritzburg South they pol led over three 
times the Federal vote.(164) 
Why had the Federals been soundly beaten again? Viewed 
broadly, the 1959 election was the culmination of a slow ' 
process of decl ine which had started' after the 1954 election. 
The party was unable to counter the prevai ling trend of South 
African politics against an exclusively Engl ish-speaking 
party. As regards the 1959 election specifically, this 
decl ine was ~ccelerated in a number of ways. One problem was 
the lack of unity. A certain diversity of opinion within a 
162. For al 11959 provincial election . statistics, vide: 
N.P.A.: The Official Gazette of the Province or-Natal, 
No. 578, 5 November 1959, p.1526. 
163. Vide supra: Ch.5. p.118. 
164. 1, 964 votes as against 559 votes. 
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po lit i ca I party i.s to be expected, but in the case of the 
Federals the diversity was extreme. Selby, for example, had 
been the only candidate to stress secession, while Batchelor 
was the only candidate who had emphasised the party's non-
White pol icy. A dispute had ensued with a fel low Federal 
candidate, whi Ie another candid~te, Seymour, had act~al Iy 
agreed with the National ists' Bantustan policy in his 
manifesto. 
Another drawback for the Federals ~as that the party 
presented the same ideas as it had in 1954, but with less 
verve and confidence. They even used the same pamphlets. 
True, the U.P. campaign was lacklustre but it could afford to 
Ignore the Federal arguments. It directed its attacks rather 
at the three Progressive candidates. The Federals themselves 
sensed their weakness. Their attempts to arrange pacts and 
al I iances flowed from this; and these moves, when they fai led, 
only damaged their morale sti II further. 
The Federals never recovered from the 1959 election 
defeat. Amid speculation that the party would disband, a 
'cross-section' of th~ Natal party ' assembled in Pietermaritz-
burg in November 1959.(165) There it was decided to 'adjourn' 
unti I March 1960.(166) The reason for this temporising 
resolution was uncertainty as to whether the Progressives 
would provide a political 'home' for Federal members.(167) 
It was hoped by the Federals that the Progressive. congress 
to decide on policy, scheduled for the end of November, would 
supply the answer.(168) 
The Federal congress also announced the resignation of 
Selby for 'health and business' reasons.(169) The real reason 
for Selby's resignation was disi I lusionment and the poor state 
of his personal finances.(170) later, he wrote that the 
165. Rand Dai I ~ Mai I : 2 November 1959. 
166. The Star: 2 November 1959. 
167. Rand Dai I~ Mai I: 2 November 1959. 
168. Rand Dai I ~ Mai I : 2 November 1959. 
169. Natal Witness: 2 November 1959. 
170. Interview with Mrs. Selby. 
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Federals had ~een ' ••• trying to flog I ife into dead mules' 
and that there was I ittle hope of achieving the Federal 
aims.(171) His successor, as 'temporary leader', was Derek 
Heaton Nicholls.(172) 
There can be no disputing the fact that the Federals 
had received a seri~s of staggering blows. In the elections 
they had been both ignored and defeated, their leader had 
resigned and the future of the party was in doubt. The party 
was, therefore, in no condition to meet the greatest challenge 
of its career - the republ ican referendum campaign. 
171. Nip: A.R. Selby to D. Heaton Nichol Is, 4 January 1962. 
172. Natal Witness: 2 November 1959. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE COMING OF THE REPUBLIC 
The critical year 1960 opened with the Natal Federal 
Party 'adjourned' and republican sentiment in the ascent. 
After their provincial election defeat, the Federals faced 
the anticipated republican election or referendum with few 
resources. Only the United or Progressive Parties seemed 
to .have sufficient support to provide significant resistance 
to a National ist republic. The Federals did not b~1 ieve, 
however, that either of these parties had the necessary 
determination. 
The U.P. was sti II regarded by the Federals as being 
compromised and vaci Ilatory in its resistance to the 
National ists. This view was for them confirmed when the U.P. 
supported the creation of the South African Foundation, which, 
the Transvaal Federals declared, planned to ' ••• boost the 
achievements of the South African tyranny.,(1) The U.P.'s 
support of the Foundation would lead to the party's com.ing 
to terms with the Nati~nal ists.(2) . 
In the belief that there was little which they could 
do to sway the Official Opposition, the Federals concentrated 
on the Progressives. When the Natal Congress of the Federal 
Party met on 31 October 1959 to determine the party's 
future,(3) the attempt was made to woo the Progressives into 
a strong repudiation of the republ ic. A statement was 
issued stressing the common attitudes which the two groups 
held, especially on the race issue, but which noted that 
the Pro~ressive . stand on the republican issue was 'not 
clear'. 4) The Progressives had both pro and anti-republ icans 
amongst their leaders.(5) The Federals were therefore 
1. The Star: 26 December 1959. 
2. The Star: 26 December 1959. , sevent -
3. Natal Witness: 2 November 1959. 
ry 19 • 
4. Natal Witness: 2 November 1959. 
5. Natal Witness: 2 November 1959. 
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concerned that there was a 'distinct possibi I ity' that the 
Progressives ~ould try and get Afrikaner support for their 
progressive non-White pol icy by 'offering republ icanism' in 
exchange.(6) In view of this danger, the statement concluded, 
there was no home with the Progressives for 'thousands who 
supported the Federal Party,.(7) . In view of this strategy, 
the decision was made not to dissolve the party and to post-
pone any decision unti I March 1960.(8) The impl ications were 
clear. Should the Progressives declare themselves adamantly 
against the republ ic, they would then receive the influx of 
the Natal Federal Party's members. 
The Transvaal' Federals were simi larly concerned about 
the Progressives. In a statement dated 10 November 1959, 
they warned that repudiation of the monarchy by the 
Progressives would be 'immoral and horrifying,.(9) This was 
because the 'monarchical foundations' of the country could not 
be violated without the consent of al I the parties to the 
'contract of Union,.(10) This 'solemn pledge', the statement 
declared, took precedence over al I other considerations, such 
as race relations.(11) 
Within days of the formal foundation of the Progressive 
Party on 13 November, the republican issue arose again. 
Professor I.S. Fourie, M.P. for Germiston District, who was 
very sympathetic to the Progressive's race policy, refused 
to join the party because, he said, it ' ••• refused to 
advoc~te a republic.,(12) In an immediate cpunter to the 
possible pressure which Fourie's action could exert on 
Progr.ess i ve po I icy, the Federa I -support i ng Nata I Witness 
stat~d that there . was every reason, but one, for 'whole-
hearted' support of the Progressives by the Federal Party.(13) 
6. Natal Witness: 2 November 1959. 
7. Natal Witness: 2 November 1959. 
8. Natal Witness: 2 November 1959. 
9. U.F.P. (Transvaal): Press Statement: 10 November 1959. 
10. Ibid. 
11. I bi d. 
12 • . Natal Witness: 16 November 1959. 
13. Natal Witness: 16 November 1959. 
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That reason was 'uncertainty' about the 'vigour' with which 
. d d b I . . ( 14) 0 the new party inten e to oppose repu Icanlsm. nce 
again, the Federals offered support to the Progressives In 
exchange for the latter's total commitment in resisting the 
republ ic. On al I these occasions, by si lence, the 
Progressives did not take up the offer. 
On 20 January 1960 Verwoerd announced in Pari iament(15) 
the government's decisions as regards the attainment of a 
republic. He declared that the question would be decided by 
means of a referendum. The country would vote as a whole, 
he declared, thereby rejecting any possibi I ity of separate 
provincial referendums. A bare majority would decide the 
issue. The "White electorate of South Africa alone would 
suffice; South West Africa being expressly excluded by 
Verwoerd from taking part.(16) Verwoerd refused to be more 
specific. He stated that the referendum would not take place 
before May 31 but would not commit the government to a 
specific date or even to a particular year. The government, 
he said, would ~hoose the best" time ' ••• in the interests of 
South Africa', to put " ~he question to the electorate. ~ (17) 
, 
As regards th~ constitution of a future republ ic, he 
would go no further than to announce that it would be 
'Christian', 'democratic', and that equal ity of the two White 
groups would be guaranteed.(18) The government, he stated, 
had already amended the Union constitution so that it was 
'almost' republ ican.(19) The main difference between the two 
constitutions ~ould be the substitution of a presidency for 
the monarchy. Because the monarchy was the royal fami Iy of 
'another State' it had become the 'bac~ground for division,.(20) 
14. Natal Witness: 16 November 1959. 
15. House of Assembly Debates: 1960, co"ls. 1-18~ 
16. In fact, the South West African electorate did take part 
in the referendum. 
17. House of Assembly Debat~~: op.cit., dol. 4. 
18. Ibid., col. 12. 
19. Ibid., col. 13. 
20. Ibid., col. 9. 
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Once it had been abolished, national unity would be achieved 
and the ' ••• 150 years' struggle between South African 
national ism and what ••• [wasJ to some extent a foreign 
national ism ••• ', would be at an end. 
Verwoerd was careful to explain that the question of 
South Africa becoming a republ ic was quite distinct from that 
as to whether she would remain in the Commonwealth. South 
Africa would remain a Commonwealth member only for as long as 
it served her interests, he said. As the date of the 
referendum had not been announced, it was not possible for 
him to say whether South Africa would wish to be a Commonwealth 
member when this eventuated. He did assure the voters, 
however, that, before the referendum was held, they would be 
told of the government's policy as regards Commonwealth 
membership. 
The speech caused a sensation. It was widely expected 
that Verwoerd would hold the referendum during the second 
half of 1960.(21) In ·that case, the supplementary rol I which 
closed on 28 February would be the last certain opportunity 
for voters to register~ The first reaction of the opposition 
parties, including the Federals, was therefore to appeal to 
voters to check the voters' roll.(22) Newspaper surveys 
showed that the Engl ish-speakers were less registration-
conscious than Afrikaners.(23) This resulted in a drive for 
voter registration on an unprecedented scale. In Natal, the 
Federals, although the party was 'adjourned', co-operated 
with the Progressives, Liberals and Black Sash in enrol ling 
voters'. (24) Simi larly, the Transvaal party helped with 
21. Natal Witness: 28 January 1960. 
22. Natal Mercury: 28 January 1960. 
23. When 108 Engl ish-speakers in the western Cape ' were 
questioned as to whether they were on the voters' rol I, 
fifty-three answered that they .were, fourteen that they 
were not and forty-one that they did not know. The 
corresponding figures for 102 Afrikaners were, seventy-
nine, six and seventeen. Cape Times: 4 February 1960. 
24. Natal Witness: 25 February 1960. 
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voters' registration. The U.P. conducted its own registration 
. (25) campaign. 
In view of the impending referendum, it was a foregone 
conclusion that the March 1960 meeting would decide that the 
Natal Federal Party would continue to exist. It was, however, 
a very different party from that which had fought the 1959 
elections. It now had no permanent office or staff, (26) no 
provincial congress and no functioning branches. The Federal 
Party of Natal, I ike its Cape and Transvaal sister parties, 
was no longer an organisation which aimed at winning elections. 
But, although it really now existed in name only, (27) the 
party's name, and the ideas which it represented, sti I I 
commanded some influence. The Federals had received a 
substantial vote the previous year and, in a referendum, 
where every vote was equally weighted because there would be 
no constituency divisions, it could sti I I have a crucial role 
to play. As Batchelor had once observed, ' ••• a party exists 
as long as it has an address and teJephone number and the 
Press publ ishes its 0~inions.,(28) The press continued to 
publ ish Federal opini~~s, especially those of Martin, who now 
became the party's leader. Derek Heaton Nichol Is became his 
deputy. They were assisted by an Executive Committee which 
played little part in the future life of the party. 
Apart from voting to keep the party al ive, the March 
meeting issued an appeal to the voters of South Africa. It 
enumerated again the faults of the government. It stressed 
the Afrikaner republ ican nature of the National Party and 
pointed out again the anti-Engl ish character of that party. 
The only way to beat the National ists and their republ ican 
cal I was for the opposition parties to 'wo~k together,.(29) 
25. Natal Witness: 26 February 1960. 
26. In a list of opposition party addresses where registration 
could b~ arranged, the Federals do not appear. Vide: 
Natal Witness: 7 June 1960. ----
27. Confirmed in interviews with Martin, Heaton Nichol Is and 
Mrs. Stewart. 
28. B. Batchelor to W. Grimwood, 28 November 1955, loc.cit. 
29. Natal Witness: 5 Apri I 1960. 
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The Federals" for their part, were prepared to give 'every 
assistance to al I Parties' who worked towards this ideal.(3
0
) 
The issue of establ ishing a united opposition front 
was complex because, in the months fol lowing Verwoerd's 
January speech, there was great disunity. Early in February, 
Mitchel I stated publ ical Iy that the U.P. would not work with 
other groups in resisting the republ ic.(31) This was , 
translated in action when t~e U.P. and the Progressives 
arranged separate anti-republ ic demonstrations and launched 
separate anti-republ ic funds.(32 ) In addition, controversies 
between opposition leaders over clause 2(d) of the U.P. 
constitution and over the Progressives' republ ican stand 
continued unabated. (33) 
There was, however, considerable pressure towards unity 
of action. Questioners at U.P. and Progressive meetings 
demanded that the parties co-operate and these demands 
received widespread publ icity.(34) Most of the Engl ish-
language press pressed for the opposition parties to co-
operate against the National ists.(35) The Natal Witness 
expressed a common op~nion when it urged the Progressives, 
liberals and Federals to support U.P. anti-republ ican rail ies, 
despite its refusal to co-operate with the other parties. 
Faced with this pressure, Mitchel I shifted his position. 
At a Pietermaritzburg rally on 9 May he cal led on al I voters 
to support one of the anti-republ ican parties, 'not 
necessari Iy the U.P.,(36 ) In addition, he rousingly cal led 
on al I Natal ians to resist republ icanism under al I 
circumstances. After the rally, Martin presented Mitchel I 
30. Natal Witness: 5 Apri I 1960. 
31. Natal Witness: 4 February 1960. 
32. Natal Witness: 2 February 1960, 2 March 1960. Natal 
Mercury: 12 February 1960. Cape Times: 19 February 1960. 
33. Natal Dai Iy News: 1 March 1960, 21 March 1960, 25 March 
1960. 
34. Natal Witness: 3 February 1960. 
35. Natal Witness: 
Cape Times: " 4 
4 February 1960, 21 March 1960, 12 May 1960. 
February 1960. 
36. Natal Witness: 11 May 1960. 
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with a written statement in which he asked for clarification. 
Are ' we to understand from. what Mr. Douglas 
Mitchel I said to-night th~t he wi I I never tel I 
the people of Natal, against their expres~ed 
wish to renounce the solemn compact of Union 
under the Crown or to submit to a Republic, 
but that he wi II tel I the Nats to go and be 
damned? (37) ( 8) 
Mitchel I dated, signed and wrote 'agreed' on the document. 3 
Armed with this guarantee of U.P. firmness, Martin 
committed Federal su)Port once again to a united front a~ainst 
the National ists.(39 He wrote to Mitchel I in Cape Town 
discussing the appointment of electoral agents. The Federals, 
he stated, did not wish to nominate any agents but requested 
that men of 'character and popularity be appointed. In 
addition, he urged that the Progressives be party to the 
discussions which would take place before agents were selected 
so as to prevent an impression of 'disunity,.(40 ) Continuing 
the unity theme, Martin wrote that he had informed the press 
that ' ••• once the Parties i.e. U.P., Progressives and Federals 
get busy, ••• there wi II be no differences between them 
whatever.,(41) Three .~eetings be~ween Martin, Boyd and 
Mitchel I followed.(42) Some difficulty arose concerning the 
appointment of electoral agents, (43) but this was eventually 
overcome. The Federals' Natal Executive thereupon cal led 
publ ically for ' ••• the closest co-operation' between al I anti-
republ ican groups in South Africa.(44) 
37. A.C. Martin: Statement, 9 May 1960. 
38. Ibid. 






A. Martin to D. 
of the author) 
Ibid. 
Natal Mercury: 
Mitchel I, 12 May 1960. (In the possession 
13 October 1961, 16 October 1961. 
Nomination of the anti-republican e 'lectoral agent was 
important because he control led al I information collected 
by the opposition as regards voters • . This would greatly 
benefit his party after the referendum. 
Natal Mercury: 27 July 1960. 
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The Transvaal Federal Party, however, did not fol low 
this lead. In a press statement it declared that co-operation 
with the U.P. in the referendum contained the 'grave danger' 
that this continu~ after the contest.(4S) The result would 
be acceptance of the U.P.'s 'weak-kneed' constitutional policy 
and its 'reactionary' colour policy.(46) In addition, the 
Transvalers pointed out, there was a basic difference between 
the U.P.'s standpoint on the republic and that of the Federals. 
The U.P. would al low South Africa to be declared a republ ic 
as long as this was 'legal,.(47) The Federals had always 
maintained that it was not merely a matter of legal ity and 
that Natal could not be compel led to accept the verdict of a 
Un i on-w i de referendum. I n any event, the ' compact' of Un i on 
could not be broken.(48) In a clear reference to the Natal 
Federal Party, the Transvaal Federals insisted that no 
agreements be made between opposition parties without 
consultation on a 'union-wide' basis.(49) 
The Transvaal Federals were incorrect in accusing the 
Natal Federals of altering their position. They supported 
Mitchel I because he gu~ranteed that Natal would be able to 
decide its own future. Apart from the private assurance which 
he had given Martin, he stated publical Iy, 'I am not prepared 
to accept ~ decision of South Africa as far as Natal is 
concerned.'(SO) Simi larly, Verwoerd had stated that ' he would 
not be bound by the referendum result. If the government lost 
the referendum he would ' ••• put the matter to Pari iament for 
a decision.,(S1) Thus, before the date of the referendum had 
been ~nnounced, major forces on each side refused to be bound 
by the resu It. 
45. Natal Witness: 30 May 1960. 
46. Natal Witness: 30 May 1960. 
47. Natal Witness: 30 May 1960. 
48. Natal Witness: 30 May 1960. 
49. Natal Witness: 30 May 1960. 
50. Natal Witness: 16 June 1960. 
51. House of Assembl~ Debates: 1960, co I. 3769. 
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The whole question of the legal ity of a possible 
republ ic in ~outh Africa which had so occupied the Federals, 
was finally settled by the Commonwealth Prime Minister's 
Conference in May 1960. The final communique stated: 'The 
meeting affirmed the view that the choice between a monarchy 
and a republ ic was entirely the responsibi I ity of the country 
concerned.,(52) The last chance of a prevention of the 
republ ic on constitutional grounds was thus removed. 
On 3 August 1960, Verwoerd announced that the republ ican 
referendum would be held on 5 October 1960.(53) Anti-
republ ican centres were opened throughout the country and 
the Federals co-operated with Progressives and the U.P. In 
the ensuing campaign. The three parties were united In a 
'common cause' declared Mitchel I to 40 000 cheering 
Durbanites.(54) In fact, there was sti II an underlying 
hosti lity between the opposition parties. The U.P. and 
Progressives issued their own anti-republ ican propaganda, 
whi Ie there was open friction between U.P. and Federal 
workers.(55) 
During the camp~lgn the National ists stressed national 
un'i'ty. (56) In a letter to every voter, Verwoerd asked for 
assistance in creating a republ ic to bui Id 'one South African 
nation,.(57) 'The question, he stressed, was 'British 
Monarchy, or: South African Republ ic,.(58) The first alterna-
tive would not only keep the country divided but would leave 
South Africa vulnerable to 'instigated racial clashes', 
Communism and the 'el imination' of the Whites.(59) He did, 
52. eeches on Commonwealth 
2. 
53. Cape Times: 
54. Recollection by the author. 





21 September 1960. 
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however, envisage a 'democratic' republ ic wi~hin the 
Commonwealth.(60) The importance of the Commonwealth 
connection was stressed by the pro-republ icans who issued a 
special booklet on the question. This contained the assurance 
that 'The Government has sound reasons for its statement that 
South Africa wi I I be al lowed to retain membership of the 
Commonwealth.,(61) 
The United and Progressive Parties based their campaigns 
on the Commonwealth issue. Little was heard of the monarchy. 
Most of the comprehensive U.P. booklet A9ainst a Republic 
was devoted to the economic and political importance of the 
( 62) . Commonwealth. Similarly, the Progressives' Twelve Reasons 
for Opposing Dr. Verwoerd's Republ ic was devoted largely to 
the economic and political consequences which would fol low 
t 6 ) . 
loss of Commonwealth membership. 3 The Federals were too 
impoverished to issue any publications. Individual members 
worked in the corrstituencies and the leaders, especially 
Martin, appeared frequently on .!anti-republ ican platforms. 
The deep and emotional attachment to the monarchy which many 
of its members felt was, however, not given prominence by 
other anti-republ ican spokesmen. 
On October 4, the day before the referendum, Martin 
publ ished his last appeal to the voters. He pointed again to 
the growing isolation of South Africa In a hosti Ie world. He 
stressed that a vote in favour of the republic would increase 
that isolation. His statement ended with the words: 
60. I bi d. 
••• any attempt by Dr. Verwoerd to force Natal 
into a republ ic against the wi I I of its people 
would be a violation of the Act of Union, ·an 
aggressive act of bad faith comparable with 
61. Republ ican Referendum Committee: Commonwealth Relations: 
Membership of South Africa, 30 August 1960. The South 
African gove~nm~nt had already given not~ce to the Common-
wealth . P~ime Ministers' meeting in March that South Africa 
wished to remain a member of the Commonwealth as a 
republic. Mansergh:op.cit., p.365. 
62. U.P.: Against the Republ ic, n.d. 
63. Progressive Party: Twelve Reasons for Opposin9 Dr. 
Verwoerd's Republic, Fact Paper No.3, n.d. 
many of the actions of Adolph Hitler. Natal 
would resent it as such. (64) 
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The result of the referendum was a majority of 74 580 
. f fbi· (65) N t I th . votes In avour 0 a repu IC. a a, e province In 
which al I Federals were most vitally interested, voted 
heavi Iy against the republ ic. In the heaviest of the 
provincial pol Is (92,5 per centJ the province registered · 
135 598 (75,9 per cent~ against and 42 299 (23,7 per centJ 
for a republ ic. The remaining 688 (0,4 per cent~ bal lots 
were spoi It. Some constituency statistics were even more 
impressive. Durban North registered the highest percentage 
vote in South Africa (94,2 per cent~, while Durban Musgrave 
achieved the highest anti-republ ican vote in the country 
(93,1 per cent~. Despite al I the efforts of E~gl ish-speaking 
Natal, however, the referendum had been lost. 
The Federals, in keeping with their oft-stated ideals, 
refused to accept that Natal was bound by the result. Martin 
declared that Verwoerd was attempting to disrupt the ' ••• . . . 
compact of Union by a bare majority of a smal I section of the 
people.,(66) In doing this, he intended 'annexing' Natal 
. . 
and, stated Martin, Natal ians would be 'dishonoured and 
servile' if they renounced their traditions and al lowed 
Verwoerd to gain his ends.(67) UNESSA later endorsed Martin's 
views(68) as did the Natal Witness.(69) 
Martin could · make such brave statements but it was a 
demonstrable political fact that only the U.P. had sufficient 
strength and influence in Natal to lead any extra-pari iamentary 
resistance to the National ists. Mitchel I, however, was in a 
di lemma. He could defy the government and lead the Natal 
resistance to a republic, as he had promised to do publicty 
in Pietermaritzburg and in writing to Martin.(70) . Such a 
64~ ~atal Dai I~ News: 4 October 1960. 
. . 
65. For al I referendum statistics, vide: Government Gazette 
Extraordinary, No. ,6557, 26 October 1960. 
66. Natal Dai I~ News: 7 October 1960. 
67. Natal Dai I~ News: 7 October 1960. 
68. Natal Witness: 12 October 1960. 
69. Natal Witness: 7 October 1960. 
70. Vide sue ra : Ch.9. pp. 202-3. 
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move would receive widespread support in the highly charged 
pol itical atmosphere of post-referendum Natal. It would, 
however, be resisted by powerful forces in the province 
(such as by leading industrial ists and the Natal Dai Iy News) 
and it would lead to the certain expulsion of Mitchel I from 
the U.P. It could also be construed as an act of rebel I ion. 
For a time it ·seemed as though Mitchel I would lead the 
resistance. He declared, on 6 October) that 'Natal's ~anti­
repub I i can fight ••• [was] not over'. (71 He arr i ved in Durban 
three days later, amid reports of the formation of a 
'secessionist o~gani~ation' in the province.{7ZY When 
spokesmen for the 1 500-strong crowd which met him at the 
airport demanded to hear that Natal was 'not at any price 
going into Verwoerd's republ ic',(73) Mitchel I baulked. He 
ca I I ed for ca I·m ina speech descr i bed by the Witness as an 
'extraordinary .piece of shuffl ing and evasiveness,.(74) In 
truth, Mitchel I was trying to prevent some Natal ians from 
taking a secessionist stand. He was attempting to retain 
U.P .• control over events in Natal, whi Ie preserving the 
national unity of the .. party.(75) The Progressives had a 
simi lar view. Boyd announced on 11 October that they did 
not take a 'purely Natal attitude' towards the coming 
repubtic.(76) . 
Martin, on behalf of the Federals, went to see Mitchel I. 
He reminded the Natal U.P. leader of his promise of 9 May.(77) 
Mitchel I expressed doubts as to whether defiance of the 
National ists had .the support of most Natal ians, especially 
the Progressives. Martin's view was that 'every hour 
71. Natal Mercury: 6 October 1960. 
7Z. Natal Witness: 10 October 1960. UNESSA, and 
Mal linick~ was heavi Iy involved in .advocating 
for Natal. Interview with A.C.Martin. 
73. Natal Witness: 10 October 1960. 
74. Natal Witness: 10 October 1960. 
75. Interview with D. Mitchell. 
76. Natal Witness: 11 October 1960. 




Mitchel I delayed played into Verwoerd's hands', whereas 
Mitchell 'ga~e him to understand that he Qiitchel 0 had not 
made up his mind.,(78) 
In an attempt to rally the public and force the political 
leaders into action, the Federals organised demonstrations 
against the republ ic. , Martin adopted an attitude 'strongly 
in favour of secession,.(79) He planned a 'giant protest 
march' by the newly-created Anti-Republican Youth Movement 
in order to demonstrate opposition to the republic and to 
form a secessionist movement to petition the Admtnistrator of 
Natal to act.(80) Three hundred and fifty young people 
marched through Durban. They carried banners, several of 
, (81) which read, 'Don't let your leaders betray you'. The 
marchers were joined by1 500 other protestors at Albert 
Park, where Martin urged them to give Mitchel I 'a little 
whi Ie lonter' to lead Natal away from a National ist 
republ ic. 82) 
Various meetings were held between Martin, Boyd, 
Mitchel I and other officials of the three parties in Natal.(83) 
At one stage De Vii liers Graaff was cal led in, (84) but 
disagreements remained. The U.P. Head Committee for Natal 
announced on 21 October, that the party would enter the 
republ ic but would seek 'concessions' from the National ists.(85) 
These 'concessions' included a guarantee of provincial 
control of White education and control of a provincial pol ice 
78. A.C. Martin: The Aftermath of the Referendum and 'The 
~atal Stand', n.d., p.2. 
79. Natal Witness: 11 October 1960. Confirmed in an 
interview with A.C. Martin. 
80. Natal Witness: 11 October 1960. 
81. Other slogans were 'Freedom or Death', 'Save Our Press' 
'No Nazi Trash for Natal', 'Natal In chains ' or Natal in' 
freedom' • 
Natal Mercury: 15 October 1960. Natal Witness: 15 
October 1960. 
82. Natal Witness: 15 October 1960. 
83. Natal Witness: 19 October 1960. 
84. Martin: The After~~th of the Referendu~, op.cit., pp.3-4. 
85. Natal Witness: 21 October 1960. 
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fo.rce.(86) Martin publ ical Iy disasso.ciated himself fro.m the 
(87) U.P. stand. 
The U.P.'s o.pen acceptance o.f the republ ic was a 
reflectio.n o.f mo.st oppo.sitio.n o.pinio.n in So.uth Africa as wei I 
as in Natal. The Rand Dai Iy Mai I, fo.r example, stated that, 
as the republ ic was inevitable, the o.ppo.sitio.n had ' ••• better 
try to. make the best o.f it.,(88) The Dai Iy Dispatch urged 
the o.ppo.sitio.n to. accept defeat 'gracefully', a line o.f actio.n 
suppo.rted by the Preto.ria News and the Cape Times.(89) 
Natal's two. largest newspapers also. suppo.rted acceptance o.f 
the republ ic. The Mercury o.bserved that the co.untry's future 
rested with Verwo.erd,(90) whi Ie the Dai Iy News co.unsel led the 
Natal Engl ish-speakers to. '1 ive and wo.rk' with their po.litical 
o.ppo.nents.(91) Pro.fesso.r E.H. Bro.o.kes, the pro.minent Liberal, 
urged acceptance o.f the republ ic,(92) whi Ie Archbisho.p "D.E. 
Hurley appealed to. Natal to. be 'big-hearted' o.n the republ ican 
issue, whi Ie co.ncentrating o.n the 'quest o.f justice fo.r 
all,.(93) Die Nataller summed up the po.sitio.n: 
It has already beco.me o.bvio.us that Natal wi II 
accept the republ ic witho.ut ~uch ado. •••• Two. 
patterns appear fro.m the po.I itical develo.p-
ments: the spl inter gro.ups and ••• the Natal 
Witness suppo.rt sundry vague ideas o.f 'separatio.n' 
and 'actio.n'; the respo.nsible parties are 
attempting to. create a bro.ad unity o.f Engl ish-
speaking peo.ple who. can 'save' Co.mmo.nwealth 
membership and can put po.ssible co.nditio.ns fo.r 
'unity' to. the Go.vernment. (94) 
These 'co.nditio.ns' were set o.ut in reso.lutio.ns passed by 
the Nat~1 Pro.vincial Co.unci I o.n 31 Octo.ber 1960. Their 
86. Natal Witness: 21 Octo.ber 1960. 
87. Natal Witness: 21 Octo.ber 1960~ 
88. Rand Dai Iy Mail: 7 Octo.ber 1960. 
89. Natal Dai Iy News: 7 Octo.ber 1960. 
90. Natal Mercury: 7 Octo.ber 1960. 
91. Natal Dai Iy News: 7 Octo.ber 1960. 
92. Natal Witness: 14 Octo.ber 1960. 
93. Natal Witness: 14 Octo.ber 1960, 4 No.vember 1960. 
94. Die Nataller: 14 Octo.ber 1960. 
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provISions had been agreed upon by Natal's three opposition 
leaders.(95) Even before being passed, they were variously 
construed as being an 'acceptance' or a 'rejection' of the 
republ ic.(96) The twelve resolutions demanded that the 
constitution should contain safeguards on freedom of worship, 
language equal ity, parental choice of medium of school 
instruction, freedom of the universities and freedom of the 
press. In addition to retaining its existing powers, 
particularly over education, provincial personnel, local 
government, and Crown lands, the Provincial Counci I would 
retain its own pol ice force and have greater financial 
powers.(97) As the four Nationalist Members boycotted the 
Counci I meeting~ the twelve resolutions were passed 
( 8) . 
unanimously. 9 
In imitation of the huge Torch Commando rally of June 
1952, (99) the Natal opposition parties organised a rally, on 
14 November 1960 to support the Provincial Counci I's 
resolutions.(100) Martin, Boyd and Mitchel I met on 7 November 
to discuss the rally and the forthcoming deputation to the 
Prime Minister to present the PrQvincial Counci I's 
resolutions.(101) The rally attracted a disappointing crowd 
of 25 000 people. Martin presented a rousing speech in which 
he sti I I maintained that a republ ic 'imposed' on Natal, 








Natal Witness: 24 October 1960. 
Natal Witness: 24 October 1960. It was, however, 
accepted by many of those who rejected the republ ic that 
there were no constitutional grounds for doing so. Even 
the federal supporters were divided on this issue. 
Natal Witness: 24 October 1960. 
Natal Mercury: 1 November 1960. 
Natal Mercury: - 1 November 1960. 
Vide supra: Ch. 2. pp. 14-15. 
It was hoped that the attendance figure would top 40 000 
exceedin~ that of the Torch Commando rally and that of ' 
t~e anti-republ ican rally of September 1960. Natal 
Witness: 4 November 1960. 
Martin: The Aftermath of the R f d ' t 5 e eren urn, Op.CI ., p •• 
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I I b · d · f ,( 102) H t d mI· d , I ega or mora 1 n ,I ng orce. e even sugges e , a 
'loud cheers", (103) to have the matter taken before an 
. t· I t f I (104) Interna lona cour 0 aw. 
Dr. Verwoerd received the five-man Natal delegation on 
1 December 1960.(105) The Prime Minister was 'most courteous" 
. d I· th· ft· ht (106) I h· I and prom 1 se a rep y WI 1 n a or n 1 g • n 1 s rep y, 
to the Administrator of Natal, he rejected al I but one 
resolution. Except for language equal ity, Verwoerd des~ribed 
the first six resolutions as containing 'undefined 
general isations~.(107) To accede to these for the sake of 
'unfortunate but unnecessary fears' would, in the Prime 
Minister's view, diminish the sovereignty of pari iament.(108) 
The last six resolutions were rejected by Verwoerd because 
acceptance of them would 'tend very far towards a federal 
system,.(109) This the government rejected because it could 
not renege on pre-referendum promises not to alter the 
constitution of South Africa more than was absolutely 
necessary. (110) 
The response of the Natal opposition was entirely verbal. 
The Provincial Counci I and the leaders of the United, 
Progressive and Federal Parties stated that, whi Ie the govern-
ment remained in power, there could ' ••• never be security of 
[Natal's] rights or freedoms or of ~atal'~ Provincial powers 
or traditions.,(111) They did not, however, suggest any 
102. Martin: Speech at Rally at Durban City Gardens, 14 
November, p.2. 
103. Natal Witness: 15 November 1960. 
104. Martin: Speech at Rally, op.cit., p.l. 
105. They were D. Mitchell (leader), E.C. Wi Iks, M.E.C., E.J.V. 
Grantham, M.E.C., L. Boyd and D. Heaton Nichol Is. Martin 
had withdrawn in favour of Heaton Nichol Is because of his 
poor relationship with Mitchel I. 
Martin: The Aftermath of the Referendum, loc.cit. 
106. Natal Witness: 2 December 1960. 
107. Nip: H.F. Verwoerd to A.E. Trol lip, 6 December 1960, p.3. 
108. Ibid. 
109. Ibid., p.l. 
110. Ibid. 
111. Natal Dai Iy News: 15 December 1960. 
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action to establ ish that security~ When Pari iament opened In 
January 1961 Martin telegraphed de Vi I I iers Graaff to ' ••• cal I 
his ~erwoerd's~ bluff and prevent him from detaching from 
their allegiance 15 -mi I I ion people.,(112) How this was to be 
done was not stated. The following month; Mitchel I declared 
that Natal considered herself ruled by ' ••• force and not by 
consent and by a hosti Ie government.,(113) Martin pledged 
the 'unswerving support' of the Federals for Mitchel I, who 
had, he said, spoken for Natal.(114) UNESSA concurred, 
stating that Mitchell's action was a 'magnificent stand'. (115) 
Mitchel I had, however, stopped short of leading a 
secessionist movement. At a rally in Pietermaritzburg he told 
how Verwoerd had challenged him to say whether he intended 
leading a 'rebel I io~,.(116) Mitchel I stated that he felt I ike 
saying, 'Yes, I'm going •••• ,(117) The remainder of his 
statement was lost ' in '~hunderous applause,.(118) Mitchel I 
quickly stressed that the Prime Minister had been 'irres-
ponsible' in provoking him, and that 'civi I war' was not a 
light matter.(119) In view of this, he had 'contracted' 
Natal out of the repu~1 ic on the 'strongest possible moral 
grounds,.(120) This was the I imit to which the opposition 
would go.(121) The Dai Iy Dispatch summed up the Natal 
opposition's weakness when it stated: 
••• it is neither courageous nor convIncIng to 
112. Natal Witness: 21 January 1961. 
113. Natal Witness: 1 February 1961. 
114. "Natal Witness: 1 February 1961. 
115. Natal Witness: 2 February 1961. 
116. Natal Witness: 11 February 1961. 
117. Natal Witness: 11 February 1961. 
118. Natal Witness: 11 February 1961. 
119. Natal Witness: 11 February 1961-
120. Natal Witness: 11 February 1961. 
121. The Progressiv~ I eader, Steytler, announced that his 
party regarded the referendum as a mandate for the 
establ ishment of the republ ic. Natal Mercury: 1 
February 1961. 
say 'we wi I I not accept the republic, we wi II 
have no part in it, we wi II continue to fight 
it' when those who make this parade of loyalty 
to the Crown have no desire or intention of 
taking up arms to retain the Monarchy, no 
intention of refusing to pay taxes to the 
republ ic or of refusing to sit in the republ ican 
pari iament. (122) 
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Faced with these insurmountable legal and political 
proplems, Martin appealed to the Commonwealth. The Common-
wealth Prime Minister's Conference was due to meet in March 
1961 and was to consider South Africa's appl ication to remain 
a member after it had become a republ ic. Martin composed 
The Case against Dr. Verwoerd's Republ ic(1 23) and sent it to 
thirty-five . newspapers and the Prime Ministers and leading 
politicians of the United Kingdom, Canada, Austral ia, New 
, 
Zealand and Rhodesia. The postings were staggered so that 
they would be received at about the same time before 25 
February, (124) when the press was requested to publ ish the 
contents of the document.(125) 
The Case I isted all the Federal Party's objections to 
the National ist government's policies and, in particular, to 
its intention to create a republ ic. The central request was 
for the Commonwealth leaders not to 'recognise' the proposed 
republic as this would be ' ••• aiding, abetting, and approving 
the subjection ••• ' of Natal and the non-Whites.(126) Martin 
asked, instead, that the Conference, ' ••• suspend South Africa 
from the Commonwealth ••• to prepare the way for a reasonable 
settlement ••• ' in the country.(127) Clearly, Martin hoped 
that the threat of exclusion from the Commonwealth would force 
the National ist government to accede to Natal's demands. 
122. Dai Iy Dispatch: 13 February 1961. 
123. It was in large measure a shortened version of The Case 
against a Republ~c which had been publ ished In 1954. 
Vide supra: ch. 6. p.147. 
124. A.C. Martin: The Case Against Dr. Verwoerd's Republ ic, 
postings, n.d. 
125. Rip: A.C. Martin to The Editor, The Times, 16 February 1961. 
126. A.C. Martin: The Case Against Dr. Verwoerd's Republ ic, p.3. 
127. Ibid., p.7. 
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In an interview with the Sunday Times, Martin enlarged 
on his attitude and intentions. He saw the whole problem 
in terms of a virtual annexation of Natal by the 'old 
republ ics,.(128) The demands which Martin hoped to extract 
from Verwoerd, via the Commonwealth Conference, were for a 
federation. In this way, Natal could remain a 'Royal 
province,·(129) a return to Heaton Nichol Is's ideas of Apri I 
1953.(130 ) Martin I inked the idea of a semi-independent Natal 
to the government's declared intent to grant self-government 
to Black ethnic groups. In view of 'separate development'; 
I 
Martin argued that Verwoerd could ' ••• have no possible gro~nds 
for reiusing self-government for Natal.,(131) . 
On lS ·Mar«h 1961, Verwoerd withdrew South Africa's 
appl ication for Commonwealth membership. He gave as his main 
reason the views which had been expressed by Commonwealth 
members ' and their 'future intentions' regarding the race 
pol icy of South Africa.(132 ) The Federal Party int~rpreted 
this as a victory. The Transvaal party welcomed the outcome 
of the Conference and cal led for an al I-race convention in 
South Africa. It added that this should take plac~ after the 
'Natal stand' had 'ov~~thrown' the government.(133) The 
executive of the Natal Federal Party declared itself 'satisfied' 
with the happenings at the Commonwealth Conference.(134) Yet, 
it also castigated the Prime Minister for his 'wantonly 
irresponsible action' in 'causing' South Africa's withdrawal 
from the Commonwealth.(13S) It then cal led on the Natal 
Provincial Counci I to ' ••• take immediate steps to ensure 
Natal's continued membership of the Commonwealth ••• as a 
128. Sunday Times: 26 February 1961. 
129. Sunday Times: 26 February 1961. 
130. Vide supra: Ch. 3. pp. 43-44. 
131. Sunday Times: 26 February 1961. 
132. N. Mansergh: loc.cit. 
133. Natal Witness: 18 March 1961. 
134. Natal Witness: 20 March 1961 . 
135. U.F.P. (Natal): Statement, 18 March 1961. 
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separate state.' (136) The executive also cal led on Natal 
voters to 're-assess their attitudes towards the non-Whites 
so as to make Commonwealth membership possible.,(137) There 
was a great divide between the Federal leaders' view of pol itics 
and the possibi I ities for pol itical action. Whi Ie t~ey made 
these threatening statements, their last ally the Witness 
d h' E' I· h ' k t th bl· (138) Th suggeste .,t at ng IS -spea ers accep e repu IC. e 
Federal Party was now alone in its opposition to a republic 
and it no longer had a sympathetic mouthpiece. South Africa 
became a republ ic on 31 May 1961. 
In the same year, South Africa faced its first general 
election as a republ ic. Reduced as it was to two committees, 
in the Transvaal and Natal, issuing increasingly strident 
statements from time to time, (139) the Federal Party was unable 
to field any candidates. The Federals considered that it sti I I 
represented 'a not inconsiderable section of informed opinion' 
and advised this section of the population to exercise 'their 
consciences' in deciding for whom to vote.(140) Th~ 'cardinal 
principle' remained the removal of the National ists.(141) As 
regards the political ,future of South Africa, the Federals 
suggested the formation of a 'Natal Party' to lead the 
province.(142) 
The last publ ic act of the Federal Party was to issue a 
statement in November 1961. Of the Federal Parties, only the 
Natal party was then sti I I functioning.(143) The statement 
reviewed yet again Nation~1 ist policies and once again 
condemned them. The government's race pol icies in particular 
were seen as fatal for the future peace of South Africa. As 
136. I bid. 
137. Ibid. 
138. Natal Witness: 10 June 1961, 24 June 1961. 
139. Natal Witness: 6 Apri I 1961, 26 Apri I 1961 13 May 1961, 
14 June 1961, 24 June 1961, 15 August 1961.' 
140. Natal Witness: 15 August 1961. 
141. Natal W.itness: 15 August 1961. 
142. Natal Witness: 15 August 1961. 
143. Interview with A.C. Martin. 
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regards the position of Natal, the Federals' attitude had not 
changed since 1953. 'By allowing its pol itics to be dominated 
by people beyond its borders, Natal traditions and aspirations 
have been continually ignored and even betrayed.~144) The 
agent of this disaster remained the U.P. It had, in the 
. d f' t d d' (145) Federals' View, a recor 0 appeasemen an surren er • 
Some of the worst fai lings of the U.P. were itemised as being 
clause 2(d) of its constitution, Mitchell ' ,s dupl icity over 
resistance to the republ ic and the 'sorry affair over 
Stander,.(146) The statement ended in an expose of the 
discrimination suffered by the Engl ish-speakers in education 
and how they had been ;Iet down' by their leaders.(147) To 
the end, the Federals saw themselves as being essentially 
defenders of the English-speakers. 
At the executive meeting which issued the last statement, 
Hughes Mason, from the chair, suggested that the party be 
dissolved.(148) Although the suggestion was not accepted, the 
party's days were clearly numbered. After the 1959 provincial 
elections, as its branches ceased to function, members began 
leaving the party in I~rge numbers.(149) Denis Lowe, the 
Federal candidate in Urnzimkulu in 1959, left to join the 
(150) , Progressives. Mrs. Stewart, the 'most popular and 
engaging' Federal(151) and the party's 1959 candidate in 
Durban North,(152) left in 1961 for the same reason.(153) 
Mrs. Park Ross, an 'indefatigable worker and a bri I liant 
woman,(154) resigned because she bel ieved that ' ••• without 




148. Nip: R. Hughes Mason to M. Park Ross, 9 January 1962. 
149. Interview with A.C. Martin. 
150. Natal Witness: 10 May 1961. 
151. Sip: A~C~ Ma~tin to J. Stewart, 16 November 1961. 
152. She h?d recei~ed the highest Federal vote in the 1959 
elections. Vide: Natal Gazette No. 578, op.cit. 
153. A.C. Martin to J. Stewart, loc.cit. 
154. Interview with A.C. Martin. 
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any popular backing, the Federal Party could no longer 
f . 1- ] f I ' (155) S unction ••• ~r serve any use u purpose.... . 0 
diminished had the party become that she did not know to whom 
she should tender her re&ignation.(156) Hu~hes Mason, a 
foundation member of the Federal Party,(157 twice Federal 
candidate(158) and the 'most energetic' Pietermaritzburg 
member, (159) agreed with Mrs. Park Ross and also resigned.(160) 
(161) . 
As Selby wrote in January 1962: 'It was al lover.' 
The last meeting of a reduced executive was held in 
June 1962. Here the party was 'disbanded' and Martin was 
given authority to use his 'discretion' regard i ng al I party 
matters.(162) He thereupon wound up the party's outstanding 
business.(163) 
155. Nip: M. Park Ross to R. Hughes Mason, 1 January 1962. 
156~ I bi d. 
157. Vide supra: Ch. 3. p.49. 
158. In an Umzimkulu by-election in 1955 and in the 1959 
provincial elections. Federal News: 21 September 1955, 
Natal Witness: 13 October 1959. 
159. Interview with A.C. Martin. 
160. Nip: R. Hughes Mason to A.C. Martin, 15 January 1962. 
161. A.R. Selby to D. Heaton Nichol Is, 4 January 1962, loc.cit. 






REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE FEDERALS 
From the time of its launching, the Federal Party had 
fared badly. The expected growth of membership in 1953 had not 
material ised(l)and the ' 1954 provincial elections had been a 
stunning defeat. (2) The hoped-for transference of al le~iance 
to the Federal Party of Torch Commando members had not taken 
place. Thus, the careful manoeuvering of the party's founders 
in I inking the two organisations had not changed the voting 
patterns of most Torch Commando members. The party did, however, 
command the support of a significant section of the Natal 
electorate. (3) 
During the latter half of 1954 and during 1955 and 1956, 
support for the Federals, despite the election defeat, continued 
to grow. I n May 1954 it was reported that there were 'more 
,than fifty branches' in Natal.(4) Subsequently, six branches 
were formed in December 1954, (5)three were reportedly'created 
early in 1955(6)and one (Queensburgh) was founded in June 1955~7) 
During this period, the party also founded and enlarged a 
newspaper, the Federal News. (8) Most important, the Natal party 
saw its income increase between 1955 and 1956. (9) 
Th i s growth was, however, not susta i ned after' 1957, when 
the Federal Party experienced a growing apathy amongst ' its 
members and supporters. This was evident in the party's finances. 
Some signs of this crisis were already evident in 1956~ Des-
pite the increased income during that year, the party stil I had 
severe financial problems. In the middle of 1956, the Finance 
1. V i de ' supra: Ch. 4. p. 66. 
2. Vide supra: Ch.5. pp. 117-8. 
3. Vide supra: Ch.5. pp. 117-8. 
4. Natal Witness: 11 May 1954. 
5. Federal News: 23 December 1954. 
6. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 25 March 1955, loc.cit. 
7. Federal News: 27 June ,1955. 
8. V ide supra: Ch. 4. pp. g2-3. 
9. From £1994. Os. Id. to £2308. 2s. Id. 
U.,F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 12 and 13 October 1956, loc.cit. 
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Committee recommended the cl.osing of the Durban office because 
of the shortfal I in income. The treasurer informed the Natal 
Provin~ial Executive on 28 July that the party could meet its 
July accounts, including the August rent, but that 'thereafter 
no funds were avai lable,.(10) Substantial donations from the 
e xecutive members, and the anticipated income from the party's 
fete to be held later in the year, averted the crisis. (11) In 
fact, the party's response to its financial difficulties made 
1956 the peak year for income and even al lowed for the estab-
I ishment of reserves for the future. (12) Early in 1957 the 
financial crisis recurred. Once again there was talk of closing 
one of the party's two Natal offices, and once again the idea 
was rejected. It was felt that the' ... closing of either 
office would be tantamount to the closing down of activity in 
the centre concerned. A13) The treasurer blamed the party's 
leadership for the poor financial position. More funds would 
be forthcom i ng, he sa i d, if there was more 'i ntens i ve act i v ity 
from the top downwards. , (14) The Action Committee, on the 
other hand, saw the lack of funds as stemming from the 'existing 
apathy' and did not consider the leaders to be responsible. (15) 
Whoever was responsible, it was clear that the' ... future did 
not look bright for the Party. ,(16) lacking the drive and 
commitment of the previous year, the Natal party had to use re-
serve funds to keep going. (17) 
No detai led set of accounts of the Natal Federal Party 
(or of its sister parties) has survived. (18) It is thus im-
possible to plot the party's decl ining income in detail 
10. U. F. P. (Nata I): Prov inc i a I Execut i ve Comm ittee Minutes, 
28 July 1956, p.1. 
11. Ibid. 
12. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 21 September 1957, loc.cit. 




17. U.F.P. (Natal): Minutes, 21 September 1957, loc.cit. 
18. Interviews with W. Grimwood and A.C. Martin. 
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as the apathy of its members deepened. 
evidence of a sharp decl ine in income. 
come the fol lowing year was ' materially 
There is, however, 
From a 1956 peak, In-
lower'. (19) For the 
nine months ending 31 March 1958, only £1 353.7s.9d. was re-
ceived, (20)more than half of it being raised at the 1957 fete~21) 
Whi Ie the 1958 figure refers to a period of only nine months, 
it is much lower than that of 1956 and this is a clear indicat-
ion of a steady and debi I itating decl ine in financial contribu-
tions. Another indication of financial stringency was the 
closing of the Federal News at the end of 1958. (22) By October 
1959, after the Federals had lost the provincial elections, 
income from the br~nches had ceased. (23) There was no longer 
any systematic or organised fund-raising by the party. (24) 
In assessing the growing apathy of the Federals after the 
1954 election, much of the statistical evidence, apart from the 
financial, has to be used with caution. The Natal party, for 
instance, actual I) increased its membership by over fifty per 
cent. from 919(25 to 1 500(26) between June 1954 and October 
1957. This is misleading because those who 'sl ipped out' of 
the party, like Br i ckh i I I and Ford, were never forma I I y removed 
from the I ist of memb~~s. (27) For this reason, the number of 
members would always continue to rise, except for the rare 
instance of a written resignation, even though party activity 
and member involvement was decl ining. 
Attendance at the Natal congresses, given the important 
role which these functions played in the I ife of the Federal 
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and interest can be measured. By comparison with the 1956 
congress, which was the largest in the party's history and 
attracted 200 delegates, (29) the 1957 congress indicated the 
party's decl ining fortunes. It drew only 100 participants. (30) 
The 1958 congress, however, attracted 140 delegates. (31) 
Considering that this figure included large groups from the 
Transvaal and the Cape, (32) there was no significant increase 
in attendance by the Natal Federals. The number of delegates 
cou I d not, I n any event, cont i nue to increase annua I I y after 
the 1956 peak attendance because the last Natal branch reported 
founded was at Queensburgh in June 1955. (33) In 1959 the 
F edera I s he I d the i r I ast congress. I t I asted on I y part of a 
day, had oniy the single purpose of discussing the forthcoming 
provincial election campaign, (34)and received little publ icity. 
After 1959 the party was unable to mount even so modest a 
congress. 
This decl ine in the party's fortunes after 1956 as suppl ied 
by statistical evidence was confirmed by the party leaders. 
Whi Ie the Natal Action Committee blamed 'apathy' amongst party 
members for the lack of funds, (35)Hughes Mason, editor of the 
Federal News, appealed to a prominent member not to resign as 
this would 'weaken •.. {:the party'] sti I I further. ,(36) The 
Provincial Executive and the Provincial Action Committee showed 
by the tone of their meetings that the party leadership knew 
that popular support was waning. (37) The results of the 1959 
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for the insignificant part p.layed ·by the Federals in the 1960 
referendum campaign. (38) During 1961, the last ful I year of 
the party's ex i stence, the F edera I I eaders constant I y adv i sed 
their supporters to use their 'consciences' in coping with 
pol itical decisions. (39) Lofty moral ity was al I that remained 
to the pol itical Iy helpless group. 
To explain this fai lure of the Federals to mobil ise publ ic 
opinion and to influence South African pol itics significantly, 
it is necessary tb examine their pol icies, the attitudes which 
created them and the interpretations which were placed on them 
from time to time. These pol icies were based on three main 
issues: federation, the Crown and the Commonwealth, and the 
race quest ion. 
38. Vide supra: Ch.9. pp. 201 and 206. 
39. Natal Witness: 15 August 1961. sip: A.C. Martin to 
Mrs. J. Stewart, 16 November 1961, loc. cit. 




The Federals had two reasons for naming their organisa-
tion the Union Federal" Party. In the first instance, they 
wished to stress that they stood 'for Union,.(40) By 'Union' 
the Federals meant the' .•. decision of the four Provinces in 
1910 to join In a single State under the Crown. ,(41) As such, 
any alteration of the 'Union' would mean a dissolution of the 
country into its component provinces. (42) The 'Federal' in the 
party's name was to denote that it aimed at ' ... an increase 
of the federal element in the Union constitution. ,(43) 
The drive behind the party's federal ideas is to be 
found in Natal's hankering for a federation in South Africa, 
ever since the Na~ional Convention in 1909. This wish was In-
spired largely by 'Engl ish' Natal's suspicion of Afrikaner nat-
ional ism. (44) One result of this attitude was the creation 
of the provincial counci Is. After the National ist triumph in 
the 1929 general election, the question of the abol ition of 
the provincial counci Is on economic grounds became a major 
pol itical issue. The Natal pol iticians, led by Heaton Nicholls, 
strongly resisted abol ition.(45) 
Natal's views at this time on the 'extension and develop-
ment' of the provincial counci I system, were expressed in a 
memorandum by F.C. Hollander, a document which was to bear his 
name. (46) Hoi lander recommended that the powers of the provin-
40. Natal Mercury: 2 July 1953. House of Assembly Debates, 1953 
col. 335. 
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cial counci Is . be 'entrenched,~47) Any alterations to their 'ent-
renched' status should be permissable only with the 'definite 
. l48) 
approval and consent' of the people of the province concerned. 
The Hoi lander Memorandum also recommended alterations to the 
constitution of the counci Is. Executive Committee members 
should be individually responsible to the counci Is for the ad-
ministration of a department, and the Executive Committ~e should 
function collectively as a cabinet. The Administrator should 
be elected either by the counci I or by an electoral col lege. 
Apart from the counci I's 'entrenchment' and its new con-
stitution, Hoi lander envisaged the extension of its function. 
In addition to their existing powers, they should control, 
'native affairs', pol ice, al I education except at a university 
level, agriculture, immigration and a provincial publ ic service~49) 
As regards finance, Hoi lander suggested that the provinces be 
permitted to negotiate loans on provincial credit and that an 
investigation by a commission, presided over by an 'experienced 
Imperial officer', establ ish ways to make the provinces viable~50) 
On 14 October 1932 at the Natal South African Party Cong-
ress, Smuts declared that the Hoi lander Memorandum was a 'reason-
able basis' on which the party could build a constitutional 
pol icy, and he recommended it to the congress. (51) The congress 
accepted' in principle' the proposals outl ined in the Hoi lander 
Memorandum as the basis for 'Home Rule for the Provinces'. (52) 
Two months later, the South African Party's National Congress In 
Bloemibntein accepted, with some misgivings, the idea of greater 
provincial autonomy. (53) In 1933, however, the South African 
Party and the National Party entered into coal ition. In a joint 
47. Ibid. 
48. I bid. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Craig: dp.cit., p.86. Vickers: · p.204. 
52. Craig: pp. 87-88. Vickers: p.205. 
53. Craig:pp.90-91. Vickers:pp. 209-12. A.R. Turrell: 
The South African Party 1932-34: The Movement Towards 
Fusion. M.A. Thesis (Natal), 197i p.4l. 
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statement Hertzog and Smuts stated: 'The unitary basis of a 
. ~. l;n b . t· d· t t ' ( 54) united South AfrIca ••• ~ou ~ e maIn alne In ac •••• 
As a sop ' to Natal, they promised to maintain the status of the 
provincial counci Is and to give 'favourable consideration' to 
the extension of provincial powers and functions.(55) Heaton 
Nichol Is and many of the Natal federal ists accepted Fusion and 
its negative impl ications for federation. In fact, except for 
the Dominion Party, I ittle was heard of the extension of prov-
incial powers unti I the victory of the National ists in 1948. 
In 1953 the Union Federal Party had, in the words of 
Heaton Nichol Is, , gone back' to the Hollander Memorandum(56) 
and revived' ... the pol itics dropped by the South African 
Party' in 1933. (57) At the Federal Party's Natal Provincial 
Convention in 1953, where pol icy was first formally adopted, (58) 
the party's federation pol icy was defined as ' ... giving a 
far greater measure of autonomy to the Provinces .•• the gen-
eral principles of which found ... expression in the Hoi lander 
Memorandum. ,(59) The 1956 Natal Congress detailed the pol icy. 
It enumerated the recommendations of the Memorandum, and re-
so I ved that they shou I,d be secured to the Nata I Prov i nc i a I 
Council. (60) By 1958, Hollander's recommendations had been 
publ ished as party pol icy. (61) The Transvaal and Cape Federal 
Parties' attitudes towards the Hoi lander Memorandum were almost 
identical to that of Natal. (62) 
The Federals envisaged many advantages accruing to South 
54. Craig: p.91. 
55. Cra i g : pp. 91-92. 
56. Natal Mercury: 2 July 1953. 
57. G. Heaton N i cho I Is: Forward to lost Opportun i ty, op. cit. 
58. Vide supra: Ch. 5. pp. 90-91. 
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Africa if the federal idea were accepted. South Africa had, 
ever since 1910, sought to incorporate the Protectorates, but 
Great Britain had constantly refused. (63) The Federals were 
confident that there could be no British objection to the in-
corporation of the Protectorates into South Africa on a federal 
basis. (64) Furthermore, the Federals aimed eventually to include 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa, together 
with the Un ion and the Protectorates, I n a huge 'Federated 
States of Southern Africa,.(65) 
Federation was seen by the Federals as the bulwark against 
'tyranny', as it would weaken the power of the central govern-
ment. Other perceived advantages of federation were that it 
would provide for local I inguistic, cultural and rei igious needs, 
thus guaranteeing the rights of individuals, and that it would 
al low for a variety of plans to suit local conditions. In 
addition, local people would receive job priority not only 
because they were 'chi Idren of the Province' but also because 
they were famil iar with local conditions and people, such as 
the Zulus~66) The over-riding advantage of federation in Fed-
eral eyes, however, was that it would create harmony in the 
country. AI I the issues which caused dissen s ion would be hand-
led by the provinces, whereas the central government would take 
care only of areas of common interest such as defence, posts 
and telegraphs, rai Iways and foreign affairs. As Heaton Nichol Is 
phrased it, federation would' ••• take from the centre those 
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federal idea. Critics, they bel ieved, were therefore totally 
wrong and were divided into three categories. The first group 
had 'emotional objections'. (68) These people felt that the 
concept of union had a 'sort of sanctity,.(69) What they 
fai led to real ise, according to the Federals, was that 'federal-
ism was a form of union. ,(70) The second category consisted 
of the 'prophets of National ist Afrikaner baaska)' who wished 
to impose their wi I I on the entire community. (71 The third 
group who opposed federal ism did so far economic reasons. This 
category was subdivided into two. One section, comprising 
'certain great economic organisations', found it convenient to 
deal with one central pol itical authority and hence ·favoured 
union. (72) ' The other section, consisting of 'ordinary folk', 
erroneously felt that federal ism would damage the economy of 
the country. (73) 
Whatever the Federals' view of their critics, it must 
be admitted that there were major weaknesses, both impl icit 
and expl icit, In their federal plan. In the first instance, 
there was no unanimity, for most of the party's I ife, as to 
what the plan actually. was. There was a general feel ing In 
favour of 'federation', but the first fully-formulated plan 
did not exist before 1958. As federal ism was a major issue 
only up to the election of June 1954,(74) this meant that there 
was considerable confusion over party pol icy at the very time 
when it was being most widely discussed. For example, Heaton 
Nichol Is, in his Services Club speech had envisaged a federa-
tion with a monarchical Natal existing together with republ ican 
provinces in South Africa.(75) Months after the formation of the 
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"d btl' (76) B th' t' bel ieved thiS I ea to e par y po ICY. Y IS Ime, 
however, the Federal Party and Heaton Nicholls himself, far 
from advocating republ icanism in half of South Africa, were 
equating it with revolution. (77) To add even greater confus-
Ion, it was stated that the party's federal ideas were based 
on the Hoi lander Memorandum. (78) But, this document did not 
discuss republ icanism at al I. 
A second weakness in the federal plan was that it was 
obvious that many of the functions reserved for provincial 
control would create severe problems if they were implemented. 
Immigration, for ' example, was a potentially explosive issue. 
There would be a national imm,igration pol icy to exclude undes-
irables ('e~g. no communists'), but thereafter the provincial 
authority, which the party maintained 'knows best the types and 
number of immigrants required', would control immigration. (79) 
If one province admitted an immigrant, it would be unreasonable 
for any other prov i r)ce to exc I ude him. In th is way, the cr i t-
erla of admittance, enfranchisement and cit 'izenship would either 
vary from province to province or would become the subject of 
t t ' 't .' I 't' t ' ( 80 ) con en 10US In er-prov'lncla nego la Ions. 
Even more prob I em at i ca I was the co lour quest i on. If 
'native affairs' were left in the hands of the provinces, as 
the Hoi lander Memorandum and thus the Federal Party suggested, 
the ensuing legal, economic, socia ,l, educational and pol itical 
confusion was I ikely to be I imitless. Thus, if the Federals 
took from the centre those things, such as immigration and the 
race issue, which tended to 'divide' the country, the result 
would be chaos and even further division. Even those issues 
which the Federals envisaged as being control led by the central 
76. Natal Witness: 3 July 1953. The Star (10 September 1953) 
simi larly bel ieved that Heaton Nichol Is's speech was the 
basis of Federal constitutional ideas. 
77. Cape Times: 15 August 1953. Senate Debates: 1953, col.336. 
Natal Witness: 4 November 195~. 
78. Vide supra: Ch.l0. pp.225-7. 
79. Federal News: ' 23 February 1956. 
80. The highl~ contentious So~th African Citizen Act of 1949 
and the disputes over immigration in the early 1950s 
illustrate how divisive this issue was. 
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authorities w~re I ikely to be grounds for dissens ion. Foreign 
pol icy, for example, would have to remain in the hands of the 
central government and could easi Iy divide the country - as it 
had done in 1939. Federation, despite Federal claims to the 
contrary, could thus not guarantee pol itical peace any more 
than union could. 'They are pursuing an illusion', declared 
the pol itical commentator, Jul ius Lewin - and most of the elect-
(81) . 
orate agreed. 
A third weakness in the federal plan was that it was im-
practical. There was some dispute as to whether a two-thirds 
or a simple pari iamentary majority was needed to alter the uni-
tary constitution in favour of a federal one. (82) In either case, 
the possibi i ity of obtaining the required majority was remote. (83) 
The National ists favoured central control and, as the U.P. was 
strongly opposed to federal ism, even a change of government could 
not faci I itate the federal idea. The parties were merely con-
tinuing the unitary ideas of the South African and National ' 
Parties before Fusion; ideas which had predominated over federal 
trends in South African constitutional thinking for the whole 
history of the Union.(84) 
Only in Natal had there ever been any sizeable group of 
federal ists; the other three provinces had always been firmly 
wedded to the idea of a unitary state. (85) Furthermore, the 
Natal 'Engl ish' were suspect in many parts of the country and 
their 'Engl ishness' had always been an additional reason for 
rejecting federal ism. (86) Therefore, with the Afrikaners numer-
ical Iy and pol itical Iy dominant, there was I ittle chance of this 
anti-federal stand being reversed. If the cause of federation 
81. Natal Witness: 4 June 1953. 
82. Rand Dai Iy Mail: 12 May 1953. Natal Mercury: 2 July 1953. 
~3. For th i s reason a sect i on of the press had ' 'rejected the 
party's federal ism from its inception. 
Vide supra: Ch.3.pp.57-8. 
84. Duminy: op.cit., p.13. The constant assaults on the 
provincial counci I idea and, in the 1950s,on the consti-
tution of the Senate, are indications of this trend. 
85. This created the unpopular notion that the Natal federal-
ists were 'abandoning' their friends in the other provinces 
to the National ists. Natal Mercury: 22 June 1956. 
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had fai led in 1908 and 1932-3, when Engl ish-speaking Natal had 
(~7) . 
been more advantageously placed to exert pressure, Its 
chances of success in the 1950s were remot~, to say the least. 
What is more, there seemed to contemporary observers to be an 
international trend towards the central isation of power In the 
first half of the century(~~)and this meant that the idea of 
federal ism In South Africa was out of date. 
A fourth weakness In the federal plan was that it was out 
of touch with real ities as regards the Protectorates. Despite 
Britain's reluctance to transfer the territories to racial Iy-
conscIous South Africa, and in spite of the rising tide of Black 
national ism, the Federals sti I I presumed that their untried 
federal plan would lead to incorporation. This attit'ude was 
based on the presumption that the British government would act 
in concert with British colonials (i.e. Engl ish-speaking Natal) 
against both Afrikaners and Blacks. (89) , The Federals did not 
real ise that the imperial idea of federation organised on a 
sub-continental scale was no longer real istic. (90) True, the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland reflected the hope of ' a 
White-control led 'British' region to the north but this obscured 
the rea I ity that, in response to post-war pressures, Br i ta i n 
was now embarking upon a pol icy of decolonisation. 
Adm itt i ng the many weaknesses in the federa I p I an, it can 
be asked why the Engl ish-speaking voters, especially Natal ians, 
did not respond to these overtures in the numbers expected by 
the Federals. After all, the plan was tai lored to appeal to 
them. One reason for this is that Natal was no longer as In-
sular as before. Greater population mobil ity, stimulated by the 
~7. For a discussion of the strength of Natal's bargaining 
position in 1932-33, vide: Vickers, pp. 214-16. 
88. Natal Witness: 4 June 1953. Cape T'imes: 11 September 1953. 
89. Rand Dai Iy Mail: 12 May 1953. Federal News: 22 December 1955, 
25 October 1956. 
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territories of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
Federal News: 22 December 1955, 10 February 1956 
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Second World War, meant that Natal had become more fully inte-
grated, socially and pol itical Iy, into South Africa. As the 
Da i I y News stated; , ..• in Nata I there had grown up a new 
South Africanism, which, whi Ie proud of its Province, sees that 
Province In its South African setting. The days of Dominion 
Partyism of two decades ••. [EreviousltJ had gone. ,(91) 
The appeal of federal ism was further eroded by its conn-
ection with secession. In the early 1930s the Devolution League 
had used the slogan 'Separate and then Federat~,.(92) When the 
Federal Party was launched, memories of the 1930s, coupled with 
the Natal Stand rally of 1952, I inked the two ideas in the publ ic 
mind. (93) The presence of Heaton Nichol Is who was popularly 
associated with the devolution movement of the 1930s, even though 
he had then fallen out with the Devolution League, served to 
strengthen the I ink between federation and secession. Whi Ie a 
theoretical idea such as federal ism could add I ittle to the 
appeal of seces~ion, the extremism of the latter did much to 
detract from the appeal of the former. 
A final factor damaging the federal idea was the tendency 
of the Federal Party to use it as a pol itical catch-all. In an 
attempt to discredit republ icanism, it adopted the slogan 
'Federation or Republ ic'. (94) In an attempt to discredit the 
nationally based U.P., the Federals used the slogan 'The Caucus 
or Federation'. (95) In an attempt to force the acceptance of 
the federal idea, the Federals coined the slogan 'Federation or 
Separation'. (96) 
Wh~chever way it turned, and however it tried to explain 
what it regarded as the weaknesses of its opponents, the Federal 
Party thus, ironically, displayed to publ ic scrutiny a facet of 
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SECTION TWO 
THE CROWN AND THE COMMONWEALTH 
The British Crown and the Commonwealth were viewed by 
the Federals as the piv~ts around which the pol itical, cul-
tural and economic I ives of al I 'British,(97)people revolved. 
The Crown was, emotionally, the 'symbol and focus,(9g)of 
the peop I e. But, I n add it ion to th i s funct ion, or because of 
it, the Crown also had a defined legal and constitutional POSI-
tion in every Commonwealth country. The South Africa Act united 
the several colonies of South Africa In a legislative union under 
the Crown, which was seen by the Federals as an integral and 
inal ienable part of the constitutional structure establ ished 
in 1909. As such, it could not' simply be lopped away as In-
essential. ,(99) From this understanding of the Crown and the 
constitution, flowed two propositions: 
••• first, that the South African Pari iament 
is the creature of the constitution, and that 
its right does not extend to altering the funda-
mental or the total or the essential character 
of the constitution which gives it being and to 
which it owes al I its right; the second that the 
Crown is a fundamental and essential part of that 
constitution, to the abol ition of which the right 
of the South African Pari iament does not extend. (100) 
The position of the Commonwealth was different. Whi Ie 
South Africa's I ink to the Crown was legal and constitutional 
as well as emot ional, its membership of the Commonwealth was 
a free association based on ties of kinship. The Commonwealth 
was, stated the Federals, , •.• created by and ••• based upon 
the 70 mil I ions of British people in the United Kingdom and 
Northern Ireland, in Canada, Austral ia and New Zealand and ••• 
97. Most Federals used the words 'Britons' or 'British' and 
'Engl ish-speaking South Africans' interchangably. 
98. U.F.P. (Natal): A Statement of Principles and Pol icies, 
op. cit., p . 5. 
99. U.F.P. (Natal): The Case Against a Republ ie, op.cit., p.13. 
100. Ibid. 
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in South Africa. ,(101) It was, i.n the phrase of Selby, 'a 
. ,(102) 
matter of uncles and aunts. 
These ideas of the Crown and the Commonwealth were based 
on a concept of the essential unity of the Engl ish-speaking 
world outside the U.S.A. Engl ish-speakers In different parts 
of the globe were seen to have more in common with one another 
than with other peoples, no matter how close they I ived to them. 
They shared an 'unbreakable loyalty' based on common traditions 
of language, cultural and pol itical traditions and of symbols 
such as the monarchy. (103) For these reasons, the Federals 
spoke frequently of the glory of the Engl ish language(104)and 
of the democratic traditions of the Engl ish-speaking world. (105) 
In short, the Commonwealth was perceived as an entity embracing 
a single cohesive group of people, far exceeding in importance 
or significance any local national ism. 
Such ideas were clearly inherited from a time when the 
British Empire, rather than the Commonwealth, was in existence. 
Both the Federals and their opponents impl icitly acknowledged 
this. The Federals referred constantly to 1910 and the forma-
tion of the Union under the British Crown. (106) This Union, 
fol lowing closely on the British victory in the South African 
War, was seen as the most creative act in South Africa's history. 
The subsequent years, a peri·od of increasing Afrikaner ascend-
ency, were viewed as a betrayal of Union and, the greater the 
threat to the British connection and the position of the Engl ish-
speakers, the greater the betrayal. After 1948 the al I-Afrikaner 
101.U.F.P. (Natal): A Statement of Principles and Pol icies, 
I oc. c it. It is for th i s reason that the I etters addressed 
to Commonwealth leaders and newspapers in 1954 and 1961 
were I imited to those of the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Austral ia, New Zealand and, in 1961, Rhodesia. 
Vide supra: Ch. 6. p.145. Ch. 9. p.214. 
102. Federal News: 26 July 1956. 
103. Federal News: 26 July 1956. 
104. Vide supra: Ch.6. p.136. 
105. Natal Oai Iy News: 14 May 1953. Federal News: 27 June 
1955. Natal Mercury: 2 February 1957. 
106. Natal Witness: 6 May 1954. Federal News: 27 June 1955. 
Nata I Mercury: 14 Apr i I 1958. 
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National ist government was perceived as the final calamity. 
'The Union has failed', declared Heaton Nicholls in 1953(107) 
and many Federals saw the battle as now returning to the South 
African War stage, with the Engl ish-speakers fighting the old 
Boer ene'my. (108) 'They want to reverse the Treaty of Vereen ig-
ing', declared He~ton Nichol Is.(109) When the New York Times 
saw the republ ican referendum of 1960 as the 'last battle , 
of the South African War', (110) it was an estimation with which 
the Federals would agree. The National ists also interpreted 
the phenomenon of the Federals in terms of British imperial ism 
and the South African War. Heaton Nichol Is was portrayed as a 
(Ill) . h ., I' t,(112) 'Victorian' gentleman and a 'nlneteent century ImperIa IS , 
whi Ie the Federals, stated Die Transvaler, ' ••. do not I ive in 
the year 1955, but in the year 1902.' ( 113) 
The antiquated vantage point of the Federals led them to 
perceive of the Crown and the Commonwealth as static and al lowed 
for no constitutional evolution. (114) Even though Heaton Nicholls 
himself, as leader of the S.A.P. in Natal in 1934, had acquiesced 
t he 
to the Status of; Union Act, the Federals tended to view Union 
under the Crown, as establ ished in 1910, as final and saw any 
departure from this as 'revolutionary'. (115) Therefore, the 
107. Vide supra: Ch. 3. p.43. 
108. Often, the Federals were open in their hankering for the 
British power of the turn of the century. On one such 
occasion, Federal News featured prominently the retort 
of Mi Iner to the Cape Boers when they protested their 
loyalty to the Crown. 'Of course you are loyal. It would 
be monstrous if you were not.' Federal News:27 June 1955. 
109. Natal Witness: 6 May 1954. 
110. Natal Witness: 17 October 1960. 
111. Die Transvaler: 3 December 1954. 
112. Die Transvaler: 3 December 1954. 
113. Die Transvaler: 24 January 1955. 
114. It is noteworthy that nat i ona lists do not env i sage any 
alte~at~on to the.nat~on state without that state's express 
permIssIon. ConSIderIng the Federalsview of the 
'British' Commonwealth, their attitude is at least as 
logical as that of a national ist. 
115. U~F.P. (Natal): State Your Pol ic~, Address by D. Heaton 
NIchol Is to th~ Institute of CitIzenship,S February 1957, 





F edera I s be I i,eved that not on I y was the government revo I ut i on-
ary in its ideas, but that al I republ icans were gui Ity of 
treason. This argument had, in fact, been presented by Heaton 
Nichol Is to the Senate a year before the Federal Party was 
formed. He ma i nta i ned that, if Min i sters of the Crown, who had 
taken an oath of loyalty to the Queen, wished to 'overthrow 
, , 't Id b 'd d h' h t ,(116) the Const I tut lon, I wou e cons I ere Ig reason. , 
This idea became part of Federal propaganda. (117) later, 
'treasonable' republ ican propaganda was I ikened to Communist 
propaganda as it was maintained by the Federals that there 
was 'nothing to choose' between an Afrikaner National ist Repub-
I ic, control led by the Broederbond, and a Soviet Republ ic. (118) 
A final element in the Federal concept of the Crown and 
the Commonwealth was their idea that the two institutions were 
inseparable. The Commonwealth was bound, In Federal eyes, 'by 
a common loyalty to the Crown. ,(119) Such a view was logical, 
given the Federal view of the Engl ish-speaking peoples as one 
inseparable unity. 
Equally logical was the Federal view of the relations 
between the provinces and the Union. These relations were 
I inked to the relations between the Union and the Commonwealth 
as they were al I fou~ded on a common base - the Crown. The 
Union of 1910 had been a 'compact', or 'contract', of the four 
provinces under the Crown. (120) Just as South Africa could not 
reject the Commonwealth without the permission of its other 
members, so the F edera I s be I i eved,. the Un i on Par I i ament cou I d 
not alter the constitution without the express permission of 
its constituent provinces. As Natal was the province which 
objected to the National ist government's actions, this idea 
116. Senate Debates: 1952, col., 3468. 
117. u. F. P. ~Natal): ,Expel the 5t~ Column, n.d. U. F. P. (Natal): 
The POint of View of the Union Federal Party, loc.cit. 
Federal News: 27 June 1955, 21 September 1955. 
118. U.F.P. (Natal): The Point of View of the Union Federal 
Party. loc.cit. 
119. U.F.P. (Natal): Statement of Principles and Pol icies, 
op. cit., p • 5. 
120. U.F.P. (Natal): Statement of Principles and Pol icies, 
loc.cit. 
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became known as the Natal Stand. 
The ideas which emerged ,as the Natal Stand of the 1950s 
were first formulated by Heaton Nichol Is in the Senate in May 
1952.(i21) He was, on that occasion, referring to Natal stand-
ing on its own because of a breach of the constitution involving 
the creation of the High Court of Pari iament. The Durban rally 
of June 1952 popularised the idea of the Natal Stand, aS , the 
oath taken by the crowd was I inked, via Ford's questions, with 
the Issue of Natal standing alone. It was in this context that 
the Torch Commando, formed to fight the government on the Coloured 
franchise issue, sup~orted the Natal Stand in July 1952 and again 
In January 1953. (122) 
By the fol lowing month, Heaton Nichol Is was seeing the 
Natal Stand not in terms of defending the 'entrenched' clauses 
but in terms of defeating a republ ic. He stated that: 
Natal ••• was a partner to a signed contract 
entered into under specific conditions; if 
these conditions are not adhered to there is 
a breach of contract; and Natal in these cir-
cumstances cannot be forced to accept any new 
agreement in which she does not bel ieve; if 
the other parties do accept a new agreement, 
(i.e. a republ ic) which is contrary to the 
provisions of the original contract, then the 
original contract ••• [:wa~ nul I and void and 
Nata I ..• CwasJ free to take whatever act ion 
she desired .••• (123) 
When the F edera I Party was created, in May 1953, the pr I n-
ciple embodying the Natal Stand was phrased wide enough so as 
to include these various interpretations. 
It stated: 
We shal I work for the maintainance and asser-
tion of the right of the people of any Province 
of the Un ion, in the face of any actua I, attemp-
ted or projected violation of the letter or the 
spirit of the Constitution, to remain a part of 
the Commonwealth of Nations under the Crown, a 
Province so to act in the fol lowing, amongst 
other eventual ities:- a weakening of our al le-
giance to the Crown; the setting aside of the 
entrenched clauses; the denial of the testing 
121. Vide supra: Ch. 2. pp.13-14. 
122. 
123. 
V ide supra: Ch. 2. pp.17 and 33. 
Natal Witness: 5 February 1953. 
pow~r of the Courts; the abol ition or th~ . 
reduction of Provinc ial powers; the abolition 
of ful I protection or of recognition of the 
equal rights of both official languages. (124) 
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This clause, by including the phrase 'amongst other even-
tual ities', gave almost unl imited choice to a secessionist-
minded prov i nce to I eave the Un i on . In pract ice, however, the 
Federals restricted the use of the Natal Stand to resisting 
the republ ic.(125) The only way, they maintained, that a 
republ ic could be achieved legally was for the Union to be 
dissolved into its constituent provinces and for each of them 
b I . U· ( 126) A t f d to agree to a new repu Ican nlon. separa e re eren um 
would have to be held in Natal to decide its future. (127) If 
the National ists declared a South African republ ic in any other 
way, it would be illegal. If the Federals controlled Natal 
at the time, they would simply refuse allegiance to the repub-
I ican government and declare Natal to be 'the onl~ province 
adhering to the Act of Union under the Crown. ,(12) The Prov-
incial Counci I would then rule Natal as a separate state, and 
a Commonwealth member, (129)which would appeal to the world 
for de facto and de jure recognition. (130) Thus, whether the 
republ ic was created in what the Federals considered to be a 
legal or i I legal manner, Natal need never be a part of it. 
124. U.F.P. (Natal): Statement, loc.cit. 
125. V ide supra: Ch. 3. p. 52 . 
126. U.F~?~ " " " (Natal): Addr~sses at 1954 Natal Congress, 
op.cit., pp. 16-17. 
127. Ibid. 
128. U.F.P. (Natal): Talking Points, op.cit., p.4. 
129. Federals assumed that 'British' Natal - despite its racial 
attitudes - would be welcome in the Commonwealth. This 
led Bis~op ~nman of Natal to state incredulously: 'Surely 
no one In his senses can suppose for one moment that a 
seceded Natal would be any more w"elcome in the Common-
wea!th than the.Union presently is. The principle of 
racial segregation, apartheid, separate development or 
whatever.term you prefer, underl ies Natal I ife just as 
much as I~ d~es the other parts of the Union, and I bel ieve 
that a major I ty of the electorate loves to have it so. ' 
Natal Withess: 6 Apri I 1961. 
130 • U. F ." P • ( N at a I ): T a I king Poi nt s, I 0 c. cit. 
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In the 1950s, the Federal constitutional argument con-
cerning the Crown and Commonwealth, placed the party in a 
weak pos it ion. Th is was because, in the first instance, the 
imperial istic attitude of the Federals confl icted with the 
rise of nat i ona I i sm. On the i nternat i ona I scene, i mper i a I ism, 
of the European type, had come increasingly under attack by 
the communists, the social ists, the U.S.A. and the subject 
peoples themselves. The ideal set against imperial ism was 
national ism. Simultaneously, the European countries, including 
Brita.n, had decl ined in power and influence in relation to the 
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. This meant that the confidence of the 
imperial ists of the first decade of the century had largely 
evaporated. It is true that the Anglo-French i nvas i on of 
Egypt in the Suez cr .i sis st i I I I ay ahead (i. e. when the F edera I 
Party was formed), but this action was a fai lure and was quick-
ly seen to be anachronistic. The position within South Africa 
had largely paralleled the international trend. The economiC, 
pol itical and demographic position of the Afrikaners had prog-
ressively improved vis a vis the Engl ish-speakers. Thus, the 
Federal stand was against the prevai I ing trend - both globally 
and in South Africa. (131) 
An example of the extent to which the Federal leaders 
were out of step IS their appeal to the Commonwealth leaders 
in 1954 to withhold their )ermission for the establ ishment of a 
South Africa republ ic. (132 The National ists responded with 
scorn. Die Transvaler cal led the campaign 'laughable,(133)and 
emphasised again the Federals' 
as an independent state. (134) 
inabi I ity to regard South Africa 
It was significant that the 
131. Many Federals are today clearly embarrassed by having 
held dated ideas in the recent past. They explain the 
circumstances in detail, attempting to justify their 
act ions. 
132. V ide supra: Ch. 6. pp. 145-6. 
133. Vide supra: Ch.6. p. 147. 
134. Die Transvaler: 24 January 1955. 
241 
Engl ish-speakers themselves, on whose behalf the Federal 
leaders claim~d to speak in their appeal to the Commonwealth 
leaders, (13S)remained si lent at the time. Doubtless, they 
were embarrassed by the Federal stand. They accepted the 
Crown and the Commonwealth but they could not agree with an 
appeal to the leaders of other countries to restrain the 
South African nation. 
Federal Party over this 
Engl ish-speakers. (136) 
Bolton~s publ ic resignation from the 
Issue expressed the feel ings of 'many 
A second objection by many South Africans, including 
Engl ish-speakers, to the Federal Party's view of the Crown, 
and especially of the Commonwealth, was that it was dated. 
The frequent sentimental ity - such as Selby's 'uncles and 
aunts' - only served to drive potential supporters of federal-
ism or of the party's comparatively I iberal native pol icy away 
from the party. The Anglophi les referred often to Britain as 
'home' and lauded Briti~h achievements and traditions over those 
of other groups. Most Engl ish-speaking South Africans, however, 
did not share these attitudes. Many of their fami I ies had been 
in South Africa for generations; or had ancestors who were 
Irish or not British at all. They supported the monarchy, re-
spected the Sovereign and valued the Commonwealth connection. 
But they regarded the actions and attitudes of the Anglophi les, 
who were increasingly dominant within the Federal Party, (137) 
as excessive. 
A third weakness in the Federal view of the Crown and 
Commonwealth was the idea that there could be no constitutional 
135. Vide supra: Ch. 6. p. 147. 
136. 
137. 
Vide sUrra: Ch.7. p. 164. 
The who e question of South Africa's freedom of action 
and relations with the Crown and the Commonwealth had 
arisen on 4 September 1939, during the debate on 
whether South Africa should enter the war. Heaton 
Nichol Is had maintained that South Africa was already 
at war as the United Kingdom (and hence the Crown) was 
at war. This view was not upheld at the time and 
shocked many Engl ish-speakers. 
Vide B.K. long: In Smuts's Camp, 1945, pp. 41-56 and 
BaTTinger: op.cit., pp.102-3. 
V i de supra: Ch. 7. pp • . 159-60 and 165-66. 
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evolution and that any departure from the 1910 constitution 
was revolutionary. This view was clearly untenable because 
there had already been evolution in the Union's constitution 
since 1910, involving the Crown. The Statute of Westminster 
and the Status Act were cases In point. It was also pointed 
out, by the U.P., that if the Federals were right in maintaining 
that constitutional evolution was impossible, then any develop-
ment along federal I ines, as suggested by the Federal Party 
itself, would be ultra ,virus.(138) Also,the precedents of 
India, Pakistan and Ghana showed that the Federals were incorrect 
in seeing any republ ic as unconstitutional. These countries 
also illustrated that not only could states abol ish the monarchy 
within their borders, but that they could remain members of the 
Commpnwealth after they had done so. The Indian Republ ic es-
tabl ished the precedent and this was reinforced by the contin-
ued membership of republ ican Pakistan and republ ican Ghana. 
As Strauss pointed out, Heaton Nichol Is impl ied that the 'Gov-
ernments and peoples of other Commonwealth countries had been 
gui Ity of revolutionary conduct. ,(139) 
The Engl i sh-spe<;ikers were, I n any event, probab I y not 
greatly concerned with detai led legal and constitutional argu-
ments. As far as they were concerned, the Federals accused the 
South African government of revolutionary conduct and maintained 
that the constitution of 1910 was static. The first contention 
was clearly fantastic and the other was erroneous. Thus, al I 
the Federals achieved by involving themselves in these complex 
arguments was to expose the contradictions in their case and 
to exasperate their potential supporters by cheapening terms 
such as 'unconstitutional' and 'revolutionary'. A similar 
effect was produced by the Federal accusations of treason 
against anyone who propagated a republ ic. 80th major parties 
permitted republ ican propaganda - they or their ,predecessors 
had done so since Union - and it was ludicrous to suggest that 
the bulk of the voters in the entire history of the Union had 
138. U.P. (Natalf: Pamphlets issued by the Federal Party, 
op. cit., p. 3. 
139. Natal Witness: 16 November 1953. 
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been involved in treasonable activity. 
The Federal idea of the Natal Stand, I inked to their 
view of the Crown and the Commonwealth, fai led for a number 
of reasons. First, it presupposed that provincial rights were 
more important than the ex i stence of the state. I n the i r argu-
ments concerning South Africa and the Commonwealth, the Federals 
fai led to allow for the existence of a South African national-
I sm. I n the i r arguments regard i ng the South Afr i can state, 
they postulated the existence of a 'Natal national ism~; whereas 
the 'South African nation' was seen by most voters as an organ-
IC whole which could only act as a single entity. 
This attitude reflected the legal position. It was the 
South African state, rather than the province of Natal, which 
had the legal right to determine the country's future. When 
Nata I entered Un i on, it had surrendered its sovere i gnty and 
there was no way in which it could legally regain its freedom 
of action. Whatever the Federals might think of the position, 
most Nata I i ans adhered to what was I ega I. (140) 
Second, In claiming that the Natal electorate was a sep-
arate entity and as such was entitled to make a separate stand, 
the Federals did not take into account regional isms within the 
province. The National ists claimed the support of northern 
Natal and maintained that this area would break from the rest 
of Natal in the event of a breakaway by Natal from the rest of 
South Africa. (141) Apart from disunity in Natal, it was evid-
ent that the people of the province were not a fixed entity. 
As in the matter of federat i on, it was becom i ng i ncreas i ngl y 
difficult for any party to speak on behalf of a province whose 
population was highly mobile. Natal had become, as the Dai Iy 
News stated, a province of 'diverse pol itical views and phi 10-
sophies'. (142) The Federals spoke frequently on the 'moral' 
right of the peopl~ of Natal stemming from 1910. By the 1950s 
140. Being law abiding was another trait which the Engl ish-
speakers admired in themselves. 
141. Nata I Da i I y News: 1 Sept.ember 1956. 
142. Natal Dai Iy News: 27 June 1956. 
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a high percentage of Natal's voters had no connection with the 
Natal ians of i910 and, as such, no inherited 'moral right'. 
In claiming to speak for Natal, the Federals also failed 
significantly to win over the majority support of the business 
community. Even before the formation of the Federal Party, a 
group of leading Natal businessmen had spoken out against sec-
ession. (143) Repeatedly during the I ife of the Federal Party, 
business leaders expressed doubts about the wisdom of the Natal 
Stand. (144) So important was this issue that the Federals 
appointed a committee to investigate and report on it. (145) 
This was done, but the report appeared to have had I ittle effect 
and Natal's business leaders, with few exceptions, remained 
overwhelmingly anti-Federal. (146) 
In the final analysis, the crucial question was whether 
the Natal Stand was a real threat or merely pol itical posturing. 
As the U.P. phrased it, ' .•• the question boi Is down to this: 
would the Federal Party countenance armed rebel I ion, or not?,(147) 
At first, many Federals felt that Natal should, if necessary, 
make its stand and that the government should be challenged to 
attack her 'at its per. ii' • ( 148) Pressed on t his quest i on dur-
ing the 1954 provincial elections, however) they stated that 
they were against the use of violence. (149 The Federals were 
trapped. If they suggested violence as a means towards their 
ends, they were I ikely to al ienate al I but a smal I section of 
the Engl ish-speak i ng popu I at i on. If, on the other hand, they 
eschewed force, the Natal Stand had no viabi I ity because, as 
the Dai Iy News commented: 'Rights that cannot be exerted are 
of no more value than guns without bul lets. ,(150) The Federals 










Vide supra: Ch.2. p.19. -----,--=--
U.P. (Natal): Pamphlets issued by Federal 
p.6. Natal Dai Iy News: 1 September 1956. 
Part y, op. cit. , 
_V_i _d...;..e~s~u.&;.p.;...r..;;a : C h • 3 . p. 75. 
Interviews with Ford, Martin and D. Heaton Nichol Is. 
U.P. (Natal): Pamphlets issued by the Federal Party, 
op. cit., p. 3. 
Natal Witness: 10 September 1953. 
Natal Witness: 7 May 1954. 
Natal Dai Iy News: 27 June 1956. 
Vide supra: Ch.9. pp~ 211~12. 
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To worsen matt~rs, the e xact nature of and the practical actions 
of this 'moral resistance ' were never clarified. The numerous 
weaknesses in the Natal Stand were appreciated by the Federals 
themselves and, for this reason, the idea was relegated to the 
background after the 1954 provincial election defeat(15
2
)and after 
the Commonwealth leaders had fai led to respond to their appeal. (153) 
Whi Ie the Federals were trying to galvanise the Engl ish-
speakers into an awareness of the National ist threats to their 
ideals, the National ists were careful to cultivate a moderate 
image and presented themselves and their republ ican idea as the 
wi I I of the people. The National ist leaders repeatedly stressed 
that the republ ic would only be declared on the 'broad wi I I of 
the people,.(154) Promises of special ~Iections or a referendum 
were repeatedly made by the Prime Ministers so as to al lay fears 
f . 't . d bl ' (155) o a mlnorl y - Impose repu IC. 
The National ists were simi larly moderate In their pronounce-
ments on the nature of any future republ ic which many Engl ish-
speakers feared would be undemocratic. (156) The 1942 Draft 
Republ ican Constitution, which was authoritarian in character, 
and which was frequently cited by the Federals as an example 
of government thinking, (157) was firmly repudiated by the Nat-
tional ists. (158) They promised time and again that the rights 
of South Africa's ~ngl ish-speakers would never be assai led. (159) 
In the early 1950s there had been a considerable fear that the 
~ ngl ish-speakers would be deprived not only of their eC9nQmic . 










Vide supra: Ch.6. p.129. 
V ide supra: Ch.6. p. 147. 
Natal Witness: 1 December 1954, 26 January 1955, 5 Sept-
ember 1959. Natal Mercury: 2 October 1956. Natal Daily 
News: 1 September 1956. 
Natal Dai Iy News: 5 October 1956. Natal Mercury: 4 Sept-
ember 1958. 
Natal Witness: 1 August 1955. 
Rand Dai Iy Mail: 25 May 1955. Natal Witness: 11 August 
1955. Natal Dai Iy News: 9 December 1958. 
Natal Mercur~: 4 September 1955. Natal Witness: 19 
Septmeber 19 8. 
Natal Mercury: 15 September 1955 24 October 1956 
Natal Dai ly News: 1 September 1956. Natal Witness; 
19 September 1958. 
V ide supra: Ch.6. pp. 52-53. 
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The United Front had expressed this fear in their 1953 election 
h . , (161) Wh th slogan; 'Vote for the rig t to vote again. en, as e 
1950s progressed, it seemed clear that the National ists did not 
intend creating a dictatorship, Engl ish-speakers' fears rece-
ded. And, opposition, especially Federal, credibi I ity receded 
as well. 
Although the Federals bel ieved that the issues of the 
Crown and the Commonwea I th were i nseparab I e, in the i r propaganda 
they tended to stress the notion of the Commonwealth to a far 
greater degree than that of the Crown. The economic, diplomatic, 
mi I itary and cultural advantages of Commonwealth membership 
were obv i ous and, in I arge measure, tang i b I e ~ Peop I e who were 
not Anglophi Ie in incl ination or even not Engl ish-speaking could 
support the Commonwealth for these reasons. Loyalty to the 
Crown, on the other hand, conferred no such material benefits 
and was therefore more vulnerable to misinterpretation or 
attack. 
The National ists appreciated this difference and strove 
to separate the questions of Crown and Commonwealth. Malan, 
for example, stated, early in 1953, that the government planned 
a republ ic but that withdrawal from the Commonwealth would be 
judged at the time' ... in the I ight of the then existing cir-
cumstances. ,(162) Later that same year, he informed a Dutch 
newspaper that he envisaged a republ ic within the Commonwealth. (16j) 
This view was subsequently expressed, on many occasions, by 
National ist leaders. (164) Having establ ished that they wished 
to retain the material advantag e s of Commonwealth membership, 
the National ists began el iminating symbols of the Crown from 
South African I ife. The prayer for the Queen at the opening 
of the .Senate was abol ished. (165) This was fol lowed by the 
abol ition of God Save the Queen as one of South Africa's anthems. 
The Federals protested but the Engl ish-speakers al lowed the 
161. Heard: General Elect ions, op. cit. , p.56. 
162. Nata I Witness: 7 July 1953. 
163. Natal Witness: 5 October 1953. 
164. Nata I . Witness: 12 May 1958. 
165. Nata I Witness: 28 May 1955. 
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., I I' t I . t . ( 166) abol ition with surprIsIng y It e OppOSI Ion. This 
action was followed by the removal of the royal coat-of-arms 
from publ ic bui Idings and of the letters O.H.M.S. from official 
mai I. (167) There was almost no opposition to these moves. 
When they discussed the republ ic, the National ists presented 
it as the fulfi Iment of South Africa's nationhood. In it, the 
divisions of the past would be obi iterated. The Crown had, 
stated the National ists, always been a cause of contenti"on 
between the two White population groups. Remove it, the argu-
ment went, and there would be unity and peace. Given the numer-
ical weakness of the royal ists and the defensive attitude which 
they had always to employ, this argument of a new fresh repub-
I ican society in the place of a strife-ridden monarchy was 
seduct ive. As the referendum result showed, it did not convince 
most Engl ish-speakers, but it did weaken the Federal support. 
The tactics of the National ists In el iminating the Crown, 
whi Ie retaining the Commonwealth, were both shrewd and effective. 
Piecemeal action coupled with ski Iful propaganda prevented a 
concerted response. The long term effect was the gradual el im-
ination of the less widely-supported and less defensible insti-
tution of the Crown. But, in Federal eyes, the Commonwealth 
depended on the Crown ('bound .•• by a common loyalty') and not 
vIce-versa. Federal resistance decl ined because their turn-
of-the-century attitude placed far greater store on the monarchy 
than on a largely commercial, and distinctly twentieth century, 
Commonwealth. With the Crown being el iminated as part of South 
African I ife, the Federals gradually lost hope in their cause. 
Thus, with the Crown reduced in stature and the Commonwealth 
viewed merely as an economic convenience (with no emotional over-
tones), the National ists were wei I placed to strike towards 
their republ ic. When Verwoerd, therefore, appealed to the 
country to vote for a republ ic in 1960, he stressed again his 
commitment to Commonwealth membership, (168)leaving the voters 
to decide on a republ ic which would then amount to I ittle more 
166. V ide supra: Ch.7. p.163. 
167. Natal Witness: 12 September 1958. 
16~. V ide supra: Ch.9. p.206. 
than a constitutional amendment as so many of the exterior 
symbol~ of mo~archy had already been stripped away. (169) 
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The National ists responded to the Natal Stand by conten-
ding that the provincial ism of the Federals was undemocratic. 
If the majority wanted a republ ic, an attempt by Natal to thwart 
the national wi II would, in the words of Verwoerd, amount to 
the 'autocracy of the minority,.(170) He observed that it was 
strange that such a move could be contemplated by a party which 
'always had their mouths ful I of sacred democratic rights etc.,(171) 
This was a tel I ing point. The Federals attempted to counter it 
with the argument that there was no 'divine' right of a majo-
rity. (172) A majority decision was simply' ••• a measure of 
convenience to the dispatch of business. ,(173) These views 
looked strange coming from a party which based the Natal Stand 
on the wishes of the majority of the province's voters. 
The essential problem here, as far as the anti- republ ican 
Engl ish-speakers were concerned, was that the Afrikaners were 
in the major ity. Therefore, if the great major ity .of the 
Afrikaners favoured a republ ic - and this appeared increasingly 
to be the case - the r~publ ic could be achieved, on the broad 
wi I I of the people, or in a referendum, 'though no person of 
British descent had cast a vote in favour. ,(174) The U.P. 
offered a way out of the d i I emma. I t assured the Eng I i sh-
speaking publ ic that republ ican sentiment amongst Afrikaners 
was greatly exaggerated. (175) Furthermore, the U.P. argued 
that 'spl inter parties' only antagonised the moderate Afrikaners 
and gave the republ ican issue undue publ icity. (176) Fearing 
an Afrikaner-dominated republ ic, yet too weak numerically to 
stop it, the Engl ish-speakers turned to the U.P. which ski Iful Iy 
exploited the situation. 
169. Natal Witness: 14 Apri I 1955. Federal News: 24 May 1956. 
170. Senate Debates: 1953, col.337. 
171. Natal Dai Iy News: 1 September 1956. 
172. Federal News: 26 Apri I 1956. 
173. Federal News: 26 Apri I 1956. 
174. Natal Mercury: 20 December 1954. 
175. Cape Argus: 24 September 1955. Natal Dai Iy News: g 
Octobe'r 1956. 
176. Natal Mercury: 11 July 1955. 
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They op,posed the rep ub I i c, supported the Crown and 
Commonwealth membership and admired many ,British traditions 
and customs such as democracy and the idea of 'fair play'. At 
the same time, they campaigned for a 'South Africanism' in 
which al I the Whites would form one group, free from the ex-
cesses of either the Afrikaner or British ~xtremists. In this, 
they pointed to the distinguished careers of Botha and Smuts 
and presented their pol icy as the only solution to the tensions 
and wars which had divided South Africa's Whites for a century 
before Union. The frequent use of the word 'moderate' appealed 
to the sense of reasonableness which al I the opposition parties 
agreed to be a trait of the Engl ish-speakers. 
In reply to the Federal cla im that the constitution was 
static, the U.P. took a stand which was more in keeping with 
the asp i rat ions of Engl ish-speakers. Strauss, ina major 
pol icy speech at East London on 1~ October 1954 set out the U.P. 
view. (177) He committed the party to the support of both the 
Crown and the Commonwealth with most accent on the economic 
advantages of Commonwea I th membersh i p. .At the same time, he 
tacitly acknowledged the evolutionary nature of the South African 
constitution. This was in keeping with the oft-stated U.P. 
stand that what was needed to defeat a republ ic (and the Nat-
ional ists) was not outmoded imperial istic arguments or an emo-
tionally-based idea of revolution, but the support of al I 
'moderate' South Africans. (178) In this way, the U.P. countered 
the Natal Stand with a 'Union Stand' (i.e. resistance to the 
National ists on a countrywide scale). (179) The appeal met with 
considerable success and was one of the major reasons for the 
defeat of the Federals in 1954. (1~0) 
177. Vide supra: Ch.6. p.139. 
178. Natal Witness: 16 November 1953, 7 May 1954, 16 June 1954. 
Natal Dai Iy News: 16 October 1957. 
179. B/P: G. Heaton Nicholls to B. Batchelor, 29 December 1954. 
180. Vide supra: Ch.5. p" 121. 
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SECTION THREE 
THE QUESTION OF RACE 
The third Federal Party pol icy which must be considered 
when ana I ys i ng the reasons for its fa "i lure, is its race po I icy. 
On this question there was a great deal of confusion. The 
Federals were clearly to the left of the U.P. but the exact 
terms of its pol icy remained vague. The major questions of 
franchise qual ification and method of election were never 
settled. (181) The reason for this delay was that the pol icy 
"caused division within the party, not least because a liberal 
race pol icy " ran counter to traditional Engl ish-speaking attitudes, 
especially in Natal. The party, therefore, had to feel its 
way towards formulating the detai Is of its pol icy. 
With the exception of the liberal Party, the colour policy 
envisaged by the Federal leaders was the most I iberal of any 
of the contemporary pol itical parties. The foundation principles 
of the party cal led for the abandonment of fear as the guiding 
principle of race relations. From this flowed the ideas of 
extending social services and even pol itical representation for 
the non-Whites. (182) 
When the Natal Federal non-White pol icy was formulated 
In 1954(183)these ideas were incorporated into it. The pol icy 
rested on five general principles. First, the 'dignity of the 
individual' irrespective of race or colour was seen as funda-
mental. (184) From this flowed the second principle that each 
ethnic group was a 'permanent' part of South Africa. (185) The 
third principle was that the Whites, who had brought Western 
civil isation to South Africa' .•. must continue to guide the 





Vide su~ra: Ch. 7. p. 169. 
Vide su~ra: Ch. 
Vide su~ra: Ch. 
U. F • P. ( N at a I ) : 
op. cit., p. I. 
185. Ibid. 
H36. Ibid. 
3. p. 53. 
4. pp. 73-75. 
Statement of non-European Pol icy, 
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fourth and fifth principles stated that there was no 'final 
solution' to the country's race problems and that al I reforms 
in th i s direct ion s hou I d be gradua I. ( 187) Th,e Statement of 
non- European Pol icy went on to envisage extensive social, 
economic and pol itical reform in the four areas of the urban 
and rura I commun it i es, industry and the organs of government. (188) 
In urban areas, al I non-Whites should have the right to purchase 
property under freehold title. Because of their low Income 
level, municipal housing schemes were envisaged. In keeping 
with the party's declared principles, (189)the Statement main-
tained the principle of social and residential segregation. In 
the rural areas, the party supported the idea of individual 
ownership of land on the basis of long leasehold which should 
be convertab Ie, in approved cases, to freeho I d. Extens i ve 
rehabi I itation of the 'African Reserves' by soi I and water 
conservation would be undertaken by the provinces, which would 
become responsible for the reserves in place of the existing 
'unwieldy' central government control. (190) 
In industry, the right of the non-Whites to enter 'al I 
fields of employment'" and the need for vocational training 
to achieve this, was stated. (191) The party argued that al I 
races should be protected from 'unfair competition', but that 
'reward regardless ,of race' should be the basis of South African 
1°f (192) econom I c I e. 
On the issue of the pol itical representation of the non-
Whites, the 1954 Statement envisaged, as has been discussed, (193) 
that al I races be represented in the Senate and in the provin-
cial counci Is. In addition, the party adhered to the principle 
of the' •.• ultimate extension of the franchise on the common 
rol I to such non-Europeans as are qual ified to exercise it. ,(194) 
187. Ibid. 
188. Ibid. 
189. V ide supra: Ch. 3. p.54. 
190. U.F.P. (Natal): Statement of non-European Pol icy, 
op • cit., p. 2. 
191. Ibid. 
192. Ibid. 
V ide supra: Ch.5. p.112 .. 193. 
194. U. F. P. (Natal): Statement 'of non-European PollOcy, I °t oc. c I . 
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For two years, however, there were no developments in formula-
ting the deta'i Is of this qual ified franchise. In 1956, as a 
result of a resolution moved by Greene and Seneque, a Franchise 
Committee was appointed to deal with the question. (195) This 
Committee rejected the multiple vote system and recommended the 
'Two-Value Roll', (196)and this recommendation was debated at the 
Natal Party's 1957 Congress. (197) 
The 'Two-Value Rol I' idea, taken from the Tredgold Commiss-
ion in Rhodesia, (198)envisaged a common rol I with two categories 
of voters. There were the general voters and the 'A' voters. 
AI I votes were of equal value except that the number of ,'A' votes 
cast in any constituency could never exceed a stated proportion 
of the general votes cast. (199) Where this occurred, the number 







V ide supra: Ch. 7. pp. 165-6. 
U.F.P. (Natal): Report of the Union Federal Party 
Franchise Committee, n d., p.2 
V ide supra: Ch. 7. p. 167. 
U.F.P. (Natal): Report of Franchise Committee, op.cit.,p.3. 
The Franchise Committee suggested that this proportion 
be half, but this was apparently not accepted because 
the pol icy booklet of the Natal Federals, issued in 
January 1958 used the words 'stated proport ion' . I bid. , 
and U.F.P. (Natal): Statement of Principles and PolICIes, 
op. cit., p.14. 
The example given by the Committee was that the 'A' votes 
should not exceed half the number of the general votes. 
It was as follows: 
In an election 6 000 votes are cast. Of these, 
4 000 are general votes and 2 000 are 'A' votes. 
They al I count equally. 
In an election 6 000 votes are cast. Of these, 
3 500 are general votes and 2 500 are 'A' votes. 
Half the number of general votes is 1 750. The 
'A' votes cannot count for more than this, and 
have to be reduced to I 750 or 7 
2 500 N 
Thus, if cand i date Pampoen rece i ved 900 ' A' votes 
they would be reduced to 900x 7 or 630. 
The balance of the 'A' 
to candidate Mitchl ing 
1 600 x 7 or 1 120. 
m 
The adjusted 'A' votes 
general votes cast for 
(Natal): Report of the 
10 
votes, 1 600, which went 
would be reduced to 
would then be added to the 
each candidate. U.F.P. 
Franchise Committee, loc.cit. 
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ended qual ifications for admission as an 'A' category voter was 
an income of £20 per month and the abi I ity to fi II , in 'unaided' 
h " f ' f th ff " I languages. (201) t e voters registration orm In one 0 e 0 ICla 
As regards the general voters' category, a detai led sl iding scale 
based on education and means was proposed. This ranged from at 
least a standard six certificate plus £50 per month (or the occu-
pation of property valued at £1 500) through Matriculation Cert-
ificate plus £35 per month (or occupation of property valued at 
£1 000) up to a recognised university degree with no financial 
I 'f' t' (202) qua I I ca Ions. 
The 'Two-Value Rol I' was accepted as party pol icy by the 
1957 Natal Congress and, was seen, according to the party's 
official poi icy booklet, to have the fol lowing merits: 
(a) It would ensure that the government of the 
country could not pass out of the hands of 
the European section of the people, which 
is best equipped to exercise control; 
(b) It would mean that both legislative and 
executive would be responsible, not to a 
narrow electorate only, but to the people 
as a who I e. I ts adopt ion wou I d thus have 
a beneficial effect, in that no pol itical 
party could afford to ignore or flout the 
interests or feel ings of the non-European 
elements of the people. 
(c) It would mean that numbers of educated and 
responsible non-Europeans would be able to 
learn democratic practice and to exercise 
their responsibil ity through the 'A' vote.(203) 
Despite the acceptance by the 1957 Congress of the 'Two-
Value Rol I' pol icy, the recommended franchise qual ifications 
were rejected, and an examination of the 'merits' of 'Two-Value 
Rol I' as set out in an official party booklet shows clearly that 
the party as a whole was more conservative than was the Franchise 
C 'tt (204) Th' d' , omml ee. IS ocument reJected the franchise qual ifi-
cation, and stated that the government of the country 'could not' 
pass out of the hands of the Whites. 
This pol icy, as finally agreed upon, contained obvious 
, , ,(205) Inconsistencies. It is assumed, for example, (although 
201. I bid., p. 4. 
20'2'. Ibid. 
203. U.F.P. (Natal): Statement of Principles and Policies, 
loc.cit. 
204. I'b i d. 
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not stated) that the major i ty of the genera I voters wou I d, In 
perpetu ity, be Wh ites. I n add it ion, the party re I egated even 
'educated and responsible' non-Whites to the 'A' category. 
Thus, the colour bl ind suggestions of the Franchise Committee 
were largely rejected in favour of a common rol I with over-
whelmingly racial categories of voters. Even this programme 
was considered too I iberal by many Federals. (206) The who,le 
issue was debated again at the 1958 Congress and the idea of a 
common rol I with high, but undefined, qual ifications was agreed 
upon. (207) The issue was never final ised. 
The Federals' race pol icy was a major cause of their 
fa i I ure. I t was too I i bera I. Whether the F edera I s adm i tted it 
or not, the basic principle on which their pol icy was based -
that al I non-Whites formed a common society with the Whites -
remained consistent from the foundation of the Federal Party 
to the end. It was fairly well known that the Engl ish-speaking 
electorate, despite the stands .taken by many of the Engl ish-
language newspapers and churches, was not notably liberal. 
Natal, the province in which the Federals hoped first to succeed 
had in the past displayed singularly few liberal tendencies. (208j 
In addition, the White electorate was accustomed to thinking 
of non-Whites in t,erms of groups rather than individuals. This 
was part of the accepted South African pol itical dialogue. The 
National ists had built their whole, electoral Iy highly success-
ful, ideal of apartheid on this basis. Whi Ie not as forthright 
as the National ists on group identity, the U.P. sti I I thought 
in terms of race groups. It rejected 'equal ity or race m 'ixing,~209) 





Vide supra: Ch.7. pp. 167-9. 
Vide supra: Ch. 7. p. 169. 
Vide suTra: Ch.5.pp.113-4. This appl ied even to the trad-
itional y I iberal university student population. Thirty-
eight per cent. of Pietermaritzburg students voted for 
segregated lectures. This figure rose to sixty per cent. 
if agricultural students alone were considered. Natal 
Witness: 2 September 1954. 
U.P. (Division of Information): The Policy of the United 
Party, n.d., p.6. 
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. h f t I . t . ,( 210) "apartheid" t at con orms 0 rea . lies. As regards the 
franchise, the party stood for 'separate representation for 
Europeans and natives,.(211) Even organisations such as the 
Torch Commando, created to fight for the common rol I franchise 
of the Coloureds, thought in terms of race groups when deciding 
on membership criteria. (212) And, the A.R.L. and even the 
Federal Party itself restricted its membership to Whites. (213) 
The Federal Party's franchise pol icy was obviously associated 
in the publ ic mind with its attack on the industrial colour 
bar, a proposal which seemed to threaten the base of the econo-
mic wei I-being of many White voters. (214) Furthermore, the 
Federal Party was itself divided on the Issue •. From the beginn-
ing the Federal Party comprised, in the words of the Natal 
Witness, , ••• not on I y I i bera I s and near-I i bera I s, but a I so 
people who have very I ittle interest in non-European aspirat-
ions, and who merely seek salvation from the National ists and 
their republ ic. ,(215) This group, consisting mainly of Anglo-
phi les, accentuated anti-republ icanism rather than I iberal ism. 
Martin's by-election campaign In Berea in 1953 is a case in 
point. He based his campaign on the Natal Stand and resistance 
to the republ ic and glossed over the Federals' colour pol icy 
as being 'largely long-term'. (216) In the 1954 Natal provinci·al 
elections, on the other hand, the colour issue was a major part 








U.P. (Division of Information): The Native and Coloured 
Peoples' Pol icy of the United Party, n.d., p.'. -
U.P. (General Secretary): Programme of Principles and 
Constitution, April 1951, p.3. 
Carter: op.cit., pp. 308-11. 
Cape Times: 11 May 1953. 
The only other parties participating in elections in 
the 1950s which supported ' the id~a of ind1vidual worth 
as a criteria for the franchise, were the Liberal and 
Progressive Parties. The former, which advocated uni-
versal adult franchise, fared even worse than the Fed-
erals at t~e pol Is, and the latter, despite its many 
advantages, such a~ the ,support of many distinguished 
pe~ple and large financial resources, only achieved a 
maJor electoral breakthrough in the 1970s. . 
Natal Witness: 15 August 1953. 
Natal Witness: 2 September 1953. 
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After the defeat in that . election, from late 1954 on-
wards, the colour issue receded in importance in Fed~ral 
thinking, as the Anglophi les achieved dominance within the 
party. Despite the efforts of people such as Greene, Seneque 
and Batchelor to formulate a I iberal non-White pol icy, the 
trend was inexorable. The non-completion of the colour pol icy 
was the clearest indication of disagreement within the party, 
and of the ascendency of the Anglophi Ie wing. (217) By the time 
of the 1959 provincial elections, despite the publ ic interest 
In the colour question, and the efforts of Batchelor, the 
Federals barely mentioned their non-White pol icy. (21~) 
The vaci I lating stand of the Federals on the colour Issue 
made a difficult task impossible. Branded as a '1 iberal' party 
in the South African context, the party needed a strong united 
effort if it were to convince the electorate of the justice and 
necessity of its position. But, many Federals themselves were 
not convinced of this and wished to remove the I iberal aura from 
the party. In this, they were unsuccessful. The trend of 
South African pol itics in the 1950s was to the Right and the 
abandonment of particu.lar facets of a non-White pol icy, as for 
example suggested by Selby, (219)could not possibly alter the 
publ ic's view of the Federals which had been built up over a 
number of years. Internal division, therefore, did not save 
the party from the stigma of I iberal ism; it only added an Im-
pression of weakness and indicisiveness to its already unpopular 
position. Furthermore, from a purely theoretical point of view, 
there was a basic i I logical ity in the Federal Party's position, 
for, if they maintained that the Engl ish-speakers and Afrikaners 
needed to be separated into different provinces, I inked federal-
ly, so as to prevent the dominance of one group, how could 
Whites and non-Whites (with a greater cultural gulf between 
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pr~vince? The only logical solution, In terms of Federal 
thinking, was to have not a common franchise and an integrated 
economy, but total separation along the I ines suggested by the 
National ists. 
The three main pol icies of the Federal Party, federation, 
the Crown and the Commonwealth, and the non-White question each 
had differing origins and each contributed in a unique way to 
the successes and then to the ultimate fai lure of the Federal 
Party. They al I, however, contained a common ingredient in that 
they were al I largely motivated by a reaction to Afrikaner 
national ism. And, this al I-pervading reaction was the final 
factor leading to the fai lure of the Federals. To obtain In-
spiration for its federal pol icy, the party looked 'back' to . 
before 1949 and to before the creation of the United Party In 
1934. In short, it gave the impression of wishing to turn the 
clock back to a time when Engl ish-speaking Natal sti I I had 
substant i a I po lit i ca I i nf I uence before the ent renchment of 
A fr i kaner nat i ona I i sm. I n the 1950s Heaton N i cho I I s be I i eved 
that he could use the same bargaining methods ~gainst the U.P. 
against Smuts in the early nineteen-
had accepted the Hoi lander Memorandum, 
then largel) abandoned his tolerance of federal ism 
through Fusion. (221 The questions therefore arise as to why 
which he had employed 
thirties. (220) Smuts 
but had 
Heaton Nichol Is, committed as he was to the federal idea, con-
tinued to support Smuts(222)and, equally significant, why the 
F edera I Party cons i stent I y rna i nta i ned, I n the face of a I I ev 1-
220. Vickers: op. cit., p.222. 
221. Mitchell tried unconvincingly to 'argue, on one occasion 
that Smuts had implemented the Hoi lander Memorandum by , 
granting the provincial councils wider powers on matters 
such as housing, water and health. 
Natal Witness: 3 November 1953. 
222. Dr. Donges, Minister of the Interior, stressed this 
point in an attack on the Federal Party's federation 
plan. Cape Times: 11 September 1953. 
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. . (223) 0 
dence, that Smuts had favoured federation. ne 
d · d t' u· ,( 224) story was that Smuts' Ie regret Ing nlon. 
current 
Both questions are answerable only in terms of the threat 
of Afrikaner national ism. Heaton Nichol Is supported Smuts and 
Fusion as the most effectiye way to contain Afrikaner national-
Ism. With Natal's electoral strength submerged in an enlarged 
U.P., this seemed to be the only possible strategy and had to 
be pursued - even at the sacrifice of federal ism. The answer 
to the second "quest ion, as to why the Federals used Smuts's 
name to support their federal pol icy, was that Natal (as wei I 
as other South African) Engl ish-speakers had come to see him 
as the bulwark against the rising strength of Afrikaner nation-
al ism. As long as Smuts was in power, the Engl ish-speakers 
could feel safe. By 1948, practically the entire Engl ish-
speaking electorate voted for Smuts or his al I ies. So signi-
ficant had he become for Engl ish-speakers, that the Federals 
had, as a propaganda necessity, to appropriate him as a 
federal ist. (225) 
When it became clear, after the 1953 general election, 
that Smuts's U.P. could no longer hold Afrikaner national ism 
at bay, the Federals broke away and reverted to the Hoi lander 
Memorandum. Even the sympathetic Natal Witness real ised the 
react i onary nature of the party's federa I i sm. I t stated: 
If the United Party plus Federal ists in Pari ia-
ment became capable of governing, the agitation 
for federation would immediately die down, since 
hardly anyone would have thought of federation 
223. Craig: op.cit., pp. 10-12. Natal Mercury: 2 July 
1953. U.P. (Natal): Pamphlets issued by the Federals 
Party, op.cit., pp. 5-7. Federal News: 23 December 
1954, 30 July 1955, 21 September 1955, 22 December 
1955, 23 November 1956. 
224. Federal News: 22 December 1955. 
225. Selby, who had come to South Africa only after the 
Second World War, did not appreciate this development 
amongst Engl ish-speakers. He wrote to Derek Heaton 
Nichol Is: 'I confess I have never shared nor understood 
t~e almost veneration wi~h which your father, in common 
with so many of the Engl Ish-speaking, regarded Smuts.' 
NIP: A.R. Selby to D. Heaton Nichol Is, 4 January 1962 
loc.cit. ' 
if it had not been for the National ists' 
election victory.(226) 
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Simi larly, the most important weakness of the Federal 
position as regards the Crown, the Commonwealth and the Natal 
Stand was that it wa~ I ike federal ism, mainly a reaction to 
Afrikaner national ism. (227) Of course, because South Africa 
was cQnstitutional Iy then a monarchy, the Federals were defend-
Ing the status qUO and would naturally react against any attack 
on it. The problem, however, went deeper than that. The Fed-
erals reacted to every move of the National ists and therefore 
appeared to have no consistent approach. When the National ists 
wished to remove the Coloureds from the common rol I, the Natal 
Stand was the reaction against tampering with an 'entrenched' 
clause. Later, as soon as the National ists had transferred 
the i r attent i on to repub I i can ism, it was emp loyed in oppos it ion 
to that issue. In their reactions against the republ ic the 
Federals also appeared to be inconsistent. They accepted the 
Clause 2(d) in the U.P. constitution while that party was in 
power but as soon as Afrikaner republ icans assumed the reins 
of government, they could no longer tolerate even the possibil-
i ty of a repub I i c. I t appeared from the F edera I behav i our 
that the Crown and the Commonwealth would always stand between 
them and their fel low South Africans and that the Natal Stand 
was an ever ready weapon to use against any law of which 
Engl ish-speaking Natal disapproved. 
In the National ist action - Federal re-action situation, 
the National ists held the advantage because they held the in-
itiative. They could emphasize the colour issue (as in 1948 
and 1953) or emphasize republ icanism (as in 195~), depending 
on the favourab iii ty of circumstance. The F edera I s, I n re-
action, were unable to choose the time for the struggle, for 
examp I e, over the Un i on Jack and the symbo I s of the Crown. In 
this way, the National ists could use their initiative, and 
226. Natal Witness: 14 May 1953. Selby confirmed this view 
soon after the formation of the Federal Party. 
Vide supra: Ch.3. p.55. 
227. For press comment on this point at the time of the 
formation of the Federal Party. Vide supra; Ch. 3.pp. 56-58. 
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their legislative power, to make the coming of the republ ic 
appear inexorable. Never having the initiative or the satis-
faction of achieving a positive victory, the Federals and 
their supporters could not sustain interest. The fai lure of 
the A.R. L. was due to the League having nothing to do after 
its initial burst of energy(228)because the government refused 
to give details of when the republ ic would be created and so 
provide the opportunity for a pol itical crisis. By the time of 
the referendum, the Federal Party and its front organisations 
were barely functioning. 
The reaction against Afrikaner national ism also affected 
the third main pol icy issue, that of colour. It is true that 
the relative I iberal ism of the Federals was rooted in the war-
time experience ' of the many ex-servicemen who launched the 
party. Equally true, however, was its reactionary source. 
Whi Ie the government strove to remove the Indian population 
by offering assisted passages to India, whi Ie it precip i tated 
the country's greatest constitutional struggle in removing the 
Coloureds from the common role and whi Ie it proposed total 
separation for the Blacks, the Federals envisaged a common 
society with a common franchise. For the strong I iberal element 
within the Federal Party this was logical, but for the i I liberal 
Anglophiles, agreement stemmed largely from reaction. 
This gave rise to the accusation that the Federals wished 
only to use the large non-White population to outweigh Afrikaners 
in the Engl ish-Afrikaner struggle. Die Burger summed up this 
accusation when it stated that the answer as to why the Federals, 
'the most British of South Africans' supported a I iberal non-
White pol icy was' ... the real isation by these people that they 
are a minority and that they are becoming powerless, the deep-
rooted distrust in and fear of the national Afrikaner, and the 
desire to find pol itical al I ies somewhere. ,(229) 
This accusation was untrue In that many Federals were 
genuinely I iberal in their views on race. On the other hand, 
228. Vide supra: Ch.6. pp. 144-5. 
229. Rand Dai Iy Mail: 30 March 1954. 
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it was true in that other sections of the party had definite 
ulterior motives to their racial I iberal ism. Early in 1954, 
Selby wrote that if the Natal Stand were to be put into action, 
Natal's case would be placed 'before the moral judgement of 
the world. ,(230) As such, Natal ia~s needed a racial pol icy 
which the British Commonwealth could 'underwrite', and would 
have to be in contrast to the apartheid of Afrikaner National-
ism. (231) A similar argument was used by Martin in his ·Case 
against Dr. Verwoerd's Republ ic in 1961.(232) ----
Like the Federal Party's statements and pol icies on 
federation and the Crown and the Commonwealth, · its pol icies 
on race were thus extremely confusing. Whi Ie it won the 
support of some, it cost the party more support than it gained. 





The Case Against Dr. Verwoerd's Republ ic, 
p.5. 
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CHAPTER , ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is not only to provide a history 
of the Federal Party, but also to place that history in the wider 
perspective of the Engl ish-speakers confronting an aggressive 
Afrikaner national ism. This required an analysis of the issues 
and pressures which swayed the Engl ish-speaking group in what 
was ·the last phase of the long Anglo-Afrikaner duel in South 
Africa. Also, it included an assessment of the reasons for 
the fai lure of the Federal response to the country's difficul-
ties. These issues have been dealt with in detai I in the pre-
ceed i ng chapters. It rema i ns to exam i ne the widespread impact 
which the Federal Part y's ideas and pol icies, as wei I as its 
Anglophi Ie tendencies, had on South African society. 
Professor Butterfield has criticised the tendency amongst 
historians to divide historical personages into' •.. the men who 
furthered progress and the men who tried to hinder it.,(I) 
'Progress' in this cootext is whatever contributed directly to 
the dominant social and pol itical ideas at the time of writing. 
In this type of classification, the thoughts and prejudices 
of the present are transported to the past and historical move-
ments are judged accordingly. Thus, the federal Party and its 
al I ies, with their pro-imperial views, which are unfashionable 
today amongst al I but a smal I group, are almost entirely ig-
nored. (2) When the Federals are briefly mentioned, it is usual-
ly as forming an irrelevant pressure group which was a nineteenth 
century remnant fighting for their ideals long after the cause 
was lost and history had by-passed them. 
But, as Butterfield points out, this tendency to 'under-
I ,(3) "d" th t " h" h t h " " va ue one Sl e In e ens Ions w IC crea e Istory IS to 
miss the point that the 'whole present .•• [is] the chi Id of 
1. H. Butterfield: The Whig Interpretation of History, 1950,p.ll. 
2. V ide supra: Ch. 1. pp. 2-4. 
3. Butterfield: op.cit., p.24. 
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the whole past. ,(4) AI I historical development emerges from 
a clash between antagonists, and therefore al I parties to the 
confl ict have a lasting influence. This influence I ies not only 
in forcing the victorious group into particular actions and 
decisions, or at least to modify many of its attitudes, but 
also in the survival of ideas and attitudes of the unsuccessful 
group. These ideas are never completely annihi lated and, al-
though not dominant, they remain in the body pol itic. In this 
context, the Federal Party is not just a fai led pol itical party 
representing a group of outdated jingos, but rather a major in-
fluence on South Africa's pol itical and social development with 
strands extending into the present. 
One of these strands was the rapprochement of the National-
ists and many of the Engl ish-speakers. During the 1940s and 
1950s the National ists were almost entirely occupied with es-
tabl ishing Afrikaner national ism as the dominant pol itical force 
in South Africa. The non-Whites and the Engl ish-speakers were 
seen as opponents who had to be contained or overwhelmed. Super-
ficially it would seem that the reaction of Engl ish-speaking 
pol itical groups, such · as the Federal Party, only confirmed 
National ist suspicions and therefore reinforced their determin-
ation to destroy opposition threats. It could be argued, how-
ever, that the strong stand made by the Federals on behalf of 
the Engl ish-speakers was a major factor in forcing the Nation-
al ists to revise their n~gative attitude to this wealthy and 
articulate group. Of course, world criticism of apartheid and 
the spectre of an Africa moving rapidly towards independence 
were also factors inducing this change. It is not, however, a 
question of which force compel led the government to accommodate 
the Engl ish-speakers, but rather an Issue of seeing al I the 
pressures acting simultaneously. Outside pressure pushed the 
National ists along the path of White unity, whi Ie Federal Party 
bel I igerence made the government real ise that it needed to pla-
cate the Engl ish-speakers or risk a completely al ienated minor-
ity within the White community. 
Of the pol itical parties, only the Federals could effect-
4. Ibid., p.27. 
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ively serve t~e purpose of for.cing the National ists to widen 
their conception of who should rule South Africa. The Liberal 
and Progressive Parties were not concerned with the Engl ish-
speakers as such, and the U.P., because of its declared bel iefs 
and because of its rei iance on the Afrikaner vote, could not 
champion Engl ish-speaking sectional ism. This is not to say 
that the creation of White unity was one of the aims of the 
Federal Party. Quite the contrary. What the party wanted was 
confrontation, not co-operation with the government. But White 
unity was a seductive idea and, when the National ists broadened 
the i r appea I, I arge numbers of the Engl ish-speakers, inc Iud i ng 
former Federals, accepted the National ist invitation and formed 
a White al I iance against non-White and foreign pressure. (5) 
The existence and activities of the Federal Party not 
only compel led the government to take cognisance of the Engl ish-
speak i ng group, ita I so forced the Engl ish-speakers to re-
appraise their position within South Africa. Previously, they 
had no opt i on but to support the U. P. or its a I lies, in contrast 
to the Afrikaners who could vote for partnership with the 
Engl ish-speakers in the U.P. or support Afrikaner national ism 
in the National Party. Now, with a choice at their disposal, 
the Engl ish-speakers were compel led to face the principal di l-
emma of their pol itical situation - whether or not to challenge 
Afrikanerdom. They could support the Federal Party and confront 
the rul ing national ism with a numerica.lly weaker Engl .ish-speaking 
imitation. Alternatively, they could support the U.P. in the 
hope of influencing pol icy in partnership with the Afrikaners. 
The fact that most Engl ish-speakers chose to support the U.P. 
obscures the basic fact that, without the Federals, the fundamen-
ta I issue of Angl o-Afr i kaner re I at ions wou I d have been blurred 
by other issues. And, as a result~ many Engl ish-speakers might 
never have real ised the powerlessness of their group. It was 
this real isation which helped to create apathy among Engl ish-
speakers and so made them more susceptible to the National Party 
5. Witness the strong National Party electoral support amongst 
Engl ish-speakers, especially in Natal, in the 1960s. Ford 
and Grimwood, in interviews, both commented on the fact that 
'many' Federals joined the National ists at that time. 
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at the very t ,ime when that party was cal I ing for White unity. 
Not al I Engl ish-speakers lapsed into apathy and subse-
quent support for the government. A large minority, especially 
the Anglophi les, continued to fight for the rights of the 
Engl ish-speakers. When it became clear that the Federal Party 
was unsuccessful, this group formed the A.R.L. to fight for the 
old imperial ist ideas under a new banner. (6) After initial 
activity, interest in the A.R.L. waned and UNESSA was constitu-
ted by the same group with the same ideas. (7) This moving of 
essentially the same group of people from organisation to organ-
isation was the only way in which they could sustain interest 
in the face of their own powerlessness. Since the demise of 
UNESSA, no organisation has taken this cry with such vigour 
and with consistency. 
Apart from the aim of defending the Engl ish-speakers, the 
Federal Party, unl ike the A.R.L. and UNESSA, also had a rela-
tively I iberal non-White pol icy. This pol icy, I ike the party's 
sectional ideas, had the effect of compel I ing the Engl ish-
speakers to clarify their attitudes; in this instance in rela-
tion to the non-Whites~ The National ists advocated apartheid 
and the U.P. adopted a stand which, whi Ie complex and confusing, 
was a I so based, in t he I ast resort, on rac i a I ism. (8) At the 
other end of the pol itical spectrum, the Liberal Party, disre-
garding South Africa's unique social and pol itical complexities, 
advocated a common society in keeping with world-wide liberal 
bel iefs. Only the Federal Party argued, al'beit gropingly and 
hesitantly at times, in favour of a pol icy which took into 
account both the real ities of South African society and the 
ideal of individual worth. They acknowledged that as there was 
a great diversity in I ifestyle, culture and experience between 
the race groups of the country, any pol icy which proposed an 
immediate common society would win the support of only a tiny 
minority in the dominant White group. Any party which enter-
tained hopes of coming to power in a reasonable time had to take 
account of this fact. At the same time, they real ised that to 
6. Vide supra: Ch. 6. pp. 140-145 eassim. 
7. Vide sue ra : Ch. 8. pp. 175-77. 
8. Vide sue ra : Ch. 5. p. 113. 
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use race as the yardstick of al ·1 social and pol itical organIsa-
tion was becoming increasingly dangerous. For this reason, 
the Federals planned a pol icr that was both a plan of action 
and a statement of bel ief. (9 
Confronted with this pol icy, the Engl ish-speakers could 
no longer ignore the race Issue. No longer could they reject 
both the I iberals and the racists and remain outside the race 
debate. The Federal Party presented a third alternative and 
compel led them to define their position. 
Whi Ie it is true that the Federal race pol icy underwent 
a number of changes, its position in the South African pol iti-
cal spectrum remained between the Liberal and United Parties. 
In addition, the basic ideas remained unchanged. This means 
that the Federal race pol icy occupies a permanent place in 
South Africa's pol itical history. The pol icy anticipated that 
of the Progressive Party which was simi larly based on the 
value of individual worth whi Ie giving protection to group id-
entity. In this way, the Federal Party, while grounded in the 
past - in the Engl ish-Afrikaner dispute - suppl ied the I ink 
with the future, In wh 'i ch the ma i n issue was to be i nter-rac i a I 
relations. Many of the former FederaJs later joined the Pro-
gressives and their comparatively I iberal ideals found further 
expression in that party. (10) 
The impact of another of the Federal Party's pol icies -
federal ism - was quite different from that of the non-White 
pol icy in that there was no successor party to make federal ism 
its central pol icy. Federation was based, in the ultimate 
analysis, on ethnicity. The whole drive behind the pol icy was 
that only in federation would the interests of the Engl ish-
speakers be protected against the Afrikaner majority. The idea 
had only a I imited impact and entered the post-1960 period 
discredited. As the discussion on the constitutional future 
of South Africa has re-opened in the 1970s, the question of 
federat ion is under discuss i on once aga i n. It is true that the 
groups involved in any federation are no longer the Engl ish 
9. Vide supra: Ch.5.pp. 112-3. 
10. Interviews with A.C. Martin, J. Stewart and B. Batchelor. 
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and Afrikaans-speakers, but r.ather the Whites and the different 
Black groups. There are, however, strong similarities between 
the federal ideas of the 1950s and those of the 1970s. Both 
are based on ethnicity and both are motivated by the need to 
protect each group from being dominated by others. 
During its I ifetime the Federal Party was commonly viewed 
as the product of a group of outmoded Engl ish-speakers, .whose 
enthusiasm was more embarrassing than it was productive. Its 
leaders and ideas were c ar i catured and lampooned in newspapers 
generally affil iated to other pol itical groups. Today it is 
perhaps easier sti I I to fal I into the same error, for modern 
perspectives are affected by ignorance of detai I about this 
period in South African history, such as did not affect the 
contemporary. It is only through historical research that such 
errors can be dispel led. 
APPENDIX 




PROMINENT FEDERAL PARTY MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS 
The information listed below has been drawn from numerous 
sources, too numerous to list in the form of footnotes. The 
most useful sources were newspapers~ minutes of various 
committees and organisations, election manifestos and personal 
interviews. 
Mrs. P. Argo. 
Born in the United Kingdom, Mrs. Argo was a prominent 
welfare worker. She was elected to the Torch Commando's Natal 
Action Committee In January 1953 and was a Natal sponsor of 
the Federal Party. For a number of years Mrs. Argo served on 
the Natal Provincial Executive Committee of the party and, in 
October 1955, was elected a vice-chairman. In the 1954 and 
1959 provincial elections, she contested the Pinetown and 
Umbi 10 constituencies respectively. 
Mrs. Argo is deceased and her executrix informed the 
author that she left no pol itical papers or documents. 
B. Aatchelor. 
A Zululand sugar farmer, B. Batchelor joined the Natal 
Federal Party in 1954. He was a member of the Natal Provincial 
Executive Committee for a number of years and, In 1957, was a 
member of a three-man Federal lecture tour of the Orange Free 
State. He convened the Federal Party's Franchise Committee 
and was prominent in the I iberal wing of the party. In the 
provincial elections of 1959, Batchelor contested the Umkomaas 
constituency. 
Batchelor made his extensive pol itical papers avai lable 
and granted several long interviews to the author at his farm 
in the Richmond district. 
J.C. Bolton. 
Born in the United Kingdom, J. Bolton became a Durban 
city counci Ilor and leading trade unionist. He was made a 
Freeman of the city of York and was awarded the Queens 
Coronation Medal in 1953 for meritorious service. Bolton 
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• joined the federal Party in the same year. In the 1954 
provincial el 'ections, he contested the Durban Central 
constituency. On 18 January 1955 he resigned from the federal 
Party in protest against its appeal to the Commonwealth 
leaders to prevent a South African republ ic. 
Mr. Bolton is deceased and, despite extensive enquiries, 
no pol itical papers could be located. 
G.A. Brathwaite. 
G. Brathwaite was a national vice-chairman of the Torch 
Commando and became one of the Transvaal sponsors of the 
federal Party. He formed a branch in Pretoria and was the 
first chairman of the Transvaal Federal Party. 
Brathwaite's widow, Shei la Brathwaite of Somerset West, 
informed the author that he left no political papers or 
documents. 
R. Brickhi II. 
Born in 1922 and educated at Maritzburg Col lege, R. 
Brickhi I I was, In the early 1950s, the secretary of the Labour 
Party in Natal. He later became a member of the Action 
Committee and the Natal organiser of the Torch Commando. In 
July 1953 he resigned his offices In the Commando to join 
the Federals. The following month he was elected a vice-
cha i rman of the Nata I Federa I Party. I n the prov inc i a I 
elections of 1954, Brickhi I I contested the Durban Berea 
constituency. Disi I lusioned at the attitudes of the electorate, 
he gradually withdrew from politics and later emigrated to 
Rhodesia, where he died soon afterwards. 
It has not been possible, despite numerous enquiries and 
letters, to trace his wife or relatives. 
E.R. Browne. 
A lawyer by profession, E. Browne was chairman of the 
Labour Party in Natal and a senator fro~ the province. He 
joined the Natal federal Party in May 1953, became its legal 
advisor, a vice-chairman and a member of its Action Committee. 
For three years he was chairman of the party. Amid controversy, 
Browne retained his Senate seat until 1954. 
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E.R. Browne of Westvi I Ie, the Senator's son, informed 
the author that his father left no pol itical papers or 
documents in his estate. 
Rev. J.B. Chutter. 
An Angl ican minister, Rev. Chutter was the chairman of 
the Nata I I n I and Reg i on of the Torch Commando. He co-operated 
closely with Ford In laying the foundations of the Federal 
Party and was one of the party's Natal sponsors. 
Rev. Chutter is deceased, and, despite exhaustive 
enquiries, his widow and fami Iy could not be traced. 
W.S. Conradie. 
W. Conradie was a member of the National Action Commitee 
and chairman of the Southern Transvaal Region of the Torch 
Commando. He was a Transvaal sponsor of the Federal Party 
and presided over its first meeting in that province. Later, 
he went on a lecture tour of the Transvaal and Natal on behalf 
of the Federal Party. One of the two prominent members who 
were Afr i kaans-speak i ng', he I eft the party when it became 
apparent that the Federals were concerned overwhelmingly with 
the Engl ish-speakers. 
Conradie granted the author a lengthy interview at his 
home in Johannesburg. 
Mrs. P.R. Cousins. 
Mrs~ Cousins was the honourary secretary of the Transvaal 
Federal Party for its entire existence. 
All attempts to trace her have fai led. 
Professor G.H. Durrant. 
G. Durrant was an act1ve Torchman and a Natal delegate to 
the Torch Commando's national congress in June 1953. Although 
he never held office, Professor Durrant was an active Federal 
supporter and organised a speech course for prospective 
Federal Party election candidates in 1957. Subsequently, he 
emigrated to Canada. 
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Although Professor Durrant, now at the University of 
British Columbia, could not supply documentation other than 
newspaper cuttings, he suppl ied useful insights into Federal 
attitudes. 
Brigadier J.T. Durrant. 
An ex-chief of the South African Defence Force and , the 
youngest major-general in the Commonwealth forces during World 
War I I, Brigadier Durrant, on retirement from the Defence 
Force, went farming at Nottingham Road. He was a national 
vice-chairman of the Torch Commando, a Natal sponsor of the 
Federal Party and a candidate for that party, in the 
Drakensberg constituency, in the 1954 provincial elections. 
In 1956, amid publ icity, he joined the A.R.L. and served on 
its Natal committee. 
Despite exhaustive enquiries, Brigadier Durrant could 
not be traced. 
R.L. Fitzgerald. 
R. Fitzgerald was ' the honourary secretary of the Federal 
Party (Cape) in 1957-58. 
He could not be traced. 
E.G. Ford. 
A lawyer by profession, E. Ford was a national vice-
chairman and chairman of the Natal Coast Region of the Torch 
Commando. Ford was more responsible than any other person 
for formulating the ideas of the Federal Party and swinging 
Torch Commando support behind the new pol itical group. A Natal 
sponsor of the F~deral Party, he was elected chairman of the 
Natal Federal Party in 1953 and 1954. Disillusioned at the 
result of the 1954 provincial elections, he gradually withdrew 
from pol itics. Later, he emigrated to Umtal i, Rhodesia. 
Ford corresponded with the author and granted him a 
lengthy interview in which he supplied a large amount of vital 
information on the formation of the Federal Party. 
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J. Freeman. 
J. Freeman joined the Natal Federal Party in 1953 and 
served as honourary secretary of the Midlands Zone and on the 
Provincial Executive Committee for a number of years. He was 
the convenor of the committee entrusted with drafting pol icy 
on social and economic affairs and later of the standing 
committee on economic development of Natal which examined the 
economic viabil ity of the province in the event of its 
breaking away from the Union. 
Freeman 'supp lied the author with a number of contemporary 
documents and granted him a lengthy interview at his 
Pietermaritzburg home. 
D. Grant. 
A director of companies and a sugar farmer, D. Grant 
became a Lower South Coast Zone chairman and a Provincial 
Executive Committee member of the Natal Federal Party. He 
contested the Umzimkulu constituency in the 1954 provincial 
elections. 
Despite exhaustive enquiries, Grant could not be traced. 
S.M. Greene. 
A lawyer by profession, S. Greene resigned as Natal 
secretary of the Labour Party to help found the Natal Federal 
Party. He became a member of the Provincial Executive Committee 
of the party and convened the standing committee deal ing with 
current legislation. A member of the Franchise Committee and 
a strong supporter of a more liberal non-White policy within 
the Federal Party, he resigned when the party did not move 
quickly enough in that direction. In the 1954 provincial 
elections, he contested the Durban Point constituency. 
Greene granted the author a lengthy interview at his 
Durban home. 
W.V. Grimwood. 
W. Grimwood joined the Federal Party in 1954 and served 
the party as an efficient honourary treasurer for a number of 
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He a lso served on the Natal Provincial Executive and years. . 
Provincial Action Committees as wei I as being elected a vice-
chairman and a deputy chairman of the party. 
Grimwood, before his death, granted the author two long 
telephone interviews. 
W. F. Ham i I ton. 
A member of the Natal Coast Action Committee and a vlce-
chairman of the Natal Coast Region of the Torch Commando, W. 
Hami Iton was a sponsor of the Federal Party. He became the 
chairman of the Durban Zone and, later, a vice-chairman of the 
Natal party. 
Hami Iton informed the author that he had no relevant 
pol itical papers. 
Mrs. G. Hamlyn. 
Mrs. Hamlyn was secretary to Rev. J.B. Chutter and 
although she did not playa major role in the formation of the 
Federal Party, she was sympathetic to the party and assisted 
Rev. Chutter in his efforts to help found the party. 
Mrs. Ham I yn granted the author severa I i nterv i ews at her 
Durban home. 
D. Hanaf in. 
D. Hanafin was a member of the Transvaal Federal Party 
and contested the Hospital provincial by-election in June 1958. 
Hanafin could not be traced. 
P. Hathorn. 
Born in Natal and educated in Pietermaritzburg and the 
United Kingdom, P. Hathorn joined the Natal Federal Party In 
1953. He was, at various times the vice-chairman of the 
Midlands Zone, a member of the Natal Provincial Executive 
Committee and a vice-chairman of the party in Natal. In the 
1954 provincial elections he contested the Pietermaritzburg 
North constituency. 
His nephew, P. Hathorn of Hilton and his former partners 
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, 
at the law firm of Hathorn, Cameron and Co. of Pietermaritzburg 
informed the author that Hathorn left no pol itical papers or 
documents. 
D. Heaton Nichol Is. 
D. Heaton Nichol Is, the son of Senator Heaton Nichol Is 
and a Zululand sugar farmer, was born and educated in Na~al. 
He was active in the Natal Coast Region of the Torch Commando 
~nd joi~ed the Federal Party in 1953. He served the Natal 
Federal Party in numerous capacities, being elected at different 
times, chairman of the Zululand Zone, a member, and later 
chairman, of the Natal Provincial Executive Committee, a member 
of the Provincial Action Committee, chairman, deputy leader and 
finally, on the resignation of A.R. Selby, 'temporary leader' 
of the party in Natal. In addition, Heaton Nichol Is was the 
Federal Party's representative on the Natal delegation which 
interviewed Dr. Verwoerd in 1960, concerning concessions to 
Natal in the future Republ ic of South Africa. In the provincial 
elections of 1954 and 1959 he contested the Zululand 
constituency. 
Heaton Nichol Is made a substantial amount of private 
correspondence avai lable and, together with his wife, granted 
two lengthy interviews to the author at his Zululand farm. 
Senator G. Heaton Nichol Is. 
Born in the United Kingdom, Senator Heaton Nichol Is 
settled in South Africa after employment in the Colonial Service 
in Rhodesia and Papua. He acquired "a sugar farm in Zululand 
a"nd, in 1920, was elected to represent that constituency in 
pari iament. In 1938 he was nominated as a senator. In 1943 
he was appointed Admirdstrator of Natal and in November of the 
fol lowing year he be~ame the Union's High Commis~ioner in 
London. He resigned his post in October 1947, was appointed 
a Privy Counci Ilor in January 1948 and re-entered the Senate, 
soon to be the U.P~ leader in "the Upper Hou~e. 
In Apri I 1953 he announced his resignation from the U.P. 
and the next month as~umed the "leadership of the Natal Federal 
Party, a position he heldunti I July 1957. 
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R. HU9hes Mason • 
. Hughes Mason, the vice-chairman of the Natal Inland 
Region of the Torch Commando, was a Natal sponsor of the 
Federal Party. He served on the Natal Provincial Executive 
and Natal Provinc1al Action Committees and was elected, at 
different times, a vice-chairman and deputy chairman of the 
party. He was a member of the three-man Federal lecture . tour 
of the Orange Free State and served as honourary organiser of 
Federal News. Hughes Mason contested the provincial 
constitu~ncies of Umzimkulu in the by-election in 1955 and 
Ixopo in the 1959 elections. 
Neither his former partners at the law firm of Mason, 
Buchan and Co. of Pietermaritzburg nor his widow had any, or 
knew the whereabouts of any, of his pol iticalpapers. 
L. Kane-Berman. 
L. Kane-Berman was the national chairman of the Torch 
Commando and was one of the sponsors of the Federal Party. He 
held no office in the party • 
. Kane-Berman, of Houghton, Johannesburg, corresponded with 
the auth~r and granted him an interview. 
M. Kettles. 
M. Kettles organised the Federal Party in the eastern 
Cape and became the chairman of the East Cape Federal Party 
of which he was the driving ,force. He resigned when the 
Federals decided not to contest the 1958 general election. 
AI I efforts to trace Kettles were unsuccessful. 
C.S. Keary. 
Chairman of the East Rand division of th~ Torch Commando, 
C.S. Keary was a Transvaal sponsor of the Federal Party. He 
held no offic~ in the party. 
Keary granted the author an interview at his Durban home. 
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C. 'Kinsman. 
A retired City Engineer of Durban, C. Kinsman joined the 
Natal Federal Party in 1954. He served on the Natal Provinc~al 
Executive and Natal Provi~cial Action Committees, and~ at 
various times, as a vice-chairman and the deputy chairman of 
the party. In the 1954 provincial elections, he contested the 
Durban North constituency. 
Kinsman, an octogenarian, decl ined to be interviewed and 
informed the author that he had no pol itical papers. 
Miss G.E. Lee. 
A keen supporter of the Transvaal Federal Party since its 
inception, Miss Lee was the honourary editor of The Federal ist. 
It was not possible to . trace Miss Lee. 
D. Lowe. 
In the 1959 provincial elections, D. Lowe contested the 
Umzimkulu constituency. 
Despite exhaustive enquiries, Lowe could not be traced. 
Dr. L.S. Manion. 
A dentist by profession, Dr. L.S. Manion was a member of 
the Natal Provincial Executive Committee and, in the 1954 
provincial elections, he contested the Durban Greyvi I Ie 
constituency. 
The author was informed that Dr. Manion IS deceased. 
Mrs. E. McChesney (now Mrs. B. Ross). 
In January 1954, Mrs. McChesney became the secretary of 
the Nata I Federa I Party and, · later, was elected a member of the 
Natal Provincial Executive Committee. 
She informed the author that she did not have any relevant 
political papers. 
ReS. McKie Thompson. 
R.S. McKie Thomps6n joined the Natal Federal Party In 
1953, was elected ' chairman of the Upper South Coa~t Zone the 
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• same year. 1n the 1954 provincial elections, he c~ntested the 
Umkomaas constituency. Later, he served as a Natal representa-
tive on the Inter-Provincial Consultative Committee. 
Despite extensive enquiries, McKie Thompson could not 
be traced. 
M. Mal I inick. 
M. Mal linick was the chairman of the Transvaal Federal 
Party for. a short period. He served as a Transvaal 
representative on the Inter-Provincial Consultative Committee. 
He was a founder and the national secretary of UNESSA. 
Despite exha~sti ve attempts, Mal I inick could not be 
traced. 
Lieut.-Col. A.C. Martin. 
Lieut.~Col. Martin retired as a school principal, joined 
the Natal Federal P~rty in 1953 and contested the Berea 
par1ia~entary by-election the same year. He was appointed 
convenor of the standing committee on education. At various 
times, he served on the ,Natal Provincial Executive and 
Provincial Action Committees, and as a Natal representative 
on the Inter-Provincial Consultative Committee. In 1958 he 
was elected deputy chairman of the Natal Federal Party and, 
the fol lowing year, he 'was elected the last leader of the 
party. In the 1954 and 1959 provincial elections, he contested 
the constituencies of Umbi 10 and Essenwood respectively. 
Lieut.-Col. Martin supplied the author with a number of 
important documents and granted him several lengthy interviews 
at his Durban home. 
D.L. Nurcombe. 
D.l. Nurcombe joined the Natal Federal Party In 1953 
and served on the Provincial Action and Provincial Executive 
Committees~ In 1958 he was elected chairman of the Natal 
Federa I Party. 
Despite extensive enquiries, he could not be traced. 
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N. 'Roberts. 
N. Roberts was a vice-chairman of the Natal A.R.L. and, 
on joining the Federal Party, contested the Pietermaritzburg 
South constituency in the 1959 provincial elections. 
Mrs. G.A. Park Ross. 
Mrs. Park Ross joined the Natal Federal Party in 1953 
and served on the Provincial Executive and Provincial Action 
Committees. After the resignation of W. Grimwood in 1958, she 
became the honourary treasurer of the party. In the 1954 
provincial elections, she contested the Pietermaritzburg 
District constituency. 
Mrs. Park Ross had no relevant political papers, but 
corresponded with the author from her home at Hi Iton. 
B. Ross. 
A farmer and former U.P. branch secretary, B. Ross joined 
the Natal Federal Party in 1953 and served, at various times 
on the Provincial Executive and Franchise Committees. 
Ross made a quantity of press cuttings avai lable to the 
author. 
Dr. B. Sampson. 
A former president of the Natal Coast branch of the South 
African Medical Association, Dr. Sampson served the Federal 
Party as a Durban Zone chairman and as a member of the 
Provincial Executive Committee. In the 1954 provincial 
elections, he contested the constituency of Umgeni. 
Despite exhaustive efforts, Dr. Sampson could not be 
traced. 
Maj.-Gen. A.R. Selby. 
Maj.-Gen. Selby was born in Austral ia and commanded 
British forces in the Middle East during World War I I. He 
emigrated to South Africa after the war. A n~tional vice-
president of the Torch Commando, Selby was a Natal sponsor of 
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the Federal Party. He served the Natal Federal Party, at 
various times,' as vice-chairman and chairman before resigning 
in 1955 to form and lead the Natal A.R.L. In 1957 Selby 
returned to the Federal Party to succeed G. Heaton Nichol Is 
as leader. The fol lowing year he was elected the first and 
only national leader of the Federal Party. Selby resigned 
his offices in November 1959 for personal reasons. In the 
1954 and 1959 provincial elections, he contested the 
Pietermaritzburg South and Pietermaritzburg District 
constituencies respectively. 
His widow, Mrs. P. Selby, informed the author that the 
General left no pol itical papers. She granted him a lengthy 
interview at her home near Grey town, Natal. 
P. Senegue. 
The honourary accountant of the Torch Commando, P. 
Seneque joined the Natal Federal Party and served as honourary 
treasurer for a short period as wei I as on the Provincial 
Action Committee. A strong supporter of a more liberal non-
White pol icy for the F~deral Party, he resigned when the party 
did not move quickly enough in that direction. 
Prof.essor Seneque of Natal University made his personal 
pol itical papers avai lable and granted an interview to the 
author. 
J.E.M. Seymour. 
From East Griqualand, Seymour did not have a great deal 
to do with the Federal Party .unti I he stood as a Federal 
candidate in Greyvil Ie in the 1959 provincial elections. 
Seymour made his election manifesto avai lable to the 
author and granted him an interview at his Durban home. 
Dr. D. Standin9. 
Dr. Standing joined the Natal Federal Party in 1953, 
served on the Provinciaf Executive Committee and contested the 
Gardens constituency in the 1954 provincial elections. 
All attempts to trace Dr. Standing were unsuccessful. 
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Mrs. J. Stewart. 
A wei I-known social worker, Mrs. Stewart joined the 
Federal Party because of a perceived threat to Natal education 
from the National Party. In the 1959 provincial elections, 
she contested the Durban North ' constituency. 
Mrs. Stewart made her extensive private pol itical papers 
avai lable to the author as wei I as granting him several long 
interviews at her Durban North home. 
Mrs. H. Struben. 
Mrs. Struben was the founder of the Federal Party in the 
western Cape and was chairman of that party. She was the 
Cape's representative on the Inter-Provincial Consultative 
Committee. 
All attempts to trace Mrs. Struben were unsuccessful. 
J. Venter. 
One of the two prominent Afrikanns-speaking members of 
the Federal Party, J. Venter served on the Transvaal Provincial 
Executive Committee of the party. 
AI I attempts to trace Venter were unsuccessful. 
L. Vermaak. 
Born and educated in Natal~ L. Vermaak joined the Natal 
Federal Party in 1954 and became chairman of the Stanger branch. 
In 1955 he was employed by the party as a ful I-time organiser. 
This, however, was of short duration owing to a lack of funds. 
Despite exhaustive attempts, Vermaak could not be traced. 
D.O. Wi I I. 
D.O. Wil I was, at various times, dhairman of the 
Pietermaritzburg City branch of the Natal Federal Party, 
chairman of the Midlands Zone and a ~ember of the Provincial 
Executive Committee. He contested the Pietermaritzburg South 
constituency in a provincial by-election in 1958. 
AI I attempts to trace Wi II were unsuccessful. 
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J • D. Wi I so n. 
J.D. Wi Ison was the chairman of the Witwatersrand 
division of the Torch Commando and was a Transvaal sponsor of 
the Federal Party. Thereafter he played no part in Federal 
Party activities. 
Wi Ison corresponded with the author and granted him a 
long telephone interview. 
D. Woods. 
A journalist by profession, D. Woods was the vlce-
chairman of the Federal Party in the eastern Cape and the 
party's candidate for the East London North pari iamentary 
by-election in 1957. 
Before he could be contacted by the author, Woods had 
left South Africa. 
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B I BLI OGRAPHY 
APPARATUS 
I I PRIMARY MATERIAL 
I I I 
(i) Official Government Publ ications 
(a) Hansard 
( i i ) 
(b) Miscellaneous 





Fenha I I s Papers 





Papers in the possession of the Author 
Publ ic Co I I ect ions 
Heaton · Nichol Is Papers - Kil I ie Campbel I 
Africana Library 
Institute of Contemporary History - University 
of the Orange Free State 
Johannesburg Publ ic Library - Africana 
Collecti on 
Progressive Party Papers - University of the 
Witwatersrand 
United Party Papers - University of South 
Africa 
(ii i) Contem~orary Booklets 
(iv) NewsPapers 
(v) Persona I I nterv i ews 
SECONDARY MATERIAL 
( i ) Books 
( i i ) Booklets 
( iii) Articles 
( i v) Un~ub I i shed Theses 
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APPARATUS 
Malan, S.I. Union Catalogue of Theses and Dissertations 
of the South African Universities 19 2-58. 
Potchefstroom, 1959. With annual supp ements) 
Muller, C.F.J., van Jaarsveld, F.A. and van Wijk, T. 
A Select Bibl iography of South African History. 
Pretoria, 1966. Supplement 1974. 
Musiker, R. Guide to South African Reference Books. 
4th ed., Cape Town, 1965. 
South African Bibl iography. london, 1969. 
Richards, M. and Honey, C. Inde x to South African 
Periodicals. Johannesburg, 1968. 
Robinson, A.M.l. Catalogue of Theses and Dissertations 
Accepted for Degrees by t he South African 
Unive~sities, 1918-4). Cape Town, 1943. 
I I PRIMARY MATERIAL 
(i) Official Government Publ i cations 
(a) Hansard 
(b) 
Debates of the House of Assembly of the Union 
of South Africa. 1952-1962. 
Senate Debates of the Union of South Africa. 
1952-1954. 
M i sce I I aneous 
The Official Gazette of the Province of Nata I • 
Nos.275-6, 24 June 1954. 
The Official Gazette of the Province of Nata I • 
No.578, 5 November 1959. 
Government Gazette Ext r aordinary. No.6557, 
26 October 1960. 
(ii) Collections of Papers 
(a) Private Collections 
Batchelor Papers (In t he possession of B. 
Batchelor, 'Newbrough Grange', Richmond, 
Natal). 
Circulars 
U.F.P. (Natal): Chairm an's Circular: Apri I 1954. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Organise r's Circular: 6 July 
1955. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Circular : 8 August 1955. 
(cyclostyled) 
285 
U.F.P. (Natal): Circular to all Members of 
the Provincial Executive Committee: 19 Apri I 
1958. (cyclostyled ) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Circular to all Members of 
the Provincial Executive Committee: 14 May 
1958. (cyclostyled ) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Treasurer's Circular: n.d. 
(cyclostyled) 
Letters 
G. Heaton N i cho II s to B. Batchelor: 3 December 
1954. 
G. Heaton Nicholls to B. Batchelor: 29 
December 1954. 
w. Grimwood to B. Batchelor: 11 January 1955. 
W. Grimwood to B. Batc helor: 24 November 1955. 
B. Batchelor to W. Grimwood: 28 November 1955. 
(~arbon) 
W. Grimwood to B. Batc helor: 1 December 1955. 
R. Hughes Mason to B. Batchelor: postmarked 
6 February 1956. 
B. Batchelor to G. He aton Nichol Is: 16 October 
1 956 • ( car bo n ) 
B. Batchelor to G.H. Durrant: 16 October 1956. 
(carbon) 
G. Heaton Nichol Is to B. Batchelor: 19 October 
1956. 
B. Ross to B. Batchel or: 19 October 1956. 
B. Batchelor to B. Ross: 20 October 1956. 
(carbon) 
E.M. Jackson to B. Bat chelor: 29 October 1956. 
W. Grimwood to B. Batchelor: 4 January 1957. 
R. Hughes Mason to B. Batchelor: 2 August 1957. 
A.R. Selby to B. Batchelor: 6 August 1957. 
U.F.P. (Natal): A.R. Selby to al I Members of 
the Provincial Executive: 9 August 1957. 
A.R. Selby to B. Batchelor: 12 August 1957. 
W. Barnes to B. Batchelor: 18 August 1957. 
G.E. Lee to A.R. Selby: 19 August 1957. 
B. Batchelor to A.R. Selby: 24 August 1957. 
(carbon) 
A.R. Selby to B. Batchelor: 27 August 1957. 
A.R. Selby to B. Batche lor: 30 August 1957. 
M.G. Colly to B. Batchelor: 4 September 1957. 
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A.R. Selby to B. Batchelor: 22 October 1957. 
B. Batchelor to A.R. Selby: 10 November 1957. 
(carbon) 
A.R. Selby to B. Batchelor: 25 November 1957. 
B. Batchelor to A.R. Selby: 1 December 1957. 
(carbon) 
B. Batchelor to R. Hughes Mason: 5 October 
1959. (carbon) 
R. Hughes Mason to B. Batchelor: 9 October 
1959. 
Minutes 
U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee 
Meeting Minutes: 19 February 1955. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Provi ncial Executive Committee 
Meeting Minutes: 25 March 1955. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Provi ncial Executive Committee 
Meeting Minutes: 28 July 1956. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): 1956 Provincial Congress 
Minutes: 12 and 13 October 1956. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Action Committee 
Meeting Minutes: 11 January 1957. 
(eye I·ostyl ed) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee 
Meeting Minutes: 22 June 1957. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee 
Meeting Minutes: 20 July 1957. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee 
Meeting Minutes: 21 September 1957. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): 1956 Provincial Congress 
Minutes: 18 and 1 October 1957. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee 
Meeting Minutes: 23 November 1957. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Provincial Executive Committee 
Meeting Minutes: 26 Apri I 1958. (cyclostyled) 
Pamphlets 
U.F.P. (Natal): D. Heaton Nichol Is' Provincial 
Election Manifesto: n.d. LJune 195!/. 
U.F.P. (Natal): Handbill for Rally: 14 June 
1954. 
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U.F.P. (East Cape): D. Woods's Pari iamentary 
by-election Manife s to: 14 August 1957. 
U.P. (Natal): United Party Provincial Election 
Manifesto: n.d. ZJune 1954/. 
U.P. (Natal): C. Hi I Is's Provincial Election 
Manifesto: n.d. ZOctober 1959/. 
Reports 
U.F.P. (Natal): Interim Report of the Non-
Euro ean Affairs of the Union Federal Part 
2 March 1954. cyclostyled 
U.F.P. (Natal): Report by the Committee on 
Current Legislation: 23 September 1954. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Provi ncial Treasurer's Report 
to the Natal Provincial Executive Committee 
Meeting: 22 June 1957. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Re or t of the Union Federal 
Party Franchise Committee: n.d. July 195Z7. 
{cyc ostyled} 
U.F.P. (Natal): W. Gr imwood's Report re 
Pro§osed Financial Control: 11 September 
195. (cyclostyled) 
Speeches 
Batchelor, B. Speech at Stanger: 7 December 
1956. (typescript) 
Heaton Nichol Is, D. Speech at Stanger: 7 
December 1956. (typescript) 
Batchelor, B. Speech at Estcourt: 29 January 
1957. (typescript) 
Batchelor, B. Short Summary in En71 ish of a 
Speech at Bethlehem : n.d. Z1957 • 
(typescript) -
Batchelor, B. Speech at Umkomaas: 12 October 
1959. (typescript) 
Batchelor, B. Speech at KinJsburgh: 
October 1959. {typescript 
13 
Miscellaneous 
U.F.P. (East Cape): Principles: 23 July 1955. 
(typescript) 
U.F.P. (East Cape): Non-European Pol icy: n.d. 
U.F.P. (Natal): The Union Federal Party's 
Educational Pol icy : n.d. L19547. 
(cyclostyled) 
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U.F.P. (Natal): 195 Provincial Con ress P ers: 
26 and 27 March 1954. cyclostyled 
U.F.P. (Natal): Economic Aspects of the Natal 
Stand: Apri I 1954. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (N~tall: Note s for S eakers No.1 
n.d. L195i7. cyc ostyled 
U.F.P. {Natal): Financial Directive: n.d. 
LI95i7. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Observations by the Provincial 
Treasurer: n.d. L19517. (cyclostyled) 
Expenditure Account 
1 December 1957: 
(typescript) 
Batchelor, B. The Ri se of the Republ ic: Notes 
on the Coming of the Republ iCj and the role 
of the Federal Party in Natal: 18 December 
1954. (typescript) 
Batchelor, B. Memorandum on the Enfranchise-
ment of AI I Sections of South Africa's 
Population: n.d. LOctober 19567. (carbon) 
Selby, A.R. Memorandum on Prel iminary 
Pre arations for Provincial for 
Discussion b the Provincia Executive: n.d. 
November 1 5 cyc osty e 
Selby, A.R. Notes on Non-European Pol icy: n.d. 
LApri I 19587. (cyc lostyled) . 
Selby, A.R. Notes on Franchise Report: n.d. 
(cyclostyled) 
Fenhal Is Papers (In the possession of R. 
Fenhal Is, 320 West Street). 
R. Parrott to J.B. Chutter and E.G. Ford: 
28 October 1952. 
J. Alexander to E.G. Ford: 30 October 1952. 
E.G. Ford to R. Febh a lls: 3 November 1952. 
R. Fenha I I s to E.G. Ford: 5 November 1952. 
(carbon) 
E.G. Ford to R. Fenh a lls: 7 November 1952. 
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Heaton Nichol Is Pape r s (In the possession of 
D. Heaton Nichol Is, 'The Huts', Mtubatuba, 
Zululand, Natal). 
letters 
G. Heaton Nichol Is t o D. Heaton Nichol Is: 27 
September 1952. 
G. Heaton, N i cho I I s t o D. Heaton N i cho I Is: 3 
November 1952. 
G. Heaton Nichol Is t o D. Heaton Nichol Is: 10 
December 1952. 
G. Heaton Nichol Is t o M. Heaton Nichol Is: 9 
February 1953. 
G. Heaton Nichol Is t o D. Heaton Nichol Is: 14 
Febru.ary 1953 . 
D. Heaton Nichol Is to G. Heaton Nichol Is: 18 
May 1953. 
G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. Heaton Nichol Is: 20 
May 1953. 
G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. Heaton Nichol Ls: 27 
October 1953. 
G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. Heaton Nichol Is, 3 
December 1953. 
G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. Heaton Nichol Is: 5 
June 1955. 
G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. Heaton Nichol Is: 
postmarked 2 August 1955. 
D. Heaton Nichol Is to G. Heaton Nichol Is: 30 
Au gu s t 1 955 • 
G. Heaton Nichol Is to D. Heaton Nichol Is: 5 
October 1955. 
B. Friedman to G. Heat on Nichol Is: 19 January 
1956. 
S. Moor to G. Heaton Nichol Is: 10 Apri I 1957. 
A.R. Selby to G. Heaton Nichol Is: 28 June 1957. 
H. Struben to D. Heaton Nichol Is: 28 June 1957. 
E.C. Wilks to D. Heaton Nichol Is: 23 November 
1960. 
H.F. Verwoerd to A.E . Trollip: 6 December 
1960. (COpy) 
J. Stapel berg to D. Heaton Nichol Is: 10 
December 1960. 
M. Park Ross to R. Hughes Mason: 1 January 
1962. 
A.R. Selby to D. Heat on Nichol Is: 4 January 
1962. 
R. Hughes Mason to M. Park Ross: 9 January 
1962. 
R. Hughes Mason to A. C. Martin: 15 January 
1962. 
R. Hughes Mason to D. Heaton Nicholls: 17 
January 1962. 
M i sce I I aneous 
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Shave, J. Memorandu m to Members of the Natal 
Delegation: 24 November 1960. (cyclostyled) 
Kleynhans Papers (I n the posseSSion of 
Professor W. Kle~n h ans, University of South 
Africa, Pretoria). 
Letters 
U.F.P. (Transvaal) t o J.G.N. Strauss: 3 
December 1954. (carbon) 
J.L. Horak to the Secretary, U.F.P. (Transvaal): 
25 January 1955. 
J.C. Moore to The Secretary to the Prime 
Minister: 27 Novem ber 1959. 
Speeches 
Woods, D. Speech at Scottburgh: 1955. 
(typescript) 
Selby, A.R. Speech at Umbi 10: 8 November 1955. 
(typescript) 
M i sce I I aneous 
U.F.P. (Transvaal): Statement issued b~ 
, Provincial Executive : 18 February 19 5. 
(carbon) 
U.F.P. (Transvaal): St atement: 4 November 1955. 
(typescr ipt) 
U.F.P. (Transvaal): St atement: n.d. LI9567. 
(typescript) 
U.F.P. (Transvaal): Federal Party Now on a 
National Basis: 21 August 1958. (carbon) 
U.F.P. (Transvaal): Resolutions adopted at the 
Annual General Meet i ng: 25 November 1958. 
(carbon) 
U.F.P. (Transvaal): Statement: 10 November 
1959. (carbon) 
A.R.L. (Natal): Statement: 8 December 1955. 
(carbon) 
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A.R.L. (Natal): Appl ication for Membership: n.d. 
A.R.L. (Natal): A Republ ic and Your Pocket: n.d. 
(cyclostyled) 
A.R.L. (Natal): Eigh t Questions on which the 
intel legent South African Patriot shou.d 
Ponder: n.d. (cyc lostyled) 
A.R.L. (Natal): Broe r derbond Republ ic or 
Freedom?: n.d. (cyclostyled) 
A.R.L. (Natal): Nata l Anti-Republican League: 
n.d. 
A.R.L. (Transvaal): Resolution on Natal and 
East Cape Stand: n. d. L1955/. (cyclostyled) 
A.R.L. (Transvaal): Statement: 5 June 1955. 
(typescript) 
A.R.L. (Transvaal): Statement: 30 September 
1955. {ty~escript } 
A.R.L. (Transvaal): Action - not Apathy: n.d. 
A.R.L. (Transvaal): These are the Facts: n.d. 
(cyclostyled) 
A.R.L. ··{Transvaal): Resolution on Boycott of 
the Senate: n.d. 
UNESSA: Report from UNESSA, No.1: Apri I 1958. 
{cyclostyled} 
UNESSA: Report from UNESSA, No.12: September 
1959. (cyclostyled) 
UNESSA: Statement: 8 November 1959. 
(cyclostyled) 
UNESSA: Statement: 2 November 1959. 
(cyclostyled) 
UNESSA: Report from UNESSA: No.17: July 1960. 
(cyclostyled) 
UNESSA: UNESSA Information Service Publ ication, 
U.l.S.l: n.d. (cyclostyled) 
UNESSA: UNESSA Information Service Publication, 
U.l.S.2: n.d. (cyclostyled) 
UNESSA: British South Africans: n.d. 
{cyclostyled} 
UNESSA: What can Teachers do?: n.d. 
{cyclostyled} 
UNESSA: Prorosed Const itution for UNESSA: n.d. 
(cyclosty ed) 
UNESSA: The UNESSA Man ifesto: n.d. 
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Senegue Papers (In t he possession of Professor 
P. Seneque, Univer s ity of Natal, Durban). 
Letters 
R. Hughes Mason to P. Seneque: 7 February 1957. 
P. Seneque to R. Hughes Mason: 6 February 1957. 
(carbon) 
Seymour Papers (In t he possession of J. 
Seymour, 62 Chelmsf ord Road, Durban). 
U.F.P. (Natal): J. Seymour's Provincial Election 
Manifesto: n.d. LOctober 1959/. 
Stewart Papers (In t he possession of Mrs. J. 
Stewart, 31 Stirl i ng Crescent, Durban North, 
Durban). 
Letters 
D. Nurcombe to J. Ste wart: 25 September 1959. 
A.C. Martin to J. Stewart: 16 November 1961. 
Pamph lets 
~.F.P. (Natal): C. Kinsman's Provincial Election 
Manifesto: n.d. LJune 195!/. 
U.P. (Natal): L. Arthur's Provincial Election 
Manifesto: n.d. LOctober 1959/. 
U.P. (Natal): R. Wood 's Provincial Election 
Manifesto: n.d. ZOctober 1952/. 
M i sce I I aneous 
U.F.P. (Natal): Balance Sheet: 31 March 1958: 
n.d. (cyclostyled) 
and 
ri I 1958: 
24 October 
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Papers in the Possess ion of the Author (65 
Harvey Road, Durban ). 
Letters 
A.R.L. (Transvaal) t o A.C. Martin: 20 June 1955. 
R. Hughes Mason to A. C. Martin: 19 November 
1958. 
A.C. Martin to D. Mi t chel I: 12 May 1960. 
(carbon) 
D. Mitchel I to A.C. Martin: 16 May 1960. 
D. Mitchel I to A.C. Martin: 25 May 1960. 
National Party: Lette r by H.F. Verwoerd to 
Each Voter: 21 Sep t ember 1960. 
A.C. Martin to Sir de Vii liers Graaff: 24 
October 1960. (car bon) 
A.C. Martin to The Editor{ The Times: 16 
February 1961. (carbon) 
A.C. Martin to The Prime Minister of Great 
Britain and Northe r n Ireland: 17 February 
1961. (carbon) 
M. Park Ross to B. Re id: 13 February 1977. 
G.H. Durrant to B. Re id: 1 March 1977. 
G.H. Durrant to B. Re id: 3 March 1977. 
E.G. Ford to B. Reid : 9 March 1977. 
G.H. Durrant to B. ft e id: 18 March 1977. 
S. Brathwaite to B~' Reid: 8 February 1978. 
E.G. Ford to B. Reid : 15 November 1978. 
E.G. Ford to B. Reid: n.d. 
J. Wi Ison to B. Reid: n.d. 
Minutes 
U.F.P. (Natal): Durban Zone Action Committee 
Meetin9 Minutes: 4 November 1956. (carbon) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Durban Zone Action Committee 




Princ iples and Policy: n.d. 
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U.F.P. (Natal): Fede r ation for a Greater South 
Africa : n.d. Z195! /. 
U.F.P. (Natal): The United Party and the 
Republ ic: n.d. Z1954/. 
U.F.P. (Natal): The Natal Stand: Past and 
Present: n.d. Z1954/. 
U.F.P. (Natal): B. Batchelor's Provincial 
Election Manifesto : n.d. LOctober 1959/. 
U.F.P. (Natal): J. St ewart's Provincial ' 
Election Manifesto : n.d. ZOctober 19597. 
U.F.P. (Natal): A.C. Martin's Provincial 
Election Man i festo : n.d. ZOctober 19527. 
U.F.P. (Natal): Are you on the Right Side?: 
October 1959. 
U.F.P. (Natal): Handb i II issued for Durban 
North Provincial Election: n.d. ZOctober 
1959/. 
U.F.P. (Natal): Do You Know what Christian 
National Education Means?: n.d. 
U.F.P. (Natal): Your Child and the Future 
The Union Federal Party's Educational 
Policy: n.d . 
U.P. (Division of In f ormation): What is 
Apartheid?: n.d. LI95l7. 
U.P. (Division of In f ormation): Fifty 
National ist Fai lure s: n.d. L195l/. 
U.P. (Division of In f ormation): Found Gui Ity 
on Ten Counts: n.d . LI95l7. 
U.P. (Natal): E.J.V. Grontham's Provincial 
Election Manifesto : n.d. ZJune 195!/. 
U.P. (Natal): Electi on News: 16 June 1954. 
U.P. (Natal): The Facts Behind the United Part} 
'Spl it': n.d. ZOct ober 1959/. {cyclostyled 
Progressive Party: Twelve Reasons for Opposing 
Dr. Verwoerd's Rep ubl ic, Fact Paper No.3: 
n.d. L1960/. 
Republ ican Referendum Committee: Commonwealth 
Relations: Membership of South Africa: 30 
August 1960 . 
Speeches 
Point of View of the Union 
Martin, A.C. Speech at 
1959. (typescript) 
G. Heaton Nichol Is 
Martin, A.C. 
Col lege: 8 
Outl ine of a Speech at Hilton 
May 1960 . (carbon) 
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Mar tin, A • C • 
Gardens: 14 
Speech at Rally at Durban City 
November 1960. (typescript) 
M i sce I I aneous 
U • F • P. ( N at a I ) : 
Federal Part • 
cyclostyled 
U.F.P. (Natal): Interim Report from Social and 
Economic Sub-Commi t tee of the Union Federal 
Party: n.d. L195jJ. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natall: Note s on Provincial Matters: 
n.d. LI9547. (cyc lostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Memor andum on Educational 
Policy: 24 January 1954. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Note s for use in conjunction 
with Memorandum on Education: 24 January 
1954. (cyclostyled ) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Statement of Non-European 
Pol icy: 27 March 1954. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Gove r nment Paral lei Medium 
Schools: 9 June 1954. (cyclostyled) 
U • F • P. (N at a I ): .;;;;.S.;:;.u..;;;..dlil.,;e~t~o:-;.f--:;;~..;;;..;...;..~~~~~~ 
Months to 15 June 1954: n!, . ' 
(cyclostyled) 
• 
U.F.P. (Transvaall: Statement of Non-European 
Pol icy: n.d. L1951/. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Special Notice to Delegates: 
n.d. LQctober 1956/" (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Circular: 31 October 1958. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): News Letter: March 1959. 
(cyclostyled) 




Talki ng Points for the Federals: 
(cyc lostyled) 
Statement: 18 March 1961. 
U.F.P. (Natal): Statement: n.d. (carbon) 
U.F.P. (Natal): The Economic Development of 
Natal: n.d. (cyclostyled) 
W.V.T.C. (Natal Coast Region): Information 
Sui letin, No.ll: 23 January 1953. 
(cyclostYled) 
Ford, E.G. et al. The Green Horror: n.d. 





Martin, A.C. The Cas e Aqainst Dr. Verwoerd's 
Republ ic, postings : n.d. LFebruary 1960/. 
(typescript) 
Martin, A.C. Statement: 9 May 1960. (hand-
written) 
Martin, A.C. The Cas e A9ainst Dr. Verwoerd's 
Republ ic: n.d. LFebruary 196!J. 
(cyclostyled) 
Martin, A.C. A Doub le Dutch Republ ic: Jyne 
1961. (carbon) 
Martin, A.C. Expel t he 5th Column: n.d. 
(cyclostyled) 
Martin, A.C. False Claims of the National ists 
for a Republic: n. d . (typescript) 
Martin, A.C. The Aft ermath of the Referendum 
and 'The Natal Stand': n.d. (typescript) 
(b) -Publ ic Collections 
Heaton Nichol Is Pape r s - Kil lie Campbel I 
Africana Library 
Circulars 
U.F.P. (Natal): Vice - Chairman's Circular: 
February 1954. KCM 4082. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Zulu l and Zone: Circular: n.d. 
KCM 4029. (carbon ) 
-Letters 
G. Heaton Nichol Is t o L. Egeland: 21 June 1951. 
KCM 3779. (carbon ) 
A.R. Selby to D. Heat on Nichol Is: 29 January 
1954. KCM 4083. 
Minutes 
U.F.P. (Natal): Prov i ncial Action Committee 
Meeting Minutes: 16 May 1957. KCM 4025b. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Prov i ncial Finance Committee 
Meetin9 Minutes: 20 September 1958. 
KCM 4025c. (cyclos tyled) 
W.V.T.C.: Joint Nata l Executives' Consress 
Minutes: 17 Januar y 1953. KCM 4017e. 
(cyclostyled) 
W.V.T.C.: Natal Coast Re ion Conference -Minutes: 
25 Apri I 1 3. KC M 4 1 a. cyclosty e 
W.V.T.C.: Joint Inter-Resional Consress Minutes: 
16 May 1953. KCM 4017. (cyclostyled) 
W.V.T.C.: Second National Consress Minutes: 
12 and 13 June 1953. KCM 4017c. (cyclostyled) 
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W.V.T.C.: Regional Executive Meeting of Natal 
and Inland Branches t Minutes: 12 September 1953. KCM 4017d. cyclostyled) 
W.V.T.C.: Third National Congress Minutes: 
25 and 26 Septembe r 1953. KCM 4017d. 
(cyclostyled) 
Pamphlets 
U.F.P. (Natal): Statement, Principles and A 
Cal I to the Electorate: 11 May 1953. 
KCM 4061f. 
U.F~P. (Natal): A.R. Selby's Provincial 
Election Manifesto : n.d. LOctober 19597. 
KCM 4061c. 
A.R.L. (Natal): This is the Law: n.d. 
KCM 4152. 
Defenders of the Con stitution: Charter: n.d. 
KCM 3777a. 
Defenders of the Cons titution: The Covenant of 
the Constitution: n.d. KCM 4129. 
Speeches 
Heaton Nichol Is, D. Speech at Durban: 16 
November 1955. KCM 4087. (typescript) 
Heaton Nichol Is, D. Summary of a Speech at 
Mount Edgecombe: 23 July 1958. KCM 4113. 
(typescript) 
Heaton Nichol Is, D. Speech at Pietermaritzburg: 
24 March 1959. KC M 4088. (typescript) 
Heaton Nichol Is, D. S8eech at Empangeni: 12 
October 1959. KCM 4 35a. (typescript) 
n.d. 
Miscellaneous 
U.F.P. (Natal): Memorandum on Coloured 
Franchise: 26 November 1953. RCM 4062a. 
(carbon) 
U.F~P. {Natal): Talki nr Points, No.1: n.d. L195J7. KCM 4066. cyclostylear-
U.F.P. (Natal): Finance Sub-Committee's 
Financial Directive No.2: February 1954. 
ReM 4082. (cyclosty led) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Statement of Federal Party 
Priorities: n.d. L195!7. KCM 4079. 
(cyclostyled) 
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U.F.P. (Natal): The Union Federal Party and 
the Torch: n.d . L195!/. KCM 4083. 
(typescript) 
U.F~P. {Natal): SKli t ting the Vote: n.d. 
L19547. KCM 40 5. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natall: Quest ions at U.P. Meetinas: 
n.d. L19547. KCM 4077a. (cyclostyle) 
U.F.P. (Natal): Short Brief to Candidates for 
the Provincial Election in 1954: n.d. ·Z195!7. 
KCM 4075. (cyclost yled) 
A.R.L. (Natal): Futu r e Pol icy: n.d. LI95Z7. 
KCM 4038. (typesc r ipt) 
W.V.T.C. (Westvi I Ie Branch): News Letter: 
February 1953. KC M 3768. (cyclostyled) 
W.V.T.C.: Addendum t o Natal Coast Region 
Information Bullet i n No.4: n.d. KCM 4064. 
(cyclostyled) 
W.V.T.C.: Appl ication for Membership: n.d. 
KCM 3766. 
Hughes Mason, R. 
n.d. KCM 4037. 
The Perpetual Dictatorship: 
( t ypescript) 
KCM 4 
Institute of Contemporary History - University 
of the Orange Free State 
Pamphlets 
U.F.P. (Natal): D. Wi II's Provincial by-election 
Man i festo: n. d. LSeptember '1950[/. 
United Party (Natal) : Provincial Election 
Manifesto: October 1959. PV55, 
Fi Ie 11/3/1/1/1. 
National Party (Natal): W. Maree's Pari iamentary 
Et~ction Manifesto: n.d. LApri I 1951/. 
PV55 r Fi Ie 11/2/2/1/2. 
National Party (Natal): J. Le Roux's Provincial 
Election Manifesto: n.d. LJune .1954/. PV55, 
File 11/2/2/1/2. -
National Party (Division of Information): Wat 
is die Torch Commando?: n.d. File P20.2:--
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M i sce I I aneous 
The South African Nat ional Coal ition: An Open 
Letter to a Federa l ist. No.2: March 1953. 
PV155, Fi Ie 35. (cyclostyled) 
U.F.P. (Natal): ~N~o~n~-~ETuTr~e~a~n~~~~~~~~~~ 
Federal Part Nata • A 
Features: 27 March 1954. 
(cyclostyled) 
Johannesburg Publ ic Library - Africana 
Collection 
U.F.P. (Transvaal): D. Hanafin's Provincial 
Ey-election Manife s to: n.d. IJune 195~/. 
S. Store 968.065 Miscellaneous pamphlets 195-. 
U. F.P. (Transvaa I): Handb i I I issued for 
"Hospital b~-electi on: n.d. IJune 195~/. 
S. Store 9 8.065 Miscellaneous pamphlets 195-. 
U.F.P. (Transvaal): Fact Sheet issued for 
Hospital b~-electi on. n.d. IJune 1958/. 
S. Store 9 8.065 Miscellaneous pamphlets 195-. 
U.f!F P. (Transvaal): Circular to Voters: n.d. 
August 19587. S. Store 968.065 Uni. 
cyclostyled) " 
Pro~ressive Party Papers - University of the 
W,twatersrand 
Letters 
D. Woods to J. Steyt ler: n.d. LT9597. 
F i I e I ~ I. 
J.C. Moore to The Cha irman, Progressive Party 
of South Africa: 16 November 1959. Fi Ie 1:3. 
N.F. Bowyer to J. Steytler: 20 August 1959. 
F i I e I: I • 
D.T. Horak to The Nat ional Secretary, UNESSA: 
30 November 1959. Fi Ie 1 :3. 
M i sce I I aneous 
U.P. (Houghton): Here are Some Reasons Why You 
Should Vote 'No' t o a Republic: n.d. L196Qj. 
F i I e I I : I • 
Progressive Party: We Say No~: n.d. LI96Q7. 
F i I e I I : I • 
United Party Papers - University of South 
Africa 
Douglas Mitchel I Coll ection (as yet 
unclassified) 
Letters 
D. Mitchell to J. Freed: 10 May 1954. (carbon) 
G. Heaton Nichol Is t o al I Members of the 
Natal Etectoral Co l lege: 8 November 1955. 
(cyclostyled) 
A.R.L. (Natal) to D. Mitchel I: 13 May 1957. 
(cyclostyled) 
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D. Mitchel I to A. Maxwel I AI len: 22 May 1957. 
A.R.L. (Cape) to Sir de Vi I I iers Graaff: 29 
May 1957. (cyclos t yled) 
Minutes 
U.P. (Durban): Candidates' Meeting Minutes: 
23 Apri I 1954. (cyclostyled) 
U.P. (Durban): Candidates' Meeting Minutes: 






Circu lar: 18 November 1953. 
Pamph lets issued by the Federal 
1954. (cyclostyled) 
U.P. (Durban), Candi dates' Publ icity Section: 
Circular: 26 March 1954. (cyclostyled) 
U.P. (Durban), Candidates' Publ icity Section: 
Notes in ReplY to Federal AI legations about 
Christian National Education and Distorted 
History in Natal Schools: 5 Apri I 1954. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.P. (Durban), Candi dates' Publ icity Section: 
Para b Para Comment on Union Federal Part 
Memorandum on Educ ation Pol icy: 27 Apri 1954. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.P. (Durban), Candi dates' Publ icity Section: 
Circular to al I Un i ted Party Candidates: 29 
Apri I 1954. (cycl ostyled) 
U.P. (Durban), Candi dates' Publ icity Section: 
Circular: 8 May 1954. (cyclostyled) 
U.P. (Durban), Candi dates' Publ icity Section: 
The Election in Qu estions and Answers: 18 May 
1954. {cyclostyled} 
U.P. (Durban), Candi dates' Publ icity Section: 
Guess Who Said This!: 20 May 1954. 
(cyclostyled) 
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U.P. (Natal): Circular to al I U.P. Members 
of the Provincial Counci I: 10 November 1955. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.P. (Natal): Statement: 20 May 1958. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.P. (Division of Information): S)eaker's 
Notes: July 1954. {cyclostyled 
A.R.L. (Natal): Statement: 9 May 1958. 
(cyclostyled) 
A.R.L. (Natal): Chai r man's Address to the 
League: 14 August 1958. (cyclostyled) 
Mitchel I, D. Statement: 15 October 1953. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.P. (Natal) Collection 
U.P. (Natal): Five Fr uitful Years: Record of 
-the United Part Natal Provincial Counci I 
1 9 1954: n.d. !. Box: Prb~incia 
E ections, 1954. 
U.P. (Natal): Natal' s Fruitful Years Under U.P. 
Administration: n. d. L195!7. Box: 
Provincial Elections, 1954. 
U.P. (Natal): Draft Pol icy Statement for 
Manifesto: n.d. L1954/. Box: Provincial 
Elections, 1954. ( typescript) 
U.P. (Natal): Confidential Circular: 6 July 
1953. Box: Provinc ial Elections, 1954. 
(cyclostyled) 
U.P. (Division of In f ormation): Speech by J.N. 
Strauss at the Open ing of the Cape Provincial 
Con ress of the Un ited Part East London: 
1 Octo er 1 54. Box: Repu icanism: Origin 
and Development of the Movement in South 
Africa. 1919-1960. 
A.R.L. (Natal): Circu lar: 9 February 1956. 
Box: Anti-Republ ic an League. (cyclostyled) 
(iii) Contemporary Booklets 
Defenders of the Constitution: Pol itical A~artheid 
and the Entrenched Cl auses of the Sout Africa 
-. Act. Durban, 1953. 
The Times: South African Real ities. London, 1955. 
U.F.P. (Natal): 
and A. Selb 
UnIon Fe era 
• 
Republ ic. 
of the Main 
of the Federal Part • 
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U.P. {General Sectretary}: Pr09ramme of Principles 
. and Constitution of t he United Party. Pretoria, 
Apri I 1951. 
U.P. {Division of Inform ation}: The White Pol icy 
of the United Party. Johannesburg, December 
1952. 
U.P. {Division of Inform ation}: The Native Pol icy 
of the United Party • . Johannesburg, n.d. LAs 
approved by the Union Congress of the U.P., 16, 
17, 18 November 195!7 . 
U.P. {Division of Inform ation}: The Native and 
Cploured Peoples' Po l icy of the United Party. 
Johannesburg, n.d. 
U.P. {Division of Inform ation}: The Policy of 
the United Party. Johannesburg, n.d. 
Brookes, E.H. The Const i tution and Publ ic 
Confidence. No place , 1955. 
Heaton Nichol Is, G. Sou t h African Native Pol icy; 
An Address to the Ro al African Societ and 
Roya Empire SocIety on 2 February 194 • 
london, n.d. 
Heaton Nichol Is, G. Gre ater South Africa. Durban, 
1953. 
Jansen, E.G. Native Pol icy of the Union of South 
Africa. Pretoria, n . d. L1950/. 
Martin, A.C. Histor in our Schools: Mutual 
Respect or Antagonism. Durban, 1 3. 
{i v} Newspapers 
Die Burger 
Die Transva I er 
Cape Argus 
Cape Times 
Federa I News 
Natal Dai Iy News 
Natal Mercury 
Natal Witness 
Ran d D a i I y M a i I 
The Star 
The fol lowing newspapers were consulted selectively: 
Dai I y 0 i spatch 
Die Nataller 
Eastern Province Herald 
Lions River Advertiser 
Port EI izabeth Post 
Pretoria News 
South Coast Herald 
Sunday Times 
Sunday Tribune 
The Federa list 
The Fr i end 
The Graphic 
The Leader 
(v) Persona I I nterv i ews 
B. Batchelor. (See Appe ndix) 
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L. Boyd. Independent member of the Provincial 
Counci I since 1943, L. Boyd joined the U.P. in 
1953 and became depu t y chairman of the party 
in Natal. He resigne d from the U.P. in 1959 
to lead the Progressive Group in Natal. When 
they were constituted the Progressive Party, 
he was elected its Natal leader. 
W.S. Conradie. (See Appe ndix) 
R. Fenhal Is. A member of the Natal Coast Region 
Action Committee of the Torch Commando, R. 
Fenhal Is strenuously opposed the future Federal 
Party leaders within the Commando. 
E.G. Ford. (See Appendi x) 
J. Freeman. (See Appendix) 
S.M. Greene. (See Appen d ix) 
W.V. Grimwood. (See Appendix) 
G. Haml yn. (See Appendi x) 
D. Heaton Nichol Is. (See Appendix) 
L. Kane-Berman .. (See Append i x) 
C.S. Keary. (See Appendix) 
A.C. Martin. (See Appendix) 
D.E. Mitchell. U.P. leader in Natal throughout 
the entire existence of the Federal Party. 
P. Selby. (See enty A.R. Selby in Appendix) 
P. Senegue. (See Append.ix) 
J~E.M. Seymour. (See Appendix) 
J. Stewart. (See Appendi x ) 
J.D. Wi Ison. (See Append i x) 
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